The Dissertation Committee for Kenneth Michael Tuite certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation

Herodotean Tools:

The Thematic Function of Objects in the *Histories*

Committee:

_____
Paula J. Perlman, Supervisor

_____
Lisa Kallet

_____
Jack Kroll

_____
Cynthia Shelmerdine

_____
Egbert Bakker

_____
Donald Lateiner

Herodotean Tools:

The Thematic Function of Objects in the *Histories*

by

Kenneth Michael Tuite, B.A., M. A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

the University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

December 2006

To My Parents

And

Pam

Acknowledgements

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all the members of the Classics Department at the University of Texas at Austin for their support, guidance, and instruction. I have benefited greatly from the supervision of Dr. Perlman, who made the development of my research interests possible. Much appreciation is owed to Dr. Kallet and Dr. Kroll, who guided the early steps of my graduate career. I would also like to thank Dr. Lateiner for his encouragement and many useful insights. The comments and constructive criticism offered by the committee members has been instrumental to the completion and focus of this dissertation.

I could not have completed this work without the love and support of many people. I extend my thanks to John Friend for his unflagging optimism, about my work if nothing else. Furthermore, I thank my brothers, James and Christopher, and especially my parents, James and Winifred Tuite, for their unwavering support of my work and career. Last but first (τελευταῖα καὶ πρώτη), I thank my beloved wife Pamela for her strength, encouragement, and love.

Herodotean Tools:

The Thematic Function of Objects in the *Histories*

Publication No. _____

Kenneth Michael Tuite, Ph. D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2006

Supervisor: Paula Perlman

In the *Histories*, objects tell their own stories. Herodotos gives them a variety of additional meanings that add to his narrative's complexity. This dissertation examines the creation and shaping of these meanings through Herodotos' manipulation of objects and their connotations. He employs two methods to shape an object's meaning: context and presentation. For the first, he emphasizes a particular connotation through a specific context. For the second, he alters the object physically, replacing it or depicting it diachronically. This work discusses Herodotos' methodology and its application to foreshadowing, comparisons, the creation of an epic setting, and the rise of Athenian power.

Herodotos uses the manipulation of objects to foreshadow Persian victories and defeat. As the Persian Empire confronts a series of kingdoms, the historian presents the respective royal monuments diachronically. Succumbing

to or enduring the passage of time, these monuments symbolize the fate of the monarchs and kingdoms.

Herodotos also manipulates objects to create comparative character portraits. The historian associates characters with distinct connotations through the repetition and substitution of an object. Placing similar characters in parallel contexts, the historian then replaces or alters an object over time. The change in the object and its attendant connotation highlights the characters' differences.

In addition to manipulating an object, Herodotos carefully controls meaning through an object's context. This dissertation examines a prominent example: the Masistios *logos* (ix.20-31). In this section, Herodotos uses corpses to create an epic setting and unite the passage structurally and thematically. Equating Masistios' corpse to the bodies of Patroklos and Hektor, the historian transforms the battle at Cithaeron into an epic duel, in which the Athenians play the role of a collective epic hero.

Athenian power is illustrated through the historian's fundamental alteration of the connotation of *teichea*. Throughout the *Histories*, Herodotos consistently places *teichea* in the context of failure, thus undermining the traditional association of *teichos* with security. He uses this new connotation to contrast the Spartan and Athenian strategies for the war against Persia and to trace the decline of Persian power and the concomitant rise of Athens. Thus, in these various ways, Herodotos controls objects to enhance his narrative.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

Introduction

Herodotos walked in a world full of objects that spoke. Tombs commemorated the lives of kings, queens, heroes, and ordinary men.[1] Monuments told the greatness of these people.[2] Dedications recounted the tales of their great deeds and the events of their lives.[3] Simple objects, such as clothing and tools – the implements of everyday life – told the historian about their peoples and what they valued.[4] He lived in a culture in which objects or images of objects were used as symbols to enhance memory[5] or as focal points for oral tales.[6] The Greeks frequently bolstered and verified their traditions and accounts through references to objects.[7] Essentially, objects, particularly monuments, became vehicles for the preservation of memory or *kleos*.[8] Walking through this world, Herodotos touched these objects and heard the stories and the meanings that clung to each of them.

The current work examines Herodotos' use and manipulation of these objects and their meanings in his narrative. The majority of the previous studies on objects in the *Histories* have examined their use from a purely historical perspective. Scholars have debated whether Herodotos explicitly set out to

[1] E.g. the public burial and tomb of Tellus the Athenian (i.31).
[2] E.g. the statues of the pharaoh Sesostris and his family before the temple of Hephaestus (ii.110).
[3] E.g. the Greek victory-dedications after the victory at Plataea (ix.81).
[4] E.g. the Athenian adoption of Ionic dress (v.87-88).
[5] Vansina. 1985, pp. 44-45. Rubin. 1995, pp. 46-48, 62. Shrimpton. 1997, p. 54.
[6] Bartlett. 1964, pp. 93-94. Vansina. 1985, pp. 44-46.
[7] Evans. 1991, p. 130. Poudrier. 2002, pp. 16-17. Higbie. 2003, pp. 208, 280. E.g.: the chains in the temple of Athene Alea in Tegea reminded the Tegeans of their great victory over the Spartans (Hdt. i.66).
[8] Jackson. 1991, pp. 243-244. Steiner. 2001, p. 254. Higbie 2003, pp. 249-250. E. g.: the statues of Kleobis and Biton preserved the memory of their great display of strength and fidelity to their mother (Hdt. i.31).

preserve a record of objects or at least great monuments. His use of the term *erga* in his proem has been interpreted to mean "deeds" or "monuments" or a combination of the two.[9] In the body of the historian's text, objects have been examined as sources. Scholars have used his accounts of great monuments and cities to aid archaeological investigations.[10] In recent years, scholars have given greater attention to how Herodotos used (or even invented) objects, particularly monuments and inscriptions, as sources for his investigation.[11]

But objects can do more than verify historical fact or preserve memories. Through their connotations, they may convey a variety of meanings, symbolizing relationships, wealth, social status, and more. Objects have a multiplicity of connotations depending upon whether they are regarded on the physical or the social level. For example, an automobile can be viewed as a pile of metal, a means of transportation, a status symbol (e.g. a luxury car), or all three simultaneously.[12] Hence imagery, generated in part by objects, may express meaning more effectively than verbal information.[13] In general, objects convey cultural content or connotations that are brought out in different ways.[14]

---

[9] For arguments that "erga" includes monuments see: Stein. 1883, p. 1f; Diels. 1887, p. 440. Jacoby. 1913, cols. 333-334. For arguments that "erga" means only "deeds" see: Schwartz. 1929, p. 20 n. 1; Focke. 1927, p. 1f; Legrand. 1954, *loc. sit;* Erbse. 1956, p. 218; Cobet. 1971, p. 30; Grant. 1983, pp. 294-296. For arguments that "erga" refers generally to "achievements" both tangible (monuments) and intangible (deeds) see: Immerwahr. 1960, pp. 263-264. Regenbogen. 1968. Bloomer. 1993, pp. 32-33. Bakker. 2002, pp. 8-12.
[10] For example: von Guschmid. 1893, pp. 148-157. Ravn. 1942, pp. 31-38. Lloyd. 1993, *passim*.
[11] Groten. 1963, p. 87. Hunter. 1982, pp. 93-97. West. 1985, pp. 287-289. Flory. 1987, pp. 40-41. Smith. 1987, *passim*. Fehling. 1989, *passim.* Evans. 1991, pp. 123-127. Flower. 1991, pp. 67-69. Hendrick. 193, p. 26. Pritchett. 1993, *passim*. Christ. 1994, pp. 167-202. Hornblower. 2002, pp. 373-386. Poudrier. 2002, pp. 8-10. Higbie. 2003, p. 262.
[12] Eco. 1976, p. 27.
[13] Rubin. 1995, p. 48.
[14] Eco. 1976, pp. 55-57, 60-61. Barthes. 1977, pp. 118-119.

But connotations are more than simply employed, they are arranged, manipulated, or even created. Renaissance artists used depictions of scientific instruments and navigation tools to convey the superiority of European culture. They also inserted images of skulls or bones into their works to symbolize mortality and death.[15] Modern media, particularly advertisements, frequently manipulate objects, linking them to specific positive or negative connotations. Such manipulation is neither new nor surprising. The early Christians transformed the image of a fish, which previously had been associated with the sea, into a symbol of their religion.[16] All objects possess a multiplicity of connotations that may be evoked by an artist or read by an audience depending upon the object's context.[17]

Herodotos reveals an awareness of an object's ability to express multiple additional meanings in his account of Periander's consultation of Thrasybulus. Through a messenger, the Corinthian tyrant asked Thrasybulus the best method to maintain his newfound power. The Milesian tyrant led the messenger out into a field and cut the heads off the highest stalks of grain (v.92ζ2). Herodotos uses the reactions of the messenger and Periander to express the grain's multiple meanings. Through the messenger's surprise at Thrasybulus' destruction of his own crops, the historian uses the grain to illustrate tyrannical waste. Through

[15] Berger. 1972, pp. 91, 94-95
[16] Elsner. 1995, p. 1.
[17] Eco. 1976, p. 57.

Periander's eyes, however, the historian uses the grain to communicate to the Corinthian tyrant the most secure way to rule (5.92.ζ3).[18]

Herodotos develops such multiple layers of meaning both explicitly and implicitly. In the case of the former, the historian includes a discussion of the significance of an object, or set of objects. For example, when the Scythians sent a bird, a mouse, a frog, and five arrows to Darius, the Persians openly debated the import of these gifts (iv.131-132). Darius optimistically interpreted them as an indication that the Scythians were surrendering. Gobryas, however, interpreted the objects differently saying:

> ἢν μὴ ὄρνιθες γενόμενοι ἀναπτῆσθε ἐς τὸν οὐρανόν, ὦ Πέρσαι, ἢ μύες γενόμενοι κατὰ τῆς γῆς καταδύητε, ἢ βάτραχοι γενόμενοι ἐς τὰς λίμνας ἐσπηδήσητε, οὐκ ἀπονοστήσετε ὀπίσω ὑπὸ τῶνδε τῶν τοξευμάτων βαλλόμενοι.
>
> Unless becoming birds you fly up into the air, O Persians, or becoming mice you burrow into the earth or becoming frogs you jump into the lakes, then being shot by these arrows you will never return home. (iv.132.3)

Regardless of the correct interpretation of the gifts, the historian plainly examines their significance.

In recent years, scholars have studied this explicit use of objects to communicate or signify meaning. Donald Lateiner first recognized that Herodotos uses objects in various forms of non-verbal communication. In a broader study of the historian's use of gestures (ritualized, informal, involuntary, and subconscious), Lateiner includes objects or tokens as another means by

[18] As will be shown, Chapter 1, pp. 13-17, the historian combines the interpretations of both Periander and the messenger to comment on the nature of tyranny.

which the historian creates lines of communication between characters and between himself and his audience.[19] In her 1993 article "Reading the World," Carolyn Dewald focuses on Herodotos' use of objects to indicate meaning explicitly. While she warns that the historian often avoids giving an object a single, clear meaning, she determines that the historian uses objects as a method of conveying additional meaning between characters and to his audience.[20] More recently, Alexander Hollmann has examined the semiotics of Herodotean objects. In his study, he argues that Herodotos encodes meaning into objects, transforming them into "sign vehicles," for communication between characters.[21]

In each of these studies, however, focus has never been placed on objects that possess an implicit meaning or connotation. The current work addresses this omission. Instead of studying the historian's use of objects for non-verbal communication or as an explicit symbol or sign, I examine objects that Herodotos charges with latent meaning or objects from which he evokes a particular connotation. The historian employs these objects to create a sub-text reified in the artifacts of his narrative, which, similar to the objects in Herodotos' world, await an audience to unlock their implicit meanings.

Such an approach to objects is not unique to Herodotos. Greek artists, particularly vase painters, used representations of objects to signify certain connotations or associations.[22] They could evoke funerary or symposiastic connotations (or both) with the simple inclusion of images of objects common to

[19] Lateiner. 1987, pp. 87, 96-97.
[20] Dewald. 1993, pp. 65-66.
[21] Hollmann. 1998, pp. 172-186.
[22] Bérard. 1989, pp. 25-26.

one or both settings.[23] Early Greek authors used objects in a similar way. On the remarkable surface of the Shield of Achilles, Homer inscribes an entire narrative for his audience to interpret.[24] Gregory Nagy has studied this poet's use of objects as symbols.[25] Nagy and other scholars have also examined the use of everyday objects, such as clothing, to define status.[26] In the works of Pindar, goads and whips are symbols of love[27] and leaves signify both victory and death.[28] In the works of the tragic poets, Oliver Taplin first recognized the manner in which they gave some objects "special associations [that] betoken much more than themselves."[29] Since then, scholars have studied notable objects in tragedy such as the carpet in *Agamemnon*,[30] the chains in *Prometheus Bound*,[31] the sword of Ajax, the robe of Deianeira, the bow of Philoctetes, and the urn of Electra.[32] Similar studies on commonplace objects have been conducted for other tragedians[33] as well as the comedian Aristophanes.[34]

Yet in these studies, scholars have never examined the process by which an author charges an object with an additional meaning. In the case of the tragedies and comedies, the playwrights no doubt relied in part upon the physical props and their performers to evoke the desired connotation. But

[23] Boardman. 1990, pp. 127-130.
[24] Becker. 1990, pp. 140-141.
[25] Nagy. 1990, pp. 203-217.
[26] Block. 1985, pp. 4-10. Nagy. 1990, pp. 203-205.
[27] Faraone. 1993, pp. 5-14.
[28] Griffith. 1999, pp. 55-58.
[29] Taplin. 1978, p. 77.
[30] Crane. 1993, p. 135.
[31] Mossman. 1996, p. 60.
[32] Segal. 1980, pp. 127-135.
[33] Mastronade. 1975, pp. 164-166. Segal. 1990, p. 304. Georges. 1994, pp. 152-153. Mueller. 2002, pp. 21-23. Lee. 2004, pp. 258-262.
[34] Compton-Engle. 2005, pp. 164-175.

Herodotos possesses no stage, no actors, and no props besides the ones that he creates within his text. Accordingly, the methods that he uses to manipulate an object's connotation are more easily discerned. Hence, this work examines not only the additional meanings that Herodotos assigns to his objects, but also the manner in which he embeds these meanings.

I divide the study of this subject into five parts. In the first chapter, I begin with an examination of Herodotos' methodology. For the most part, the historian does not create an additional meaning; rather he evokes one of an object's existing connotations. He emphasizes the desired connotation through one of two methods: the object's context in the text or by the alteration of its presentation. Through a series of examples, this chapter illustrates how the historian places an object in a carefully constructed context to elicit a particular connotation. Next, the chapter examines two methods by which Herodotos alters an object's appearance or description and hence changes its meaning. First, he uses repetition with substitution to replace an object with one of a similar category (e.g. clothes: *himation* for *chiton*) in the same or similar scene. Second, he presents an object diachronically. Through the use of analepsis or prolepsis, the historian describes an object in multiple time frames. In both cases, Herodotos generates multiple images of the same object, which creates a text of connotations for his audience to interpret.

In the next two chapters, I examine Herodotos' manipulation of objects and their contexts in greater depth. The second chapter illustrates the historian's use of the diachronic presentation to foreshadow major events in his narrative.

As Herodotos traces the expansion of Persian power in the first half of his narrative, he examines in turn several of the major empires or polities as they encountered Persia. Immediately before he describes the encroachment of Persian power, Herodotos selects royal monuments and reveals how each one succumbed to or endured the passage of time. The historian links the fate of the ruler to the fate of the monument, a symbol of the monarch's greatness. The historian uses a monument's decay at a later point in time to presage a similar decline in the monarch's fate. In this way, he illustrates the imminent defeat of Lydia, Babylon, Egypt, and Samos. But in the case of Scythia, Herodotos reverses this paradigm, foreshadowing the failure of Darius' campaign through the diachronic presentation of one of his monuments.

The third chapter examines Herodotos' other method for the manipulation of objects and their connotations: the repetition and substitution of an object. This chapter focuses specifically on the historian's use of comparisons to highlight character traits. Herodotos places characters of a similar class (e.g. kings, tyrants, etc.) in analogous circumstances. Within this pattern of repeated contexts, the historian alters an object that is central to the character or the action in the narrative. By changing an object (diachronically) or replacing it (through repetition and substitution), the historian associates the characters with different connotations to emphasize the disparities between the characters and their natures.

In the next two chapters, I return to the historian's use of an object's context to emphasize or even transform its connotation. The fourth chapter

examines how the historian uses the context of a battle to place a class of objects (corpses) in an epic light. Herodotos then uses these corpses to unite and shape a particular section of the narrative, the Masistios *logos* (ix.20-31). Equating the corpse of the Persian cavalry commander Masistios at one point to the body of Patroklos and later to the body of Hektor, Herodotos presents the Athenian army in the role of an epic hero. The historian uses the corpse to create several allusions to the *Iliad* and to equate the battle on the foothills of Cithaeron to a transitional moment in the epic poem. He then perpetuates the praise of the Athenians in the following two sections: the debate between the Tegeans and the Athenians and the catalog of the Greek forces. In both sections he maintains the epic tone of the passage and continues to use corpses to praise the Athenian contribution to the Plataean campaign.

The fifth chapter demonstrates that Herodotos may also fundamentally alter the connotation of an object through its presentation. By consistently placing *teichea* in a context of failure, the historian undermines the association of *teichos* with security and replaces it with the connotation of vulnerability. In the *Histories*, fortifications fail 86.0% of the time and nearly 100% of the time when attacked by the Persians (prior to the battle of Salamis). In the opening books of his work, Herodotos demonstrates the futility of defending a fortified position against the Persians and emphasizes the nascent empire's siege-craft. The historian uses this altered connotation for two purposes. First, he compares the strategies proposed by the Spartans and Athenians to defend Greece against the invasion of Xerxes. The Spartans continually espoused the construction or

defense of a fortified position, which, when presented in light of *teichea's* established context of failure, appears foolish and foredoomed to failure. In contrast, the Athenians eschewed traditional *teichea* in favor of an offensive strategy centered on their fleet. Second, Herodotos uses *teichea* to trace the rise and fall of imperial powers. He links the rise of Persia to its ability to defeat strongly fortified positions. When the Persians shifted to the defensive in Scythia and Greece, however, they began to rely on fortifications and were soon defeated. In the second campaign, Herodotos traces the concomitant rise of Athens as the fortunes of Persia declined after the Battle of Salamis. The Athenians became the key to the defeat of various Persian defenses at Plataea, Mycale, and later at Sestos. The historian uses this newfound proficiency with siege-craft to illustrate the growing power of Athens and to indicate its transformation from a defender of Greece into an imperial power.

Chapter 1:
Shaping Objects, Shaping Connotations:
Objects with Additional Meaning

Objects are full of potential meanings or connotations. An article of clothing, for example, may reveal or conceal the wearer's identity, which may range from regal to common. An object's connotation is a social construct, derived from the preconceptions of the viewer.[1] In the physical world, an object's appearance limits the range of potential connotations, but in the pages of the *Histories* Herodotos controls this appearance and hence may exert direct control over an object's connotation. He creates every detail that he wishes his audience to notice; the manner of this creation provides a way of discerning the historian's methods of manipulating an object's various connotations.

Herodotos limits and directs the audience's gaze to the connotations that he wishes to convey in two ways: an object's context and its description. Through these two methods, the historian emphasizes particular connotations and minimizes others. Context largely dictates meaning. The clothing worn by the Cean concubine discovered in the Persian camp at Plataea illustrates her status and identity (ix.77). Conversely, the women's clothing used to disguise the Macedonian youths intent on murdering some Persian ambassadors signifies concealment and deception (v.20). Despite the differing contexts, however, the objects, female garb, are essentially the same.

[1] Eco. 1976, pp. 24-26.

In addition to guiding an object's connotation through its context, Herodotos further manipulates an object's meaning by altering the presentation of the object itself. Herodotos alters an object in two ways. First, he replaces the object for another of the same type. Second, he retains the specific object, but alters it physically. In the first approach, the historian uses repetition and substitution to replace one type of the object with another (e.g. a *chiton* for a *himation*, a sword for a spear). In the second approach, the historian emphasizes how a specific object changes over time. Through such alterations, Herodotos generates multiple images, and hence multiple meanings, of the same or similar object, transforming the object into a text of connotations. Like an old fashioned flipbook, Herodotos creates a cinematic effect, a series of shifting images that enables him to tell a story.

This chapter examines both the historian's use of context and his manipulation of objects to derive meaning through the analysis of select examples that employ one or both methods. Beginning with the manipulation of an object's context, I examine how the historian emphasizes or minimizes a particular connotation. Next, I review the historian's use of repetition with substitution and his diachronic presentation of objects to create multiple images, and hence multiple meanings, of the same (or similar) object.

Evoking Meaning Through Context

Context is a pervasive term that includes characters, setting, action, dialogue, and even other props in the narrative. For example, a bottle of wine

contains the connotations of "value," "revelry," and "desperation" when presented in the respective contexts of "a collector's wine cellar," "a dinner party," and "a homeless man drinking straight from the bottle." Through these contexts, an author does not alter the wine bottle's basic meaning – a drink – but emphasizes its various latent additional meanings. Hence, in the context of the wine cellar, the author directs the audience to interpret the wine bottle as a symbol of value. At the dinner party, however, if the author describes the breaking of the bottle and its use as a weapon, he undermines the wine bottle's connotation, creating two contrasting meanings of revelry and violence. The author may also arrange a series of connotations into a narrative pattern. Through the presentation of the same or a series of wine bottles, first in the wine cellar, next at a several dinner parties, and finally in the grasp of a homeless man, the author may illustrate the decline of successful wine collector into alcoholism and ruin.

In this same way Herodotos shapes the connotations and hence the latent meanings of the objects in his narrative. Controlling an object's context, he promotes, minimizes, and arranges these connotations into coherent messages for his narrative and so transforms objects into a sub-textual tool with which he communicates to the audience.

Wasteful Tyranny – Corn to Loaves (v.92ζ-η)

When Socles sought to persuade the Lacedaemonians to abandon their restoration of the Athenian tyrant Hippias to power, he cited his own *polis'*

painful memories of the tyrant Periander. Scholars have long studied this passage to discern Greek and Herodotean views on tyranny. In this *logos*, tyrannical violence reaches all levels of society[2] and there is a discernible link between the tyrant and waste.[3] Yet, the totality of the tyrant's destructive behavior has not been fully recognized. Periander assaulted not merely the bodies of the Corinthian *polis*, but on a symbolic level the Corinthian *oikos* as well. The Greek *oikos* ideally operated within a cycle of self-sufficiency. The *oikos* would both produce and consume its staple needs, often represented by the processing of wool and grain, which the Greeks would then wear as clothing or consume as food.[4]

Tyrannical waste is a familiar theme in the *Histories*. Even when tyrants worked towards a desirable, even productive, goal, they often utilized wasteful methods. Thrasybulus heaped the few grain stores left in Miletos in the town center and ordered his subjects to drink and revel (i.21). Although he did this to fool Alyattes, the potential exposure of grain to the elements and vermin as well as the unnecessary consumption of food and wine for the revelry was profligate. Polycrates, even though he failed to achieve his goal, sought to destroy his own signet ring (iii.41-42). He also engaged in pointless piratical raids, often returning the plunder that he had stolen (iii.40). Finally, when a force of Samian exiles threatened his hold on power, he placed the wives and children of potential traitors in his boat-sheds and threatened to burn them and the sheds, which were

[2] Van der Veen. 1996, p. 82.
[3] Gray. 1996, p. 379.
[4] Jenkins. 1985, p. 111.

an integral part of the tyrant's naval power (iii.45.4). Even Peisistratus, who amassed resources to seize power in Athens a third time and husbanded them to maintain his position, engaged in wasteful behavior. In his first attempt, he wounded himself and his mule in an attempt to elicit sympathy (i.59). When he was in power a second time, he engaged in unproductive sex with Megacles' daughter to prevent conception (i.61).

In Socles' speech, Herodotos represents the destructive nature of tyranny through Periander's and Thrasybulus' assaults on the two staples of the Greek *oikos*: clothes and food. After Periander assumed power he killed and exiled many citizens (πολιήτας). He destroyed the public representatives of the various Corinthian *oikoi*, but did not immediately assault the *oikos*. This changed, though, when he lost a friend's deposit. He consulted his dead wife, Melissa, about its whereabouts, but she refused to answer because she lacked clothes in the afterlife. Rather than simply sacrifice some of her old clothes or even new clothes, the tyrant summoned the women of Corinth to the temple of Hera and sacrificed their finest clothes to his Melissa:

> αἳ μὲν δὴ ὡς ἐς ὁρτὴν ἤισαν κόσμῳ τῷ καλλίστῳ χρεώμεναι, ὁ δ' ὑποστήσας τοὺς δορυφόρους ἀπέδυσε σφέας πάσας ὁμοίως, τάς τε ἐλευθέρας καὶ τὰς ἀμφιπόλους, συμφορήσας δὲ ἐς ὄρυγμα Μελίσσῃ ἐπευχόμενος κατέκαιε.
>
> The women came as though to a festival wearing their finest clothes, and he having concealed some guards for this purpose stripped everyone of the women both free and servants, and collecting the clothes in a pit he burned them and prayed to Melissa. (v.92.η5)

In addition to this direct violation of the sanctity of the temple and the women, representatives of the Corinthian *oikoi*, Periander wantonly destroyed one of the two symbols of an *oikos*' self-sufficiency – clothing, or more specifically the women's finest clothing (κόσμῳ τῷ καλλίστῳ).

Herodotos also links tyrants, both Periander and his mentor Thrasybulus, to the waste of food. When the ghost of Melissa complained to the Corinthian tyrant that she was naked in the afterlife, she made a cryptic reference to the fact that Periander had slept with his wife after her death to prove that she spoke the truth:

> μαρτύριον δέ οἱ εἶναι ὡς ἀληθέα ταῦτα λέγει, ὅτι ἐπὶ ψυχρὸν τὸν ἰπνὸν Περίανδρος τοὺς ἄρτους ἐπέβαλε.
>
> Then as evidence that she spoke the truth to him, she said that Periander placed loaves of bread in a cold oven. (v.92η2)

As Vivienne Gray points out, this is another sign of tyrannical waste, for Periander literally wasted his own seed in the corpse of his wife.[5] However, the significance of the metaphor has not been fully appreciated. Symbolically Periander wasted the other mark of *oikos* self-sufficiency: bread.

Moreover, Herodotos attributes similar behavior to the Milesian tyrant Thrasybulus. After succeeding his father as tyrant, Periander sent a messenger to ask Thrasybulus how he might "most securely" (ἀσφαλέστατον) and "best" (κάλλιστον) rule Corinth. Instead of a verbal response, Thrasybulus led the messenger out to a field where he lopped the heads off of the best (κάλλιστα)

[5] Gray. 1996, p. 379.

wheat stalks (v.92ζ2). Scholars have studied the manner in which Thrasybulus and Periander used the grain to encode and decode a message,[6] but the meaning of the action is often overlooked. While Benardete argues that it was symbolic, advising Periander that beauty may need to be sacrificed for security;[7] the literal action should not be disregarded. Thrasybulus willfully destroyed the best heads of grain, which in the *oikos* would ideally have been harvested and turned into flour and then bread. Hence, both literally and metaphorically the tyrant wasted the staple produce and product of the Greek *oikos*: food.

Herodotos, then, uses Thrasybulus' and Periander's treatment of the two staples of the Greek *oikos*, food and clothing, to symbolize the profligacy of tyranny. In the case of the first, the tyrants destroyed the core of the ancient diet, bread, at both ends of the production cycle: harvesting and baking. Next, Periander first provided inadequate clothing for his deceased wife and second violated the women of Corinth by stripping off and burning their finest clothes. Thus, through the destruction of these two classes of objects, Herodotos depicts the tyrants not merely as destroyers of rivals (the wealthy and powerful), but also pillagers of the essentials of an *oikos*' self-sufficiency.

The Table of the Sun (iii.17-26)

Using this necessity of life, food, Herodotos adds another layer of meaning to Cambyses' campaigns against the Ethiopians and Ammonians. In this *logos,* food, or more precisely diet, occupies a central position both in

[6] Forsdyke. 1999, p. 367. Hollmann 1998, p. 294.
[7] Benardete. 1969, p. 149.

Cambyses' investigation of Ethiopia and his invasion of the country. The historian describes both the Ethiopian diet and the provisions that Cambyses supplied to his invasion force in detail. In addition to defining Ethiopian customs and the causes for the failure of the Persian campaign, however, Herodotos uses his description of food and differing diets to contrast the wisdom of the respective monarchs and to emphasize Cambyses' lack of perspicacity and his growing madness.

Cambyses began his preparations for invasion by dispatching spies to Ethiopia. Herodotos appropriates this investigation to insert his own observations about the Ethiopians.[8] Scholars overlook, however, the historian's foregrounding of Cambyses' lack of perception through the episode. The Persian king charged his spies, the Fish-Eaters, with three tasks:

> ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς Αἰθίοπας κατόπτας πρῶτον, ὀψομένους τε τὴν ἐν τούτοισι τοῖσι Αἰθίοψι λεγομένην εἶναι ἡλίου τράπεζαν εἰ ἔστι ἀληθέως, καὶ πρὸς ταύτῃ τὰ ἄλλα κατοψομένους, δῶρα δὲ τῷ λόγῳ φέροντας τῷ βασιλέι αὐτῶν.
>
> [Cambyses decided to send] the spies to Ethiopia first to see the table that the Ethiopians called the Table of the Sun really existed and next to inspect the other things in the country, while supposedly bringing gifts to the Ethiopian king. (iii.17.2)

Making the Table a focal point of the mission, Herodotos describes at length the curious custom that surrounds it:[9]

> ἡ δὲ τράπεζα τοῦ ἡλίου τοιήδε τις λέγεται εἶναι, λειμών ἐστι ἐν τῷ προαστίῳ ἐπίπλεος κρεῶν ἑφθῶν πάντων τῶν

[8] Christ. 1994, pp. 180-181. Christ regards this episode as one in which Herodotos "…appropriates a kingly inquiry for his own purposes. These episodes without a doubt serve a 'compositional function,' since the historian takes advantage of them to insert his own observations."
[9] Munson. 1991, p. 181. While Munson notes Herodotos' focus, she overlooks the significance of the Table's contents and its maintenance.

> τετραπόδων, ἐς τὸν τὰς μὲν νύκτας ἐπιτηδεύοντας τιθέναι τὰ κρέα τοὺς ἐν τέλεϊ ἑκάστους ἐόντας τῶν ἀστῶν, τὰς δὲ ἡμέρας δαίνυσθαι προσιόντα τὸν βουλόμενον. φάναι δὲ τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους ταῦτα τὴν γῆν αὐτὴν ἀναδιδόναι ἑκάστοτε.
>
> The story about the Table of the Sun is that there is a meadow in the area in front of the town full of the boiled meat of all kinds of four-footed animals, during the night it is the duty of the town's magistrates to place the meat there, and during the day he who wishes may approach and eat. But the natives say that the earth itself produces these things each time. (iii.18)

Meat was central to diet of the Ethiopians (iii.23.1), who apparently possessed no knowledge of agriculture. In this respect they resemble the warlike men of Hesiod's fabled Bronze Age (*W&D* 144-150), whose lack of agriculture characterized their lack of civilization.[10] But while the Ethiopians appear less civilized in terms of their diet, they were not a barbarous meat-eating/man-eating people like Polyphemus, the epitome of rustic barbarism. The Ethiopian king, through his magistrates, provided for the needs of his people. Although the people believed that the meat appeared spontaneously from the earth (φάναι δὲ τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους ταῦτα τὴν γῆν αὐτὴν ἀναδιδόναι ἑκάστοτε), the local magistrates nightly restocked the supply of food (ἐς τὸν τὰς μὲν νύκτας ἐπιτηδεύοντας τιθέναι τὰ κρέα τοὺς ἐν τέλεϊ ἑκάστους ἐόντας τῶν ἀστῶν) (iii.18).

In the Fish-Eaters' subsequent interview with the Ethiopian king, Herodotos uses the discussion of diet to proclaim the superiority of the Ethiopian diet and king. When the Ethiopian monarch learned how the staple of the

[10] Athanassakis. 1983, pp. 92-93.

Persian diet, grain, was grown and bread produced, he called this food the "produce of animals" (or dung) and attributed the relatively short Persian life-span to it (πρὸς ταῦτα ὁ Αἰθίοψ ἔφη οὐδὲν θωμάζειν εἰ σιτεόμενοι κόπρον ἔτεα ὀλίγα ζώουσι· / The Ethiopian king said that he was not surprised if eating dung they lived only a few years - iii.22.4). Herodotos validates the king's judgment through his response to the Fish-Eaters' counter-inquiry about the Ethiopian life span and diet:

> ἀντειρομένων δὲ τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Ἰχθυοφάγων τῆς ζόης καὶ διαίτης πέρι, ἔτεα μὲν ἐς εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπικνέεσθαι, ὑπερβάλλειν δέ τινας καὶ ταῦτα, σίτησιν δὲ εἶναι κρέα τε ἑφθὰ καὶ πόμα γάλα.
>
> In response the Fish-Eaters asked the king about the Ethiopian lifespan and diet, they were told that most of them lived to be one hundred twenty years old, and that some surpassed even this, and that their diet was boiled meat and milk. (iii.23.1)

In this exchange, Herodotos uses lifespan as a gauge to compare the Ethiopian diet favorably to the Persian and to support the Ethiopian king's apparent wisdom about food.

In contrast, Cambyses, despite the greater civilization implied by the Persian diet, displayed a disastrous lack of understanding about food. First, he selected spies inadequate to their task. Herodotos delays the identification of Cambyses' spies, the Fish-eaters (Ἰχθυοφάγων), until after his description of the Table (iii.19.1). But thereafter, through repeated mention of their name, he draws attention to their diet.[11] Although their familiarity with the Ethiopian language suited their mission, their limited diet of fish precluded a complete investigation

[11] iii.19.1, 20.1, 21.1, 22.1, 22.2, 22.4, 23.1, 25.2.

of a table covered with the meat of land animals. They could not, like anyone that desired (τὸν βουλόμενον), partake of the Table's bounty. Hence through the Table's repast, the historian suggests that Cambyses chose his spies poorly.

The Persian king's ignorance about food extended to his own people as well. When his spies reported what they had seen and heard in Ethiopia, the monarch became incensed and launched his campaign against the Ethiopians:

> θεησάμενοι δὲ τὰ πάντα οἱ κατάσκοποι ἀπαλλάσσοντο ὀπίσω … αὐτίκα ὁ Καμβύσης ὀργὴν ποιησάμενος ἐστρατεύετο ἐπὶ τοὺς Αἰθίοπας, οὔτε παρασκευὴν σίτου οὐδεμίαν παραγγείλας
>
> Seeing everything the spies returned … immediately Cambyses became angry and began his campaign against the Ethiopians, ordering no supply of provisions … (iii.25.1)

Unlike the Ethiopian leaders, who took care each night to renew the supply of meat on the Table of the Sun (ἐπιτηδεύοντας . . . τοὺς ἐν τέλεϊ ἑκάστους ἐόντας τῶν ἀστῶν), Cambyses failed to secure an adequate supply of food prior to marching to the ends of the earth. This oversight led to the regression of his men's diet to a less civilized level. When the soldiers exhausted their supplies, presumably the bread central to the Persian diet (iii.22.4), they adopted an Ethiopian-style diet:

> πρὶν δὲ τῆς ὁδοῦ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος διεληλυθέναι τὴν στρατιήν, αὐτίκα πάντα αὐτοὺς τὰ εἶχον σιτίων ἐχόμενα ἐπελελοίπεε, μετὰ δὲ τὰ σιτία καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια ἐπέλιπε κατεσθιόμενα.
>
> Before the army had covered a fifth of distance, it already had exhausted every sort of provision they had, and after the grain they ate the pack animals until they were gone. (iii.25.4)

Cambyses, however, remained insensate to this degradation of diet. According to Herodotos, the Persian king could have been a wise man (ἀνὴρ σοφός) if only he had turned the army around at this point (iii.25). By implication, though, Cambyses was not a wise man and presided over the reduction of his army's diet:

> οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται ἕως μέν τι εἶχον ἐκ τῆς γῆς λαμβάνειν, ποιηφαγέοντες διέζωον, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐς τὴν ψάμμον ἀπίκοντο, δεινὸν ἔργον αὐτῶν τινες ἐργάσαντο· ἐκ δεκάδος γὰρ ἕνα σφέων αὐτῶν ἀποκληρώσαντες κατέφαγον.
>
> While the soldiers were able to take something from the land, living on grass they survived, but when the came to the desert, some resorted to a terrible measure; selecting one out of ten of their own men they ate him. (iii.25.6)

Only the advent of cannibalism (ἀλληλοφαγίην), which the Greeks attributed to the most barbarous of men,[12] compelled Cambyses to return to Egypt with a now greatly reduced force (iii.25.7).

Food figured prominently in each stage of the Persian king's invasion. Driven by the report of the Fish-Eaters (Ἰχθυοφάγων), Cambyses led an ill-equipped army into the desert and into barbarism. Beginning with civilized men that ate bread (σιτία), the Persian king reduced them into eaters of meat (ὑποζύγια ... κατεσθιόμενα.), grass (ποιηφαγέοντες), and finally their fellow man (κατέφαγον ... ἀλληλοφαγίην). Cambyses was ignorant of both food's significance as sustenance and as an indicator of civilization. He did not perceive that, when his army's supplies had run out and his men had begun to subsist on

[12] Cf. *Odyssey* ix.287-375. Polyphemus is regarded as the epitome of barbarity.

a diet of meat, he had led his men not merely against the Ethiopians, but into Hesiod's mythical and primitive Bronze Age. Only when his men adopted the diet of grazing animals and finally cannibals did the Persian king finally comprehend his army's level of degradation as expressed through food. He responded fearfully to the change (δείσας τὴν ἀλληλοφαγίην) and led his men back to civilization.

The men in Cambyses' Ammonian campaign, however, never returned to civilization. Although Herodotos does not attribute the campaign's failure to a lack of supplies, he still places the failure in the context of food and eating. The army of 50,000 men set out with guides and reached as far as the town Oasis, a journey of seven days from Thebes (iii.26.1). Thereafter nothing further was heard of the army. It never reached the Ammonians, nor did it return to Egypt (iii.26.2). According to the Ammonians, an immense sandstorm struck and destroyed the Persian army while it was taking its midday meal (iii.26.3).

Thus, while Herodotos presents food merely as sustenance in the individual sections of the narrative, the broader context of the entire *logos* reveals that the historian also draws upon food's connotation as an indicator of civilization with which he contrasts the Persian and Ethiopian kings. Although the Ethiopians appear less civilized because of their diet of boiled meat, the Ethiopian king recognized the monarch's role with respect to food. He provided his people with a steady supply of meat placed on the Table of the Sun. He displayed wisdom and perspicacity through his evaluation of the respective Persian and Ethiopian diets. In contrast, the Persians ate "dung" and were ruled

by Cambyses, who failed to provide food for his army and so put in motion a chain of events that would reduce his men to the extreme barbarity of cannibalism. First, he selected dietetically challenged spies, who were incapable of investigating the Table of the Sun. Next, he displayed a similar lack of prudence when he led an army into starvation and barbarism. Through the Persian king's misunderstanding of food, Herodotos alludes to Cambyses' mental shortcomings and growing instability.

The Pelusian Krater: Wine, Water, Blood, and the Subjugation of Egypt (iii.11)

Before the Battle at Pelusium, Greek and Carian mercenaries in Egyptian service murdered the children of their former commander, mixed the blood with wine and water, and drank the mixture. Viewed within the context of this passage, a battle, the *krater* and its contents have been correctly identified as a jarring mixture of symposiastic and non-symposiastic elements.[13] Yet, when viewed within a broader context, the account of the Persian invasion of Egypt, the *krater* and its contents also are revealed to possess an additional, previously unnoted, meaning. In the battle passage, Herodotos specifies the elements within the *krater* (wine, water, and blood), which connote the former peaceful state of Egypt, that land's future subjugation, and the current state of violence. Throughout the historian's narrative of Cambyses' invasion and conquest of

[13] Bowie. 2003, p. 105. See also Slater. 1990, pp. 215-216 for the jarring effect created by the introduction of violence or elements of warfare into the peaceful setting of the symposium.

Egypt (iii.1-15), Herodotos uses the repetition of wine, water, and blood[14] to link these elements to their respective states. Hence, when he describes the *krater* on the eve of the battle, the historian creates a text of objects that depicts the transition of Egypt from independence to subservience.

Before Cambyses invades Egypt, Herodotos steeps his description of the country in wine, an element of revelry and joy.[15] Wine is a key element in the symposium, which was the Greek ideal of peace and repose.[16] According to the historian, the drink was also a particular favorite of the Egyptian pharaoh Amasis:

> τὸ μὲν ὄρθριον μέχρι ὅτευ πληθώρης ἀγορῆς προθύμως ἔπρησσε τὰ προσφερόμενα πρήγματα, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου ἔπινέ τε καὶ κατέσκωπτε τοὺς συμπότας καὶ ἦν μάταιός τε καὶ παιγνιήμων.
>
> From dawn until the market-placed filled up, he worked eagerly on all the matters brought before him, but from that time he drank and joked with his fellow symposiasts and was light-hearted and turned his attention to games. (ii.173.1)

Further emphasizing the link between Amasis and wine, Herodotos notes that even before his rise to power Amasis was a noted lover of wine and jest (ὡς φιλοπότης ἦν καὶ φιλοσκώμμων), who would steal to fund his passions

[14] Wine (iii.4.3; iii.6.1; iii.11.3; iii.14.7 [symposiast]); water (iii.6.2; iii.7.1-2; iii.9.1-4; iii.10.1-3 [rain]; iii.11.3; iii.14.2); blood (iii.8.1; iii.11.3; iii.15.4).
[15] Herodotos generally describes wine in positive terms (revelry or as part of an individual's or people's normal practice) (i.71.3; i.126.2; i.133.3; i.193.4; i.194.2; i.202.2; ii.37.4; ii.60.3; ii.70; ii.121δ 1, 2 *ter*; iii.20; iii.22.3, 4; iv.66; iv.177; vi.57.2) or in the context of a sacrifice (ii.39.1, 4; iv.62; iv.70). Wine is only regarded in a clearly negative light when Cyrus used it to trick the Massegetae (i.207.6, 211.2, 213), when Prexaspes confronted Cambyses about his alcoholism (iii.34.3), and when Cleomenes went mad from his consumption of wine (vi.84).
[16] Slater. 1990, pp. 213-215.

(iii.174.1). This love of wine extended to members of the royal court.[17] When Amasis dispatched his most trustworthy eunuch to halt the defection of Phanes to Persia (iii.4.2), the captured Greek mercenary leader used wine to effect his escape:

> ὃς αἱρέει μιν ἐν Λυκίῃ, ἑλὼν δὲ οὐκ ἀνήγαγε ἐς Αἴγυπτον· σοφίῃ γάρ μιν περιῆλθε ὁ Φάνης· καταμεθύσας γὰρ τοὺς φυλάκους ἀπαλλάσσετο ἐς Πέρσας.
>
> He [the eunuch] captured him [Phanes] in Lycia, but seizing him he did not take him back to Egypt; for Phanes got around him with trickery; getting the guards drunk he [Phanes] escaped to Persia. (iii.4.2-3)

In Herodotos' account, all Egypt was besotted with wine. The Egyptians imported so much wine from all over Greece and Phoenicia that they were able to line the passage through Gaza with the emptied wine jars (ii.6.1). The sheer volume of wine imported "to Egypt" (ἐς Αἴγυπτον), not simply to Memphis, indicates that the love of the drink extended beyond the royal court to Egypt as a whole. In the reign of Amasis, then, wine pervaded all strata of Egyptian society from commoner to the joyful tippler monarch. The historian links the object (wine) and its pleasurable connotation with the state of peace and independence that reigned immediately prior to the Persian invasion. Although he includes wine in his descriptions of Egypt prior to Amasis,[18] he does not associate the drink or symposiastic behavior with previous monarchs.

[17] The exception appears to be Amasis' friends, who attempted to reform behavior that they deemed unsuited to the throne (ii.174.1). Amasis, though, refuted their arguments and made a persuasive case for his mixture of business and pleasure (ii.174.2).
[18] ii.39.1, 39.4, 121δ.1, 121δ.2.

Herodotos infuses the wine with new elements, water and blood, to reflect the imperiled state of Egypt faced with Persian aggression. The Egyptians refilled their empty wine jars with water for the passage through Gaza (iii.6.2). By their love of wine, the Egyptians appear to have provided a means for invaders to cross the formidable desert barrier. Only after he completes his description of the practice, however, does Herodotos reveal that the Persians mandated this behavior only after the conquest of Egypt (iii.7.1). Collected in the service of Persia, the water here connotes submission. Just as elsewhere in the *Histories,* water is used as a token of submission to Persia.[19] Thus, by transforming the contents of the vessels (κέραμοι) from wine to water, the historian indicates a change in behavior from the consumption of wine in an independent Egypt to the obedient collection of water for the Persian conquerors.

Herodotos reinforces the connotation of water with servitude as he turns to Arabia, which Cambyses, following the advice of Phanes, contacted for help in passing through Gaza. Although the historian includes a small reference to blood in his description of Arabian oaths (iii.8.1) and implies the presence of wine when he indicates that the Arabians only worshipped Urania and Dionysios (iii.8.3), he most closely associates this land with water. He provides two accounts of how the Arabians supplied the invading Persians with this essential element. First, he claims that they filled camel skins with water and carried them into the desert to await the Persian troops:

[19] v.18, v.73, vi.48-49, vi.93.

> ὁ Ἀράβιος, ἐμηχανᾶτο τοιάδε· ἀσκοὺς καμήλων πλήσας ὕδατος ἐπέσαξε ἐπὶ τὰς ζωὰς τῶν καμήλων πάσας, τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας ἤλασε ἐς τὴν ἄνυδρον καὶ ὑπέμενε ἐνθαῦτα τὸν Καμβύσεω στρατόν.
>
> The Arabian king contrived the following: filling camel skins, he loaded the skins on live camels, and doing this he went to the desert and there awaited Cambyses' army. (iii.9.1)

Second, he narrates the less credible account in which the Arabian king fabricated a pipe to convey water from the river Corys to cisterns in the desert:

> ἀπὸ τούτου δὴ ὧν τοῦ ποταμοῦ λέγεται τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Ἀραβίων, ῥαψάμενον τῶν ὠμοβοέων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δερμάτων ὀχετὸν μήκεϊ ἐξικνεύμενον ἐς τὴν ἄνυδρον, ἀγαγεῖν διὰ δὴ τούτου τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀνύδρῳ μεγάλας δεξαμενὰς ὀρύξασθαι, ἵνα δεκόμεναι τὸ ὕδωρ σῴζωσι.
>
> It is said that from this river the Arabian king, stitched together the cowhides and the skins of other animals into a pipeline stretching in length to the desert, and through these he led the water into the desert, and in the desert he dug great cisterns, so that he might store the water. (iii.9.3)

Through these elaborate descriptions of the Arabian water supply, the constant repetition of water (ὕδωρ) and its movement to the waterless (ἄνυδρον) waste, the historian emphasizes the association of water with service to Persia.

As he develops his account of the invasion, Herodotos moves water from the periphery to the heart of Egypt. As long as Amasis lived, the Egyptians made no move to counter the Persian plans, but after the pharaoh's death, his son Psammenitus began preparing Egypt's defenses (iii.10). According to the historian, a great portent (φάσμα Αἰγυπτίοισι μέγιστον – iii.10.3) accompanied Psammenitus' ascension – it rained in Upper Egypt:

> ὕσθησαν γὰρ Θῆβαι αἱ Αἰγύπτιαι, οὔτε πρότερον οὐδαμὰ ὑσθεῖσαι οὔτε ὕστερον τὸ μέχρι ἐμεῦ, ὡς λέγουσι αὐτοὶ Θηβαῖοι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὕεται τὰ ἄνω τῆς Αἰγύπτου τὸ παράπαν· ἀλλὰ καὶ τότε ὕσθησαν αἱ Θῆβαι ψακάδι.
>
> It rained on Thebes, never before had it rained nor has it rained since up to my day, so the Thebans say; for no rain at all falls in Upper Egypt; but then it rained on Thebes in a light shower. (iii.10.3)

Although the water fell from the sky and was not drawn in service of Persia, the historian uses the unprecedented appearance of water in the heart of the once wine-loving Egypt to link the reign of the new pharaoh with water, a symbol of servitude to Persia.

When Herodotos begins his account of the actual invasion, he blends these two elements with the blood of Phanes' children. Angered by the defection of their former commander, the Greek and Carian mercenaries in Egyptian employ set a *krater* and the children, whom Phanes had abandoned in Egypt, before their battle line. Filling the vessel with wine and water, the mercenaries killed the children, mixed their blood in with the wine and water, and drank the grisly mixture (iii.11.3).[20] Elsewhere in the *Histories*, drinking the blood of others appears only *in extremis,* e.g. among the alien Scythians, who routinely drank their enemies' blood (iv.64.1), or Cyrus' metaphorical blood drinking after his

[20] Although the mercenaries' actions appear to have some features of oath taking, the historian makes no mention of an oath (ὅρκος) or pledge (πίστις) as in the case of the Arabian oath (iii.7). See Blakesley. 1854, p. 316. Moreover, the Arabian oath involved drawing one's own blood (iii.8.1.). Elsewhere in the *Histories,* the ingestion of blood plays a limited role in some oaths and sacrifices, but again one tastes or drinks one's own, not another's, blood. The Medes and Lydians licked blood from shallow cuts in their arms as part of their oaths (i.74.6) and the Scythians mixed a little of their own blood with wine to swear an oath (iv.70).

defeat by Tomyris.[21] The anger of the mercenaries, the murder of the children, and the drinking of the bloody mixture evoke blood's connotations of violence, vengeance, and barbarity.

The addition of the blood perverts the normal association of the admixture of water and wine in a *krater* with the Greek symposium.[22] The *krater* and its contents symbolize the transitional state of Egypt, blending its peaceful past (wine) and its subjugated future (water) with the violence of the present war (blood). Violence and its symptoms flow through the subsequent sections from the closely fought battle (iii.11.3), to the corpse strewn field (iii.12), and the siege of Memphis, where the Egyptians poured out (ἐκχυθέντες) of their citadel to violate propriety by tearing Cambyses' heralds limb from limb in a quasi-Dionysiac act (τοὺς ἄνδρας κρεουργηδὸν διασπάσαντες – iii.13.2).

After Cambyses defeated the Egyptians and the tide of violence subsided, the Persian king fulfilled the vow he had made to his mother to turn Egypt upside down (iii.3.3). Herodotos depicts this change in part by completing the inversion of the liquid objects in Egypt. In place of the wine-loving Amasis (φιλοπότης), who spent each day drinking and joking with his friends (ἔπινέ τε καὶ κατέσκωπτε τοὺς συμπότας / he drank and joked with his symposiasts – ii.173.1), Herodotos describes Psammenitus, who wept at the sight of one of his fellow symposiasts (τῶν συμποτέων οἱ ἄνδρα) reduced to the life of a beggar

[21] After the death of her son, the Massagetae queen Tomyris swore a terrible oath that she would give the Persian king Cyrus his fill of blood. Later, when she defeated the Persians, she placed Cyrus' severed head in a skin full of blood (ἀσκὸν δὲ πλήσασα αἵματος – i.214.4).
[22] Contra Bowie. 2003, p. 105. He regards the *krater* solely in the context of the negative atmosphere he perceives in banquets in the *Histories*. As shown, I argue that the krater should be viewed more broadly as the literal blending of the connotations of wine, water, and blood.

(iii.14.7).[23] The historian replaces wine with water to reflect this change. He describes how Cambyses turned Psammenitus' daughter into a water bearer:

> στείλας αὐτοῦ τὴν θυγατέρα ἐσθῆτι δουληίῃ ἐξέπεμπε ἐπ' ὕδωρ ἔχουσαν ὑδρήιον, συνέπεμπε δὲ καὶ ἄλλας παρθένους ἀπολέξας ἀνδρῶν τῶν πρώτων
>
> Dressing the pharaoh's daughter in slave's clothing he sent her with a water jar to fetch water, and he sent with her other maidens selected from among the noble families. (iii.14.2)

While the Egyptian nobles wept at the sight of their daughters reduced to slavery, the pharaoh seemingly remained impassive. Although Psammenitus' silence frustrated Cambyses, who arranged another test, the historian notes a significant response that apparently escaped the Persian king's notice. The pharaoh "bowed down to the earth" (ὁ δὲ Ψαμμήνιτος … ἔκυψε ἐς τὴν γῆν - iii.14.3). The historian uses the scene of pharaoh and daughter to insert the traditional tokens of submission to Persia – earth and water.

Additionally, in this scene Herodotos emphasizes the transformation of Egypt from freedom to subjugation through the daughter's clothes. Before the war Amasis attempted to trick Cambyses, who had requested the hand of the pharaoh's daughter in marriage. Fearing that Cambyses would treat his daughter as a concubine and not a wife, Amasis instead sent Nitetis, the daughter and last surviving child of the deposed pharaoh Apries. Adorning her with fine clothes and gold (κοσμήσας ἐσθῆτί τε καὶ χρυσῷ), Amasis attempted to pass off Nitetis as his own daughter, transforming a woman who was essentially his

[23] Bowie. 2003, p. 105, n. 31. Bowie notes the return of the symposiastic element, but does not tie it to the symposiasts at Amasis' table.

slave into a princess. Although a noted trickster, capable manipulator and interpreter of signs elsewhere,[24] Amasis failed to deceive Cambyses and precipitated a war that would reduce Egypt to slavery; for while he crafted an image of a woman adorned as a princess, this fake princess refused to play along. Urging Cambyses to look beyond her clothes, she unveiled her true identity and fanned the Persian king's desire for war (iii.1.3-4). After the Persian conquest, Cambyses effected the reverse transformation by dressing Psammenitus' daughter, Amasis' granddaughter, in the clothing of a slave (ἐσθῆτι δουληίῃ - iii.14.2). But whereas the transformation of Nitetis did not extend below the surface, Cambyses truly altered the status of the pharaoh's daughter, changing her from a princess into a slave.

Herodotos concludes his description of Egypt's conquest by again returning to an object from the *krater*, blood. After a failed rebellion, Psammenitus committed suicide by drinking the blood of a bull (iii.15.4). Despite the difference, the blood retains its association with violence, heralding the death of Psammenitus. In a similar vein, the blood symbolizes the end of the future. At Pelusium, the Greek and Carian mercenaries drew the blood of Phanes' children (iii.11.2), destroying their former comrade's future. After the conquest, Psammenitus suffered a similar loss when Cambyses executed the pharaoh's son (iii.14.4). The pharaoh still possessed a future, though, and could have recovered Egypt since the Persians were accustomed to honor the sons of kings and even restore these sons to their former thrones (iii.15.2). But Psammenitus destroyed

[24] Dewald. 1993, pp. 59-60. Hollmann. 1998, p. 159.

this future when he conspired against the Persians (iii.15.4) and completed this destruction when he uses bull's blood (a symbol of violence) to end his life.

The Pelusian *krater*, then, is a mixture of distinct elements and connotations. Appearing on the eve of a decisive battle, the *krater* contained elements of Egypt's past, present, and future: peaceful wine, violent blood, and subservient water. Herodotos does not create these connotations, but uses the context of the *logos* to emphasize each particular meaning. He associates pre-war, independent Egypt with wine, blood with the slaughter of children on a battlefield, and water with service to Persia. Using these objects and their connotations throughout the *logos*, the historian creates an object-based text of Egypt's status from freedom to slavery.

Hence, Herodotos evokes and arranges an object's meaning through its context. Composing the stage, characters, and action, the historian filters an object's connotation(s) and informs the audience which one(s) apply. In the account of Periander's tyranny, Herodotos illustrates the inherently wasteful nature of tyranny through Thrasybulus' and Periander's interaction with food and clothing. While the tyrants wasted or destroyed both objects separately, together they represent the two main staples of an *oikos*' self-sufficiency. In his account of Cambyses' invasion of Ethiopia, Herodotos again uses food, but as a measure of royal behavior and wisdom. He presents the Ethiopian and Persian diets individually, but within the broader context of the entire passage the diets and the actions of the kings with respect to food create a striking contrast.

In each example the historian simply employs the object's (or class of object's) connotation to create an additional meaning in his text. Hence, Thrasybulus' wheat stalks operate on a metaphorical level, advising the murder of the leading Corinthians, and a literal level, displaying the tyrant's contempt for property, even his own. Herodotos increases the complexity of this message by increasing the number of objects and connotations. He uses wine, water, and blood to symbolize the three states of Egypt (free, enslaved, and at war) before, during, and after the Persian invasion. The historian does not subvert any particular connotation, but selects and arranges them to create an extended message concerning the plight of Egypt. In all three variations of this method, Herodotos places an object (or set of objects) in a varied and even changing landscape to emphasize or deemphasize an object's connotation.

Object Manipulation

In his second method for shaping an object's additional meaning, Herodotos adopts the reverse approach. He places a changing (or different) object(s) in an unchanging landscape and uses the manner in which the object changes to shape its meaning. He uses two narrative tools to create this change: repetition with substitution and the passage of time. Herodotos commonly employs repetition for emphasis and clarity in his writing.[25] Repetition against a new background also allows the audience to develop hitherto unforeseen

[25] Immerwahr. 1966, p. 53, 60-61. Stahl. 1968, pp. 389-390. Flory. 1969. pp. 102-103. Long. 1986, pp. 11, 23. Dewald, 1993, p. 61. Herington. 1997, p. 150.

connections.[26] When the historian substitutes rather than repeats, however, he does so to draw the audience's attention to a particular point.[27] In the case of objects, substitution is a particularly effective method for shaping an object's additional meaning. He does not transform the object into something alien; rather he merely substitutes one object for another object of the same type. For example, "a bottle of wine" in a man's hands as he comes home to his wife has several potential connotations. If, however, the author retells the scene and changes the bottle of wine each time from "a gift-wrapped bottle of wine" to "a bottle of champagne" and then to "a box of wine," he varies the connotations from gift to celebration to inebriation even though in all cases the object remains essentially the same. A similar effect occurs in the case of parallel scenes. If an author presents three men coming home to their wives, each carrying one of the above, then the author uses the related, but distinct, connotations of the "bottle of wine" to create an implicit comparison of the men's intentions.

In a related manner, Herodotos presents an object in time to create similar variations. Instead of altering the type of object, the historian places a specific object in more than one temporal context. He indicates the state of the object at its time of creation (or dedication) and then again at a later time, perhaps the historian's own day. While Naiden has shown how the historian uses this presentation to emphasize or allude to the impending decline of the object,[28] the effect of this diachronic presentation has gone largely unnoticed. For example,

[26] Iser. 1974, p. 278.
[27] Stahl. 1968, p. 391. Long. 1986, p. 23.
[28] Naiden. 1999, pp. 135-140. See n. 76.

the passage of time on a "bottle of wine" can produce three results. First, the "bottle of wine" might remain unchanged in form and meaning. Second, the "bottle of wine" might improve with age and become a "fine bottle of wine," altering its meaning in a positive manner. Finally, the "bottle of wine" might degrade into a "bottle of vinegar," altering its meaning in a negative manner. The multiple images generated by the diachronic presentation inform the audience of an object's significance through how it fares over time.

Using both methods Herodotos creates multiple (even contrasting) images of an object. This almost cinematic technique allows the audience to perceive an object from a variety of perspectives and with a variety of connotations. The historian uses this multiplicity to transform an object into a text, a series of connotations that combine to form a coherent message.

Royal Disrobing: The Chiton *and the Queen of Lydia (i.8-11)*

At the beginning of the *Histories*, Herodotos uses the first method of direct manipulation, the altered presentation of an object through repetition, to create a subtext with the queen of Lydia's *chiton*. Enamored with his wife's beauty, the Lydian king Candaules desired to display her naked form to his most trusted servant, Gyges. The king planned and carried out Gyges' concealment in the royal bedchamber where he gazed upon the queen as she undressed. As Gyges slipped out of the bedroom, however, the queen noted the voyeur's presence. Realizing Candaules' complicity, she confronted Gyges and compelled him either to murder the Lydian king and take his place on the throne as her husband or to

accept his own death for having seen what he ought not to have seen. Arming the hapless Gyges with a sword, she placed him again in the bedroom. When the king retired to bed, Gyges slipped out, killed his master, and took the throne.

While the story possesses elements of folklore,[29] in tone, characterization, plot, and pacing Herodotos patterns the tale after tragic poetry.[30] But the central action of his drama, the queen's disrobing, has special significance in tragedy that belies both the events and consequences of the tale. In the tragic genre, clothing is a means of power (or an avenue to resist power) and control for women.[31] Clothes signify a woman's status, and as her status changes, her clothes change.[32] The removal of clothing in particular may evoke the stripping of the dead and hence may symbolize the loss of a primary trait, such as Cassandra's loss of prophecy along with the loss of her στέφος or Iphigeneia's loss of marriageability with the removal of her πέπλος (Aes. *Ag.* 1264f and 232f).[33] Yet in the Gyges episode, the queen's loss of clothing did not mark her downfall or destruction. Instead she was empowered and, as Stewart Flory puts it, she became the archetype of the vengeful queen in the *Histories*.[34] Manipulating Gyges to murder her husband, the Lydian queen gained and asserted greater power than her clothing, or lack thereof, would suggest.

[29] Aly. 1969. pp. 32-33.
[30] Lattimore. 1939, p. 25. Stahl. 1968, *passim*. Lesky. 1977, pp. 224-226. Saïd. 2002, pp. 118-119. Travis. 2000, pp. 331-333. Chiasson. 2003, p. 21.
[31] Mueller. 2002. pp. 27-28.
[32] Segal. 1990. p. 304. Block. 1985. pp. 9-10.
[33] Griffith. 1988. p. 553.
[34] Flory. 1987, p. 42.

Herodotos resolves this apparent paradox in the passage's subtext, which he creates through a carefully controlled depiction of the queen's dress. As Dewald and Travis note, the historian unfolds the plot around the queen's body,[35] but both fail to look beyond the queen's nudity. Like the tragic poet, the historian uses her clothing to indicate her identity or status.[36] Candaules' plan threatened this status. Although his proposal sought to display his wife without her αἰδώς,[37] it also implicitly sought to redefine her identity. Candaules did not display his queen; rather he displayed the most beautiful of women (πασέων καλλιστην - i.8.1). Yet Herodotos counters this redefinition by shielding her body from the audience's gaze. Through a varied presentation of her clothing, he creates the perception that she remained clothed and in control of her identity.

In this *logos,* power is denoted through the act of viewing.[38] Hence, Herodotos suggests Candaules' power through his ability to display his wife's naked form. Yet while both he and Gyges anticipated viewing the queen's naked body (ἐκείνην θεήσεαι γυμνήν / you will view that woman – i.8.2 / κελεύων με δέσποιναν τὴν ἐμὴν θεήσασθαι γυμνήν / ordering me to view my mistress naked – i.8.3), this power quickly dissipated when they began to plot her actual

[35] Dewald, 1993, p. 62. Travis. 2000, pp. 332-334.
[36] He uses clothing as an identifier in his ethnographic accounts (i.195; iv.74; iv.116; iv.189 et al.) and to illustrate status and identity or a change in the same (i.111 (the royal status of the infant Cyrus is apparent in his gilded clothing); iii.1-14 (see pp. 24-33); v.20 (Macedonian youth disguised as women murder Persian emissaries); v.87-88 (The Athenians and the statues of Damia and Auxesia); ix.22 (Masistios' golden armor – see chapter x); ix.76 (Persian concubine from Cos).
[37] Cairns. 1996, 78, 81.
[38] Travis. 2000, p. 333.

exhibition.[39] She did not appear naked (γυμνή) either during Candaules' planning (i.9.2) or Gyges' execution of the deed (i.10.1-2). Rather during the actual display of the queen, Herodotos uses the adjective to describe not the queen but Lydian mores on *male* nudity:

> παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι βαρβάροισι καὶ ἄνδρα ὀφθῆναι γυμνὸν ἐς αἰσχύνην μεγάλην φέρει.
>
> For among Lydian men, and among nearly most other barbarian races it is considered especially shameful for a man to be seen naked. (i.10.3)

He refers to the queen's nakedness only implicitly through her disrobing (discussed below) or in retrospect and in her own words when she confronted Gyges with his crime and planned the murder of Candaules from the place that he displayed her:

> ἀλλ' ἤτοι κεῖνόν γε τὸν ταῦτα βουλεύσαντα δεῖ ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἢ σὲ τὸν ἐμὲ γυμνὴν θεησάμενον καὶ ποιήσαντα οὐ νομιζόμενα.
>
> But it is necessary for that man planning these things to die, or you who saw me naked and violated propriety. (i.11.3)
>
> ὅθεν περ καὶ ἐκεῖνος ἐμὲ ἐπεδέξατο γυμνήν,
>
> From where that man also displayed me naked. (i.11.5).

The historian delays a direct reference to the queen's naked body until her confrontation with Gyges, when she, at the height of her power, manipulated a dynastic change.

[39] Contra Travis. 2000, pp. 343-344. Travis maintains the shift in power from king to queen occurred when she appeared naked at i.10, but, as I argue, Herodotos undermines the image of the naked queen both through his depiction of her clothing his limited use of the term γυμνή.

Moreover, through the description of her clothing Herodotos covers the queen's implicit nakedness. He describes her disrobing three times: once figuratively (i.8.3), the second in the plans of Candaules (i.9.2), and the third in actuality (i.10.1). This drawn out striptease heightens the drama of the passage, but each time the historian refers to the queen's clothing, he alters its description, using repetition for emphasis and substitution to convey additional meaning.[40] Gyges first conjured the image of the naked queen by objecting to the Lydian tyrant's plan to display his wife. The servant told Candaules that a woman puts off her shame as she takes off her *chiton* or undergarment, the last layer of clothing between the man's gaze and her nude body (ἅμα δὲ κιθῶνι ἐκδυομένῳ συνεκδύεται καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ γυνή / but at the same time that a woman removes her *chiton* she does away with her shame – i.8.3). Herodotos discards the *chiton*, however, when Candaules explained the details of his plan. The Lydian king stated that Gyges would be able to see the queen as she disrobed before getting into bed (κεῖται δὲ ἀγχοῦ τῆς ἐσόδου θρόνος· ἐπὶ τοῦτον τῶν ἱματίων κατὰ ἓν ἕκαστον ἐκδύνουσα θήσει /A chair lies near the entrance; onto this she will place each piece of clothing as she undresses – i.9.2). Powell rightly translates the plural form ἱματίων as "clothes," for the *himation* was typically one piece of clothing.[41] The term ἱμάτιον commonly referred to a woman's outer garment.[42] In many Greek communities, a woman would draw the *himation* across her face as a

[40] For Herodotos' general use of repetition and variation see Long. 1986, p. 23. Unfortunately Long overlooks the repetition of objects in his study.
[41] Powell. 1960, p. 171.
[42] Evans. 1964, p. 48.

veil when in the presence of a man other than her husband and would ritually remove her veil during her wedding ceremony.[43] By painting an image of the queen unveiling herself to Gyges, Candaules evoked an association with wedding rites[44] and unwittingly presaged his wife's marriage to Gyges. Moreover, the historian's shift from *chiton* to *himation* moves the audience's gaze from an inner to an outer garment and makes the queen appear more dressed while in the act of disrobing.

Herodotos alters his description of the queen's clothing further in his narration of the disrobing scene. Hidden behind the door, "Gyges watched [the queen] as she entered [the chamber] and removed her clothes" (ἐσελθοῦσαν δὲ καὶ τιθεῖσαν τὰ εἵματα ἐθηεῖτο ὁ Γύγης – i.10.1). As with ἱματίων, Powell translates εἵματα simply to mean "clothes," but the introduction of yet another term invites another possible interpretation. Like the singular *himation*, *heima* refers to an exterior layer of clothing, usually a cloak or mantle worn on top of one's outer garments.[45] In Herodotos, the Lydians customarily wore the *heima* as an outer garment. After a failed rebellion, Croesus advised Cyrus not to punish the Lydians, but to make them less warlike by ordering them to wear *chitons* beneath their cloaks (κέλευε δέ σφεας κιθῶνάς τε ὑποδύνειν τοῖσι εἵμασι – i.155.4). The *heima*, then, diverts the audience's gaze away from her body to her cloak, and thus creates a competing image of the naked queen fully dressed.

---

[43] Galt. 1931, pp. 379-381. Nagler. 1974, pp. 44-47. Galt argues that the Athenian practice of veiling may have originated from the adoption of Ionian or rather Carian dress (Hdt v.87-88).
[44] Cairns. 1996, p. 80.
[45] Powell, p. 100 – e.g. i.152.1; i.155.4; ii.81.1, ii.81.2; iii.20.1; iii.22.1; iii.22.3; iii.139.2; iii.140.1; vii.67.1; vii.77.

Whereas Herodotos mentions the queen's clothing in each iteration of her disrobing, no other object appears in each version. He refers to the chamber (οἴκημα – i.9.2 and i.10.1) for the queen's second and third disrobing, but only mentions the bed (κοίτης/κοίτην – i.10.1, 2) in the final telling, and the doors to the chamber (θύρης/θυρέων – i.9.2, 3) and the *thronos* upon which she places the clothes (θρόνος/θρόνου – i.9.2, 3) in the second telling. In contrast, the queen's body occupies the spotlight. By including her clothing in each repetition, the historian emphasizes the changing state of her dress in the *logos*.

Herodotos strengthens the association between the queen's clothing and her royal power by noting her proximity to the *thronos* in the second account. As Candaules laid out the details of his plan to Gyges, the Lydian king mentioned that the queen would place her clothing upon the chair (*thronos*) that stood near the entryway (i.9.2).[46] Herodotos primarily uses the term *thronos* to refer to the seat of a monarch, grandee, or official.[47] Thus, the queen's placement of her clothing upon the throne while disrobing implies a connection between the queen, her clothing, and royal power.

While the historian subverts the image of the naked queen, he implicitly depicts Candaules losing his clothing when he loses his life. After placing Gyges in his bedroom Candaules disappears from the narrative until his murder at i.12. According to the queen's plan, Gyges crept out from the exact spot where he had

[46] The royal connotation of the word "θρόνος" should not be overlooked regardless of Powell's (p. 168) translation of the word here to mean a simple "chair."
[47] i.9.2, i.9.3 (chair); vii.40.4 (seat in Xerxes' chariot); i.14.3 *bis*, i.183.1, ii.149.2, ii.173.2, iii.30.2, iii.61.3, iii.64.1, iii.144, iii.155.1, v.25.1, v.25.2, v.26, v.72.3, vii.8α2, vii.16.1, vii.17.1, vii.15.3 (solemn seat or throne of monarch, grandee, or official).

gazed on her naked form and struck the sleeping king (καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναπαυομένου Κανδαύλεω ὑπεκδύς τε καὶ ἀποκτείνας αὐτὸν / and after these things, when Candaules was asleep, he crept out and killed him - i.12.2). In this scene, Herodotos describes the action after the king has entered bed and presumably already removed his clothes. Whether the king slept naked or changed into bedclothes, Gyges has gazed upon the naked Candaules before murdering him. Without clothes or weapons Candaules was reduced to the status of a woman.[48] Hence, for Candaules, the historian completes the tragic paradigm that connects the loss of clothing with the loss of life and/or power.

In this *logos*, Herodotos uses clothing in a manner consistent with tragedy as an indicator of status or even death. As the story unfolds, however, Herodotos seems to subvert this paradigm. Candaules displayed his wife in a form of subjugation, but instead of this action leading to her destruction she was empowered and engineered his death. Playing out the tragic significance of their clothing in the subtext, the historian manipulates his description of the queen's nudity and clothing to forestall her loss of power and to hasten Candaules' destruction. Despite her husband's efforts, the queen controlled her body. She is described as naked only in Candaules' amorous description and in her self-description once she has Gyges in her power. Moreover, the historian provides a subtext for the queen's actual disrobing. He subverts the image by altering his depiction of her clothes from undergarment (κιθών) to cloak (ἱματίων) to outer garment (εἵματα). As the historian adds layers to her outfit he transforms her

[48] McCary. 1982, pp. 155-156.

from an object to an agent.[49] Candaules failed to achieve his objective as the queen retained (and improved) both her clothing and her status. In contrast, the queen successfully stripped Candaules of his clothing and his life as she placed Gyges in a position to view and murder the naked monarch.

Weapons, Wealth, and the Peisistratid Rise to Power (i.59-64)

Herodotos uses a similar combination of repetition and substitution of objects to illustrate the importance of money and arms to the rise of the Peisistratids. Yet, instead of repeating the same scene, here he capitalizes upon the historian's vantage point and contrasts the repetition of objects from distinct but related scenes at different times. In his description of Peisistratus' three attempts at tyranny, he repeats elements typically centered on an object or objects. Using these repeating motifs, the historian illustrates the escalation of Peisistratus' behavior and the necessity of money and arms for the establishment and maintenance of a tyranny.[50]

In his narration of the first two attempts, Herodotos follows the same narrative pattern and refers to similar objects to illustrate the futility of a tyranny based on deception and limited violence. Although the historian esteems deception and deceivers,[51] he demonstrates that it is not the path to secure tyrannical power. Elements common to both stories include a conveyance, arms,

[49] Long. 1986. p. 28. Long notes a similar transformation as Herodotos alters her description from 'woman' or 'wife' (i.8.1, 2, 3, 4; i.9.1, 2; i.10.1, 2) to 'queen' (i.11.1, 2 and i.12.2).
[50] Contra Myres. 1971, p. 84. Myres arranges the passage within his 'pedimental' structure, making the second attempt the focal point of the story. As my argument will show the historian uses the three attempts for a cumulative effect. The similarity of the first two attempts stands in stark contrast to the different methods of the third.
[51] Lateiner. 1990, pp. 231-232.

and the goddess Athena represented through her temples or dress. In the first attempt, after wounding himself, Peisistratus drove a mule cart into the Agora to elicit the sympathy of the Athenian public (τρωματίσας ἑωυτόν τε καὶ ἡμιόνους ἤλασε ἐς τὴν ἀγορὴν τὸ ζεῦγος ὡς ἐκπεφευγὼς τοὺς ἐχθρούς / wounding himself and his mules he drove his cart into the agora as though fleeing from enemies - i.59.4). The Athenians were duped and assigned Peisistratus a bodyguard armed with wooden clubs:

> ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐξαπατηθεὶς ἔδωκέ οἱ τῶν ἀστῶν καταλέξας ἄνδρας τούτους οἳ δορυφόροι μὲν οὐκ ἐγένοντο Πεισιστράτου, κορυνηφόροι δέ· ξύλων γὰρ κορύνας ἔχοντες εἵποντό οἱ ὄπισθε
>
> The Athenian demos was deceived and picking men from the city gave to him these men who were not spear-bearers of Peisistratus, but club-bearers; for having clubs of wood they followed behind him. (i.59.5)

Peisistratus then used these men to seize the Acropolis and established himself as ruler in Athens (i.59.6). Although Herodotos makes no explicit reference to Athena, the Acropolis is nearly synonymous with the goddess and her most famous shrine.

After the Athenians expelled Peisistratus from power the first time, Herodotos patterns the Athenian's second attempt at tyranny upon the first one. This time, conspiring with Megacles, Peisistratus arranged two, more elaborate deceptions. First, he deceived Megacles by agreeing to marry his daughter, but restricting himself to non-reproductive intercourse with her (i.61.1). Second,

Peisistratus undertook to deceive the Athenian people by adopting the pose of Herakles or Theseus accompanied by the goddess Athena:[52]

> ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Παιανιέι ἦν γυνή, τῇ οὔνομα ἦν Φύη, μέγαθος ἀπὸ τεσσέρων πήχεων ἀπολείπουσα τρεῖς δακτύλους καὶ ἄλλως εὐειδής. ταύτην τὴν γυναῖκα σκευάσαντες πανοπλίῃ, ἐς ἅρμα ἐσβιβάσαντες καὶ προδέξαντες σχῆμα οἷόν τι ἔμελλε εὐπρεπέστατον φανέεσθαι ἔχουσα ἤλαυνον ἐς τὸ ἄστυ, προδρόμους κήρυκας προπέμψαντες, οἳ τὰ ἐνεταλμένα ἠγόρευον ἀπικόμενοι ἐς τὸ ἄστυ
>
> In the deme of Paenia was a woman named Phye, lacking three fingers of four cubits in height and otherwise beautiful. Dressing this woman in a full panoply, mounting her in a chariot and posing her in the most impressive way they drove into the city, sending ahead heralds as forerunners, who arriving in the city proclaimed the things ordered. (i.60.4)

While Peisistratus crafted an image of Athena to manipulate the Athenians,[53] Herodotos works on another level. In the second deception, he substitutes the objects of the first attempt at tyranny with more potent or dangerous props. He replaces the cart with a chariot, the wooden clubs with a full panoply of armor, and the Acropolis with the "goddess" herself.

Peisistratus' second failure, though, triggered a change in strategy and approach that Herodotos reflects in the objects and elements of his story. Rather than simply launch a third, grander scheme along the same lines as the first two, the former and future tyrant, at the urging of his son Hippias, spent several years amassing money from various sources and using it to gather a large force of mercenaries (i.61.3-4). While he gathered money (ἕως μὲν Πεισίστρατος τὰ χρήματα ἤγειρε), the Athenians made no move against the would-be tyrant

[52] Sinos. 1993, p. 82.
[53] Hollmann. 2005, pp. 289-290.

(i.62.2). But when he led his mercenaries to Attica (i.62.1), he encountered the Athenian army near the temple of Athena Pallenis where the two forces grounded arms:

> καὶ οὗτοί τε πανστρατιῇ ἦισαν ἐπὶ τοὺς κατιόντας καὶ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πεισίστρατον, ὡς ὁρμηθέντες ἐκ Μαραθῶνος ἦισαν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄστυ, ἐς τὠυτὸ συνιόντες ἀπικνέονται ἐπὶ Παλληνίδος Ἀθηναίης ἱρόν, καὶ ἀντία ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα.
>
> Both these men came in full strength against the men returning from exile and the followers of Peisistratus, once they roused themselves and set forth from Marathon towards the city, coming together in the same place reached the temple of Athena Pallenis and grounded arms opposite one another. (i.62.3)

Upon the advice of an oracle monger, Peisistratus launched a surprise attack, routed the Athenians, and secured power (i.63.1).

Herodotos repeats here the elements of Athena, weapons, and deception, but he alters the significance of each in important ways. While the historian escalates the magnitude of the tyrant's deception, the nature of Peisistratus' conveyance, and the role of Athena (from destination to participant) from the first to second attempts, he minimizes their roles in the third attempt. Although deception remains an element of the tale in the form of the surprise attack, Herodotos greatly reduces its importance.[54] The tyrant only incorporated deception as an addendum to his plan, launching a surprise night attack after hearing the *chresmologos'* prophetic words (i.63.1). Herodotos scatters fantastic events, such as the *chresmologos'* proclamation, throughout the account of

[54] Contra Immerwahr. 1966, p. 87. Immerwahr regards deception as an important element of each attempt.

Peisistratus' rise to power.[55] But the seer's description of the Athenians as tunnies running into a net merely reinforces their stupidity, which Herodotos highlights during the second attempt, not the magnitude of the tyrant's deception. The historian reduces the presence of Athena from the goal of the coup (Acropolis) or a co-opted participant (Phye) to a simple setting for the battle near one of her lesser temples (i.62.3). Finally, he abandons any reference to a conveyance, simple at first and then splendid, aside from Peisistratus' mounted sons chasing the fleeing Athenians (i.63.2).

In place of these elements, Herodotos further magnifies the role of arms and introduces a new factor: money. The historian replaces Athena's panoply with the arms of an entire army (οὗτοί τε πανστρατιῇ … ὅπλα). In conjunction with arms, he repeatedly mentions money,[56] stressing its role and giving the impression of the continual growth of Peisistratid strength and power.[57] At the end of the *logos*, Herodotos underscores the importance of these two elements by noting that Peisistratus maintained his tyranny "through a steady income of money and many mercenaries" (ἐπικούροισί τε πολλοῖσι καὶ χρημάτων συνόδοισι – i.64.1). Money and force differ from the previous elements in their ability to secure power for the tyrant. Although Peisistratus seized power the first time through deception and mild force, the historian notes that his rivals Megacles and Lycurgus removed the tyrant before his power could take root (καὶ

[55] Lateiner. 1993, p. 184.
[56] i.61.3: δωτίνας, χρήματα, χρημάτων. i.61.4: μισθωτοὶ, χρήματα. i.62.2: χρήματα. i.64.1: χρημάτων συνόδοισι.
[57] Lavelle. 1991, p. 320.

τὴν τυραννίδα οὔ κω κάρτα ἐρριζωμένην ἔχων ἀπέβαλε / and having power that had not yet taken root he lost the tyranny - i.60.1). In the last attempt, however, the greater role of arms and the introduction of money allowed Peisistratus' power literally "to take root" (ἐρρίζωσε τὴν τυραννίδα – i.64.1), to gain the stability that mild force and deception could not achieve.

Thus, through the repetition and substitution of related objects in the repeated context of the seizure of tyrannical power, Herodotos illustrates the tyrant's most effective route to power: money and arms. In each attempt, the historian uses different objects of the same type to emphasize the escalation of Peisistratus' attempts at power. In the first two attempts, the tyrant exchanged a temple for the goddess herself, a cart for a chariot, and wooden clubs for a full set of armor, but failed to secure his power. Hence he discarded the conveyance, minimized the role of Athena, and instead employed greater force (the arms of a mercenary army) and amassed money. Through the substitution of the objects, the historian emphasizes the necessity of the new elements – more arms and money – to the acquisition and maintenance of tyrannical power.

The Anchor of Sophanes (ix.74-75)

In a similar manner, Herodotos describes the Athenian Sophanes in numerous contexts. He creates multiple images of Sophanes both from the Battle of Plataea and events from before and after the Persian war. Although the historian places the Athenian in a variety of situations and time frames, he relies on the objects in each section to characterize the behavior of Sophanes, who

otherwise receives little descriptive attention. As in the case of the preceding examples, when read together these multiple images provide a nuanced argument about the changing nature of Athens after the Persian War. The historian encourages such a reading through he brief history of Sophanes' deme of Decelea. The historian links the aid that the ancient Deceleans gave to the Spartan king Tyndareus, when Theseus abducted his daughter Helen, to events in the fifth century. In gratitude for this assistance, the Spartans gave the Deceleans certain honors and later spared their lands from devastation during the Peloponnesian War (ix.73). The individual depictions of Decelea (the aid to Tyndareus or the sparing of Decelea) can stand alone, but when the historian places them together he provides a diachronic, if brief, picture of the Attic deme.

Herodotos presents Sophanes in a similar manner. He uses the multiple images of the Athenian, and the objects in these images, to present not only a brief history of the man's life, but also a glimpse into the transformation of Athens. At Plataea, Herodotos recounts two diverse images of Sophanes' performance in the battle. In the first, Sophanes used an iron anchor, curiously attached to his belt by means of a bronze chain, to maintain his place in the battle line (ὡς ἐκ τοῦ ζωστῆρος τοῦ θώρηκος ἐφόρεε χαλκέῃ ἁλύσι δεδεμένην ἄγκυραν σιδηρέην /he bore an iron anchor attached to the belt of his *thorax* by a bronze chain – ix.74.1).[58] In the second, the Athenian merely bore the image of an

[58] Elsewhere in the *Histories*, Herodotos uses anchors in nautical settings: vi.12.1 (At Lade, Dionysius of Phocaea proposes that the Greeks not beach their ships, but remain at anchor); vii.36.2 (the Persians set the ships of Xerxes' Hellespontine bridge into position with anchors); vii.188.1 (most of the Persian fleet near Cape Sepias remains at anchor because the beach may

anchor on his shield (ὡς ἐπ' ἀσπίδος αἰεὶ περιθεούσης καὶ οὐδαμὰ ἀτρεμιζούσης ἐφόρεε ἄγκυραν / he bore an anchor which was always turning and never at rest on his shield – ix.74.2). Although both describe a hoplite, these images emphasize a range of Greek warfare from epic combat to the naval campaigns of the fifth century. In the first image, while the iron anchor may symbolize Athenian naval power, the bronze composition of the chain lends the object an epic tone. By planting his anchor in the battlefield before encountering his opponent, Sophanes fought in a manner better suited to the lone combat of epic than to hoplite warfare.[59] The security of the anchor would have forced Sophanes out of step whenever the phalanx moved. The Athenian also wore a warrior's belt (ζωστήρ) (ix.74.1), an accouterment common in the *Iliad*, but worn only by non-Greeks elsewhere in the *Histories*.[60] In the second image, the anchor again symbolizes naval power, but its ever-turning nature (οὐδαμὰ ἀτρεμιζούσης) recalls the characterization of the Athenians during the height of their *arche* (Thuc. i.70).[61] Set in the context of a hoplite battle, these objects move Sophanes simultaneously backward and forward in time.

---

only hold a small number of their ships). While Herodotos portrays the use of anchors at Lade as martial behavior, the other anchors are presented as simple nautical instruments.

[59] Krentz. 1985, pp. 54-55. Cawkwell. 1989, p. 387. Contra Flory. 1987, pp. 43-44. He views the account as "burlesque Greek heroism" designed to mock the self-congratulatory efforts of the Greeks after the Persian Wars. While a defensible reading, Flory overlooks the clearly epic and non-epic images of Sophanes prior and following the Persian Wars.

[60] *Iliad:* iv.132, 134, 136, 186, 213, 215; v.539, 615, vi.219; vii.305; x.77; xi.236; xii.189; xvii.519, 578; xx.414. *Histories*: i.215 (Massagetae); iv.9.5, 10.1, 10.3 (the Scythians).

[61] Although Thucydides does not use the term ἀτρεμίζω to characterize the Athenians, he describes his countrymen, through the words of the Corinthian ambassador, as a daring, innovative people, who are quick to take action (οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν· … καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ

Herodotos emphasizes this diachronic view of Sophanes through the description of events from the man's life before and after Plataea. First, the historian describes Sophanes' actions during the Athenian siege of Aegina in the years before Plataea (c. 487-483 BC). There Sophanes killed Eurybates the Argive, a winner of the pentathlon, in an epic-styled challenge (ὅτε περικατημένων Ἀθηναίων Αἴγιναν Εὐρυβάτην τὸν Ἀργεῖον, ἄνδρα πεντάεθλον, ἐκ προκλήσιος ἐφόνευσε. / When the Athenians besieged Aegina, he killed Eurybates the Argive, a winner of the pentathlon, in single combat. – ix.75).[62] Similar to the first image at Plataea, Sophanes fought like an epic hero.

Directing the audience's gaze to the years after Plataea, Herodotos transforms the Athenian from an epic hero to an imperialist. No longer fighting for Greek unity, Sophanes advanced Athenian imperial ambitions in the Thraceward area[63] where he led men into battle not as an epic champion, but as one of two *strategoi* (ix.75). In place of a warrior's belt, an iron anchor, and a bronze chain, Sophanes "was killed by the Edoni while fighting for control of the gold mines at Datum" (ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ Ἠδωνῶν ἐν Δάτῳ περὶ τῶν μετάλλων τῶν χρυσέων μαχόμενον – ix.75). This transition from bronze to gold reifies the transformation of Sophanes' martial objectives from the Battle of Plataea and later years, replacing honor with income and the fight for Greek freedom with imperial ambition.

ἀποδηματαὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους οἰονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἄν τι κτᾶσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι. – i.70.2, 4).

[62] Flower. and Marincola. 2002, p. 240.

[63] Macan. 1973 (1908), p. 191.

Through the four distinct images of Sophanes, Herodotos illustrates the changing nature of the Athenians and through him Athens itself. Focusing in particular upon the objects that Sophanes handled or fought for (an epic belt, the anchor, shield, and the gold mines), the historian moves the Athenian from epic combat in which *kleos* was the ultimate prize to an imperialistic campaign in which revenue was sought. He symbolizes the transitional nature that the Persian War represented for Athens through his changing description of this best, model, Athenian.

Unconquered Chains: The Tegean and Athenian Chains (i.66 and v.77)

While Herodotos uses the manner in which an object changes, or is replaced in a telling fashion, he uses the unchanging object to similar effect. Like the dog that did not bark in the night, the lack of change, highlighted through a diachronic presentation, may be as powerful an indicator of meaning as mutability. Herodotos presents the Tegean and Athenians chains of i.66 and v.77 in such an unchanging fashion. Drawing upon the connotation these objects have with slavery and oriental imperialism, the historian uses the dramatic display of these sets of chains to illustrate the Greek rejection of such concepts.

Herodotos places the first set of chains, and the first set of *pedai* in the *Histories*, in the hands of the Spartans during their attempt to expand their control over the Peloponnese. After Lycurgus reformed the Spartan constitution (i.65), the Lacedaemonians consulted Delphi about the conquest of Arcadia. In response, the oracle stated:

> δώσω τοι Τεγέην ποσσίκροτον ὀρχήσασθαι καὶ καλὸν πεδίον σχοίνῳ διαμετρήσασθαι.
>
> I will give you Tegea to dance with tapping feat and the beautiful plain to measure with a rope. (i.66.2)

Misinterpreting the oracle's meaning, the Spartans confidently invaded Tegea bearing chains (οἱ δὲ πέδας φερόμενοι) with which to bind the Tegeans (i.66.3). But the Spartans were defeated and bound with their own fetters, which the Tegeans later hung in the temple of Athene Alea:

> ἐσσωθέντες δὲ τῇ συμβολῇ, ὅσοι αὐτῶν ἐζωγρήθησαν, πέδας τε ἔχοντες τὰς ἐφέροντο αὐτοὶ καὶ σχοίνῳ διαμετρησάμενοι τὸ πεδίον τὸ Τεγεητέων ἐργάζοντο. αἱ δὲ πέδαι αὗται ἐν τῇσι ἐδεδέατο ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ἦσαν σόαι ἐν Τεγέῃ περὶ τὸν νηὸν τῆς Ἀλέης Ἀθηναίης κρεμάμεναι.
>
> But they were defeated in battle, those who were taken prisoner wore the very chains they brought and they worked the Tegean plain measuring it out with a rope. But the chains in which they were bound were still preserved in my own lifetime in Tegea, hanging up around the temple of Athene Alea. (i.66.4)

The *pedai* symbolized the immediate victory.[64] But Herodotos emphasizes their description[65] and thereby the enduring nature of Tegean resistance through the survival of the *pedai* over time (αἱ δὲ πέδαι αὗται ἐν τῇσι ἐδεδέατο ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ἦσαν σόαι – i.66.4).[66]

Herodotos parallels this description in his account of the Athenian chains.[67] After the overthrow of the Peisistratid tyranny, the Boeotians and Chalcidians attacked Attica during the Spartan king Cleomenes' attempt to

[64] Higbie. 2003, pp. 249-250.
[65] Naiden. 1999, pp. 138-139, n. 18. See n. 41.
[66] The Tegean speaker before the Battle of Plataea proudly cited this continued resistance (ix.26.7).
[67] Gray. 1997.

install Isagoras in power (v.75-76). When the Peloponnesian force withdrew, the Athenians sought revenge upon the opportunistic Boeotians and Chalcidians. Defeating both and placing the prisoners in fetters, the Athenians displayed the chains on the Acropolis:

> τὰς δὲ πέδας αὐτῶν, ἐν τῇσι ἐδεδέατο, ἀνεκρέμασαν ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν· αἵ περ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ἦσαν περιεοῦσαι, κρεμάμεναι ἐκ τειχέων περιπεφλευσμένων πυρὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Μήδου, ἀντίον δὲ τοῦ μεγάρου τοῦ πρὸς ἑσπέρην τετραμμένου.
>
> [The Athenians] hung the chains, in which they [the Boeotians and Chalcidians] had been bound, on the Acropolis; they survived even to my day, hanging from the walls scorched by fire by the Persians, opposite the shrine that faces west. (v.77.3)

Indicating that they survived to his own day (ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ἦσαν περιεοῦσαι), the historian once again emphasizes the chains and the victory they represent.[68]

Beyond simple victory, however, the chains symbolize a victory over oriental-style (i.e. Persian) imperialism. While Herodotos employs a variety of terms to describe imprisonment, the binding of prisoners, and prisoners of war,[69] he reserves the use of *pedai*, apart from the Tegean and Athenian examples, for instances of Persian imperialism and subjugation. The historian often presents Persian subjects, whom were regarded as the Persian king's slaves, in *pedai*. After the conquest of Lydia, Cyrus placed the defeated Croesus in chains (i.86.2), which the former monarch later dedicated to Delphi to indicate his servile status (i.90.2-4). Within the royal court, Persians wore golden torques and bangles that the perceptive Ethiopian king identified as *pedai*, indicative of their subservient

[68] Naiden. 1999, pp. 138-139, n. 18.
[69] δέω, ἐνδέω, καταδέω, μετίημι, ζωγρέω, ζεῦγος, δεσμός.

status (iii.22.2). When the Greek doctor Democedes moved from a prison to the palace, his level of comfort changed, but not the presence of his chains (πέδας … πεδέων χρυσέων δύο ζεύγεσι· / chains … two golden chains - iii.129.3 and iii.130.4). Providing a Hellenic perspective, Democedes questioned whether his reward of two golden chains in place of his original chains signified the doubling of his woes (iii.130.4). The Persians even used chains in attempts to subdue the forces of nature. Angered by the destruction of his first bridge across the Hellespont, Xerxes attempted to enslave the body of water by casting a set of fetters into it (πεδέων ζεῦγος - vii.35.1).

Although neither the Tegeans nor Athenians confronted the Persians in their respective *logoi*, their chains nevertheless symbolized their triumph over imperialism. In the Spartan invasion of Tegea, Herodotos emphasizes the measuring rope (σχοίνος) or the chains (πέδαι),[70] which reify the Spartan aim of dominion over all Arcadia (πάσῃ τῇ ᾽Αρκάδων χωρῇ - i.66.1). Interpreting the oracle's "σχοίνος" to mean a measuring rope, the Spartans transformed the object into a tool of imperialism and enslavement:[71]

> οἳ δὲ πέδας φερόμενοι ἐπὶ Τεγεήτας ἐστρατεύοντο … ὡς δὴ ἐξανδραποδιούμενοι τοὺς Τεγεήτας
>
> Bearing chains they campaigned against the Tegeans … as though enslaving the Tegeans … (i.66.3)

While the verb ἀνδραποδίζω ('to sell into slavery') appears in both Persian and non-Persian contexts, Herodotos employs the compound ἐξανδραποδίζω ('to lead

[70] i.66.2 (σχοίνω), 66.3 (πέδας), 66.4 (πέδας, σχοίνῳ, πέδαι).
[71] Immerwahr. 1966, pp. 200-201.

a nation into captivity') only here and in his narration of Persian conquests.[72] Thus, when the Tegeans displayed the captured chains, the objects not only represented their victory over the Spartans, but also their defeat of oriental-style imperialism.

In Athens, Herodotos uses the diachronic presentation to broaden the symbolism of their *pedai*.[73] Unlike the Spartan invasion of Tegea, the historian does not present the Boeotian or Chalcidian attacks in an imperial light. The invading Greeks neither bore chains with them nor sought to enslave the Athenians. Instead their actions resembled typical Greek warfare. The Boeotians seized two outlying demes while the Chalcidians devastated parts of Attica (v.74.2). Perhaps in an ominous allusion to the Athenian *Arche*, the *pedai* belonged to the Athenians, who used them to bind the prisoners from their retaliatory campaigns (v.77.3). But this sign of nascent Athenians imperialism is soon transformed into a symbol of defiance against Persian imperialism. Hanging amid the ruins of the Persian sack (κρεμάμεναι ἐκ τειχέων περιπεφλευσμένων πυρὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Μήδου – v.77.3), the *pedai* are linked the Persians both through connotation and proximity. The *pedai*, like Athens, survived the sack (αἵ περ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ἦσαν περιεοῦσαι – v.77.3). The

[72] i.66.3 (the Spartan assault on Tegea); i.155.1, i.156.2 (Cyrus contemplated enslaving the rebellious Lydians); i.161 (the Persian commander Mazares carried off the people of Priene into slavery); iii.25.3 (Cambyses proposed to reduce the Ammonians to slavery); vi.9.4 (before the battle of Lade, the Ionian tyrants threatened that the Persians would enslave any Ionian city that resists Persian reconquest); vi.94.2 (Darius appointed Datis to enslave Eretria and Athens); vi.108.2 (in the context of the Persian invasion at Marathon, the Plataeans were advised to seek protection from Athens rather than Sparta to avoid enslavement); viii.126.2 (Artabazus attempted to enslave the rebellious Potidaea).

[73] Poudrier. 2002, p. 66. Poudrier notes that the chains represent a dual monument that signifies victory over the Greeks and later the Persians, but does not examine the diachronic presentation.

historian uses their continuing presence to extend the Athenian message of defiance from her fellow Greeks to Persian imperialism.

An object that remains unchanged in the narrative, whether over time or through repeated references, then, like an object that changes or is replaced, may possess an added layer of meaning. But whereas Herodotos uses change to undermine or alter an object's meaning, he uses constancy to reinforce or widen the application of an object's significance. In this manner, Herodotos employs endurance over time to expand the significance of the Tegean and Athenian chains beyond their immediate victories. Drawing upon the link between *pedai* and oriental slavery and imperialism, the historian uses the respective chains to deny the creation or extension of imperialism into Greece. The Tegean chains were both a monument of their first victory over Sparta and a symbol of the limit placed upon Lacedaemonian imperial ambitions. Against Persian imperial ambitions, the historian transforms the Athenian chains from a simple monument commemorating a victory over neighboring Greeks into a denial of the expansion of Persian imperialism into Athens and Greece.

Changing an object amid a consistent context, Herodotos creates varying images of the same or a similar object that inform the audience of its significance. Either he alters an object through repetition and substitution, replacing an object with another of the same type (e.g. a coat for a jacket), or he alters a specific object by depicting it over time. These changes generate multiple images, which, like a flipbook, create a series of meanings, like a text, centered upon the object.

Conclusion

Herodotos, then, uses two opposing methods to transform objects into repositories of added meaning and significance. First, he uses the context of an unchanged object to evoke a particular connotation or meaning. Through setting, characters, or the action of the narrative, the historian emphasizes or deemphasizes an object's connotation. In the case of complex objects, composed of several elements, Herodotos blends the respective connotations into an object-based text. Rather than shaping meaning through the context, the historian may change the object by arranging a series of images of the object on a consistent background. Through repetition and substitution, the historian may replay and revise either the same scene or compare analogous contexts. Within this similar context, Herodotos exchanges the original object for one of the same type (e.g. a bottle of wine for a bottle of champagne). Additionally, the historian may present a specific object diachronically, highlighting how the object changes or remains the same over time. For both methods (repetition and diachronic presentation), he uses the subtle change in the object(s) and the resulting alteration in its (their) connotation to build up a complex message within the body of the object.

Herodotos uses these two methods either individually or collectively to "charge" many objects in the *Histories*. In the subsequent chapters, further examples of the historian's use of object manipulation (Chapter 2: The Fragile Future; Chapter 3: Comparative Objects) and contextual manipulation (Chapter 4: Masistios *Logos;* Chapter 5: The Fallacy of Fortifications) are explored.

Chapter 2:
The Fragile Future: Monuments and Foreshadowing

Time is the domain of the historian. Herodotos frequently manipulates this domain, arranging the sequence of the past to foreshadow his narrative's future.[1] One effective, but unstudied, tool is his use of royal monuments to presage events in his narrative.[2] As the previous chapter demonstrates, the historian uses time to create multiple images of specific objects and to chronicle their changing (or unchanging) shapes and statuses over time. By carefully sequencing the events of his narrative, the historian presents royal monuments diachronically and uses their survival or deterioration to foreshadow the fate of a ruler and/or his kingdom, specifically Lydia, Babylon, Egypt, Samos, and Scythia as each polity is conquered by or successfully resists Persian power.

Royal monuments are the key to this type of foreshadowing, but what do they signify? While monuments may commemorate a life or event, on a basic level they symbolize or represent the dedicant(s). According to Henry Immerwahr, Herodotos uses such monuments as tangible "yardsticks" for the measurement and display of a monarch's greatness in the *Histories*.[3] For example, the historian uses the pyramid of Cheops as a measure of the pharaoh's great power and wealth (ii.124-125). Yet, while Immerwahr correctly identifies this

[1] For Herodotos' general use of foreshadowing see: Lattimore. 1939, pp. 32-33. Flory. 1978, pp. 150-151. Dewald. 1985, pp. 50-51. I. De Jong. 2001, p. 95. Poudrier. 2002, p. 49. Harrison. 2003, *passim*. Brock. 2003, pp. 14-15.
[2] For this chapter "royal monuments" includes not only monuments (e.g. the golden lion statue of Croesus, i.50), but also tombs (e.g. the tomb of Nitocris, i.187).
[3] Immerwahr. 1960, pp. 265-266.

basic significance of monuments as symbols of individual greatness, he overlooks the sophisticated manner in which the historian uses time to reshape many monuments and the significance this manipulation has for a monarch's greatness.

As early as Homer, the Greeks regarded physical monuments as memorials for themselves and their deeds. When Hector proposes to duel an Achaean champion, he vows that he will hang the armor of the man he kills in the temple of Apollo, but will return the champion's body for burial:

> τὸν δὲ νέκυν ἐπὶ νῆας ἐϋσσέλμους ἀποδώσω,
> ὄφρα ἑ ταρχύσωσι κάρη κομόωντες᾽Αχαιοί,
> σῆμά τε οἱ χεύωσιν ἐπὶ πλατεῖ῾Ελλησπόντῳ.
> καί ποτέ τις εἴπῃσι καὶ ὀψιγόνων ἀνθρώπων,
> νηῒ πολυκλήϊδι πλέων ἐπὶ οἴνοπα πόντον·
> 'ἀνδρὸς μὲν τόδε σῆμα πάλαι κατατεθνηῶτος,
> ὅν ποτ' ἀριστεύοντα κατέκτανε φαίδιμος᾽Εκτωρ.'
> ὥς ποτέ τις ἐρέει· τὸ δ' ἐμὸν κλέος οὔ ποτ' ὀλεῖται.
>
> …but his corpse I will give back to the strong-benched ships
> so that the flowing-haired Achaeans may bury him
> and heap a mound over him by the broad Hellespont.
> And one day someone of the men yet to be will say,
> as he sails a many-benched ship on the wine-dark water:
> 'This is the tomb of the brave man buried long ago,
> whom performing feats glorious Hector killed.'
> So will one speak someday; and my glory will never die.
> (*Iliad* vii.84-90)

In Hector's view, the funeral mound will be a monument that preserves the memory of the deeds of both victor and vanquished. Often referring to monuments as μνῆμα, μνημήιον, and μνημόσυνον,[4] Herodotos, too, frequently

[4] μνῆμα – vii.167.2, 228.3. μνημήιον – ii.126.1, 135.3. μνημόσυνον – i.185.1, 186.1; ii.101.2, 110.1, 121.1, 135.3, 148.1; iii.136.3; iv.81.6, 88.2, 166.1; vi.109.3; vii.24, 226.2; ix.16.2.

links commemoration with a physical object.[5] Whether it memorializes a person or deed, the object becomes a measure for the greatness of the individual who dedicated the monument. Although the object may tell the audience little about the individual's personal qualities, Herodotos uses the memorial as an indicator of "… the unmeasurable quality, human greatness."[6]

Time, however, mars this legacy of greatness by diminishing or even effacing its physical representation. Homer illustrates this danger when Nestor, advising his son Antilochus during the funeral games of Patroclus, points out the burial mound of an unknown ancient hero:

> ἤ τευ σῆμα βροτοῖο πάλαι κατατεθνηῶτος,
> ἢ τό γε νύσσα τέτυκτο ἐπὶ προτέρων ἀνθρώπων,
> καὶ νῦν τέρματ' ἔθηκε ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.
>
> … either it is the tomb of a mortal buried long ago,
> or the racing goal fixed by men who lived before us,
> and now swift-footed Achilles made it a turning post.
> (*Iliad* xxiii. 331-333)

Time has changed the *séma*. While it remains physically unchanged, time has altered the object's relationship (or recognition) by the world. The identity of the man who built or is buried in the mound is lost and Nestor can only guess at its function.

Herodotos, too, recognizes the ability of time to affect the physical world. He argues that the Nile was once a gulf of the Mediterranean and that the Nile

[5] Steinkopf. 1957, pp. 74-75. Immerwahr. 1960, pp. 266-267. Bakker. 2002, p. 26.
[6] Immerwahr. 1960, p. 265. "Greatness is then simply wealth and power, and these we measure by reckoning up the trouble undergone in the erection of monuments, and by the marvelous size of the surviving structures. The motivation attributed by Herodotus to the great builders is precisely that of arousing in the beholder a feeling of marvel, and thus perpetuating their fame." For the use of an object, particularly a statue, as a representation of the individual see also: Ducat. 1976, p. 243. Vernant. 1990, pp. 75, 79-82. Steiner. 2001, pp. 11-14.

Delta was a recent addition due to the accretion of silt (ii.11-12). He even posits that in ten or twenty thousand years the continued accumulation of silt will alter the course of the great river towards the Red Sea (ii.11.4). In his proem, the historian recognizes the threat such change over time poses to monuments, proposing to preserve the deeds and works of men from *aklea* over time:

> ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεᾶ γένηται…
>
> … so that the achievements of men may not be forgotten in time, and that the great deeds and wonders, the ones displayed by the Greeks and the others displayed by the barbarians, may not be without glory … [*proem*]

The *erga* that Herodotos seeks to preserve include both monuments and deeds, which he regards collectively as "achievements."[7] In the case of monuments, the historian expresses his doubts about their continued survival. He uses the prospective imperfect and the accompanying statement *kai es eme* (or the like) to create the impression that while an object has survived to the point of his narration it may not endure much longer.[8] Hence, recognizing the vulnerability of physical monuments to the passage of time, the historian seeks to preserve their *kleos* through the process of his *apodexis*.[9]

Foreshadowing Objects

Herodotos preserves the majority of the monuments in his work and with them the *kleos* of their dedicants. Yet, in rare cases, objects in the *Histories* do

[7] As noted earlier, *supra* p. 2, n. 9.
[8] Naiden. 1999, pp. 136-138. e.g. i.93.2f (the inscriptions on the tomb of Alyattes).
[9] Bakker. 2002, pp. 24-26.

deteriorate over time. Herodotos limits this deterioration to monuments associated with monarchs.[10] With the exception of the decay of the maiden statues erected by Mycerinus, used to favor one tradition over another,[11] he employs these monuments as evaluative tools. For example, he exemplifies Xerxes' impiety through the king's theft of the golden statue of Babylon (i.183).[12] Additionally, the historian catalogs the deterioration of the victory monuments erected in other lands by the Egyptian conqueror Sesostris (ii.102-110):

> τὰς δὲ στήλας τὰς ἵστα κατὰ τὰς χώρας ὁ Αἰγύπτου βασιλεὺς Σέσωστρις, αἱ μὲν πλεῦνες οὐκέτι φαίνονται περιεοῦσαι…
>
> Most of the *stelai*, which the Egyptian pharaoh Sesostris erected in the conquered lands, have disappeared. (ii.106.1)

While Herodotos observes that many of the *stelai* no longer survive, he does so, in part, to emphasize the survival of the others. The continued existence of these *stelai* in hostile terrain (Palestine and Asia Minor) testifies not only to the past achievement, but the continuing fame of the Egyptian conqueror.

Aside from these examples, Herodotos restricts the diachronic presentation of royal monuments to the major Persian campaigns against polities with a monarchic figure: Lydia, Samos, Babylon, Egypt, and Scythia. No such presentation appears in lesser campaigns such as Cyrus' failed attempt to

[10] i.50-52, i.91 (the dedications of Croesus); i.183 (the golden statue of Babylon); i.187 (the tomb of Nitocris); ii.102-110 (the victory monuments of Sesostris); ii.130-131 (the maiden statues of Mycerinus); iii.122-123 (the furniture of Polycrates); iv.87 (the *stelai* of Darius). One possible exception is the golden statue of Apollo (vi.118). But Herodotos does not present the deterioration of the statue over time. Rather, he credits Datis with an attempt to restore the statue to its sanctuary.

[11] Herodotos cites the presence of maiden statues' hands on the chamber floor to argue against the story that Mycerinus' wife cut off the hands of her servants. Instead, the historian argues, the hands clearly fell off over time (ii.131).

[12] See Chp. 3, pp. 101-103.

conquer the Massagetae, the Persian expedition against the Libyans at Barca (i.201-216 and iv.197-202), or in the great campaigns against the Greek *poleis* in Ionia and Greece. The accounts of the first two campaigns are shorter and the historian omits a lengthy treatment of their customs, leaders, and a narrative of their history before the Persian invasion. In his presentation of the Greek campaigns, Herodotos describes no single figure as supreme leader; figures such as Aristagoras, Histiaeus, Leonidas, and Themistocles were not autocratic. Herodotos does present a Greek victory trophy, a captured Phoenician trireme, diachronically at viii.121, but only after the major victory at Salamis.[13] In the examples discussed below, the historian presents such monuments *before* his account of a war even begins, anticipating rather than commemorating the results. For the major campaigns against kingdoms, the historian includes an account of the country's significant monuments and memorials. In the course of this review, he presages the polity's fall through the description of monuments belonging to the final (or last significant) ruler.

Herodotos manipulates such objects, or more precisely his audience's perception of them, to alter the monument's function from commemorative to predictive. By changing the object's physical description diachronically, he redirects the audience's attention from the monarch's past greatness to his or her future greatness – the monarch's fate or legacy. As the monument, a measure of monarchic greatness, surrenders to the passage of time, it implies a similar decline in the monarch and, described on the eve of a conflict with Persia, the

[13] See Chp 5, pp. 223-224 for an analysis of the trireme's significance.

subjugation of his or her kingdom. In the first two cases, Lydia and Samos, Herodotos describes the portentous monuments at the moment when the respective monarchs, Croesus and Polycrates, decided to challenge Persian power. In the next two examples, the historian illustrates the fates of Babylon and Egypt through the monuments of their penultimate monarchs, Nitocris and Amasis, who feared the growth of a foreign power. In the final example, that of Scythia, the historian alters this pattern. He uses the survival of the Scythian king's monument and the deterioration of Darius' monument to foreshadow the Persian king's defeat. In each campaign, then, the historian uses these "yardsticks" not merely as an indicator of royal greatness, but as an indicator of royal destiny as well.

The Dedications of Croesus (i.50-52)

The first monarch to succumb to Persian power in the *Histories* is the tragic figure Croesus.[14] Herodotos fills the account of the king with foreshadowing, from Solon's description of the happiest man (i.30-33) to the monarch's dream about his son's death (i.34), presaging the disasters that will befall Croesus.[15] In addition to these warnings, Herodotos uses the Lydian king's dedications to Delphi and the Amphiareion (i.50-52) to foreshadow the monarch's fall in his war against Persia. Presenting the objects at a critical moment – Croesus' consultation with Delphi about the war – Herodotos describes them diachronically, removing each notable monument from the monarch's control at

[14] Immerwahr. 1966, pp. 69-71. White. 1969, pp. 47-48. Segal. 1971, p. 50. Saïd. 2002, pp. 134-7.
[15] Stahl. 1975, pp. 4, 8-9.

the moment of its description. Through this catalog, the historian creates a subtext of failure that paves the way for a negative reading of the subsequent ambiguous oracles (i.53-55).

Herodotos compiles a highly selective catalog of Croesus' dedications at i.50-52. He describes the physical deterioration or appropriation of each of the Lydian king's notable dedications. Yet, after Croesus' fall from power (i.84-91), the historian describes other dedications belonging to the Lydian king more objectively. Cataloging several other notable monuments, Herodotos simply states that some survived and other did not:

> ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ἔτι ἐς ἐμὲ ἦν περιεόντα, τὰ δ' ἐξαπόλωλε τῶν ἀναθημάτων·
>
> … these dedications survived even to my own day but others have perished; (i.92.1)

The mixture of these monuments' fates contrasts sharply with the uniform destruction and degradation of monuments in the earlier catalog. For example, he states that Croesus sent both a golden shield that was displayed in the temple of Athena Pronaia at Delphi and a golden tripod to the temple of Ismenian Apollo (i.92.1). Despite his lengthy description of other Lydian dedications at the same shrines in his earlier catalog (i.50-52), the historian reserves the mention of these offerings until after Cyrus' conquest of Lydia. His delay in the description of these other notable dedications until i.92 suggests that the historian carefully shapes his presentation of the dedications at i.50-52.[16]

[16] For the selectivity of Herodotos' catalog at i.50-52 see Parke. 1984, p. 222. and Flower. 1991, p. 67 n. 69. Parke argues that Herodotos conflated several discrete dedicatory acts into one display of generosity. Flower notes several recent archaeological finds that have been attributed to the

According to Herodotos, Croesus initiated his contact with Delphi and the Amphiareion to see whether he might check the growing power of Cyrus, the king of Persia. Seeking to win the gods favor, Croesus conducted animal sacrifices and sent splendid gifts to the two shrines. While Herodotos' description of these dedications may stem from an interest in wealth[17] or his reliance upon object-driven mnemonic traditions,[18] he also notes the frailty of each to the passage of time.

Herodotos begins the catalog with the sacrifices that Croesus conducted in Lydia. The monarch sacrificed to the god costly yet functional items such as gold- and silver-plated *klinae*, golden *phialae*, purple cloaks and *chitons*, which he burned on a large pyre (i.50.1). Next, he ordered the Lydian people to sacrifice to Apollo, each according to his ability and collected the precious metal for his own dedication. From this metal he had built a statue base composed of gold and electrum half-bricks, whose size and weight Herodotos carefully notes in order to emphasize the wealth of Lydia (i.50.2). Atop this base, the historian continues, Croesus placed a golden statue of a lion, the symbol of the Mermnadid dynasty,[19] weighing ten talents. But Herodotos no sooner describes its erection than he describes its fall in the great fire that destroyed the Temple of Apollo:

> οὗτος ὁ λέων, ἐπείτε κατεκαίετο ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖσι νηός, κατέπεσε ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμιπλινθίων (ἐπὶ γὰρ τούτοισι ἵδρυτο), καὶ νῦν

Lydian dynasty, suggesting that Croesus' dedications exceeded those described within the *Histories*.

[17] Flory. 1987, p. 85. Konstan. 1987, pp. 68-73.

[18] Flower. 1991, pp. 69-70.

[19] How and Wells. 1912, *loc. sit*. Asheri.1988, pp. 292-293. Both commentaries focus upon the historical issues of the statue (its dimensions, et al.).

κεῖται ἐν τῷ Κορινθίων θησαυρῷ, ἕλκων σταθμὸν ἕβδομον ἡμιτάλαντον· ἀπετάκη γὰρ αὐτοῦ τέταρτον ἡμιτάλαντον.

This lion, when the temple at Delphi burned down, fell from its base of half-bricks (upon which it had been placed), and now lies in the Corinthian Treasury. It weighs six and one-half talents; for three and a half talents of it melted in the fire. (i.50.3)

Described both before and after the temple fire, the statue wastes away before the eyes of the audience, losing nearly four talents worth of gold. The statue's fall from its base of bricks, funded by the Lydian people, may be understood to signify the end of Croesus' leadership of his people. The wasting away of the lion, the symbol of the king's dynasty, presages Croesus' impending reduction from monarch to slave.[20]

In addition to the physical deterioration, Herodotos undermines Croesus' claim to the monument. Once Croesus dedicated the statue to Apollo, it became the god's property. But, as the dedicant, the Lydian king retained a link with the object and through it a special connection to the god. Noting the movement of the monument from its place of honor near the temple to the Corinthian treasury (καὶ νῦν κεῖται ἐν τῷ Κορινθίων θησαυρῷ / and [it] now lies in the Corinthian Treasury – i.50.3), Herodotos challenges this link.[21] This placement weakened Croesus' connection with the statue and established a new connection between the statue and the Corinthians.

In the context of public display at Delphi, a *thesauros* has a proprietary significance. While a personal gift expressed an individual's relationship with the

[20] Kurke. 1999, p. 62. Kurke has also noted the implication of the damage to the statue, but overlooks the significance of its new placement and the similar presentation of Croesus' other dedications.
[21] Since the fire damaged the statue, the dedication presumably originally stood near the temple.

god, the *thesauros* removed the dedication from the individual sphere and placed it in the context of the *polis*. The treasury re-contextualized the dedication. While the dedication still reflected well on the dedicant, it now also glorified the *polis*.[22] Thus, in the case of Croesus' monuments, the placement of a dedication within the control of another polity signaled the end of the object's exclusive connection with the Lydian king. Hence, when the golden statue was moved, it ceased to be a solely Lydian dedication. Croesus' claim to the statue and the privileged relationship with the god it represented was then shared with the Corinthians. Through this redefinition, Herodotos transforms the Lydian king's enduring symbol of his power into a more malleable, even transitory, image. Altering its size, shape, and location, he presents the statue as a changeable object against an unchanging (albeit restored) background of temple and treasury.

Herodotos similarly undermines Croesus' link to his other notable dedications. The historian first describes the fate of two immense[23] and exceptional[24] *kraters*, one gold, and the other silver:

> κρητῆρας δύο μεγάθεϊ μεγάλους, χρύσεον καὶ ἀργύρεον, τῶν ὁ μὲν χρύσεος ἔκειτο ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ἐσιόντι ἐς τὸν νηόν, ὁ δὲ ἀργύρεος ἐπ' ἀριστερά. μετεκινήθησαν δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ὑπὸ τὸν νηὸν κατακαέντα καὶ ὁ μὲν χρύσεος κεῖται ἐν τῷ Κλαζομενίων θησαυρῷ, ἔλκων σταθμὸν εἴνατον ἡμιτάλαντον καὶ ἔτι δυώδεκα μνέας, ὁ δὲ ἀργύρεος ἐπὶ τοῦ προνηίου τῆς γωνίης, χωρέων ἀμφορέας ἑξακοσίους·
>
> There are two large *kraters*, one gold and the other silver, the gold one was placed on the right side of the temple entrance, the silver

[22] Neer. 2001, p. 284.
[23] For a structural analysis of the golden *krater's* that supports Herodotos' description of the vessel see: Blackman and Sawyer. 2000, pp. 319-321.
[24] Asheri. 1988, pp. 293-294. Besides labeling the *kraters* as "not everyday works," the historian emphasizes their splendor with the reference to the famed artist/architect Theodorus of Samos.

> one on the left. They were moved when the temple burned down and the gold *krater* located in the Clazomenian Treasury, weighs nine half-talents and twelve minae, the silver *krater* located in the corner of the temple's *pronaos*, holds six hundred amphorae. (i.51.1-2)

Although they survived the fire, the *kraters*, like the lion statue, were relocated in the aftermath. They were separated and moved to positions of lesser honor (another building and the corner of the *pronaos*). Once again Herodotos re-contextualizes Croesus' dedications by establishing connections between his monuments and other polities. Although the Clazomenians were subjects of Croesus,[25] their treasury was not his. The placement of the golden *krater* within their structure would have re-contextualized the object as a Clazomenian dedication. Similarly the silver *krater* fell prey to appropriation by the Delphians, who used the *krater* in their Theophania celebration (ἐπικίρναται γὰρ ὑπὸ Δελφῶν Θεοφανίοισι. / wine is mixed in it by the Delphians for the Theophania – i.51.2). Although these dedications retained a link to Croesus, Herodotos uses their movement to establish other claims than those of the Lydian king and hence to undermine his connection to these monuments.

Like the *kraters*, the silver *pithoi* and golden sprinklers passed outside of Lydian control. Herodotos locates the four silver *pithoi* in the Corinthian treasury (καὶ πίθους τε ἀργυρέους τέσσερας ἀπέπεμψε, οἳ ἐν τῷ Κορινθίων θησαυρῷ ἑστᾶσι / He also sent four silver *pithoi*, which stand in the Corinthian Treasury – i.51.3). The historian uses this observation once again to undermine Croesus' connection to his dedications. Placing these vessels in another polity's *thesauros*,

[25] Balcer. 1984, p. 81.

Herodotos transforms them from aristocratic dedications into a public, even foreign, gifts to the god. Croesus' loss of his golden sprinkler was more blatant. According to the historian, a Delphian stole the sprinkler by falsely engraving the name of the Lacedaemonians upon it and allowing the Spartans to incorporate it into a statue of a boy:

> καὶ περιρραντήρια δύο ἀνέθηκε, χρύσεόν τε καὶ ἀργύρεον, τῶν τῷ χρυσέῳ ἐπιγέγραπται Λακεδαιμονίων φαμένων εἶναι ἀνάθημα, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντες·
>
> …and he dedicated two sprinklers, both gold and silver, of which the gold one has the name of the Lacedaemonians engraved upon it and they claim it is their dedication, but they do not speak the truth; (i.51.3)[26]

The theft provides an explicit indication that, once again, one of Croesus' dedications has changed location, function, and ownership.

Croesus' dedications to the shrine of Amphiaraus suffered a similar fate. According to Herodotos, the Lydian king deemed the oracle to be truthful (i.49) and rewarded this honesty with the gift of a golden shield and a spear with a golden shaft and head (i.52). Although the Lydian king dedicated the shield and spear at the Amphiareion, Herodotos describes their placement in the temple of Ismenian Apollo in his own day. The implicit movement of the dedications challenges the link that Croesus sought to establish between himself and the god. Additionally, although the historian states that the objects were still extant in his own day (τὰ ἔτι καὶ ἀμφότερα ἐς ἐμὲ ἦν / both of these were still in existence

[26] West.1985, p. 280. West notes that the false inscription and Herodotos' correction as a warning against undue confidence in epigraphic evidence. This may also be the case, but it does not negate the argument that Herodotos is also using the sprinkler to illustrate Croesus' loss of control over his dedications.

in my day – i.52), he implies that the objects will not long survive. He frequently uses the prospective imperfect with the phrase "in my time" (ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ἦν) to suggest an object's imminent decay.[27] Thus described, Croesus' dedications to the Amphiareion, like those to Delphi, soon passed beyond his control and, although not destroyed or damaged, they faced an uncertain future.

In his account of the dedications sent to Delphi and the Amphiareion, Herodotos differentiates between notable (or marked) objects and unremarkable (or "unsigned") objects. The Lydian king's dedications of the latter type suffered no deterioration over time. Croesus sent silver basins, the golden statue of a woman, which the Delphians claimed was of his baker, and his own wife's jewelry and girdle (i.51.5). Although hardly less impressive than the other dedications,[28] Herodotos does not mention any deleterious effects time may have had upon them. However, the historian distinguishes these enduring objects by describing them as Croesus' "unremarkable" or, more literally, "unmarked" dedications (ἄλλα τε ἀναθήματα οὐκ ἐπίσημα πολλὰ / and many unmarked dedications - i.51.5).[29] These are minor works that possess no explicit link to the Lydian king. Hence, the historian does not employ them as indicators of Croesus' fate.

[27] Naiden. 1999, p. 138, n. 17.
[28] The silver *pithoi* do not appear to stand out from the silver basins. Similarly a golden statue, even of a baker, appears to be a more remarkable sign of wealth than the stolen sprinklers. Finally, Croesus' dedication of his wife's jewelry and clothing would seem to offer a possible resonance to the clothing of Candaules' wife.
[29] Powell, p. 137 s.v. ἐπίσημος (2) defines the adjective to mean "remarkable," but LSJ, p. 656 s.v. ἐπίσημος II defines the adjective to mean "having a mark, inscription."

The major dedications, however, occupy a central role and Herodotos links Croesus' subsequent consultation of the oracles to them. The historian describes the Lydian ambassadors as the men who were bringing the gifts (τοῖσι δὲ ἄγειν μέλλουσι τῶν Λυδῶν ταῦτα τὰ δῶρα ἐς τὰ ἱρὰ ἐνετέλλετο ὁ Κροῖσος ἐπειρωτᾶν τὰ χρηστήρια / Croesus ordered the Lydians about to bring these gifts to the temples to ask the oracle … – i.53.1) and offered the dedications (οἱ Λυδοὶ ἀνέθεσαν τὰ ἀναθήματα / the Lydians offered the dedications - i.53.2). When these men addressed the oracles, they identified Croesus, who sought the oracle, as the man that gave worthy gifts to the shrine:

> Κροῖσος ὁ Λυδῶν τε καὶ ἄλλων ἐθνέων βασιλεύς, νομίσας τάδε μαντήια εἶναι μοῦνα ἐν ἀνθρώποισι, ὑμῖν τε ἄξια δῶρα ἔδωκε τῶν ἐξευρημάτων, καὶ νῦν ὑμέας ἐπειρωτᾷ εἰ στρατεύηται ἐπὶ Πέρσας καὶ εἴ τινα στρατὸν ἀνδρῶν προσθέοιτο σύμμαχον.
>
> Croesus the king of the Lydians and other nations, believing these oracles alone to be true among men, both gave gifts worthy of divination, and now asks you if he should wage war against the Persians and if he should seek an alliance. (i.53.2)

But, as Herodotos shows, these worthy gifts have an unfortunate future, which suggests the meaning of the oracles' ambiguous answers. The historian, then, uses the fate of these gifts to foreshadow that the great empire that Croesus would destroy when he campaigned against the Persians (ἢν στρατεύηται ἐπὶ Πέρσας, μεγάλην ἀρχὴν μιν καταλύσειν· / …if he should wage war against the Persians, that he would destroy a great empire - i.53.3) would be his own.

Herodotos reiterates this destiny through the *krater* at i.70, which the Spartans sent to Croesus to commemorate an alliance (i.69.4 – 70.1). Similar to the

noteworthy dedications at Delphi and the Amphiareion, Herodotos describes the *krater* emphatically, noting in particular its composition, decoration, and great size:

> τοῦτο δὲ ποιησάμενοι κρητῆρα χάλκεον ζῳδίων τε ἔξωθεν πλήσαντες περὶ τὸ χεῖλος καὶ μεγάθεϊ τριηκοσίους ἀμφορέας χωρέοντα ἦγον,
>
> They had this bronze *krater* made, in size large enough to hold three hundred amphorae, and covered with figures around a rim on the exterior (i.70.1)

The fate of this *krater*, though, like those the Lydian king dedicated in Greece, foreshadows Croesus' fall. According to the historian, the vessel never reached Sardis for one of two reasons. Either the Samians stole the *krater* (i.70.2) or the Spartan ambassadors sold it to the Samians when they learned of Croesus' capture by Cyrus (i.70.3). No matter which version of events the audience believes, the result is the same. Croesus lost "his" *krater* to the Samians who dedicated it at their Heraion (i.70.3). Like the earlier dedications, then, the historian uses the *krater's* transfer to another's control to foreshadow the Lydian king's fall.[30]

Thus, through his discussion of Croesus' dedications at Delphi and the Amphiareion at i.50-52, Herodotos creates a subtext of destruction and loss that foreshadows the fall of the Lydian king and his kingdom on the eve of war with Persia. Presenting the significant objects diachronically before revealing the Lydian king's fate or his questions to the oracles, Herodotos emphasizes the negative fate of the objects most closely linked to Croesus. As an indicator of the

[30] Poudrier. 2002, pp. 49-50. Poudrier has also noted the predictive nature of the Lacedaemonian krater.

Lydian king's greatness, the deterioration of these objects presages Croesus' similar decline from monarch to slave. Herodotos reinforces this perception by structurally linking the monuments closely to his inquiry about the war. Although the king cannot perceive it, the god gives the audience a clear indication of the monarch's future through the fate of his many dedications.

The Couch of Polycrates (iii.121-123)

Like Croesus, Polycrates too considered interfering with the affairs of Persia. The satrap of Sardis, Oroetes, lured the tyrant to his death with an offer of gold in return for his support for a supposed rebellion from Persia. At the moment of Oroetes' offer to Polycrates, Herodotos uses the diachronic presentation of an object that belongs to the tyrant (the furniture of his *andreion*) to foreshadow the Samian's fall. The decisive moment occurs when Oroetes, an enemy unknown to Polycrates, devised a plan to lure the tyrant to the mainland in order to kill him. Dispatching a messenger to the Samian court (iii.121), the Persian offered Polycrates gold in return for help (iii.122). Although the historian refers to the tyrant's impending fall in the episode of Polycrates' ring (iii.39-43), he presents no specific expectation of disaster in this passage until the warnings of several soothsayers and Polycrates' daughter just prior to the tyrant's departure for Magnesia (iii.124). Drawing upon the funerary imagery of Polycrates' *kline* and Maeandrius' dedication of the tyrant's belongings, the historian anticipates these explicit warnings.

Herodotos uses two notable objects to reflect both the intent and the fate of the two men: Oroetes' *larnakes* and the furniture from Polycrates' *andreion* (particularly his *kline*). The purpose of the first object is clearly deceptive. The historian presents the *larnakes* transparently, showing that Oroetes filled them with stones and then covered the stones with a thin layer of gold to give the appearance of a great hoard of wealth (iii.123.2). In a manner reminiscent of Thrasybulus' deception of Alyattes during the siege of Miletus (i.22), Oroetes used an apparent abundance of an object to manipulate another's behavior. While Oroetes used the *larnakes* to entice Polycrates, though, the historian uses the objects to emphasize the Persian's duplicitous nature.

Polycrates' gullibility is to be expected. Previously, when faced with the highly significant events surrounding his signet ring, the tyrant only perceived their superficial meaning.[31] Unlike the tyrant, the Egyptian pharaoh Amasis recognized the significance of the ring's recovery. He broke off his friendship (*xenia*) with Polycrates, seeking to avoid the grief that he would feel for his friend when some inevitable and horrible mischance (συντυχίης δεινῆς) befell him (iii.43.2). Herodotos notes this turn of Polycrates' luck when the tyrant, reclining in his *andreion*, greeted Oroetes' emissary. According to the historian, either by design or chance (συντυχίη) the tyrant faced the wall as the messenger delivered the Persian satrap's message:

[31] van der Veen. 1993, pp. 435-448, esp. 446-448. Polycrates failed to follow Amasis' advice. Instead of discarding an object whose loss would cause him to suffer (ἀλγεῖν), the tyrant selected an object whose loss would merely grieve him (ἀσάσθαι).

καί κως εἴτε ἐκ προνοίης αὐτὸν κατηλογέοντα τὰ Ὀροίτεω πρήγματα, εἴτε καὶ συντυχίη τις τοιαύτη ἐπεγένετο· τόν τε γὰρ κήρυκα τὸν Ὀροίτεω παρελθόντα διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ τὸν Πολυκράτεα (τυχεῖν γὰρ ἀπεστραμμένον πρὸς τὸν τοῖχον), οὔτε τι μεταστραφῆναι οὔτε τι ὑποκρίνασθαι.

> And it happened that Polycrates was facing the wall when Oroetes' messenger came to speak, whether from intention to slight Oroetes' power or by some sort of chance, and he neither turned around nor gave an answer. (iii.121.2)

Like the Lydian monarch Meles, who overlooked (κατηλόγησε) guarding the precipitous portion of Sardis' acropolis (i.84.3),[32] Polycrates contributed to his downfall by overlooking the danger inherent in Oroetes' message and the turn of his luck.

Herodotos alludes to this downfall through Polycrates' manner and position upon his *kline.* Although the historian does not mention the piece of furniture, he describes the tyrant as "lying down in his *andreion*" (κατακείμενον ἐν ἀνδρεῶνι). The tyrant's presence and placement in the room implies the presence of a *kline*, a piece of furniture commonly found in Greek *andreia*. As in the episode of his signet ring, the tyrant remained blind to the impending danger, a position Polycrates physically emulated by facing the wall during the audience (ἀπεστραμμένον πρὸς τὸν τοῖχον). Moreover, the tyrant's position upon the *kline* heightens the sense of danger. In addition to its symposiastic

[32] Herodotos uses this verb only three times – in the tale about Meles (Μήλης ὁ πρότερον βασιλεὺς Σαρδίων … κατηλόγησε … / Meles, an earlier king of Sardis, disregarded this ... - i.84.3), the athlete Agasicles' disdain for established custom that led to Halicarnassus' expulsion from the Triopium (ἀνὴρ ὧν Ἁλικαρνησσεύς, τῷ οὔνομα ἦν Ἀγασικλέης, νικήσας τὸν νόμον κατηλόγησε / The man was a Halicarnassian, by name Agasicles, who although he emerged victorious disregarded the custom … - i.144.3), and Polycrates' oversight here (iii.121.2).

connotation, a *kline* possessed a funereal significance.[33] Frequently Greek art presents the honored dead in the position of a symposiast, lying upon his *kline* with all the accoutrements of the feast (side table, food, wine, et al.).[34] The image of Polycrates lying (κατακείμενον) upon the *kline* supports this sepulchral view. Moreover, this verb is often used to describe the laying out of an animal for sacrifice or a body for burial.[35] Herodotos, then, uses the *kline* and Polycrates' appearance on it to create an ambiguous image of the tyrant both at a feast and at a funeral.

The fate of the tyrant's *kline* supports this funereal image. After hearing the satrap's proposal, Polycrates sent his secretary Maeandrius to verify Oroetes' offer of riches (iii.123.1). However, Herodotos interrupts the flow of the narrative here and notes that:

> ὃς χρόνῳ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον τούτων τὸν κόσμον τὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνδρεῶνος τοῦ Πολυκράτεος ἐόντα ἀξιοθέητον ἀνέθηκε πάντα ἐς τὸ Ἥραιον.
>
> [Maeandrius] not much later than these events dedicated all the magnificent furniture of Polycrates' *andreion*, which is worthy of seeing, to the Samian Heraion. (iii.123.1)

Describing the dedication as "worthy of seeing," Herodotos emphasizes the furniture that would have included Polycrates' *kline* and alludes to a time when the tyrant would no longer have need of it. Through this second description of the tyrant's furniture, immediately after Polycrates consented to Oroetes' proposal, the historian signals the outcome of the *logos* – the death of Polycrates.

---

[33] Boardman. 1990, pp. 127-129.
[34] Murray. 1983, p. 263. and Boardman. 1990, pp. 126-128.
[35] Sacrifice: *Od*. x.532; Funerary: *Il.* 24.10, 527; Tyrt. 11.19; Ar. *Ach.* 70. Herodotos uses the verb only two other times to refer to the laying out of the sick (iii.29.3 and vii.229.1).

Like Croesus, Polycrates fell from power when he attempted to interfere with Persia. In both cases, Herodotos describes not merely the individual's decision, but explores the moment of decision-making, in which he uses the fate of the ruler's property to foreshadow the fate of the ruler himself. For Croesus, he focuses upon the dedications with which the king hoped to win the favor of Delphi; for Polycrates he focuses upon the *kline* from which the tyrant consented to a plan that lead to his execution. Depicting the objects over time, Herodotos uses the future state of the dedications to reflect the future state of the monarch or tyrant. Damaged, destroyed, or more commonly displaced (in location and association), the object foreshadows the fate of an individual no longer able to maintain control over his possessions.

The Tomb of Nitocris of Babylon (i.187)

In the conquests of Babylon and Egypt, Herodotos instead focuses on a notable monarch who reacted to the growing power of another nation rather than a monarch conquered by the Persians.[36] Through the presentation of their monuments, the historian foreshadows the impending conquests of the kingdoms but not the rulers' individual destinies. Like the accounts of Lydia and Samos, Herodotos foreshadows the fall of Babylon at a critical moment in the narrative – on the eve of the Persian invasion. Although Cyrus defeated the Babylonian king Labynetus, the historian focuses on his mother, Queen Nitocris,

[36] Nitocris strengthened the fortifications of Babylon in response to the growing power of the Medes (i.185.1). Fearful of the power of Persia (iii.1.2), Amasis could not refuse Cambyses' request for the pharaoh's daughter in marriage (iii.1).

and her effort to strengthen the Babylonian defenses. Presenting her tomb diachronically immediately before the invasion, the historian demonstrates the futility of her attempt to safeguard the city. He transforms the queen from Babylon's protector into the means of its capture.

Babylon became a Persian target after Cyrus' conquest of Asia Minor. Before the invasion, however, Herodotos describes the ancient city, its temples, and its extensive fortifications (i.178-183). Queen Nitocris, whose son would face Cyrus' invading armies, attempted to strengthen these fortifications. Like Croesus, Nitocris feared a neighboring power, the Medes rather than the Persians, but to a Greek audience the two were often synonymous (i.185). Diverting the course of the Euphrates into a reservoir, she built walls along the banks of the river within the city (i.185-186). This project would later provide Cyrus with the means to capture the city (i.190-191).[37]

Herodotos illustrates the futility of the queen's efforts through the description of her tomb, which she placed atop a heavily trafficked gate of the city:

> ὑπὲρ τῶν μάλιστα λεωφόρων πυλέων τοῦ ἄστεος τάφον ἑωυτῇ κατεσκευάσατο μετέωρον ἐπιπολῆς αὐτέων τῶν πυλέων,
>
> She had a tomb built for herself atop one of the most-heavily trafficked gates of the city right above the gates themselves… (i.187.1)

Outside the tomb she inscribed an invitation to future rulers of the city to remove money from the chamber in time of need (i.187.1-2). The queen's resting place

[37] See Chp. 5, pp. 195-196.

remained undisturbed until years after the Persian conquest, when Darius, vexed that he could not use the gate[38] and desiring the money, opened the tomb:

> τῇσι δὲ πύλῃσι ταύτῃσι οὐδὲν ἐχρᾶτο τοῦδε εἵνεκα, ὅτι ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς οἱ ἐγίνετο ὁ νεκρὸς διεξελαύνοντι. ἀνοίξας δὲ τὸν τάφον εὗρε χρήματα μὲν οὔ, τὸν δὲ νεκρὸν καὶ γράμματα λέγοντα τάδε· εἰ μὴ ἄπληστός τε ἔας χρημάτων καὶ αἰσχροκερδής, οὐκ ἂν νεκρῶν θήκας ἀνέῳγες.
>
> And he never used these gates for this reason, because there would be a corpse above his head as he drove through. But opening the tomb he did not discover the money, but her corpse and an inscription, which read: if you had not been greedy for money and avaricious, you would not have opened the chamber of the dead. (i.187.4-5)

While Herodotos presents Nitocris as a vengeful queen[39] who mocked Darius for his wasteful behavior,[40] he also uses her tomb to reveal the failure of her efforts to safeguard Babylon. First, in her inscribed invitation, the historian states that the queen wrote her message for future monarchs of Babylon (i.187.2). Although Darius, as the king of Persia, was also king of Babylon, it is unlikely that Nitocris anticipated that her successor would have been a foreign conqueror.

Second, Herodotos uses the violation of the queen's tomb to undermine the efficacy of Babylon's reinforced fortifications. The historian's placement of the episode is purposeful. He does not recount the tale during Darius' siege of the city in book III when the story would make the most sense chronologically. Instead, Herodotos places the description of the tomb at a pivotal point in the

[38] How and Wells. 1912, *loc. sit*. Dillery. 1992, pp. 36-37. Dillery posits that Darius' unwillingness to pass beneath a corpse stemmed from the monarch's Zoroastrianism.
[39] Flory. 1987, pp. 41-42.
[40] Avery. 1972, pp. 545-546. Avery's claim that the episode creates an implicit comparison between Darius and Cyrus is questionable. Darius' actions and the objects with which he interacts have no counterpart in the later chapters on Cyrus. Hence the comparison as presented by Avery is one based upon the actions of Darius and the inaction of Cyrus in dissimilar circumstances.

Babylonian *logos*: directly after his lengthy description of the city's fortifications (i.178-186) and immediately before Cyrus' breach of these same defenses (i.188-191). The historian closely links the city's *teichea* to Nitocris, who is the only individual named in their construction. She even enhanced the already formidable walls with a set of interior walls and gates along the banks of the Euphrates (i.184-186). Finally, she placed her tomb *within* the exterior *teichos*, above one of the city's heavily trafficked, strong, bronze gates (i.187.1).[41] Here, she provided a modicum of protection against foreign invaders; for she rendered the gate unusable to Darius, whom Persian or Zoroastrian *nomoi* may have prevented from passing under a grave (i.187.4).[42] When Herodotos describes the opening of her tomb by a successor of Cyrus, whose siege immediately follows, he presents the metaphorical penetration of the city's defenses that he so closely associated with the queen, and he reveals the futility of her efforts.

Herodotos emphasizes the link between Nitocris' attempt to secure Babylon and Babylon's failure to hold out against Cyrus' siege. Frustrated by the old defenses of Babylon (i.190), Cyrus exploited the recent channels and reservoir that Nitocris had built to divert the Euphrates and to reinforce the Babylonian defenses. Using these structures, the Persian king diverted the river (i.191.1) and breached the city's defenses through the walls and gates that Nitocris constructed along the riverbanks within the city (i.191.5). Since the Babylonians neglected to guard these positions, the failure of these defenses did not lie with

[41] Presumably this gate, like each gate of the city possessed a bronze door, jamb, and lintel (πύλαι δὲ ἐνεστᾶσι πέριξ τοῦ τείχεος ἑκατόν, χάλκεαι πᾶσαι, καὶ σταθμοί τε καὶ ὑπέρθυρα ὡσαύτως - i.179.3).
[42] Dillery. 1992, p. 37.

Nitocris. But the queen's construction of the channels and reservoir allowed Cyrus to expose these unguarded sections and to capture the city.

Hence, Herodotos uses the dual image (intact and violated) of Nitocris' tomb not merely to illustrate Darius' greed, but also to foreshadow the Persian conquest of Babylon. Linking the tomb to the queen's fortification efforts and placing it in the text before the Persian siege, Herodotos transforms the tomb into a weathervane of Babylon's fortunes. As Darius would one day breach her tomb so also would Cyrus breach the city's vaunted defenses.

Amasis and the Temple of Hephaestus (ii.176)

Like Babylon, Herodotos foreshadows the fall of Egypt through the monuments of the penultimate pharaoh Amasis, against whom Cambyses launched the Persian invasion. But instead of presenting Amasis' monuments diachronically, the historian allows the unchanging image of the monuments to equate the pharaoh to a fallen warrior. Herodotos describes the monuments after his account of the pharaoh's rise to power and the nature of his rule (ii.162-174), but before his description of the Persian conquest (ii.181f).[43]

Although Amasis dedicated many noteworthy works to a variety of temples (ii.176.1), the historian focuses upon his dedications to the Temple of

[43] Although Herodotos first mentions Cambyses' desire to invade Egypt at ii.1 and implies Egypt's conquest at ii.110, he does not specify when the conquest took place until this point (ὡς ἐπεκράτησε Καμβύσης Αἰγύπτου – ii.181.5). Only after this revelation does the historian diachronically describes some of Amasis' dedications to Greek temples that survived until Herodotos' day (αἳ ἐν τῷ νηῷ τῷ μεγάλῳ ἱδρύατο ἔτι καὶ τὸ μέχρι ἐμεῦ, - ii.182.1). The survival of these dedications does not undermine Herodotos' foreshadowing at ii.176, for, as in the case of Croesus' surviving notable monuments (i.91), the historian delays their description until after he reveals the fate of Egypt.

Athene at Sais and the Temple of Hephaestus. In the Egyptian *logos*, temples, particularly the temple of Hephaestus, provide an arena of display for the different pharaohs. Herodotos uses the temple of Hephaestus as the setting for royal dedications that in some way symbolized the dedicants.[44] Beyond the bounds of sacred precincts, as well, the historian uses objects to reify some aspect of a pharaoh's nature. He recounts the dimensions and construction techniques for several pyramids, which he uses to symbolize the despotism of Cheops (ii.124-125), the prostitution of his daughter (ii.126), and the lesser despotism of Chephren (ii.127) and others.[45] In the case of the militaristic Necos, the historian mentions none of the typical dedications, but links the pharaoh to slipways for triremes and states that he dedicated the clothes he wore in a battle against the Syrians to Apollo and Branchidae (ii.159). Finally, Amasis used an object to symbolize himself. He transformed a golden footbath into the statue of a god as a metaphor for his own transformation from commoner to pharaoh (ii.172).[46]

Herodotos uses Amasis' monuments at the temples of Athene and Hephaestus in an equally revealing way. In the first temple the pharaoh erected a *propylaia*, a large stone chamber, and male-sphinxes as symbols of his greatness (ii.175). But his next two dedications, two recumbent statues placed before this temple and the temple of Hephaestus, suggest a limit to this greatness:

---

[44] The first pharaoh, Min, was credited with the temple's foundation (ii.99). His successor Sesostris erected large statues of himself and his family before the temple, which the historian links to his legacy as a conqueror (ii.110). The blind Pheros dedicated two stone obelisks as a thank-offering for the recovery of his sight. Sethos dedicated a statue of himself with a mouse, the creature that helped him to ward off a foreign invasion (ii.141).
[45] Moeris (ii.101); Mycerinus (ii.134); the two pyramids of the duodecarchs (ii.149).
[46] Dewald. 1993, pp. 59-60. Hollmann. 1998, p. 159.

> ἀνέθηκε δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖσι ἄλλοισι ἱροῖσι ὁ Ἄμασις πᾶσι τοῖσι ἐλλογίμοισι ἔργα τὸ μέγαθος ἀξιοθέητα, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἐν Μέμφι τὸν ὕπτιον κείμενον κολοσσὸν τοῦ Ἡφαιστείου ἔμπροσθε, τοῦ πόδες πέντε καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα εἰσὶ τὸ μῆκος· ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ βάθρῳ ἑστᾶσι Αἰθιοπικοῦ ἐόντες λίθου δύο κολοσσοί, εἴκοσι ποδῶν τὸ μέγαθος ἑὼν ἑκάτερος, ὁ μὲν ἔνθεν, ὁ δ' ἔνθεν τοῦ μεγάλου. ἔστι δὲ λίθινος ἕτερος τοσοῦτος καὶ ἐν Σάι, κείμενος κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ ἐν Μέμφι.
>
> Amasis also dedicated to all the other temples of note works worthy of seeing for their size, and in Memphis there is a colossal recumbent statue in front of the temple of Hephaestus, which is seventy five feet long; on the same platform stand two colossal statues of Ethiopian stone, each being twenty feet in height, on both sides. There is another such stone statue in Sais, lying in the same manner as the one in Memphis. (ii.176.1-2)

Herodotos emphasizes the statues indirectly by placing them between other noteworthy dedications (ἀξιοθέητα) and the most noteworthy temple of Isis that Amasis built at Memphis (ἀξιοθεητότατον). Despite these epithets the historian focuses on the statues in between, giving the other dedications and the temple scant attention. The positions of the statues were unusual, and it is likely that either they had fallen over by Herodotos' time or had never been erected to the vertical position.[47] The historian overlooks the possible implication of each statue's fall and concentrates upon their recumbent (ὕπτιον) position. At first such a figure might seem to suit the symposiastic lifestyle that the monarch so enjoyed (ii.173), but the figures were lying on their backs (ὕπτιον), a position unsuited to the symposium.[48] Rather, in Homer, the term commonly refers to a

[47] Lloyd. 1993, vol. II p. 218.

[48] Neither Herodotos nor his contemporaries use ὕπτιον in a symposiastic context. In Aristophanes *Lysistrata* 195 the adjective refers to an inverted *kylix*, not a person.

person who has fallen onto his back in death, usually during combat.[49] Hence, at not one, but two Egyptian temples, the historian describes statues of Amasis, symbols of the pharaoh's greatness, which resembled fallen warriors.

Thus, for four major Persian conquests (Lydia, Babylon, Egypt, and Samos) Herodotos uses royal monuments to foreshadow the fall of the kingdom. For Lydia and Samos, he focuses on their respective rulers as they considered confronting Persian power or interfering with Persian affairs. Selecting the moment of decision (Croesus' consultation of Delphi and Polycrates' consideration of Oroetes' offer), the historian then describes the deterioration of objects closely associated with the rulers. The display of the object's loss, damage, or destruction in turn reflects upon the owner and indicates the likely result of the current decision (Croesus' enslavement and Polycrates' death). In the cases of Babylon and Egypt, though, Herodotos instead chooses monuments not of the monarchs defeated by Persia, but their immediate and more prominent predecessors (in both cases their parents). Here, the historian combines the diachronic technique with the object's nature to indicate the fate of the monarch's kingdom. Darius' breach of Nitocris' tomb provides a metaphor for the breach of the Babylonian defenses and Amasis' recumbent statues symbolize Egypt's impending fall. Hence, Herodotos uses the message of failure that he creates through an object linked to an important or ruling monarch as a means to foreshadow not only the downfall of the ruler, but also their kingdom as well.

[49] *Iliad* iv.108, 522; vii.145, 271; xi.144, 179; xii.192; xiii.548; xv.434, 647; xvi.289, 863; xvii.523.

Enduring Monuments and Victory over Persia - Scythia

Herodotos reverses this paradigm for the Persian campaign against Scythia. As in the other invasion *logoi*, Herodotos describes notable monuments – the Scythian *krater* and the *stelai* of Darius – immediately before his description of the Persian invasion. The appearance of the Persian king's monument is unprecedented. Never in the campaigns of Cyrus and Cambyses, or even Darius' campaign against Babylon, does the historian describe a Persian war monument and certainly not one that commemorates the beginning of a war. The outcome of the campaign was as unusual as its monument: Persian defeat. Herodotos foreshadows this result through the two royal monuments. Presenting both diachronically, the historian transforms the *krater* from a symbol of the Scythian population into an anticipatory victory monument and the *stelai* into symbols of Darius' impending failure.

As in the preceding invasion narratives, Herodotos presents an extensive examination and review of Scythian customs and marvels. Near the end of this Scythian ethnography, on the eve of Darius' invasion, the historian describes a large bronze *krater* that was situated between the Borysthenes and Hypanis rivers and was constructed by the Scythian king Ariantes as a symbol of the Scythian population. Ariantes ordered every male Scythian, upon pain of death,

to bring him an arrowhead, which he had melted down and cast into a lasting memorial, a gigantic *krater* that held six hundred amphorae:[50]

> βουλόμενον γὰρ τὸν σφέτερον βασιλέα, τῷ οὔνομα εἶναι Ἀριάνταν, τοῦτον εἰδέναι τὸ πλῆθος τὸ Σκυθέων κελεύειν μιν πάντας Σκύθας ἄρδιν ἕκαστον μίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀιστοῦ κομίσαι. ὃς δ' ἂν μὴ κομίσῃ, θάνατον ἀπείλεε. κομισθῆναί τε δὴ χρῆμα πολλὸν ἀρδίων καί οἱ δόξαι ἐξ αὐτέων μνημόσυνον ποιήσαντι λιπέσθαι. ἐκ τουτέων δή μιν τὸ χαλκήιον ποιῆσαι τοῦτο καὶ ἀναθεῖναι ἐς τὸν Ἐξαμπαῖον τοῦτον.
>
> For their king named Ariantes wanting to know the number of Scythians ordered all the Scythian men to bring one arrowhead to him. And whoever did not bring an arrowhead would be put to death. A great number of arrowheads were brought and it seemed best to Ariantes to make a memorial from them. From these he made this bronze vessel and set it there at Exampeus. (iv.81.5-6)

While the object's function as a symbol, something to be interpreted by the historian, has been well noted, what the *krater* symbolizes has not been adequately explained. As Dewald and Hollmann note, the *krater* clearly signifies the male population of Scythia.[51] But Herodotos imbues the *krater* with a military significance as well. Comprised of arrowheads, the chief weapon of the Scythian cavalry, the vessel represented not merely the male population of Scythia, but its military power. The historian emphasizes this military aspect through its comparison to the *krater* that Pausanias dedicated to commemorate his victory over the Persians:[52]

> ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χώρῳ κεῖται χαλκήιον, μεγάθει καὶ ἐξαπλήσιον τοῦ ἐπὶ στόματι τοῦ Πόντου κρητῆρος, τὸν Παυσανίης ὁ Κλεομβρότου ἀνέθηκε.

[50] For the debate on the *krater's* size and the veracity of Herodotos' account see: Armayor. 1978, pp. 51, 57. Fehling. 1989, p. 223. Pritchett. 1993, pp. 245-255.
[51] Dewald. 1993, pp. 55-56. Hollmann. 1998, p. 159.
[52] How and Wells. 1912, *loc. sit*. Cf. Nymphis. *FGrH* 432 fr. 9.

> … in this place lies the bronze vessel, and in size it is six-times larger than the *krater* at the mouth of the Pontus, which Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus dedicated. (iv.81.3)

A mere $1/6^{th}$ the size of Ariantes' twenty-two and a half ton vessel, the selection of this Greek *krater* at first seems curious. In terms of size, the Lydian *kraters* at Delphi (i.51.2), even if their sizes are somewhat inflated in Herodotos' account,[53] were more comparable and equally as recognizable to Herodotos' audience as the *krater* of Pausanias.[54] Comparable *size*, then, must not have been the reason for the choice. Rather the historian selects the Greek *krater* for its comparable *significance*. Pausanias dedicated the vessel to celebrate his victory over the Persians at Plataea and the defeat of the third Persian invasion of Europe (Nymphis *FGrH* 432, fr. 9). The historian draws significant parallels between this final Persian invasion and the first (Darius' invasion of Scythia), equating the Scythian defeat of Darius to the Greek defeat of Xerxes.[55] Read within this broader context, Herodotos' comparison of the two vessels not only gives an indication of relative sizes, but also an indication of significance, transferring the victorious symbolism of Pausanias' *krater* to Ariantes'. Moreover, the Scythian *krater's* larger size and the source of its bronze imply that Darius was about to invade a country that possessed six times the military power of the Greeks, the

[53] Griffith. 1988. Arguing that a golden vessel, the size of which Herodotos attributes to Croesus' golden *krater*, could not support its own weight, Griffith suggets that the Lydian *krater* was actually made of bronze. For an impressive response to Griffith's argument see Blackman and Sawyer. 2000, pp. 319-321. The work of these two engineering students successfully counters the Griffith's suggestion that the Lydian krater, if measuring 600 amphorae in volume, must have been made of bronze. Their study shows that tensile strength of gold is sufficient to make a vessel of that size.

[54] How and Wells. 1912, *loc. sit*. Corcella. 1993, p. 299. and Marincola. 1996, p. 576. see also Kimball. 1978, p. 51 for a critique of the Scythian krater's implausible size.

[55] Immerwahr. 1966, pp. 106-107. Hartog. 1988, *passim*, but esp. pp. 36-37.

people who would defeat his son years later. Hence, the historian presents the *krater* as a victory monument that anticipates the Scythian success against the Persians.

Presenting the *krater* diachronically, Herodotos strengthens the association of Ariantes' *krater* with victory. Through his combined use of the present (κεῖται χαλκήιον) and past tenses (θάνατον ἀπείλεε), Herodotos describes the state *krater* at the time of its construction and its implicitly unchanged state in the historian's day. His presentation implies that the *krater*, still lying between the two rivers, survived the impending Persian invasion, unlike the royal monuments of Lydia, Samos, and Babylon.

As Herodotos uses the *krater* to presage Scythian victory, so he uses the *stelai* of Darius to warn of Persia's imminent defeat. The historian closely links Darius' first land crossing of the Bosphorus to Jason's first sea passage through the area, symbolized by the Clashing or Cyaenan Rocks. Herodotos frequently incorporates allusions to Greek myth and legend in his work, echoing Homeric language, particularly speeches and scenes, to color his narrative and give greater weight to his words.[56] Physical artifacts are natural conduits for such allusions and the importation of meaning. Herodotos elevates the battles at Thermopylae and Cithaeron in part through his equation of the corpses of

[56] Jacoby. 1913, pp. 502-503. Giraudeau. 1984, pp. 4-6. Boedeker. 2002, pp. 100-107. See especially Huber. 1965, pp. 31-33. Huber argues that Herodotos uses Homeric language and allusions to recall famous passages of Homeric epic and hence to increase the weight and impact of his own language. Essentially, the allusions convey greater meaning with significant brevity.

Leonidas and Masistios with Patroklos and Hektor.[57] He also uses Protesilaus' grave to link the final Greek victory to the opening chapters of the Trojan War (ix.116f).[58] For the Persian invasion of Europe, the historian uses the earlier passage of Jason, reified in the Cyanean Rocks, to highlight the impiety and failure of Darius' act.

Herodotos frames Darius' crossing within references to the famed exploit of the *Argo*. Before leading his army across the bridge over the Bosphorus, Darius viewed the Cyanean Rocks (τὰς Κυανέας καλευμένας, τὰς πρότερον πλαγκτὰς Ἕλληνες φασὶ εἶναι /the rocks called the Cyanean, which previously the Greeks say were roaming - iv.85.1) through which Jason passed on his voyage to find the Golden Fleece.[59] After the Persian entry into Europe the historian again refers to the legendary rocks (iv.89), suggesting that Darius' crossing should be read within that context.[60] Throughout his work, Herodotos uses the *Argo's* exploits to place the events of his narrative within this earlier context.[61] At the Bosphorus, the historian links the Persian king directly with the passage through the Cyanean Rocks, which feat the Greeks most closely associated with the *Argo's*

[57] vii.225 and ix.21f (respectively). Masaracchia 1978. p. 162. Boedeker. 2001. p. 122. Flower and Marincola. 2002. pp. 143-144. The fight between the Greeks and Persians for possession of the cavalry commander's corpse also follows the general pattern that battles for heroic corpses in the *Iliad* follow (cf. the battle over the body of Sarpedon xvi.691f and the battle for Amphimachos xiii.193f). See Chp 4, for a further discussion of Herodotos' imitation of Homer in this regard.
[58] Boedeker. 1988, pp. 47-48.
[59] How and Wells. 1912, *loc. sit*. Corcella. 1993, p. 301. While both commentaries note the clear allusion to the *Argo's* voyage, neither considers the relationship between Darius, his bridge, and the Rocks.
[60] *Pace* Immerwahr. 1954, p. 26. Hartog. 1988, pp. 36-37. Both Immerwahr and Hartog overlook the significance of this earlier crossing, focusing primarily upon the similarity between Darius' and Xerxes' bridging of Asia and Europe.
[61] iv.145-6; iv.179; vii.193. Vandiver. 1991, pp. 34-38, 41-42. Newman. 2001, pp. 323-324. Calame. 2003, pp. 138-139. Most references are for aetiological or ethnographic purposes.

voyage.[62] When Darius arrived at the site of his bridge, the Persian king boarded a ship and sailed to the Cyanean rocks:

> Δαρεῖος δὲ ἐπείτε πορευόμενος ἐκ Σούσων ἀπίκετο τῆς Καλχηδονίης ἐπὶ τὸν Βόσπορον ἵνα ἔζευκτο ἡ γέφυρα, ἐνθεῦτεν ἐσβὰς ἐς νέα ἔπλεε ἐπὶ τὰς Κυανέας καλευμένας, τὰς πρότερον πλαγκτὰς Ἕλληνές φασι εἶναι, ἑζόμενος δὲ ἐπὶ ῥίῳ ἐθηεῖτο τὸν Πόντον ἐόντα ἀξιοθέητον·
>
> When Darius marching from Susa arrived at Chalcedon on the Bosphorus where the bridge was erected, boarding a ship from there he sailed to the Cyanaens, which the Greeks say once were wandering, and sitting upon the promontory he gazed at the Pontus, which is worth seeing; (iv.85.1)

Seated upon this now fixed promontory, Darius viewed the Pontus that the Argonauts first glimpsed from amid the churning waves caused by the movement of the same rocks (Apollonius Rhodius *Ar.* ii.579-580).[63] Returning to his bridge, Darius ordered his army to cross over into Europe and his fleet to sail into the Black Sea (iv.89.1). Here the historian again notes the presence of the Cyanean Rocks (Κυανέας), through which the fleet sailed (iv.89.2). Framing Darius' crossing between the Cyanean Rocks, Herodotos causes the audience to recall and so compare the two crossings of continental boundaries.

---

[62] Williams. 1991, p. 129. Pindar *Pythian* 4.207-211 regards the passage as the only trial that the Argonauts faced before reaching Colchis. Whether Herodotos is drawing upon a particular literary source for his material or is shaping his own version is unknown. The fragmentary nature of early *Argonautica* texts, such as those by Cinaethon, Ibycus, and Stesichorus, precludes a clear determination. Nevertheless its widespread use as a poetic subject, even for the comic poet Telestes at the end of the fifth century, made the *Argo's* voyage a common and readily perceptible allusion for Herodotos' text.

[63] ἤδ δ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα διὰ πλατὺς εἶδετο Πόντος, | καί σφισιν ἀπροφάτως ἀνέδυ μέγα κῦμα πάροιθεν | κυρτόν, ἀποτμῆγι σκοπιῇ ἴσον· οἱ δ' ἐσιδόντες | ἤμυσαν λοξοῖσι καρήασιν. εἶσατο γάρ ῥα | νηὸς ὑπὲρ πάσης κατεπάλμενον ἀμφικαλύψειν. (Apollonius Rhodius *Ar.* ii.579-583).

The historian credits Jason's voyage with no causative role in Darius' invasion. At the beginning of his work he identifies Croesus as the immediate cause of East-West hostility (i.5) and discounts the arguments of Persian *logioi*, who traced a series of reciprocal rapes, including Medea's, as the cause of the conflict (i.2-5). At the beginning of the Scythian *logos*, Herodotos attributes the Persian invasion to Darius' desire to avenge a previous Scythian attack (iv.1). Yet, while they do not share a causative link, Jason's passage and Darius' crossing do share a similar theme – the first passage/crossing of a continental division or boundary. Whereas Jason acted within a divine plan and with the support of the gods, Darius violated the separation of the continents. Aided by Athena, Jason slipped the *Argo* through the rocks and fixed their position, which the gods had decreed would happen once humans had passed between them (A.R. *Ar.* ii.604-607). In the *Histories*, however, Herodotos presents the crossing of such boundaries in a negative light.[64] He describes Darius' march across his bridge from Asia to Europe with the verb διαβαίνω,[65] which term often denotes some form of physical and moral transgression.[66] Hence, his references to the Cyanean Rocks and their allusive force in recalling Jason's divinely sponsored passage emphasize Darius' violation of the divine order and the natural boundaries between continents.

Herodotos deepens the contrast between Darius' and Jason's crossings and foreshadows the failure of the Persian campaign through the diachronic

[64] Immerwahr. 1966. pp. 84, 293. Lateiner. 1985, pp. 89-91.
[65] iv.88.1; iv.89.1; iv.89.3.
[66] Lateiner. 1985, p. 91.

presentation of both the bridge and the rocks. After the Argonauts successfully navigated the hazardous passage:

> πέτραι δ' εἰς ἕνα χῶρον ἐπιχεδὸν ἀλλήλῃσιν
> νωλεμὲς ἐρρίζωθεν, ὃ δὴ καὶ μόρισμον ἦεν
> ἐκ μακάρων, εὖτ' ἄν τις ἰδὼν διὰ νηὶ περήσῃ.
>
> … the rocks were now rooted close to each other, which fate was decreed by the gods whenever some mortal seeing the rocks sailed through them. (A.R. *Ar.* ii.604-607)

The Cyanean Rocks remained a permanent monument to Jason's passage. Herodotos acknowledges this altered and now unchanged state in his description of the Cyanean Rocks as the ones once called the Wandering Rocks (τὰς πρότερον πλαγκτὰς - iv.85.1). In contrast, the historian describes Darius' bridge as a temporary structure, a pontoon bridge (σχεδίη) that would hardly endure. Instead Darius erected two commemorative *stelai*:

> θεησάμενος δὲ καὶ τὸν Βόσπορον στήλας ἔστησε δύο ἐπ' αὐτῷ λίθου λευκοῦ, ἐνταμὼν γράμματα ἐς μὲν τὴν Ἀσσύρια ἐς δὲ τὴν Ἑλληνικά, ἔθνεα πάντα ὅσα περ ἦγε·
>
> Gazing upon the Bosphorus he erected two *stelai* of white stone there, inscribing on them in Assyrian and Greek letters, all the many races that he led. (iv.87.1)

Unlike the Cyanean Rocks, however, these monuments were not fixed in place. Years later the *stelai* were moved:

> τῇσι μέν νυν στήλῃσι ταύτῃσι Βυζάντιοι κομίσαντες ἐς τὴν πόλιν ὕστερον τούτων ἐχρήσαντο πρὸς τὸν βωμὸν τῆς Ὀρθωσίης Ἀρτέμιδος, χωρὶς ἑνὸς λίθου· οὗτος δὲ κατελείφθη παρὰ τοῦ Διονύσου τὸν νηὸν ἐν Βυζαντίῳ γραμμάτων Ἀσσυρίων πλέος.

> Years later the people of Byzantium moved these *stelai*, except for one, to their city and used them for an altar to Artemis the Protectress. The other stone remained near the temple of Dionysus in Byzantium full of Assyrian letters. (iv.87.2).

Darius attained no lasting memorial for his achievement.[67] As in the cases of the Lydian, Babylonian, and Samian rulers, Herodotos challenges Darius' control of his memorial at the moment of its dedication.

Rather the only memorial of the bridge belonged to the Greek architect Mandrocles, who dedicated a painting of Darius and the bridge to the temple of Hera on Samos with this inscription:

> Βόσπορον ἰχθυόεντα γεφυρώσας ἀνέθηκε
> Μανδροκλέης Ἥρῃ μνημόσυνον σχεδίης,
> αὑτῷ μὲν στέφανον περιθείς, Σαμίοισι δὲ κῦδος,
> Δαρείου βασιλέος ἐκτελέσας κατὰ νοῦν.
>
> Bridging the Bosphorus full of fish, Mandrokles dedicated the memorial of the bridge to Hera, winning a crown for himself, and praise for Samos, fulfilling the design of king Darius. (iv.88.2)

Although the memorial noted the prominent role of Darius, it presented the bridge as the work of Mandrocles. Thus, while the Cyanean Rocks forever served as a testament to Jason's voyage, Darius' memorials were short-lived. Only the work of a Greek, Mandrocles, memorialized the deed, but to his own glory and on Greek soil far away from Darius' bridgehead.

---

[67] The stelai may also be read in the context of the historian's comparison of Darius and the Egyptian Sesostris described in ii.102-110. According to Herodotos, when Darius visited Egypt he desired to erect a statue of himself in front of the monumental statues of Sesostris, his wife, and sons that stood before the temple of Hephaestus (Min). The priests, however, refused this request since Darius had not matched the accomplishments of Sesostris, whose dominions were as vast as Darius' and also included the Scythians, whom Darius failed to subdue (ii.110.2). Sesostris commemorated his conquests with the erection of stelai (στήλας) with his name and country (ii.102.4). Unlike the stelai of Darius, which were dismantled in less than a century, the monuments of Sesostris survived the passage of many centuries (ii.106.1).

Herodotos, then, uses the Cyanean Rocks to evoke an uncommon, even innovative, connotation for Darius' bridge and *stelai*. In the context of Jason's divinely sponsored passage through the once-Clashing Rocks, the historian emphasizes Darius' violation and minimizes his achievement. While the rocks remained an enduring memorial of the *Argo's* passage, Darius' memorials succumbed to the passage of time. Hence, in the Scythian *logos*, Herodotos reflects the reversal of victor and vanquished through the monuments of the notable Scythian king, Ariantes, and the invasion's architect, Darius. By comparison to the *krater* that Pausanias dedicated to commemorate the Greek victory over the Persians, the historian transforms the Scythian *krater*, a symbol of the kingdom's military might, into an anticipatory victory monument that survives the passage of time. Against this might, Darius' monument failed, passing into the control of others and foreshadowing the Persian failure.

Conclusion

Herodotos, then, links the fate of the animate to the inanimate, monarch to object. While the historian is cognizant of the deleterious effect that time has upon objects, he rarely depicts their actual deterioration in his narrative. He reserves this negative depiction primarily for a few select cases that foreshadow the Persian conquests of Lydia, Babylon, Egypt, and Samos as well as the Persian defeat in Scythia. On the eve of each campaign or the decision to interfere in Persian affairs, the historian describes a royal monument belonging to the kingdom's current or the last notable monarch. In the cases of Lydia, Babylon,

and Samos, the loss or decay of royal monuments illustrates the monarch's downfall (subjugation, failure, or death) and the kingdom's conquest by Persia. For Egypt, the historian instead relies upon the significance of the object itself to achieve similar results. In Scythia, Herodotos follows this paradigm to reflect the defeat of Persia. Instead of depicting the decline of a Scythian monument, he emphasizes its endurance and martial significance. Simultaneously, he illustrates the impending Persian defeat through the loss of a monument that Darius erected to commemorate the invasion. Thus, Herodotos not only uses his description of royal monuments as "yardsticks" of a monarch's greatness, but he also manipulates their images to foreshadow their destinies.

Chapter 3:
Comparative Objects

Herodotos need not change an object physically to shape its meaning. Instead, he may simply change its appearance through the use of repetition and substitution. As shown in Chapter 1, the historian alters an object's connotation or meaning by changing his presentation in a retelling of the same scene or in analogous circumstances. For example, in the case of the Lydian queen, the historian alters the significance of her clothing by changing its description from *chiton* to *himation* to *heima* in three accounts of her disrobing. Although the action of the narrative remains constant (the queen disrobed), the change in the clothing's description creates a subtext, or visual text, for the audience.

Herodotos uses this same technique to contrast different characters. Characterization and the study of characters' temperaments is a central feature of Herodotos' *Histories*. Through the use of speeches,[1] elaborate settings,[2] and even gestures,[3] Herodotos explores the natures of his characters, paying particular attention to kings and tyrants.[4] Placing characters in analogous circumstances, the historian contrasts individual characteristics and invites the audience to draw parallels. Two commonly cited examples of this are the historian's implicit

[1] Solmsen. 1944, p. 253.
[2] Stahl. 1968, p. 391. Segal. 1971, pp. 39-40.
[3] Lateiner. 1977, pp. 173-173. Lateiner. 1987, pp. 90-95.
[4] Immerwahr. 1966, pp. 182-183. Chiasson. 1986, p. 249. Lateiner. 1989, pp. 172-179. Christ. 1994, p. 198.

comparison of Darius and Xerxes' invasions of Europe (iv.87 and vii.54-55)[5] and the reversals that Candaules and Xerxes suffer at the hands of their wives (i.8-11 and ix.108-113).[6]

Although scholars have long studied the historian's penchant for comparison,[7] they have given scant attention to the function that objects play in many of these comparisons.[8] In place of a single character, such as the Lydian queen, Herodotos places two or more characters in comparable scenes that share the same or similar objects. Whether the change is dramatic (like the deterioration of Croesus' lion statue) or superficial (like the Lydian queen's clothing), Herodotos uses the change as a means of establishing a contrast. The object's change takes the form of an alteration or a substitution. In the first case, he places characters in identical settings in which he emphasizes an object's modified state. In the second case, he places characters in analogous settings in which he substitutes the original object with a similar but distinct object. Emphasizing the alteration or substitution of the object, Herodotos uses the change to distinguish individual characteristics. This method allows the historian to create succinct, elegant, portraits of the individuals in his narrative.

Through select examples, this chapter examines Herodotos' use of object-based comparisons in two parts. In the first set of examples (the Golden Statue of Babylon and Datis and the Golden Statue of Apollo), this chapter examines the

[5] Immerwahr. 1954, pp. 25-26. Hartog. 1988, pp. 36-37.
[6] Herrington. 1997, p. 152. Larson. 2006, pp. 236-241.
[7] For work on Herodotos' use of comparisons see: Aly. 1969, *passim*. Immerwahr.1960, pp. 265-270. Immerwahr. 1966, *passim*. Avery. 1972, pp. 529-546. Flory. 1987, *passim*, esp. pp. 25-26. Hartog. 1988, *passim*. Gray. 1995, *passim*. Gray. 2001, pp. 17-18. Munson. 2001, esp. pp. 45-47.
[8] Munson 2001, p.45 states that Herodotos may create comparisons using objects, but she does not pursue the subject or provide significant examples.

immediate repetition of an object to create a comparison. In the second set of examples (the Ethiopian Bow and the *Kraters* of Lydia), this chapter examines the repetition and substitution of objects within similar contexts to create comparisons.

The Golden Statue of Babylon (i.183)

In his narration of the Persian conquest of Babylon, Herodotos creates a comparative portrait of three of his main actors (Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes). Describing Babylonian *thomata*, Herodotos compares the three Persian monarchs through his diachronic presentation of a golden statue. Located inside the temple of Bel, the statue is presented in the context of each reigning monarch. Noting how each Persian king treated (changed) the statue, the historian highlights the greed of Darius, the cruel impiety of Xerxes, and the nobility of Cyrus, the founder of the empire.[9]

After a lengthy account of the temples of Bel and the various notable objects within the temples (i.181-183.2), Herodotos describes a large golden statue of a man situated in the lower *temenos*:

> ἦν δὲ ἐν τῷ τεμένεϊ τούτῳ ἔτι τὸν χρόνον ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἀνδριὰς δυώδεκα πηχέων χρύσεος στερεός.
>
> Still in that time there was also in this temenos a twelve-foot tall statue of a man made of solid gold. (i.183.2)

[9] Cf. Immerwahr. 1966, pp. 175-176, who notes the use of the statue to compare Darius to Xerxes (one of several instances of such a comparison). He overlooks, however, the effect of the diachronic presentation and the implicit comparison to Cyrus. Arieti. 1995, pp. 176-177. Arieti too notes the comparison of Darius and Xerxes, but overlooks the additional contrast to Cyrus and the diachronic presentation.

Unlike his previous account of the statue of Bel (i.183.1), the historian constructs only a meager description of the golden statue. He focuses instead upon the object's fate during the reigns of the successive Persian monarchs. Beginning his narrative in a time before the Persian conquest, Herodotos implies that the statue stood in the temple's *temenos*, where it remained unchanged through the reign of Cyrus (ἔτι τὸν χρόνον ἐκεῖνον – i.183.2).[10] Later, Darius desired the statue, but lacked the daring to carry through his design (Δαρεῖος μὲν ὁ Ὑστάσπεος ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἐτόλμησε λαβεῖν – i.183.3). Xerxes, however, removed the the statue and killed the priest (Ξέρξης δὲ ὁ Δαρείου ἔλαβε καὶ τὸν ἱρέα ἀπέκτεινε ἀπαγορεύοντα μὴ κινέειν τὸν ἀνδριάντα. / Xerxes son of Darius took the statue and killed the priest when he forbade him to move the statue. - i.183.3).

In addition to recording the statue's changed physical state, Herodotos alters, or rather alternatively emphasizes, the object's connotations. While he initially stresses the statue's religious connotation through its placement in a *temenos* and proximity to a cult statue, Herodotos later emphasizes the golden object's intrinsic value through Darius' desire to seize it. Containing these two meanings, the statue becomes a gauge by which the historian creates comparative portraits of the Persian kings. Hence, Cyrus' inaction implies a respect for sacred objects consistent perhaps with his merciful treatment of conquered Ionia, but at odds with his impious treatment of the captured

[10] How and Wells. 1912, *loc. sit*.

Croesus.[11] Darius' desire and inaction illustrate this monarch's greed and his timidity or alternatively his respect for propriety.[12] Finally, Xerxes' theft exemplifies the monarch's impiety, a characteristic that becomes emblematic of the king later in the narrative.

Through the diachronic presentation of the golden statue at Babylon, then, Herodotos creates four scenes: the statue's initial state and the varying interactions of monarch and statue. Changing both the object's physical state, inviolate and violated (or stolen), and alternatively emphasizing different connotations, the historian creates contrasting portraits of the three Persian monarchs.

Datis and the Golden Statue of Apollo (vi.118)

Herodotos creates a similar comparative portrait of Datis through the diachronic presentation of a gold-covered statue of Apollo that the Persians removed from Delium during their invasion in 490 BC. As the Persians sailed back to Asia, the Persian commander Datis received a dream about the theft and ordered a search of his fleet when it put in to Myconos. Discovering the statue on a Phoenician vessel, the general placed it in the temple of Apollo on Delos for safekeeping, and instructed the Delians to return the stolen item (vi.118.1-2).

[11] Cf. i.169 and i.86. Unlike Darius' later subjugation of Ionia, Herodotos makes no mention of the Persian destruction of Ionian temples. After the defeat of Croesus, however, Cyrus violated Persian *nomos* by attempting to burn Croesus alive (How and Wells. 1912, *loc. sit.* and Avery. 1972, pp. 533-534).

[12] For the nature of Darius' greed see Kurke. 1999, pp. 71-80, 99. Darius' forbearance here resembles the respect he showed to the priests of the Egyptian Temple of Hephaestus, who prevented the monarch from erecting a statue of himself before that of the conqueror Sesostris (ii.110).

While Datis' careful piety in relation to Apollo and Delos has been noted,[13] the fact that the history of the statue illustrates the relative piety of Datis and the Delians has been overlooked.

There are few golden statues in the *Histories*.[14] When they do appear, Herodotos typically uses the object to create a sub-text. He uses the golden statues of a lion to foreshadow the fall of Croesus (i.50; see Chp. 2, pp. 66-76), the golden statue of a man to contrast three Persian kings (i.181.3; see pp. 101-103), and the golden statue of a god to illustrate the change of Amasis from commoner to pharaoh (ii.172.2 *bis*, 4).[15] Those gold statues that he does not use directly in this manner, he places in passages with significant meaning. The historian places the golden statues of Bel immediately before his comparative characterization of the Persian kings (i.181.1). He includes the statue of the Lydian baker-woman as one of the gifts that Croesus sent to Delphi before his downfall (i.51.5). He links the golden statue of Apollo in Sparta to the Lacedaemonian *krater* that foreshadows Croesus' downfall (i.70-71; see Chp. 2, pp. 74-75). Most statues of gold in the *Histories*, then, either directly or indirectly signify an additional layer of meaning in the text.

The gold-covered statue of Apollo in Delos directly denotes an additional meaning. Like the golden statue of Babylon, the statue in Delos is both an object of value and an object of reverence. After the statue's theft, Herodotos uses the

[13] Stadter. 1992, p. 791.
[14] Solid gold statues: i.50 (Croesus' lion statue); i.51.5 (the statue of Croesus' baker); i.181.1 (the statue of Bel); i.181.3 (the statue of a man); ii.172 *bis*, 4 (the statue of a god that Amasis constructs from his golden foot pan). Gold-covered statues: i.69.4 (the Spartan statue of Apollo, which according to Pausanias was merely gold-covered (iii.10.8)); vi.118 (the gold-covered statue of Apollo from Delium). There are no silver statues in the *Histories*.
[15] Dewald. 1993, pp. 59-60. Hollmann. 1998, p. 159.

object's mobility as recognition of its religious significance and the object's immobility as recognition of its monetary value. When Datis discovered the Phoenician booty, the Persian attempted to amend the crime by moving the god's statue to one of his sacred precincts. Due to his recent defeat at Marathon, Datis was unable return the statue to Delium and ordered the Delians to complete the task:

> καὶ ἀπίκατο γὰρ τηνικαῦτα οἱ Δήλιοι ὀπίσω ἐς τὴν νῆσον, κατατίθεταί τε ἐς τὸ ἱρὸν τὸ ἄγαλμα καὶ ἐντέλλεται τοῖσι Δηλίοισι ἀπαγαγεῖν τὸ ἄγαλμα ἐς Δήλιον τὸ Θηβαίων·
>
> By that time the Delians had also returned to the island, and he placed the statue in the temple and ordered the Delians to bear the statue back to Delium, which was in the land of the Thebans. (vi.118.2)

Although the movement of the statue from ship to temple reflects Datis' piety, its continued presence on Delos reveals a Delian lack of piety. The Delians failed to perform their allotted task:

> τὸν δὲ ἀνδριάντα τοῦτον Δήλιοι οὐκ ἀπήγαγον, ἀλλά μιν δι' ἐτέων εἴκοσι Θηβαῖοι αὐτοὶ ἐκ θεοπροπίου ἐκομίσαντο ἐπὶ Δήλιον.
>
> The Delians did not return this statue, but twenty years later the Thebans themselves carried it back on the advice of an oracle. (vi.118.3)

Only when the Thebans arranged for the return of the statue did the Delians at last discharge their pious duty.

Through the statue's brief history, Herodotos creates an anomalous portrait of Datis as a pious man. Elsewhere in the *Histories* this Persian displays no similar consideration, burning the city and temples of Naxos (vi.96) and the

temples of Eretria (vi.101). At Delos, though, the Persian was different. He spared the island sanctuary at the outset of his expedition to Greece and upon his return exhibited his pious regard for Apollo's cult figure.[16] Appearing in the statue's changing context, the Persian stands out from thieving Phoenicians and indifferent Delians as an example of piety.

The Ethiopian Bow and the Madness of Cambyses (iii.21 – 37)

Herodotos creates a more complex version of this type of comparison in his treatment of Amasis, the Ethiopian king, and Cambyses. Although the monarchs do not appear side by side in his text as in the previous example, the historian places them in strikingly similar contexts: the drawing of a king's bow. Defining each king's nature through his use of the bow, Herodotos also establishes this object as a means contrast. In particular, he compares the physical and mental prowess of the Ethiopian and Persian kings. As Cambyses descends into madness,[17] Herodotos uses the bows and attendant objects to gauge the Persian monarch's deterioration. The historian presents a consistent portrait of the Persian monarch not merely as a mad king, but as the antithesis of the Ethiopian king.

In the *Histories*, the bow is a royal weapon. While Herodotos mostly describes bows in the context of a mass of archers,[18] he pairs individual bows

[16] Stadter. 1992, pp. 787-788.
[17] For studies of Cambyses' madness see: Aly. 1969, pp. 84f. Bruns. 1961, pp. 79-80. Avery. 1972, pp. 535-6. Flory. 1978, pp. 150-151. Brown. 1982, pp. 387-403. Munson. 1991, pp. 43-66. Thomas. 2000, pp. 34f.
[18] Τόξον: ii.141.5; iv.3.4; vii.61.1; vii.64.1, 2; vii.65; vii.67.1 *bis*, 2; vii.69.1; vii.77; vii.92; ix.62.1. Τόξα: v.49.3. Τόξευμα (bow implied): iv.132.3; iv.139.1; vi.112.3; vii.218.3; vii.226.1; vii.128.1, 2; ix.22.1; ix.49.3; ix.61.3; ix.72.1. Τοξεύω (bow implied): ii.136.2; i.214.2; iv.22.2; iv.94.4; iv.94.4; iv.114.3;

with regal characters. Cyarxes, the Median king, hired Scythians to teach his sons the *techne* of the bow (τὴν τέχνην τῶν τόξων – i.73.2). The *stelae* of Sesostris depicted a figure with a bow in his left hand (τῇ δὲ ἀριστερῇ τόξα – ii.106.3). The magus who impersonated Smerdis attempted to defend himself with a bow (τόξα) against Darius and the Persian conspirators, but was unable to use it (iii.78.2 *bis*, 3).[19] Herakles left a bow (τόξον) in Scythia as a test for his sons by the viper maiden (iv.9.5; 10.1). The Scythian king Saulius shot Anacharsis for practicing a foreign religious rite (τοξεύσας αὐτὸν - iv.76.5). After hearing about the sack of Sardis, Darius called for his bow (τόξον), shot an arrow into the air and asked Zeus to let him punish the Athenians (v.105.1, 108.1). Finally, Herodotos associates bows with Amasis, Cambyses, and the Ethiopian king (ii.173.3; iii.30.1, iii.35.3, iii.36.4, iii.74.1; iii.21.3, iii.22.1).

The Ethiopian bow plays an important role in this comparison. The Ethiopian king gave the bow to the Fish-Eaters, whom Cambyses sent to explore the country as a prospective conquest and to alleviate suspicion of Persian intentions with the presentation of gifts. Perceiving Cambyses' imperialist design,[20] the Ethiopian king responded with the gift of a large unstrung bow:

> νῦν δὲ αὐτῷ τόξον τόδε διδόντες τάδε ἔπεα λέγετε· βασιλεὺς ὁ Αἰθιόπων συμβουλεύει τῷ Περσέων βασιλέι, ἐπεὰν οὕτω εὐπετέως ἕλκωσι τὰ τόξα Πέρσαι ἐόντα μεγάθεϊ τοσαῦτα, τότε

viii.52.1; viii.128.1; ix.49.2. Τοξόται (bows implied): i.215.1; iii.39.3; iii.45.3; vii.158.4; ix.22.1; ix.60.3. Τοξοφόροι (bows implied): i.103.1; ix.43.3.

[19] In light of the association between bows and kings, the magus' inability to use the bow may be a reflection of his status as impersonator. Herodotos emphasizes this inability by mentioning it twice (iii.78.2 and 78.4 respectively).

[20] Dewald. 1993, p. 58.

ἐπ' Αἰθίοπας τοὺς μακροβίους πλήθεϊ ὑπερβαλλόμενον στρατεύεσθαι·

> Now giving this bow to him [Cambyses] say these words: the Ethiopian king advises the king of the Persians that, whenever the Persians might easily draw a bow of such a size, then raising a large army let them campaign against the long-lived Ethiopians. (iii.21.3)

Through the unstrung bow, a symbol of Ethiopia in Egyptian hieroglyphs,[21] the king sent a symbolic message to warn Cambyses that he attacked Ethiopia at his peril.[22] Unlike the Scythian tokens sent to Darius (iv.131), the Ethiopian king accompanied his token with an explicit message about its significance. He used the bow merely to underscore the verbal message about Ethiopian strength and power.

The bow's greater significance lies in its secondary function as a test for the Persians. As his message states, the Ethiopian king advised Cambyses not to invade his country "…*until* he found a man able to draw such a large bow easily" (ἐπεὰν οὕτω εὐπετέως ἕλκωσι τὰ τόξα Πέρσαι ἐόντα μεγάθεϊ τοσαῦτα – iii.21.3). This test of strength resembles others in Greek literature such as the Bow of Odysseus that Penelope uses to test her suitors.[23] Whoever proves his strength by stringing the bow would become her new husband (*Od.* xix.572f, xxi.65ff). When Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, attempts to string the bow, however, the task is not merely a test of strength, but of his identity as well (*Od*.

[21] How and Wells. 1912, *loc. sit*.
[22] Dewald. 1993, p. 58. Hollmann. 1998, p. 162.
[23] Aly. 1969, p. 85. Aly equates Herodotos' use of bows both to the Homeric usage and to other similar tests of strength such as Aegeus' hiding of his sword beneath a boulder as a test for Theseus.

xxi.404ff).[24] Through the act, the hero reclaims his home, his wife, and his place in Ithacan society.[25] The bow serves a similar function for Telemachus, who verifies his paternity and his manhood by nearly stringing the bow (*Od.* xxi.128-135).[26]

While Herodotos regards most bows simply as weapons of war,[27] he also employs this trope – the bow as a questing or identifying instrument. In the opening sections of the Scythian *logos*, the historian recounts the tale of Herakles' bow and girdle, which the hero left behind as a test for his children by the viper maiden:

> ἐπεὰν ἀνδρωθέντας ἴδῃ τοὺς παῖδας, τάδε ποιεῦσα οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοις· τὸν μὲν ἂν ὁρᾷς αὐτῶν τόδε τόξον ὧδε διατεινόμενον καὶ τῳ ζωστῆρι τῷδε κατὰ τάδε ζωννύμενον, τοῦτον μὲν τῆσδε τῆς χώρης οἰκήτορα ποιεῦ· ὃς δ' ἂν τούτων τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἐντέλλομαι λείπηται, ἔκπεμπε ἐκ τῆς χώρης.
>
> When you see that the boys have become men, do the following and you will not err: whichever one of them you see string this bow thusly and don this girdle in this way, make that one the inhabitant of this land; but whoever fails these tasks that I order, send him from the land. (iv.9.5)

Herakles, then, offered the bow and girdle to the viper maiden as a means of identifying their most worthy child, the one that would become the founder of the Scythian kingdom.

Herodotos uses the three royal bows in a similar manner, although less for identification than for characterization of the respective monarchs. In the first pairing of king and bow, Amasis did not string a bow to prove his identity or worth; rather he identified his nature through the metaphor of a bow. He

[24] Woodhouse. 1930, pp. 98-101. Austin. 1975, pp. 229-230, 234-235.
[25] Hoffner. 1995, p. 530.
[26] Olson. 1994, p. 370.
[27] τόξον – i.73.2; ii.141.5; iv.3.4; vii.61.1 et al.

conducted the business of government until mid-morning at which point he turned his attention to wine and frivolity. He defended this latter behavior, which his supporters considered unsuited to his office, by comparing himself to an archer's bow:

> ὃ δ' ἀμείβετο τοισίδε αὐτούς. τὰ τόξα οἱ ἐκτημένοι, ἐπεὰν μὲν δέωνται χρᾶσθαι, ἐντανύουσι, ἐπεὰν δὲ χρήσωνται, ἐκλύουσι. εἰ γὰρ δὴ τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἐντεταμένα εἴη, ἐκραγείη ἄν, ὥστε ἐς τὸ δέον οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν αὐτοῖσι χρᾶσθαι. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου κατάστασις· εἰ ἐθέλοι κατεσπουδάσθαι αἰεὶ μηδὲ ἐς παιγνίην τὸ μέρος ἑωυτὸν ἀνιέναι, λάθοι ἂν ἤτοι μανεὶς ἢ ὅ γε ἀπόπληκτος γενόμενος·
>
> He [Amasis] replied to them: archers, whenever they want to use the bow, they string it, but after they use the bow, they unstring it. For if a bow should be strung at all times, it would break, so that it would not be able to use it when needed. So also is man's nature; if he should wish always to take himself seriously and never to partake of his share of amusement, he would surely go mad or suffer a stroke; (ii.173.3-4).

In this defense of the *bon vivant's* behavior, Herodotos establishes the bow as a means of identifying or characterizing a monarch. He transforms the bow into a measure for the entire spectrum of kingship. In the case of Amasis, the bow's dual state, strung and unstrung, signifies Amasis' balanced approach to kingship. But through the pharaoh's description of the dangers of an unbalanced bow, the historian warns against an unbalanced approach to kingship and prepares the audience for the subsequent pairings of bow and king. Indeed, he fulfils Amasis' warning that an ever-strung bow (man) would go mad or have a

stroke (μανεὶς ἢ ὅ γε ἀπόπληκτος γενόμενος) in his account of Cambyses' madness and epilepsy later in the narrative.[28]

Before moving to the high-strung Cambyses, however, Herodotos directs the audience's gaze to the unstrung bow of the Ethiopian king. This king does not fit easily within Amasis' model, for his unstrung bow does not accompany a pleasure-absorbed monarch.[29] Instead the bow creates a separate contrast between Cambyses and the Ethiopian king. Unlike Amasis this monarch did not seek to define himself simply through his bow. The historian moves the questing tool into his own hands instead and uses it to compare the latter two monarchs (the Ethiopian king and Cambyses). First, he combines the bow with his description of the Ethiopian king's reaction to the Persian gifts to illustrate the monarch's physical vitality and mental acuity. According to the historian:

> οἱ δὲ Αἰθίοπες … λέγονται εἶναι μέγιστοι καὶ κάλλιστοι ἀνθρώπων πάντων. νόμοισι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοισι χρᾶσθαι αὐτούς φασι κεχωρισμένοισι τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων καὶ δὴ καὶ κατὰ τὴν βασιληίην τοιῷδε· τὸν ἂν τῶν ἀστῶν κρίνωσι μέγιστόν τε εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγαθος ἔχειν τὴν ἰσχύν, τοῦτον ἀξιοῦσι βασιλεύειν.

[28] Madness: ἐμάνη (iii.30.1); ἐξεμάνη (iii.33); ἐξεμάνη (iii.34.1); παραφρονέειν (iii.34.3); μαίνομαι (iii.35.4). Apoplexy: καὶ γὰρ τινὰ ἐκ γενεῆς νοῦσον μεγάλην λέγεται ἔχειν ὁ Καμβύσης, τὴν ἱρὴν ὀνομάζουσι τινές. (iii.33). While apoplexy differs from the epilepsy that Herodotos later attributes to the Persian monarch, the Greeks viewed the two afflictions as related (Hippocrates *On Breaths* 13-14).

[29] It is possible to read the Ethiopian king and his unstrung bow within Amasis' range of kingship, but in doing so one must invert the expected association between a strung bow and work and an unstrung bow and relaxation. Within this framework the Ethiopian king and his unstrung bow appears to be the symbol of sobriety and good governance, Cambyses and his ever-strung bow (see below) appears to be the symbol of excess and bad governance, and Amasis appears to be a balance of the two. This reading, however, requires the unlikely association of stringing and shooting a bow with relaxation and unstringing a bow with work in Amasis' metaphor.

> The Ethiopians are said to be the tallest and most handsome of all men. They say that they use customs different from other men especially with regard to kingship; whomever of the city-men they judge to be the tallest and strongest in proportion to his height, they deem this one worthy to be king. (iii.20.1-2)

This paradigm of physical perfection selected a bow to test the Persians, stating that they should not invade his country until they could draw such a bow easily (εὐπετέως - iii.21.3). The implication of his statement is that the Ethiopians, and their king, could have drawn the bow with ease. The bow, then, is not only a challenge to the Persians, but also a statement of the king's strength.

But the Ethiopian king was not merely a man of muscle. He displayed wisdom and intelligence commensurate with his physical powers. As previously discussed, the monarch displayed considerable forethought and prudence with regards to food (Chp. 1, pp. 17-24). The Ethiopian king matched this prudence with great perspicacity, which the historian reveals through the king's reaction to the Persian gifts. Penetrating Cambyses' deceptive offer of friendship, the king perceived his counterpart's intent to enslave Ethiopia.[30] He correctly labeled the clothing and the Fish-Eater ambassadors as deceitful gifts borne by deceitful men (δολεροὺς μὲν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἔφη εἶναι, δολερὰ δὲ αὐτῶν τὰ εἵματα. /he said that them men and their clothes were deceptive – iii.22.1). Nevertheless the monarch displayed mercy when he spared the ambassadors/spies from any retribution. Whereas the Ethiopian discerned the true significance of the clothes, Cambyses failed to understand the purpose of the fine clothing worn by the

[30] Dewald. 1993, p. 58.

Egyptians. After his failed invasion of Ethiopia, Cambyses returned to Egypt where he found the Egyptians at Memphis, dressed in their finest clothes:

> ἀπιγμένου δὲ Καμβύσεω ἐς Μέμφιν ἐφάνη Αἰγυπτίοισι ὁ Ἆπις, τὸν Ἕλληνες Ἔπαφον καλέουσι· ἐπιφανέος δὲ τούτου γενομένου αὐτίκα οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι εἵματα ἐφόρεον τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ ἦσαν ἐν θαλίῃσι.
>
> When Cambyses arrived at Memphis, the Apis calf appeared to the Egyptians, which the Greeks call Epaphus; and when this appeared the Egyptians immediately donned their finest clothing and entered into revelry. (iii.27.1)

Cambyses decided to investigate this behavior[31] before simply reacting; he summoned the governors of Memphis to question them about the celebration. Unlike the Ethiopian king's investigation of the Persian gifts, however, Cambyses failed to perceive the veracity of their explanation about the Apis calf::

> οἳ δὲ ἔφραζον ὡς σφι θεὸς εἴη φανεὶς διὰ χρόνου πολλοῦ ἐωθὼς ἐπιφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὡς ἐπεὰν φανῇ τότε πάντες Αἰγύπτιοι κεχαρηκότες ὁρτάζοιεν. ταῦτα ἀκούσας ὁ Καμβύσης ἔφη ψεύδεσθαί σφέας καὶ ὡς ψευδομένους θανάτῳ ἐζημίου.
>
> They said that a god had appeared to them and that he was accustomed to appear to them after a long period of time, and so whenever he appeared then all the Egyptians rejoiced and celebrated a festival. Hearing these things Cambyses said the men lied and for liars the punishment was death. (iii.27.3)

Confronting both monarchs with fine clothing, Herodotos compares their characters through their ability to interpret its meaning. Cambyses answered the Ethiopian king's astuteness and mercy with thoughtlessness and cruelty.

[31] Christ. 1994, pp. 180-182. Christ claims that Herodotos uses Cambyses' investigation of Ethiopia for his own ends, but he overlooks this example of the king's further (and still faulty) investigation.

Herodotos further distinguishes the two monarchs and their kingdoms through their reaction/interaction with jewelry and fetters. For while the Persians wore golden torques and bangles, the Ethiopians used gold to forge chains for their prisoners:

> δεύτερα δὲ τὸν χρυσὸν εἰρώτα τὸν στρεπτὸν τὸν περιαυχένιον καὶ τὰ ψέλια. ἐξηγεομένων δὲ τῶν Ἰχθυοφάγων τὸν κόσμον αὐτοῦ γελάσας ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ νομίσας εἶναί σφεα πέδας εἶπε ὡς παρ' ἑωυτοῖσί εἰσι ῥωμαλεώτεραι τουτέων πέδαι.
>
> Next he [the Ethiopian king] asked about the gold torques and bangles. When the Fish-Eaters explained the jewelry, the king laughing and believing them to be chains said that there were stronger chains than these in his own land. (iii.22.2)

The historian personalizes the contrast in the Ethiopian king's tour of his prison:

> ἀγαγεῖν σφέας ἐς δεσμωτήριον ἀνδρῶν, ἔνθα τοὺς πάντας ἐν πέδῃσι χρυσέῃσι δεδέσθαι.
>
> He led them to a prison, there all the prisoners were bound in golden chains. (iii.23.4)

In contrast to the Ethiopian prison, Cambyses instead presided over a lone puppy on a leash. When Cambyses staged a combat between a puppy and a lion cub, one of the puppy's littermates broke free:

> νικωμένου δὲ τοῦ σκύλακος ἀδελφεὸν αὐτοῦ ἄλλον σκύλακα ἀπορρήξαντα τὸν δεσμὸν παραγενέσθαι οἱ, δύο δὲ γενομένους οὕτω δὴ τοὺς σκύλακας ἐπικρατῆσαι τοῦ σκύμνου.
>
> When the puppy was losing, another puppy, its sibling, broke its leash and came to his aid, and there being two the puppies thus defeated the lion-cub. (iii.32.1)

Rather than a monarch who displayed golden-fettered men (πέδῃσι χρυσέῃσι) in prisons (δεσμωτήριον), Cambyses imprisoned animals, puppies and cubs, which he restrained with simple leashes (δεσμὸν). The Persian king also failed to perceive the symbolic importance of the combat. Whereas his sister-queen regarded the puppies as symbols of Cambyses and his brother Smerdis, whose recent execution deprived the Persian king of such similar aid, it is also possible to interpret Cambyses as the lion cub soon beset by the two magi.[32] The Persian king responded to such interpretations with irrational violence, killing his wife to death (iii.32.3). Hence the contrast of fetters (gold chains/leashes) and the prisoners over which the monarchs preside (humans/animals), presents Cambyses as a petty, violent individual compared to his Ethiopian counterpart.

Herodotos extends the contrast through the respectful and disrespectful treatment of mummified corpses. In Ethiopia, families preserved a relative's corpse in a crystal coffin and then displayed it in their *oikos* for one year (iii.24.2-4). In Egypt, embalmers treated corpses with a variety of methods, but all aimed at the preservation of the deceased's body (ii.86-87). But Cambyses repeatedly mistreated such objects, defiling the corpse of Amasis (iii.16) and opening many Egyptian tombs to examine the remains (iii.37).[33] The Persian king's impropriety extended into his own household. He executed his brother Smerdis and kicked his pregnant sister-wife in the stomach, causing her death, after she used a stripped head of lettuce as a metaphor for her husband's treatment of the house

[32] iii.32.2. McNellen. 1997, p. 16.
[33] Munson. 1991, p. 46. Cambyses' actions are not merely impious, but a violation of *nomos* – both Egyptian and Persian.

of Cyrus (iii.32.4).[34] In this way, the historian contrasts the mental faculties of the two monarchs. While he presents the Ethiopian king as astute, prudent, and merciful, he depicts his Persian counterpart as obtuse, thoughtless, and brutal. Cambyses is in every way the inferior of his Ethiopian adversary.

Herodotos continues this comparison by following the Ethiopian bow once it was brought to the Persian court. Although every Persian boy was taught the use of the bow (i.136.2), Cambyses and his fellow Persians were unable to draw the bow and failed this Ethiopian test of strength. His brother Smerdis alone was able to make any progress with the bow, drawing it a mere two fingers' breadth:

> καὶ πρῶτα μὲν τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάσατο τὸν ἀδελφεὸν Σμέρδιν ἐόντα πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς τῆς αὐτῆς, τὸν ἀπέπεμψε ἐς Πέρσας φθόνῳ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου, ὅτι τὸ τόξον μοῦνος Περσέων ὅσον τε ἐπὶ δύο δακτύλους εἵρυσε, τὸ παρὰ τοῦ Αἰθίοπος ἤνεικαν οἱ Ἰχθυοφάγοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Περσέων οὐδεὶς οἷός τε ἐγένετο.
>
> The first of all the evils he carried out was against his brother Smerdis, who was of the same father and mother. Cambyses sent him back to Persia from Egypt due to jealousy, because he alone of the Persians drew the bow, which the Fish-Eaters brought back from Ethiopia, although only as much as two fingers' breadth; none of the other Persians were able to draw the bow. (iii.30.1)

Like Telemachus with Odysseus' bow, Smerdis proved his relative worth through the bow.[35] But what does the stringing (or near-stringing) of the bow signify? As previously discussed, the Greeks viewed such a contest as a proof of worth or identity. Since the Ethiopian king designed the test, the answer must lie

[34] The head of lettuce offers another possible contrast between the Ethiopian and Persian monarchs. In Ethiopia, Herodotos describes the Table of the Sun, loaded with meat for all to enjoy. In the household of the Persian king, however, the historian describes a table, bare but for a head of lettuce picked clean.
[35] Aly. 1969, pp. 84-85.

with him. As Herodotos states, the healthy, long-lived Ethiopians selected their king based upon his great height and strength relative to his size (iii.20). They defined kingship through physical strength and vitality. Hence when the Ethiopian king proffered the unstrung bow, a bow that he presumably could string, he initiated not merely a test of a person's strength, but also of his suitability (from an Ethiopian perspective) for kingship.

Hence, Smerdis' near-success and Cambyses' failure signifies that the former appeared more physically able, and hence more regal, than his brother. As in the case of the Ethiopian king, Herodotos couples this feat of strength with physical stature. For in Cambyses' subsequent dream about Smerdis, he saw his brother seated on the royal throne with his head touching the heavens:

> ἐδόκεέ οἱ ἄγγελον ἐλθόντα ἐκ Περσέων ἀγγέλλειν ὡς ἐν τῷ θρόνῳ τῷ βασιληίῳ ἱζόμενος Σμέρδις τῇ κεφαλῇ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ψαύσειε.
>
> It seemed to him that a messenger coming from Persia reported that Smerdis sitting on the royal throne touched the sky with his head. (iii.30.2)

Pairing greater height and strength in Smerdis, Herodotos presents Cambyses' brother as closer to the Ethiopian ideal of kingship. In contrast, within the parameters of the Ethiopian kingship, Cambyses is found wanting and appears as the opposite of the Ethiopian king both mentally and physically.

Herodotos refines this straightforward opposition of kings into a definite image through the third bow: the bow of Cambyses. Unlike Amasis, who strung and unstrung his bow as needed, or the Ethiopian king, who presented the Persians with an unstrung bow, Cambyses kept his bow strung and ready for

use.[36] He was ignorant of Amasis' warning that an ever-strung bow would break or the like-minded man would suffer from madness or apoplexy (μανεὶς ἢ ὅ γε ἀπόπληκτος γενόμενος). Indeed, Cambyses was thus afflicted. After his murder of the Apis calf, Herodotos describes the king, who was formerly "far from sound in his mind" (φρενήρης) as insane.[37] He claims that Cambyses suffered from epilepsy (iii.33) and links these two maladies through the Persian king's bow.[38] Discounting the Egyptian claim that Cambyses' impious murder of the Apis calf at iii.29 caused the king's madness, the historian instead posits the likelihood of an underlying physical cause:[39]

> ταῦτα μὲν ἐς τοὺς οἰκηίους ὁ Καμβύσης ἐξεμάνη, εἴτε δὴ διὰ τὸν Ἆπιν εἴτε καὶ ἄλλως, οἷα πολλὰ ἔωθε ἀνθρώπους κακὰ καταλαμβάνειν· καὶ γὰρ τινὰ ἐκ γενεῆς νοῦσον μεγάλην λέγεται ἔχειν ὁ Καμβύσης, τὴν ἱρὴν ὀνομάζουσι τινές. οὔ νύν τοι ἀεικὲς οὐδὲν ἦν τοῦ σώματος νοῦσον μεγάλην νοσέοντος μηδὲ τὰς φρένας ὑγιαίνειν.
>
> Cambyses performed these mad acts against his family, whether on account of the Apis calf or some other reason, as many sorts of maladies afflict mankind; for Cambyses is said to have suffered from some serious illness from birth, which some call the sacred

[36] Cf. iii.35.2 and iii.36.4. Cambyses abruptly drew his bow and shot Prexaspes' son while talking to the father (ταῦτα δὲ εἰπόντα καὶ διατείναντα τὸ τόξον βαλεῖν τὸν παῖδα – iii.35.3). Later, when angered by Croesus, the Persian king took up his bow to shoot the former monarch, who was only saved by swift feet (ταῦτα δὲ εἴπας ἐλάμβανε τὸ τόξον ὡς κατατοξεύσων αὐτόν, Κροῖσος δὲ ἀναδραμὼν ἔθεε ἔξω. – iii.36.4). In both cases, Herodotos omits any reference to stringing the bow and the quick pace of the narrative suggests that such a step was unnecessary.

[37] ἐμάνη; ἐξεμάνη; μαίνομαι – iii.30.1; iii.33; iii.35.4.

[38] Contra Munson. 1991, p. 56. Munson argues: "What the metanarrative labels 'clinical madness,' the narrative describes in ethical and sociocultural terms. The text and the metatext cooperate to force two different aspects of reality together, suggesting their equivalency while keeping them distinct at the same time." Munson overlooks the significance that Cambyses' murder of Prexaspes' son has for the Herodotean diagnosis of the cause of the royal madness (see below).

[39] Thomas. 2000, pp. 34-35. Thomas notes Herodotos' preference for a physical rather than divine cause of Cambyses' madness, suggesting that he is here following Hippocratic thinking. She overlooks, however, the equivocal nature of the link between the disease and madness at iii.33 and the role that the bow plays in constructing that link (see below).

> disease. It is not strange that a body suffering from a serious illness would not enjoy good mental health. (iii.33)

Herodotos presents two such possible causes: first epilepsy and later excessive drink. But at no point does the historian explicitly favor one or the other. Although he mentions the sacred disease while positing the likelihood of a physical cause, he uses λέγεται to distance himself from the diagnosis.[40]

Herodotos resolves the issue in Cambsyes' confrontation with Prexaspes. When the servant expressed the Persians' concern that their king was too fond of wine (φιλοινίῃ - iii.34.2), Cambyses reacted violently and exclaimed that the Persians thought that excessive drinking had driven him mad:

> Πρήξασπες, κοῖόν μέ τινα νομίζουσι Πέρσαι εἶναι ἄνδρα τίνας τε λόγους περὶ ἐμέο ποιεῦνται; τὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν· ὦ δέσποτα, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα μεγάλως ἐπαινέαι, τῇ δὲ φιλοινίῃ σέ φασι πλεόνως προσκεῖσθαι. τὸν μὲν δὴ λέγειν ταῦτα περὶ Περσέων, τὸν δὲ θυμωθέντα τοιάδε ἀμείβεσθαι· νῦν ἄρα μέ φασι Πέρσαι οἴνῳ προσκείμενον παραφρονέειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι νοήμονα·
>
> Prexaspes, what sort of man do the Persians think I am and what do they say about me? Prexaspes responded, "O master, you are highly praised in all other regards, but they say that you are too fond of wine." After he said these things, Cambyses grew angry and responded with the following words: "Now the Persians say that my fondness for drink has driven me mad and that I am not sane; (iii.34.2-3)

Cambyses alone connected his drinking and his sanity, but such a link was not unknown. Elsewhere in the *Histories*, the Spartans attributed Cleomenes' madness to his practice of drinking unmixed wine (vi.84). Cambyses, however, decided to test this imagined assertion. In a confusion of two tenets of Persian

[40] For Herodotos' use of λέγεται as a means to distance himself from a particular claim see Lateiner. 1989, p. 22.

education (telling the truth and using the bow), Cambyses proposed to shoot an arrow through the heart of Prexaspes' son.[41] If the arrow pierced the boy's heart, the king maintained, then he would disprove the Persians' complaint and demonstrate his sanity:

> εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παιδὸς τοῦ σοῦ τοῦδε ἑστεῶτος ἐν τοῖσι προθύροισι βαλὼν τύχω μέσης τῆς καρδίης, Πέρσαι φανέονται λέγοντες οὐδέν· ἢν δὲ ἁμάρτω, φάναι Πέρσας τε λέγειν ἀληθέα καὶ ἐμὲ μὴ σωφρονέειν.
>
> For if I happen to shoot your son standing in the doorway through the middle of the heart, then the Persians appear to be speaking nonsense; but if I miss, the Persians speak the truth and I am not in my right mind. (iii.35.2)

Shooting the arrow into the boy's chest, Cambyses cut open his chest and found the arrow lodged in his heart. Laughing, he rejoiced in the proof of his "sanity":[42]

> ὡς δὲ ἐν τῇ καρδίῃ εὑρεθῆναι ἐνεόντα τὸν ὀιστόν, εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τοῦ παιδὸς γελάσαντα καὶ περιχαρέα γενόμενον· Πρήξασπες, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ τε οὐ μαίνομαι Πέρσαι τε παραφρονέουσι, δῆλά τοι γέγονε.
>
> When the arrow was found lodged in his heart, he [Cambyses] laughing and extremely pleased said to the boy's father: Prexaspes, it has been made clear that I am not mad and the Persians are insane. (iii.35.3-4)

But the act was not really a test of sanity, and Prexaspes rightly regarded it as the work of a madman (Πρηξάσπεα δὲ ὁρῶντα ἄνδρα οὐ φρενήρεα / …and Prexaspes saw that the man was unbalanced… – iii.35.4). Herodotos uses the act as a test, but for the cause of the king's madness rather than its existence. The accuracy of Cambyses' aim proved his contention that he was not significantly

[41] Georges. 1994, p. 187.
[42] For Herodotos' ominous use of laughter see Lateiner. 1977, pp. 176-177 and Flory. 1978, pp. 150-152.

affected by wine. Hence, wine could not have been the underlying physical cause of his madness. By process of elimination, then, Herodotos uses the feat of skill to assert that the physical cause must have been epilepsy (as he thought likely) and thereby links the king's mental ailment to this physical malady.

Thus, Herodotos uses the two bows and attendant objects to create contrasting pictures of the Ethiopian king and Cambyses. Through his description, bow, and review of the Persian gifts, the Ethiopian king appears to have been a physically vigorous and mentally acute man. In contrast, Herodotos uses the Ethiopian bow, Persian bow, and other objects to demonstrate Cambyses' physical and mental weakness. He links these two infirmities together through an apparent act of physical prowess: the accurate shooting of Prexaspes' son. Through this act, Herodotos demonstrates that Cambyses suffered from mental *and* physical maladies, making him the opposite of the vital, vigorous, and astute Ethiopian king.

Herodotos completes the physical opposition of Cambyses to the Ethiopian king by coupling the Persian king's physical weakness with a dwarfish frame. As in his metaphoric description of Smerdis, whose display of strength was followed by a dream that implied large stature, Herodotos couples Cambyses' revealing use of his bow with an image that belittles his height: the cult statue at the temple of Hephaestus (iii.37). Visiting the temple, the Persian king ridiculed the cult statue, yet again displaying his deranged state. This scene, however, reflects the king's physical as well as mental state. Previously in the *Histories*, the historian describes the temple formulaically. Herodotos literally

constructs the temple complex, one piece at a time, over the course of the Egyptian king list. At some point in his description of each pharaoh, the historian notes the monarch's various dedications, many of which were made to the Temple of Hephaestus. He uses several of these dedications to reflect the character or greatness of the respective monarchs.[43]

Curiously, though, none of the eleven previous references to the temple complex describes the central figure: the cult statue of the temple. Herodotos postpones his description of this statue until the visit of the current *de facto* pharaoh: Cambyses. This pairing of monarch and monument in the temple complex perpetuates the formula of the king list and implicitly links the Persian monarch and the monument. The historian's description of the statue is provocative:

> ὡς δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐς τοῦ Ἡφαίστου τὸ ἱρὸν ἦλθε καὶ πολλὰ τῷ ἀγάλματι κατεγέλασε· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦ Ἡφαίστου τῶγαλμα τοῖσι Φοινικηίοισι Παταΐκοισι ἐμφερέστατον, τοὺς οἱ Φοίνικες ἐν τῇσι πρῴρῃσι τῶν τριηρέων περιάγουσι. ὃς δὲ τούτους μὴ ὄπωπε, ἐγὼ δὲ σημανέω· πυγμαίου ἀνδρὸς μίμησίς ἐστι.
>
> So he also came to the temple of Hephaestus and laughed greatly at the statue; for the statue most closely resembles the Phoenicians Pataici, which the Phoenicians carry around on the prows of their triremes. I will describe them for whoever has not seen one: it resembles a pygmy. (iii.37.2)

By simple proximity, the historian links Cambyses to this symbol both of his ironic "greatness" and metaphorical lack of physical stature. Herodotos provides no details about Cambyses' actual height, but, viewed from the framework laid out by the Ethiopian king and his test, great strength is coupled with great

[43] Immerwahr. 1960, pp. 265-266.

height. A corollary of this definition of kingship is that weakness (through lack of strength, infirmity, or both) is coupled with a slight frame. The historian uses the statue to complete this corollary. Hence, Cambyses was not merely mad, but the mental *and* physical opposite of the Ethiopian king – a mentally and physically infirm pygmy.

Herodotos, then, uses the repeated pairing of bow and monarch to contrast and hence define the Persian king with respect to his two contemporaries. First, he uses Amasis' bow to establish a relationship between the stringing of a bow and a king's identity or character. Amasis used his bow to espouse a balanced approach to kingship that involved work and relaxation. A lover of drink (φιλοπότης), the pharaoh wisely divided his day between his royal duties and pleasures. Within the parameters of Amasis' metaphor, the alcoholic (φιλοινίῃ) Cambyses was a "snapped bow," living and ruling in an excessive fashion.

Next, Herodotos uses the second and third bows as well as the gifts of the Persian embassy and similar objects later in the narrative to contrast the physical and mental states of the Ethiopian king and Cambyses. First, he describes the Ethiopian king as physically tall and strong, a description that the king's bow supports. The historian couples this physical vitality with mental acuity, which he reveals through the king's analysis of the Persian gifts as well as his management of food and drink. Second, through his depiction of Cambyses' interaction with objects similar to the gifts, he presents the Persian king as obtuse, imprudent, and insane. Cambyses fell short physically as well, failing the

test of strength posed by the Ethiopian bow. He finished behind his brother Smerdis, whose greater success placed him closer to the Ethiopian ideal of kingship based upon physical vitality. Failing the Ethiopian king's test, Cambyses next arranged one of his own using his own bow and in doing so links his mental and physical infirmities. Shooting Prexaspses' son through the heart, the Persian king ironically demonstrated his insanity and its underlying cause – the sacred disease. Lastly, Herodotos implicitly links Cambyses' mental and physical shortcomings with slight stature, associating the Persian monarch with the pygmy statue of Hephaestus. The historian creates a complex set of comparisons between these three kings, but links their behavior and his evaluation of them through a set of unchanging objects and in particular the stringing of their respective bows.

The Kraters of Lydia (i.14, i.25, and i.51)

Herodotos uses this same method to evaluate dynasties through the evaluation of its successive members. The succession from father to son typically invites comparison as seen within the pages of epic[44] and within the *Histories* itself.[45] Instead of using objects to illustrate the characters/natures of the respective generations, the historian evaluates the relative success or failure of each generation. In the first book of the *Histories*, Herodotos associates *kraters* solely with the Lydian Mermnadid dynasty. These monarchs alone dedicate,

[44] E.g. Odysseus to Telemachus (*Od.* i.204-205; iv.140-146, et al.)
[45] Cf. i.183 (the comparison of Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes) and iii.34 (Croesus' comparison of Cyrus and Cambyses).

receive, or manipulate these vessels prior to the Pelusian *krater* at iii.11.[46] Despite this privileged relationship, little attention has been given to their significance save as examples of the historian's interest in wealth.[47] But *kraters* in the *Histories* are often exceptional objects that the historian uses to convey additional meaning. Herodotos describes their use in sacrifices, has them offered as dedications/monuments, and introduces them into scenes of elaborate dining.[48] We have explored how the historian uses the Pelusian *krater* to signifiy the changing status of Egypt from freedom to servitude (iii.11.2 – Chapter 1, pp. 24-33) and the *krater* of Ariantes to foreshadow Scythia's victory over Persia (iv.81 – Chapter 2, pp. 88-97). Herodotos uses the Lydian *kraters* in book 1 in a similar fashion. But while Poudrier notes the aristocratic significance of Croesus' use of *kraters*,[49] an idea supported by the use of *kraters* in epic as "a symbolic kernel of power within the princely *oikos*,"[50] she limits her analysis to the single Mermnadid monarch. Yet Gyges, Alyattes, and Croesus, the three Lydian

[46] i.14.1; i.25.2; i.51.1; i.70; i.207.6. Dedications: Gyges offered several *kraters* as part of his thank-offering to Delphi (κρητῆρες οἱ ἀριθμὸν ἓξ χρύσεοι - i.14.1); Alyattes made a similar dedication to the sanctuary after his recovery from a near-fatal illness (κρητῆρά τε ἀργύρεον μέγαν - i.25.2); Croesus sent two monumental *kraters* to Delphi prior to his campaign against Persia (κρητῆρας δύο – i.51.1). Gifts: the Spartans sent a bronze *krater* to Croesus as a gift (κρητῆρα χάλκεον – i.70). Manipulation: after Cyrus defeated Croesus, the former Lydian monarch accompanied his master in his campaign against the Massagetae, where he advised the Persian king to bait a trap for the Massagetae with a sumptuous banquet and *kraters* full of unmixed wine (κρητῆρας ἀφειδέως οἴνου ἀκρήτου – i.207.6).

[47] Flory. 1987, p. 85.

[48] Sacrifices: iii.11.2 bis (the Pelusian *krater* – see Chp. 2, pp. 24-33); iv.61.1 (Herodotos compares the shape of a Scythian cauldron to a Lesbian *krater*); vii.54.3 (Xerxes pours wine and throws a golden *krater* into the Hellespont as a possible sacrifice). Dedications/Monuments: iii.47.1, 2; iii.48.1 (the Spartan *krater,* which was intended for Croesus, revisited); iv.81.3 (the Scythian *krater* – see Chp. 3, pp. 88-97); iv.152.4 (*krater* dedication at the Samian Heraion to commemorate a profitable trading voyage); viii.122 (Aeginetan *krater* – placed beside the dedications of Croesus). Dining: iv.66 (Annual Scythian celebration); vii.119.2, 4 (Antipater hosted Xerxes' army with golden *kraters* that the Persians took with them); ix.80.1 (These were the gold and silver *kraters* found in the Persian camp after Plataea).

[49] Poudrier. 2002, pp. 24-25.

[50] Luke. 1994, p. 24.

monarchs prominently described by Herodotos, all engaged in similar behavior – the dedication of monumental *kraters* to Delphi. Similar to the repetition of royal bows, the historian uses the recurrence of Lydian monumental *kraters* to compare the three monarchs, in particular Gyges to Croesus, and to illustrate the dynasty's changing fortunes.

As we have already discussed, Herodotos uses the unchanged state of a monument, such as the *stelai* of Sesostris, to emphasize a monarch's legacy or fame (Chp. 2, p. 64). In contrast, the historian uses Croesus' gold and silver *kraters* to foreshadow the Lydian monarch's fall. Immediately after the description of the *kraters*, the historian describes their relocation. Through his presentation of the objects as mutable against the immutable background of Delphi, he undermines the king's connection to his dedications and the god they celebrated (Chp. 2, pp. 66-76). In many respects, these *kraters* appear similar to the dedications of his father Alyattes and ancestor Gyges. Like Croesus, these monarchs dedicated large or numerous *kraters* composed of precious metal to the sanctuary at Delphi (κρητῆρες οἱ ἀριθμὸν ἓξ χρύσεοι … κρητῆρά τε ἀργύρεον μέγαν – i.14.1 and i.25.1 respectively). Although his forebears sent these vessels to Delphi as thank-offerings rather than an attempt to win the god's favor, the *kraters* of Croesus matched the previous dedications in composition and location.

The resemblance, however, ends there. Herodotos distinguishes the *kraters* of Croesus from those of his predecessors both in his assessment of their worth and their fate. Worth is a familiar criterion for many of the sights and wonders that the historian includes in his narrative. The attribution of worth underscores

the splendor of the monument, and through it, the monarch's greatness.[51] In the Lydian *logos*, Herodotos almost completely reserves the classification of worth(y) (of seeing, recalling, description, or reckoning) to the Lydian dynasty and its monuments.[52] After his usurpation of the Lydian throne, Gyges sent dedications worthy of remembrance such as six golden *kraters*:

> πάρεξ δὲ τοῦ ἀργύρου χρυσὸν ἄπλετον ἀνέθηκε ἄλλον τε καὶ τοῦ μάλιστα μνήμην ἄξιον ἔχειν ἐστί, κρητῆρές οἱ ἀριθμὸν ἓξ χρύσεοι ἀνακέαται.
>
> Besides the silver he dedicated a great deal of gold objects and the most noteworthy are six golden *kraters*. (i.14.1)

Herodotos frames his account of Alyattes' reign with similar terms, beginning with the king's deeds most worth description (ἄλλα δὲ ἔργα ἀπεδέξατο ἐὼν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἀξιαπηγητότατα τάδε. / While in power he performed these other deeds most worthy of mention – i.16.2) and concluding with the description of his *krater* and bowl-stand:

> ἀνέθηκε δὲ ἐκφυγὼν τὴν νοῦσον δεύτερος οὗτος τῆς οἰκίης ταύτης ἐς Δελφοὺς κρητῆρά τε ἀργύρεον μέγαν καὶ ὑποκρητηρίδιον σιδήρεον κολλητόν, θέης ἄξιον διὰ πάντων τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖσι ἀναθημάτων.
>
> After he recovered from the illness this king, the second of his house to do so, dedicated a great silver *krater* and a welded iron stand, a sight worth seeing of all the dedications at Delphi. (i.25.2)

[51] Immerwahr. 1960, p. 267.

[52] ἄξιος (i.14.1; i.25.2; i.32.1, 7), ἀξιοθέητος (i.14.3), ἀξιαπήγητος (i.16.2). The only exception is the throne of Midas, which Herodotos describes as "worthy of seeing" (ἀξιοθέητον – i.14.3). He uses this object, however, as a reference point for the dedications of Gyges. The historian does not use another form of ἀξιο- again until i.107.2, after the conclusion of the Lydian *Logos*.

But Herodotos denies this appellation to Croesus and his works. When Solon awarded the title of the "the happiest" (ὀλβιώτατος) to other men, the king asked why the Athenian did not regard Croesus as even "the equal in worth to commoners" (οὐδὲ ἰδιωτέων ἀνδρῶν ἀξίους ἡμέας ἐποίησας; - i.32.1). In a similar manner, Herodotos withholds such a classification from the Lydian monarch's *kraters*. For despite their impressive size and composition, he at no point describes the vessels, or any other dedications of Croesus, as "worthy."

Herodotos correlates this disparity of worth to the manner in which the *kraters* of the Lydian kings endured the passage of time. While the *kraters* of Croesus were lessened due to the passage of time, the *kraters* of Alyattes and Gyges endured the passing years with no negative effect. In the case of Alyattes, Herodotos presents the *krater* simply without any overt consideration of the passage of time (i.25.2). Yet, while the historian describes the dedication in the past tense, he implies that the *krater* still existed in his own day in that it was worth seeing.

For Gyges, though, Herodotos presents the monarch's *kraters* in an explicitly diachronic fashion similar to the dedications of Croesus, but with the opposite result. Like Croesus, the first Mermnadid sent golden and silver dedications to the sanctuary. Amid this endless (ἄπλετον) supply of golden objects, the historian notes six golden *kraters* worthy of mention (i.14.1), which he locates in the Corinthian treasury:

> ἑστᾶσι δὲ οὗτοι ἐν τῷ Κορινθίων θησαυρῷ σταθμὸν ἔχοντες τριήκοντα τάλαντα· ἀληθέι δὲ λόγῳ χρεωμένῳ οὐ Κορινθίων τοῦ δημοσίου ἐστὶ ὁ θησαυρός, ἀλλὰ Κυψέλου τοῦ Ἠετίωνος.

> These stood in the Corinthian treasury and weighed thirty talents. In truth, though, it is not the treasury of the Corinthians, but of Cypselus son of Eëtion. (i.14.2)

Similar to the location of Croesus' golden *krater* in the Clazomenian treasury, the location of these *kraters* recontextualized the dedication and linked it with the Corinthians as well as Gyges. The fixed limit placed upon the Mermnadid dynasty, however, namely that it would fall in the fifth generation (i.13.2), explains this lessening of the Lydian dedication. Moreover, the historian reinforces the Lydian identity of the objects, describing the *kraters* and other dedications as the "Gygean Treasure" (καλέεται Γυγάδας – i.14.3).

While Herodotos presents both Croesus' and Gyges' *kraters* with a sense of their dynasty's demise, however, he reverses the relationship of their dedications and the landscape over time. Whereas the historian alters the location of the *kraters* of Croesus against an unchanged landscape, he presents the *kraters* of Gyges as fixed points against a changed landscape. Describing the treasury at two points in time, he places the *kraters* in one place but notes the changed ownership of the treasury building from Cypselus to the Corinthians (ἀληθέι δὲ λόγῳ χρεωμένῳ οὐ Κορινθίων τοῦ δημοσίου ἐστὶ ὁ θησαυρός, ἀλλὰ Κυψέλου τοῦ Ἠετίωνος./ In truth, though, it is not the treasury of the Corinthians, but of Cypselus son of Eëtion. - i.14.2). Against the background of the treasury building, then, the *kraters* of Gyges appear to suffer no change, no decline over time, unlike the *kraters* of his ancestor Croesus. As previously discussed, Herodotos moves that monarch's vessels against an unchanged background. After the temple fire,

the Lydian vessels were moved from their position of honor at the entrance of the temple of Apollo to the corner of the new temple's *pronaos* and the Clazomenian treasury (i.51.2).[53]

Through the Lydian *kraters*, then, Herodotos reifies different phases of the Mermnadid dynasty: its rise, rule, and fall. Restricting the vessels to the Lydian monarchy, Herodotos places the vessels in analogous contexts with distinct results to illustrate the relative greatness of Gyges and to a lesser extent Alyattes with respect to Croesus. Withholding the classification of "worthy" from the *kraters* of Croesus, the historian distinguishes the last Mermnadid monarch from his predecessors. Additionally, he uses the repetition of two elements – the *kraters* and a treasury building – and the passage of time to illustrate the secure and insecure power of Gyges and Croesus, the rise and fall of the Mermnadid dynasty. Whereas the historian presents Gyges' *kraters* as unchanged or unmoved against a changing background, he presents the *kraters* of Croesus as changed or mobile against an unchanged background.

Within the parameters of dynastic generations, then, Herodotos uses the repetition and variation of objects to create a message about the entire dynasty rather than individual characters. Selecting a consistent set of objects (*kraters* in the case of the Mermnadae), the historian evaluates the dynasty's status through these signature objects. He uses the alteration or interruption of the expected pattern to signal a change (usually for the worse) of the family's fortunes.

[53] See Chp. 2, pp. 66-76 for a complete discussion. Herodotos uses a different portion of the Delphic landscape for his account of Croesus' dedications, replacing the Cypselid/Corinthian treasury with the Clazomenian (i.51.2). But in the next section, which details the fate Croesus' four silver *pithoi*, the historian reintroduces the familiar Corinthian structure and provides another commonality to assist the audience's recognition of the comparison.

Conclusion

Herodotos, then, alters objects on two different levels (specific objects and objects of the same category). In the case of specific objects, he changes them either through a diachronic presentation or through repetition and substitution. Like a simple flipbook, Herodotos creates a cinematic technique through the multiplicity of images, each with a slightly different connotation or meaning. In the case of objects of the same category, the historian utilizes the same techniques, but over a more extended section of the narrative. He either reuses the same object or introduces another of the same type (e.g.: Cambyses' bow for the Ethiopian bow). He places this new object in an analogous context to ensure the audience perceives the connection. Hence, even though Alyattes dedicated a different *krater* to Delphi than Croesus, the similarity of the contexts – two kings dedicating *kraters* to the same Greek sanctuary – encourages the comparison between the two objects, scenes, and kings.

In both the immediate and extended comparisons, Herodotos uses objects to create contrasting character portraits. The initial objects convey a distinct connotation in each scene that aids in characterization. When changed or replaced, the object(s) again conveys a connotation that aids in characterization, but the contrast between meanings is revealing. The historian uses the familiar context and object to invite the audience to contrast these two meanings, and by extension, the characters with whom they are associated. Hence, objects provide

the historian with a stable, yet malleable, vehicle with which to characterize the individuals within his narrative.

Chapter 4:
The Masistios *Logos* (ix.20 – 31.1)

In addition to creating or altering an object's connotation through its direct manipulation, Herodotos may evoke a particular meaning through the context of the passage. In this way, the historian emphasizes or de-emphasizes an object's various potential connotations. Thus, as in the example of the Pelusian *Krater*, Herodotos draws upon the connotation of wine with peace and water with subservience to Persia to illustrate the transition of Egypt from one state to another (Chp. 1, pp. 24-33). The historian uses some objects, however, not merely as a means to convey additional meaning, but also as a means to arrange and structure the narrative.

One such example is Herodotos' treatment of the battle in the foothills of Cithaeron and its aftermath. Beginning with the heroic figure and corpse of the Persian Masistios, the historian focuses on heroic death, heroic corpses, and corpses in general to impart an epic tone to the action and characters. Minimizing or overlooking the importance of these corpses, scholars have viewed the battle in the foothills of Cithaeron (ix.20 – 25.1), the movement of the Greek camp (ix.25.1 – 26.1), the Tegean/Athenian debate (ix.26.2 – 28.1), and the catalogue of Greek forces (ix.28.2 – 30) as independent sections of the narrative.[1]

[1] Macan. 1973 (1908), pp. 629-657. How and Wells. 1912, *loc. sit*. Myres. 1971, pp. 115, 133. Immerwahr. 1966, pp. 289-291. Masaracchia. 1978, pp. 160-168. Flower and Marincola. 2002, pp. 138-161. Macan treats each section as a different stage of the larger battle narrative, but does not note any particular relation between them. How and Wells divide the *logos* at ix.25.1 and takes no notice of the heroic qualities of Masistios. Myres' pedimental approach seeks to draw a closer correspondence between the various sections and events after the catalogue, such as cavalry engagement (ix.20-24) and the Persian attack on the Greek supply train (ix.38-39), than between the various parts. Immerwahr generally follows Myres arrangement of this *logos*, dividing it

This chapter, however, argues that these sections comprise the Masistios *logos* (ix.20 – 31.1) and work as a unit.

Herodotos employs objects (primarily corpses) to link the various sections of the *logos* together. Using related items (e.g. corpses) or the repetition of the same item (e.g. the corpse of Masistios), the historian creates a highly structured narrative and links one section to another. He organizes the first section (ix.20-25.1) around the heroic figure of Masistios and later the struggle for his corpse. Next, the historian widens the scope from one heroic figure to several as the Greek camp moves from one heroic gravesite to another (ix.25.1-26.1). As the Greeks advance from a struggle of arms to a struggle of words, Herodotos retains heroic combat and death as a significant theme within the Athenian/Tegean debate (ix.26.1-28.1). While the historian does not include heroic corpses in the third section, his catalog of the Greek forces (ix.28.2-30), he models the section on the epic catalogs of Homer, perpetuating the epic tone of the *logos*. Finally, he concludes the section with a return to the corpse of Masistios, providing a summation of the episode and signaling the end of a unified narrative section.

The structural unity of these passages suggests a thematic unity as well. Herodotos uses heroic death and corpses to place and to evaluate the characters and events in an epic context. At the beginning of the *logos*, Herodotos employs the living Masistios to compare the Athenians favorably with other Greeks and

---

between the Greek to Cithaeron followed by the cavalry engagement (ix.19-24) and the Greek movement to Gargaphia (ix.25-32). Masaracchia notes several Homeric influences upon the passage, but makes no effort to tie the various sections together. Flower and Marincola divide the passage into the engagement, the movement of the camp, the debate, and the catalogue of Greek and Persian forces.

later the Persian commander's corpse to place the Athenians into the role of an epic hero (ix.20-25.1). Next, he perpetuates the *Iliadic* setting and continues the presentation of the Athenians as the "hero" of Cithaeron in the Greek review of Masistios' corpse (ix.25), comparable to the review of Patroklos and Hektor's corpses. During the debate between the Tegeans and the Athenians (ix.26-27), the historian again compares the Athenians favorably to other Greeks, presenting them, collectively, as a hero both in the past and the contemporary era. In each section, Herodotos makes a different point with similar objects: heroic corpses. If taken together, however, as the structural arrangement suggests, these points contribute to a larger argument: the heroic presentation of the Athenians and praise for their contribution to the Battle of Plataea. Herodotos strengthens this last point with the inclusion of the catalogue, in which he asserts that the Athenians supplied the greatest number of quality troops (i.e. hoplites) to the campaign. Thus, the corpses, while not present in every chapter of the *logos*, help to establish an epic setting in which Herodotos presents the Athenians in a positive and even heroic light.

This chapter will advance this argument in three parts. The first section will establish the status of a corpse as an object. A review of Herodotean corpses will demonstrate their unique presentation in the Masistios *logos*, which limits the scope of its argument. Not all corpses belong to heroes nor do heroic corpses elsewhere in the narrative contribute to a laudatory presentation of the Athenians. The second section of this chapter then presents the structural and argumentative components of the objects of the *logos*. First, it shows how

Herodotos uses corpses and combat (and the epic setting they produce) to frame and to link the different sections together. Next, it examines the secondary meaning of the corpses and of the sections themselves, showing how each section contributes to an overall praise of the Athenians. Herodotos combines the structural and interpretive functions of objects within the *logos* to advance an argument of a limited scope.

Corpses in the Histories

Corpses as Objects

A corpse is at once a symbol of a former person and a thing to be manipulated by those around it. Friends and relatives of a person may view a corpse as the continuing representation of that character, but still treat it like an object. The corpse is mute, lifeless and motionless, neither acting nor communicating with the world around it. Instead, like any other object, it is the focus of human manipulation. Friends and relatives seek to conduct some form of burial rites, which involve manipulating the corpse (mummifying, anointing, burying, burning, or even eating). Like other objects, corpses may be adorned or decorated,[2] moved,[3] somehow diminished, such as by the removal of a fallen warrior's armor,[4] damaged,[5] stolen,[6] or generally suffer from the effects of time.[7] In every instance, the corpse initiates no action, but endures these vagaries of fate

[2] i.140.1-2; ii.81.2; ii.86.2-87.3; ii.90.1-2; ii.129.3; iii.10.2; iii.24.2-3; iv.71.1-72.5.
[3] i.64.2; i.68.3-6; i.113.1-3; i.187.4-5; ii.121γ1-2; iii.125.4; vi.73.1-2.
[4] i.82.5-6; viii.27.4; ix.22.2; ix.80.2.
[5] i.214.4; ii.121β2; iii.16.1-3; iii.79.1; iv.64.3; iv.103.3; v.114.2; vi.30.2; vii.39-40; vii.238.1-2; ix.78.79.1.
[6] ii.121ε4-5; ix.24.
[7] iii.12.1; ix.83.2.

common to all objects in the *Histories*. The transition of a body/corpse from person to object immediately follows death. Those around the body cease to interact with the body as a person and instead treat it as an object. Only characters displaying aberrant behavior, such as Periander,[8] continue to interact with a corpse as though with the living person.

The distinct characteristics of a corpse, its human shape and status as a symbol of an entity, are not unique. Statues, both of gods and humans, share these traits and appear just as passive. Characters manipulate both these mortal and the divine objects in an equal fashion. Statues, like corpses, may also be clothed or adorned.[9] They may be moved for proper purposes, such as to a temple,[10] or away from danger,[11] or even as part of a religious procession.[12] Similarly statues suffer over time. Herodotos notes their theft,[13] insult, and desecration.[14] Finally, like almost any object in the *Histories,* statues are susceptible to incidental or willful destruction over time.[15] Like corpses, human statues serve as memorials, symbols of the deceased. Some focus on a certain aspect, deed or event,[16] but others simply represent the person.[17] Aside from

[8] v.92γ. Sex appears to be the only treatment of a corpse as a living body. The Egyptians, for instance, delayed the mummification of a beautiful woman's corpse to prevent its sexual violation by the embalmers (ii.89.2).
[9] ii.42.6; iv.189.1.
[10] i.31.5; ii.181.4-5.
[11] i.164.3.
[12] ii.42.6; ii.63.1-2.
[13] i.183.3; v.83.2, v.85.1, v.86.3.
[14] ii.121; iii.37.2, 3; vii.129.3.
[15] ii.131.2 and iii.37.3; vii.140.1 *or*; vii.109.3; viii.143.2; viii.144.2 respectively.
[16] i.24.8; i.31.5; ii.141.6; vi.58.3.
[17] ii.110.3; ii.131.2; ii.143.2-3; viii.121.2.

unusual displays of divine action,[18] then, statues resemble other objects. They are as fragile and as subject to manipulation as any other object in the *Histories.*

The human form or the fact that a corpse, like a statue, represents an animate entity (e.g. god or spirit), then, does not privilege its treatment. Like statues, corpses remain passive foci of action and suffer fates common to all objects in the *Histories.* While corpses require certain ritual actions, they do so as objects, not as persons.

The Meaning of a Herodotean Corpse

Epic treatment of corpses in the *Histories* is unusual. For the most part, Herodotos treats dead bodies in a non-epic fashion. The majority of corpses serve as ethnographic markers to distinguish cultures and as behavioral gauges to judge individuals. Twenty-eight of the sixty-seven references to corpses in the *Histories* concern the customs and rites necessary for a "proper" burial outside of a military context.[19] The few corpses treated in a heroic fashion outside of the Masistios *logos* are not part of extended presentations. Moreover, unlike Masistios, they only obtain heroic status after their burial.

Herodotos attributes what appear to be epic elements to the burial practices of some cultures, but these practices differ from the treatment of the dead in epic. Some cultures, such as the Thracians, held funeral games for their dead (v.8), but Herodotos does not link this practice to the burial of a warrior.

[18] vi.82.2; v.86.3.
[19] i.45.1-3; i.64.2; i.67.2-68.6; i.93.2-4; i.140.1-2; ii.81.2; ii.85.1; ii.86.2-7; ii.87.1-3; ii.89.2; ii.90.1-2; ii.121ε1-4; ii.129.3; ii.1169.3; iii.10.2; iii.24.2-3; iii.38.4; iv.62.4; iv.71.1-72.5; iv.73.1-2; iv.190; iv.8; v.92γ; v.114.2; vi.30.2; vi.58.2-3; iv.103; vii.117.1-2.

This difference makes a comparison to the distinctive burials of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* problematic. Nor does the treatment of the dead during war resemble the practices displayed in the Homeric epics. Although Spartan kings killed in battle received special honors and a statue, Herodotos presents these practices as part of his ethnographic treatment of Sparta and does not link them to any heroic individual (vi.58.3). Moreover, while he expresses the desires of many societies to recover their war dead, he does not restrict their attentions to a single corpse (such as a leader); rather, he describes their efforts to bury all their soldiers. Thus, at Plataea the Greeks honored no individual with a notable burial (ix.85). The Cimmerians buried their nobles (who fought each other to the death) without singling anyone out for special treatment (iv.11.4). Not even the Greek practice of stripping the armor from the corpses of their enemies established a clear allusion to Homer. Epic heroes seized the armor from the corpses of other heroes during battle. The Greeks in the *Histories*, however, stripped their enemies *en masse* after the battle had ended.[20] Thus, the historian attributes no regular burial rites and practices similar to the treatment of the dead in epic.

Herodotos reserves this treatment, attributing heroic or quasi-heroic honors, to few individuals outside of the Masistios *logos*, casting them into an epic mould briefly and posthumously. At times, he records singular honors, such as for Tellus, whom the Athenians buried at public expense in a mound on the battlefield where he fell (i.30.5).[21] In his description of the burial of a heroic

[20] i.82.5-6; viii.27.4; ix.80.2.
[21] Cf. iii.55.2. The Samians granted the Spartan Archias a public funeral, but Herodotos omits any details, precluding an association with funerals in Homer.

figure, the historian may recall some of the burial practices described in the *Iliad*, but rarely links the burial or the figure to a particular character or scene from epic. Only five other corpses, those of Orestes, Leonidas, Artachaees, Onesilaos, and Philippos, received heroic treatment. The first, Orestes, was an actual figure from the heroic age, but his corpse received recognition of its status only after its burial and later reburial in Sparta. Moreover, he was found in a setting foreign to epic: the courtyard of a smithy (i.68.3-6). While the body of the next, Leonidas, became the focal point of a battle, similar to Patroklos, Herodotos does not style the battle of Thermopylae overall as a heroic combat (vii.224). The final three, Artachaees, Onesilaos, and Philippos, possessed neither heroic lineage nor died in a heroic fashion. They only achieved heroic status after their burials and thus do not resemble heroic figures from epic.[22] The historian treats Masistios alone, then, as a heroic figure and places him in a sustained epic setting.

The Structure of the Masistios *Logos* (ix.20 – 31.1)

Through this extended presentation of heroic death and heroic corpses, Herodotos unites his account of the battle on Cithaeron (ix.20 – 25.3), the Tegean/Athenian debate (ix.26.1 – 27.6), and the catalog of Greek forces (ix.28.1 – 31.1). While part of the Plataea narrative, the epic tone of the Masistios *logos* distinguishes it from the sections immediately preceding and following it.

[22] The Amanthians at first dishonored Onesilaos' body, decapitating it. Only later, upon the advice of an oracle, did they rebury the corpse and treat Onesilaos as a hero (v.114.2). Artachaees' fellow Persians did not regard him as a heroic figure, even though he was possessed the physical qualities common to many heroes (a large frame and loud voice); rather, the Acanthians later gave the Persian's grave heroic honors in response to an oracle (vii.117.2). The Egestans honored Philippos with a hero-shrine after his death (v.47.1-2).

Herodotos provides a clear marker for the *logos*: Masistios. Alive, he begins the first skirmish and the *logos* (ix.20); dead, he appears one last time at its end in the thoughts of his fellow Persians (ix.31.1). Prior to his appearance, the narrative is not particularly epic. Mardonius' test of the Phocians bears no resemblance to heroic combat (ix.17-18). Immediately preceding the Persian attack at Cithaeron, Herodotos describes the slow advance of the Greeks from the Isthmus to Boeotia (ix.19). No heroic figures appear; neither does Herodotos interject any epic allusions. He uses the final reference to Masistios at ix.31.1 to divide the Greek and Persian catalogs and to shift the narrative's point of view from the former to the latter. The narrative further reflects this shift in the abandonment of epic themes (such as personal combat).

Within the Masistios *logos*, Herodotos uses heroic corpses and other heroic elements to divide the passage into three major parts:

I. The events at Cithaeron
    A. Persian cavalry assault
        1. Initial assault against the Megarian position (ix.21.1 – 21.2)
        2. Advance of the Athenian volunteers and the death of Masistios (ix.21.3 – 22.3)
    B. Battle for the body of Masistios.
        1. Struggle between the Athenians (later Greeks) and the Persian cavalry (ix.22.3 – ix.23.2)
        2. Persian and Greek mourning/admiring of Masistios' corpse (ix.24 – ix.25.1)
    C. Movement of the Greek camp from Cithaeron to the Asopus (ix.25.2 – ix.25.3)

II. The debate between the …

A. Tegeans (ix.26.1 – 26. 7)

B. Athenians

1. Athens in the Age of Heroes (ix.27.1-4)

2. Athens at Marathon (ix.27.4-6)

III. The catalogue and conclusion

A. Catalogue of the Greek forces at Plataea (ix.28.1 – ix.30)[23]

B. Persian camp mourning Masistios (ix.31.1)

In the first section, Herodotos utilizes Masistios (or his corpse) as a focal point of the narrative. He places the living Masistios, the Persian protagonist, at the center of the battle (IA). After the death of the cavalry commander, the historian makes him the focus of the struggle between the Greeks and Persians as each side attempted to gain possession of the corpse (IB). After the battle, Herodotos moves the Greek camp from where Masistios was killed to a spot along the Asopus River near the tomb of the hero Androkrates (IC). The literal presence of heroic corpses becomes figurative in the debate between the Tegeans and the Athenians. Using agonistic language appropriate to a description of a battle for a corpse, the debate includes accounts of heroic duels, death, and burial. The Tegean argument rests primarily upon the heroic combat between Echemos and Hyllos (IIA). The Athenian argument adduces further examples of epic combat and death both through their recollection of their deeds during the heroic age and more recently at Marathon (IIB). The catalogue at the end of the

[23] The catalogue of the Greek forces at Plataea (ix.28.2 to ix.30) does not make use of the heroic motif, but as will be shown the purpose of this section and the remainder of the *logos* have a connection.

logos (IIIA) moves from the dead to the living, but Herodotos concludes the catalogue and the *logos* with a final consideration of the death of Masistios (IIIB).

The remainder of this section is divided into four subsections. The first establishes the heroic credentials of Mastistios. The second subsection traces the use of Masistios, his trappings, and his corpse to organize the first part of the *logos*. Third, Herodotos' organization of the debate through references to heroic combat and death is examined. The final subsection demonstrates how the historian uses Masistios to bracket the catalog and include it within the *logos.*

The Epic Nature of Masistios

Herodotos' presentation of Masistios as a heroic figure is essential to the creation of an epic setting. Unlike Leonidas, and the cult figures Onesilaos and Artachaees, the historian casts the living Masistios into a heroic mould. Scholars have long recognized the Persian's heroic appearance and death as well as the epic tone of the struggle for his corpse.[24] Masistios himself cut a clear Homeric figure in his own person, his trappings, and even his double name - Μασίστιος/Μακίστιον ("the tallest").[25] Herodotos further emphasizes his size and beauty through the description of the Persian's corpse (ὁ δὲ νεκρὸς ἦν θέης ἄξιος μεγάθεος εἵνεκα καὶ κάλλεος / His corpse was worth seeing because of its great size and beauty - ix.25.1). The historian similarly attributes great size and beauty to other heroic and heroicized (cult-heroes) figures in the *Histories*.

[24] Aly. 1969 (1921), p. 274. Masaracchia. 1978, p. 162; Flower and Marincola. 2002, p. 143; Boedeker. 2003, p. 20.
[25] Boedeker. 2001, p. 122. She equates the punning of Masistios' name with *Iliad* vii.155.

He ascribes a large frame to Orestes, Perseus, Herakles, and the cult figure Artachaees.[26] He describes the great beauty (κάλλεος) of Philippos, whom the Egestans honored with a hero-shrine after his death.[27] In the *Iliad*, the Achaeans note these same characteristics when gazing upon the body of Hektor (οἳ καὶ θηήσαντο φυὴν καὶ εἶδος ἀγητὸν Ἕκτορος· / They gazed upon the stature and impressive beauty of Hektor - *Iliad* xxii.373-4), the significance of which will be explored further below (pp. 167-169). Herodotos also clothes the heroic body in epic armor, a golden thorax (ἐντὸς θώρηκα εἶχε χρύσεον λεπιδωτόν) reminiscent of the golden armor that Glaukos wears in the *Iliad*.[28] The unusual efficacy of his golden thorax, which withstood repeated blows (ix.22.2), resulted in Masistios dying a particularly Homeric death. An Athenian bypassed the armor and killed the Persian with a blow to the eye, like the hero Ilioneus (*Iliad*

[26] Although μεγάθεος is not used to describe all the heroes, a larger than life stature is commonly associated with recognized heroic figures in the *Histories*. The bones of Orestes (i.68.3) are measured as equivalent in length to the seven cubit-long *soros* (σορῷ ἑπταπήχει) in which they were buried. The immense statures of Perseus and Herakles are both indicated by the size of their feet. Like some overgrown teenager Perseus would leave one of his size two (cubit) sandals (σανδάλιόν … ἐὸν τὸ μέγαθος δίπηχυ / a sandal two cubits in size) near the city of Chemmis (ii.91.3). The similarly-soled Herakles merely left his two-cubit long footprint (βήματι … ἔστι δὲ τὸ μέγαθος δίπηχυ / footprint two cubits in size) in the living rock in Scythia (iv.82). The Persian Artachaees, who was remarkable in part for his large size (μεγάθεί τε μέγιστον ἐόντα Περσέων (ἀπὸ γὰρ πέντε πήχεων βασιληίων ἀπέλειπε τέσσερας δακτύλους) / in size he was the largest of the Persians (for he was four fingers short of five royal cubits in height), was worshipped by the people of Acanthus as a hero (τούτῳ δὲ τῷ᾽Αρταχαίῃ θύουσι᾽Ακάνθιοι ἐκ θεοπροπίου ὡς ἥρωι / by oracular command the Acanthians sacrifice to Artachaees as if her were a hero - vii.117.2).

[27] Herodotos describes Philippos as the most handsome man of his time and that because of this beauty he won from Egestans a hero shrine (ἐών τε᾽Ολυμπιονίκης καὶ κάλλιστος῾Ελλήνων τῶν κατ' ἑωυτόν. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἑωυτοῦ κάλλος ἠνείκατο παρὰ᾽Εγεσταίων τὰ οὐδεὶς ἄλλος· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ τάφου αὐτοῦ ἡρώιον ἱδρυσάμενοι θυσίῃσι αὐτὸν ἱλάσκονται. / he was an Olympic victor and the most handsome of all the Greeks of his time. On account of his beauty he achieved from the Egestans that which no other man had: building a heroon above his tomb they propiate him with sacrifices - v.47.1-2).

[28] ix.22.2 and *Iliad* vi.232-5.

xiv.493).[29] Masistios, then, through his physical attributes, armor, and even his death, casts an epic shadow.

Cithaeron (ix.20 – 25.3)

Herodotos centers the first part of the *logos* on this heroic figure. In the sequence of events that unfold upon the foothills of Cithaeron from ix.20 until the beginning of the debate at 25.3, Masistios plays a central role in each section: the battle between the Persians and the Megarians/Athenians (IA: ix.20-22.2); the battle for Masistios' corpse (IB: ix.22.3-ix.25.1); and the movement of the Greek camp to the bank of the Asopus river (IC: ix.25.2-ix.25.3).

The presence of Masistios and his steed frames the initial attack (IA.1) in a ring structure, easing the transition from a conventional to an epic battle. Ingrid Beck argues that ix.21.1 and 21.3 constitute a simple frame formula, bound by the opening and closing lines that indicate the Megarian and Athenian positions.[30] But Herodotos creates a more complex ring structure, answering the three opening stages of the attack with three similar stages once the Athenians relieved the Megarians:

(a): Masistios on his steed with the golden bridle (ἵππον ἔχων Νησαῖον χρυσοχάλινόν τε καὶ ἄλλῶς κεκοσμημένον καλῶς) leads the attack (ix.20)

(b): The Megarians, by chance stationed in the most vulnerable position, resist the Persian cavalry assault (προσέβαλλον κατὰ τέλεα) but fare poorly and send messengers to the

[29] Boedeker. 2003. pp. 20-21.
[30] Beck. 1971, p. 11 n. 37.

Greek generals (κατὰ συντυχίην δὲ Μεγαρέες ἔτυχον ταχθέντες τῇ τε ἐπιμαχώτατον ἦν τοῦ χώρου παντός, καὶ ἡ πρόσοδος μάλιστα ταύτῃ ἐγίνετο τῇ ἵππῳ. προσβαλλούσης ὧν τῆς ἵππου οἱ Μεγαρέες πιεζόμενοι… - ix.21.1)

(c): The Megarian messenger warns Pausanias that, unless relieved, the Megarians will abandon the position (νῦν τε εἰ μή τινας ἄλλους πέμψετε διαδόχους τῆς τάξιος, ἴστε ἡμέας ἐκλείψοντας τὴν τάξιν. ὁ μὲν δὴ σφι ταῦτα ἀπήγγελλε… - ix.21.2-3)

(c'): The Athenian volunteers step forward to replace the Megarians (Παυσανίης δὲ ἀπεπειρᾶτο τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἴ τινες ἐθέλοιεν ἄλλοι ἐθελονταὶ ἰέναι τε ἐς τὸν χῶρον τοῦτον καὶ τάσσεσθαι διάδοχοι Μεγαρεῦσι. οὐ βουλομένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπεδέξαντο - ix.21.3)

(b'): The Athenians are stationed before the other Greeks (οἱ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν παρεόντων Ἑλλήνων ἐς Ἐρυθρὰς ταχθέντες) and face the Persian cavalry assault (προσβαλλούσης τῆς ἵππου κατὰ τέλεα - ix.22.1)

(a'): Leading the charge Masistios' horse rears up and throws its rider (ὁ Μασιστίου προέχων τῶν ἄλλων ἵππος βάλλεται τοξεύματι τὰ πλευρά, ἀλγήσας δὲ ἵσταταί τε ὀρθὸς καὶ ἀποσείεται τὸν Μασίστιον·). An Athenian then kills Masistios despite the protection of his golden armor (ἐντὸς θώρηκα εἶχε χρύσεον λεπιδωτόν - ix.22.1-2)

Herodotos uses the embedded sequence to move from one topic (the Megarians) to the next (the Athenians).[31] The historian marks each step of the action with δέ, highlighting the symmetry of the comparison. He omits the use of μέν until the center of the structure at ix.21.2-3. There, Herodotos concludes the Megarian speech and turns to Pausanias' request for help from the other Greeks (ix.23.1). He augments the transitional nature of the μέν-δέ with δή, frequently used to formulate transitions in Herodotos (and other historians),[32] to mark the shift from the Megarian (c) to the Athenian (c') half of the ring structure. At the center of the structure he contrasts the Megarian threat to abandon the position with Athenian willingness to defend it (c/c'). This contrast rests within a further comparison of the Megarian and Athenian defensive positions. Whereas Herodotos depicts the Megarian position as accidental and vulnerable (κατὰ συντυχίην … ταχθέντες τῇ τε ἐπιμαχώτατον), the Athenians intentionally manned the position before their fellow Greeks like some *promachos* (οἱ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων …Ἑλλήνων … ταχθέντες) against similar Persian assaults (προσέβαλλον κατὰ τέλεα / προσβαλλούσης τῆς ἵππου κατὰ τέλεα) (b/b').

As he develops this ring structure, Herodotos changes the character of the battle from conventional to epic. The historian frames the transformation of the battle with twin references to Masistios. He places both the Persian commander's horse, adorned with a golden bridle, and the commander himself, wearing a

[31] For a general study of Herodotos' use of ring-composition in transitions see Slings. 2002, pp. 71-72.
[32] Denniston. 1934, p. 258.

golden thorax (χρυσοχάλινόν /θώρηκα … χρύσεον λεπιδωτόν) at the head of the first assault and at its end (a/a'). The appearance of Masistios at the start of the Persian assault and at the forefront of the battle facing the Athenians facilitates what Beck characterizes as a *Rückverweise*.[33] The correspondence of material (gold) and purpose (martial) between the bridle and the breastplate augments the connection between a and a'. The description of horse and rider in each instance, however, is incomplete. Although Herodotos names Masistios as the cavalry commander at the beginning, he lavishes descriptive detail upon his Nisean steed instead. The image of a large Persian, mounted upon a magnificently outfitted horse, provides an unfinished face for the Persian assault (τὸν Ἕλληνες Μακίστιον καλέουσι, ἵππον ἔχων Νησαῖον χρυσοχάλινόν τε καὶ ἄλλως κεκοσμημένον καλῶς /whom the Greeks called Makistios, having a Nisean horse with a golden bridle and otherwise excellently outfitted - ix.20). Herodotos completes the picture at the moment of Masistios' death during the Persian withdrawal. He shifts from using the imperfect, used to narrate the bulk of the Persian attack, to the present tense, giving the death of Masistios greater animation and impact.[34] At the same time the historian alters his description of the Persian protagonist, removing his Persian clothes from the view of the audience and unveiling Masistios' golden, heroic, armor (ἐντὸς θώρηκα εἶχε χρύσεον λεπιδωτόν, κατύπερθε δὲ τοῦ θώρηκος κιθῶνα φοινίκεον ἐνεδεδύκεε /underneath he had a thorax of golden scales, and over the thorax he had put on

[33] Beck. 1971, pp. 8-9. Beck argues that Herodotos can create an association between two passages by a similar (not repeated) appearance (or personality).
[34] Flower and Marincola 2002, p. 142.

a purple *chiton* - ix.22.2). The effect is dramatic. Herodotos transforms Masistios with his sudden change in appearance, his position before his men like a *promachos* (προέχων τῶν ἄλλων), and his death.[35] This change in the aspect of the Persian protagonist alters the nature of the battle from conventional to epic. The historian begins the battle with a conventional Masistios attacking the timorous Megarians. He then replaces the latter with the Athenians, whom he locates before the Greeks like a *promachos* against the now-heroic Masistios.

After Masistios has fallen, Herodotos continues the heroic characterization as an organizing principle of the *logos*. In an allusion to the fate of many fallen epic figures such as Patroklos, the historian strips Masistios' corpse of its armor and focuses the next section (IB) on the struggle for his corpse (ix.22.3 – ix.25.1). He rapidly transforms the Persian into a corpse (νεκρὸς). Falling from his horse and dying (ἔπεσε τε καὶ ἀπέθανε) at the end of ix.22.2, Masistios' body presumably ended up in Athenian hands. The historian arranges the subsequent narrative as a series of actions centered on (or aiming at) possession of this object. He claims that the discovery of their commander's loss (οὔτε γὰρ πεσόντα μιν εἶδον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵππου οὔτε ἀποθνήσκοντα) drove the Persian attempt (IB.1) to recover his corpse:

> οὔτε γὰρ πεσόντα μιν εἶδον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵππου οὔτε ἀποθνήσκοντα … μαθόντες δὲ τὸ γεγονός, διακελευσάμενοι ἤλαυνον τοὺς ἵππους πάντες, ὡς ἂν τὸν γε νεκρὸν ἀνελοίατο.
>
> For they neither saw that he fell from his horse nor that he was killed … but learning what had happened, passing the word to one

[35] Boedeker. 2003, pp. 20-21.

> another they all advanced, so that they might recover his body. (ix.22.3)

Herodotos centers the battle upon the body (μάχη ὀξέα περὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ γίνεται / a fierce battle broke out over the body - ix.23.1), which the Athenians, fighting alone, had to abandon (ἐσσοῦντό τε πολλὸν καὶ τὸν νεκρὸν ἀπέλειπον / they were being soundly defeated and they lost possession of the body - ix.23.2). The arrival of the Greek army to the Athenians' aid, however, frustrated the Persian attempt to carry off the corpse (οὐδέ σφι ἐξεγένετο τὸν νεκρὸν ἀνελέσθαι / but they were not able to carry away the body) and compelled their retreat (ix.23.2). Possession of Masistios' corpse remains the focal point as Herodotos transfers the narrative's focus from the Persian to the Greek camps in a μέν/δέ structure. He contrasts the Persian reaction to their loss of the corpse (οἱ μέν νυν βάρβαροι τρόπῳ τῷ σφετέρῳ ἀποθανόντα ἐτίμων Μασίστιον / On the one hand the barbarians honored the fallen Masistios according to their custom) with the Greek possession of it (οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες … ἐθάρσησαν πολλῷ μᾶλλον /On the other hand the Greeks … were greatly encouraged - IB.2 - ix. 25.1). Herodotos completes the transition with the Greek display of the corpse (καὶ πρῶτα μὲν ἐς ἅμαξαν ἐσθέντες τὸν νεκρὸν παρὰ τὰς τάξις ἐκόμιζον· / Placing the body on a cart they paraded it through the ranks - ix.25.1). As with the initial Persian assault, Masistios occupies a central position in the battle, which, upon his death devolves into a general melee for his corpse that ends with the Greek capture of his remains.

Herodotos moves the focus from Masistios with the movement of the Greek camp. Crossing what has been previously identified as the end of the Masistios *Logos* at ix.25.1,[36] he links the events at Cithaeron (I) to the Tegean/Athenian debate (II). The historian forms and breaks the ranks of the Greek army near one corpse at Cithaeron only to reform their ranks near the sanctuary of another heroic figure at the Asopus, framing the selection of and the movement to the new camp. The narrative structure also redirects the focus away from Masistios' corpse to other images of the heroic dead:

a. The corpse of Masistios, borne on a cart, was carried through the ranks of the Greek army (καὶ πρῶτα μὲν ἐς ἄμαξαν ἐσθέντες τὸν νεκρὸν παρὰ τὰς τάξις ἐκόμιζον - 25.1).

b. The Greek army broke ranks to view the heroic corpse (τῶν δὲ εἵνεκα καὶ ταῦτα ἐποίευν· ἐκλιπόντες τὰς τάξις ἐφοίτων θεησόμενοι Μασίστιον - 25.1).

c. The Greeks considered moving down from Cithaeron towards Plataea (μετὰ δὲ ἔδοξέ σφι ἐπικαταβῆναι ἐς Πλαταιάς· - 25.2).

c'. The spot near Gargaphia, seeming best, was chosen (ἐς τοῦτον δὴ τὸν χῶρον … ἔδοξέ σφι χρεὸν εἶναι ἀπικέσθαι καὶ διαταχθέντας στρατοπεδεύεσθαι - 25.2)

b'. Taking up their arms (ἀναλαβόντες δὲ τὰ ὅπλα) the Greeks moved from the foothills of Cithaeron to Plataea, taking up station near Gargaphia and the tomb of the hero Androkrates (ἀπικόμενοι δὲ ἐτάσσοντο κατὰ ἔθνεα

[36] Flower and Marincola, 2002, pp. 138-139.

πλησίον τῆς τε κρήνης τῆς Γαργαφίης καὶ τοῦ τεμένεος τοῦ ᾽Ανδροκράτεος τοῦ ἥρωος - 25.3).

a'. There, in ranks, the Tegeans and Athenians began a debate (ἐνθαῦτα ἐν τῇ διατάξι ἐγένετο λόγων πολλῶν ὠθισμὸς Τεγεητέων τε καὶ ᾽Αθηναίων - 26.1)

Herodotos organizes the passage with an extended μέν/δέ structure. Beginning with the Greek review of Masistios' corpse (μέν), the narrative follows the Greeks as they broke ranks (δέ), considered a change of camp (δέ), selected the spot near Gargaphia (δή), and finally took up their arms (δέ) and arrived (δέ) near the *temenos* of Androkrates. As with the previous ring-structure, Herodotos marks the central (transitional) point with δή (c' – ix.25.2). He divides the central portion into two halves: the consideration of well-watered sites and the selection of the spot near the spring of Gargaphia (c/c'). The historian uses the aorist form of δοκέω (ἔδοξε/ἔδοξε) in these two sections to set them apart from the remainder of the structure, in which he uses the imperfect.

Herodotos brackets the decision making process with the image of the Greek army breaking and then forming ranks near a heroic corpse (b/b'). He depicts the Greeks leaving their ranks (ἐκλιπόντες τὰς τάξις) to visit (ἐφοίτων) Masistios' heroic corpse (b – ix.25.1). He then reverses this sequence after the Greeks have selected a new location for their camp. Taking up their arms (ἀναλαβόντες δὲ τὰ ὅπλα), the Greeks arrived at the Asopus and formed ranks by nation (ἐτάσσοντο κατὰ ἔθνεα) near the spring of Gargaphia and the *temenos* of the hero Androkrates (τοῦ τεμένεος τοῦ ᾽Ανδροκράτεος τοῦ ἥρωος - b' –

ix.25.3). While Herodotos refers to the spring elsewhere,[37] he mentions the *temenos* only here. The locations of both remain contested, but they do not appear to have been situated near one another.[38] Admittedly, the historian may simply have included the double reference because of these locations' proximity to the battle;[39] yet a structural argument should not be overlooked. The correspondence of movement out of and into ranks near the resting-place (honorable or not) of a heroic figure provides a strong connection between the interior frames of the ring-structure.

Finally, Herodotos connects the outer frames of the ring structure (a/a'), while linking the movement of the camp to the battle at Cithaeron and the subsequent debate, through the proximity of the Greek army near the heroic dead. In the opening lines, the historian describes the Greeks as arranged in ranks (παρὰ τὰς τάξις) to view the consequence of the former conflict – the corpse of Masistios (a – ix.25.1). At the end, he again describes the Greeks in ranks (τῇ διατάξι - a' – ix.26.1). This time, however, they did not gaze upon the consequence of a skirmish, but ahead to the advent of another (λόγων πολλῶν ὠθισμὸς). Here ὠθισμὸς indicates a heated debate (as at Salamis – viii.78),[40] but its fundamental meaning is the "battle-scrum," the pushing of shields at the center of battle. Herodotos uses ὠθισμὸς in this sense in his narration of the

[37] ix.25.2, 49.2, 51.1, & 52.
[38] Masaracchia. 1978, p. 163 identifies Gargaphia as modern Apotripi and Androkrates' tomb near Plataea while Flower and Marincola 2002, pp. 146-7 identify Gargaphia as the spring now called Retsi and place the hero's tomb somewhere near the Greek left. The distances range from two to several kilometers apart.
[39] Flower and Marincola 2002, pp. 146-7 following Lazenby. 1985, pp. 223-7. Hignett. 1963, pp. 301-11. A. R. Burn. 1962, pp. 519-22.
[40] Flower and Marincola 2002, pp. 147-8.

battle of Thermopylae to describe the struggle for the body of Leonidas (vii.225.1), a passage that scholars have compared to the fight for the corpse of Patroklos in *Iliad* xvii.[41] The term, therefore, evokes associations not only with the Greek debate at Salamis, but also with other Greek struggles for possession of corpses of the heroic dead. While the historian describes a verbal rather than a martial contest, then, he retains the imagery of heroic combat and corpses.

Thus, Herodotos centers the Cithaeron narrative upon Masistios. First as a living participant and then as a corpse, the Persian commander is the focal point of the action. Living, he led the Persian horsemen's charge and appeared before their ranks as they retreated. In his description of the Persian withdrawal, Herodotos shifts the tone of the battle from conventional to heroic. He emphasizes the heroic features of Masistios and replaces the conventional Megarians with Athenians, who fought as *promachoi*. In a manner reminiscent of the *Iliad*, he describes the death of Masistios and the struggle for his body, which became the focus of the next phase of the battle. Finally, Herodotos moves the victorious Greeks, who, like their Achaean forebears, marveled at their dead foe, from the site of one heroic body to that of another, from the foothills of Cithaeron to the plains of Plataea.

The Tegean/Athenian Debate (ix.26.1 – 27.6)

[41] Masaracchia 1978, p. 162. And Flower and Marincola. 2002, pp. 143-144. The fight between the Greeks and Persians for possession of the cavalry commander's corpse also follows the general description of heroic corpse battles throughout the *Iliad* (cf. the battle over the body of Sarpedon xvi.550-680 and the battle for Amphimachos xiii.180-212) see also Boedeker. 2001, p. 122.

Although the movement of the camp and the shift from a physical to verbal struggle appears to provide a break in the narrative, Herodotos perpetuates the theme of heroic death and corpses, and thereby maintains the unity of the *logos*, in the Tegean/Athenian debate (II). Engaged in a sharp struggle (ὠθισμός) for a new prize, a place of honor in the Greek battle line, the protagonists drew upon heroic deeds (and heroic death) to prove their worth. The Tegeans claimed the honored place in the battle line in consideration of deeds both ancient and recent, but focused the bulk of their argument upon the Heroic Age, citing their resistance to the Heraklid invasion as proof of their martial prowess (IIA). Herodotos arranges the argument in a ring structure, which includes allusions and references to heroic death.[42]

a) The Tegeans claim that they are worthy of the position in the battle line
(Ἡμεῖς αἰεί κοτε ἀξιεύμεθα ταύτης τῆς τάξιος …- ix.26.2)
(b) After the death of Eurystheus the Heraklids attempted to invade the Peloponnese (ἐπείτε Ἡρακλεῖδαι ἐπειρῶντο μετὰ τὸν Εὐρυσθέος θάνατον κατιόντες ἐς Πελοπόννησον. - ix.26.2)
(c) Specific Tegean claim to the honor based upon this past deed (τότε εὑρόμεθα τοῦτο διὰ πρῆγμα τοιόνδε. - ix.26.3)

---

[42] Beck 1971, p. 83 identifies ix.26.1-7 as a double ring structure (see below), but only the first ring will be examined in this section.

First Ring
(a)Ἡμεῖς αἰεί κοτε ἀξιεύμεθα ταύτης τῆς τάξιος.
(b) τότε εὑρόμεθα τοῦτο διὰ πρῆγμα τοιόνδε.
(c) ἐπεὶ μετὰ᾽Αχαιῶν …
(b') ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ἔργου εὑρόμεθα … τοῦ κέρεος τοῦ ἑτέρου αἰεὶ ἡγεμονεύειν
(a') τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου φαμὲν ἐς ἡμέας ἱκνέεσθαι ἡγεμονεύειν
Second Ring
χωρίς τε τούτου … ἔργου ἀξιονικότεροι εἰμεν᾽Αθηναίων … ἔχειν
πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ εὖ ἔχοντες
οὕτω ὧν δίκαιον ἡμέας ἔχειν τὸ ἕτερον κέρας ἤ περ᾽Αθηναίους·

(d) The Tegeans helped the Achaeans and Ionians defend the Isthmus of Corinth (ἐπεὶ μετὰ᾽ Αχαιῶν καὶ᾽ Ιώνων … ἐς τὸν ᾽Ισθμὸν ἰζόμεθα ἀντίοι τοῖσι κατιοῦσι - ix.26.3)

(e) The Heraklids proposed a duel instead of a battle (τότε ὧν λόγος ″Υλλον ἀγορεύσασθαι ὡς χρεὸν εἴη … τοῦτόν οἱ μουνομαχῆσαι ἐπὶ διακειμένοισι. - ix.26.3)

(e') The Peloponnesians accepted the proposal (ἔδοξέ τε τοῖσι Πελοποννησίοισι ταῦτα εἶναι ποιητέα … μὴ ζητῆσαι κάτοδον ἐς Πελοπόννησον - ix.26.4)

(d') The Tegean king Echemos volunteered to fight (προσκρίθη … ἐθελοντὴς ″Εχεμος ὁ ᾽Ηερόπου … ἐὼν καὶ βασιλεὺς ἡμέτερος - ix.26.5)

(b') Echemos fought and defeated Hyllos (the Heraklid champion) (καὶ ἐμουνομάχησέ τε καὶ ἀπέκτεινε″Υλλον - ix.26.5)

(c') Specific Tegean claim of the honor restated (ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ἔργου εὑρόμεθα … τοῦ κέρεος τοῦ ἑτέρου αἰεὶ ἡγεμονεύειν - ix.26.5)

(a') Tegean claim to the battle line restated (τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου φαμὲν ἐς ἡμέας ἱκνέεσθαι ἡγεμονεύειν - ix.26.5).

Framing the *logos* with general and specific Tegean claims, Herodotos begins, and ends the Tegean speech with the deaths of two figures of the Heroic Age: Eurystheus (b) and Hyllos (b'). Eurystheus recalls Herakles, the greatest Greek hero, and his death (b) immediately precedes the first specific Tegean claim of their worthy deeds (c). In a similar pairing, the reiterated claim (c') follows the

death of Hyllos (b'). The speech culminates in a proposed μουνομαχέω, a heroic duel that comes nearly at the end of the Heraklid proposal (e) and immediately precedes the Peloponnesian acceptance (e'). Centering both the invasion and Tegean argument upon the duel, Herodotos once again places a heroic corpse (Hyllos) at the center of his narrative.

Heroic combat and death remains a central issue in the Athenian response (IIB). Once again Herodotos employs a ring structure, but it lacks a single focal point. Instead the question of who are χρῆστοι frames a consideration of a series of heroic Athenian deeds first of the distant past and then of more recent memory:[43]

(a) The Athenians have always been χρῆστοι (ἀναγκαίως ἡμῖν ἔχει δηλῶσαι πρὸς ὑμέας ὅθεν ἡμῖν πατρώιόν ἐστι ἐοῦσι χρηστοῖσι αἰεὶ πρώτοισι εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρκάσι. - ix.27.1)
(b) Athenian participation in the Heraklid invasion (ix.27.2)
(b) Athenian recovery of the corpse of Polynikes (ix.27.3)
(b) Athenian repulse of the Amazonian invasion (ix.27.4)
(b) Athenian participation in the Trojan War (ix.27.4)
(a) People change over time, thus there is little profit in recounting ancient deeds (ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ τι προέχει τούτων ἐπιμεμνῆσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἂν χρηστοὶ τότε ἐόντες ὡυτοὶ νῦν ἂν εἶεν φλαυρότεροι, καὶ τότε ἐόντες φλαῦροι νῦν ἂν εἶεν ἀμείνονες. παλαιῶν μέν νυν ἔργων ἄλις ἔστω· - ix.27.4-5)
(b) The Battle of Marathon (ix.27.5-6)

[43] Beck 1971, p. 60.

(a) Wherever the Athenians are positioned they will try to be χρῆστοι (πάντῃ γὰρ τεταγμένοι πειρησόμεθα εἶναι χρηστοί. ἐξηγέεσθε δὲ ὡς πεισομένων. - ix.27.6)

The speaker cited both Athenian participation in the Heraklid invasion and their repulse of the Amazons (ix.27.2 and 4). These heroic combats bracket a struggle akin to the battle for the corpse of Masistios. In ix.27.3 the speaker recalled the Athenian campaign against the Thebans to secure the proper burial of Polynikes and the Seven Against Thebes:

> τοῦτο δὲ ᾽Αργείους τοὺς μετὰ Πολυνείκεος ἐπὶ Θήβας ἐλάσαντας, τελευτήσαντας τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ ἀτάφους κειμένους, στρατευσάμενοι ἐπὶ τοὺς Καδμείους ἀνελέσθαι τε τοὺς νεκροὺς φαμὲν καὶ θάψαι τῆς ἡμετέρης ἐν᾽Ελευσῖνι.
>
> Next, we say that when the Argives with Polyneikes marched against Thebes and dying remained unburied, we campaigned against the Cadmeans to recover the bodies and buried them in our own land at Eleusis. (ix.27.3)

In this previously unrecorded version of the myth, the Athenians entered battle to "take up" (ἀναιρέω) the corpse of a fallen warrior similar to the Persian counter-attack at ix.22.3.[44] Throughout all of these heroic exploits, the historian omits any reference to a specific Athenian hero such as Theseus or Menestheus. As Herodotos moves the speech from the Heroic to the Historic Age, he perpetuates the theme of heroic combat and death. Presenting the Battle of Marathon in a heroic light, he describes the battle as a duel (μουνομαχήσαντες τῷ Πέρσῃ), the same term used for the fight between Hyllos and Echemos (ix.27.5). Filling the two speeches with tales of heroic battles, then, Herodotos shifts the

[44] νεκρὸν ἀνελοίατο (ix.22.3) and τὸν νεκρὸν ἀνελέσθαι (ix.23.2)

narrative's focus from the corpse of Masistios to heroic combat in general, and in doing so maintains the theme of heroic death.

Catalogue and Conclusion (ix.28.1 – 31.1)

Herodotos does not mention corpses in the catalogue (IIIA) following the debate, but its epic quality[45] maintains the heroic theme established with the death of Masistios. He also brackets the catalogue with references to Masistios. The narrative returns to the Persian camp (IIIB) still in a state of mourning for their lost cavalry commander (οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ Μαρδόνιον βάρβαροι ὡς ἀπεκήδευσαν Μασίστιον / The barbarians around Mardonius finished their mourning of Masistios - ix.31.1). Absent from the previous five chapters, seemingly ignorant of Masistios' fate, the relocation of the Greek army, and the debate, the Persians at last reacted and moved up to the Asopus River. As Herodotos describes the mustering of the Persian troops opposite the Greek ranks, he begins a corresponding catalogue of the Persian forces. Although he groups the Persian and Greek catalogues together, Herodotos nevertheless establishes a division between the two with the final mention of Masistios' corpse. He uses the final mention of the Persian as a summation, an ending point of a unified section. Heroic combat and corpses fade from the narrative, marking a break from the theme of the Masistios *logos.*

[45] Flower and Marincola 2002, p. 158.

Thus, Herodotos uses Masistios and heroic corpses to organize the *logos* from ix.20 to 31.1. Heroic combat and death figure prominently in nearly every part: the battle, the movement of the Greek camp, and the Tegean/Athenian debate. The historian employs Masistios, his trappings, and his corpse, in ring structures and as the foci of the narrative to organize the battle sequence and the movement of the Greek camp. He then uses references to other heroic corpses to move the narrative from the events at Cithaeron to the Tegean/Athenian debate. The use of heroic precedent in the debate perpetuates the epic setting of the *logos*. When Herodotos returns to the main battle narrative of Plataea, he frames the end of the Masistios *logos* with a final reference to the Persian's corpse.

Heroic Corpses and the Athenian Phalanx

Linking these sections together through the recurrent appearance of heroic corpses and combat, Herodotos also uses the objects to foster a laudable presentation of the Athenian contribution to the Battle of Plataea. Through heroic corpses in particular, the historian alludes to famous scenes from the *Iliad*. Herodotos commonly echoes the language (and to a lesser degree the imagery) of the epic poem in an effort to magnify the meaning of a passage with an economy of language.[46] Whereas previous work has noted in particular the historian's echoing of Homeric speech or use of metaphor, the function of an object as a repository and transmitter of meaning must not be overlooked. Placing meaningful objects in an analogous setting, such as the struggle for a heroic

[46] Huber. 1965, pp. 32-33.

corpse on the battlefield, creates not merely an allusion to a passage in epic, but also evokes the values and roles for the attendant scene and characters. Hence, when Herodotos places the Athenians over the body of the heroic Masistios, he creates an analogy between their actions and those of heroic figures seeking to despoil the body of a slain enemy. In doing so, the historian presents the Athenians in the role of a collective heroic figure.

Herodotos advances this message in the first two sections of the *logos*. First, he recreates the oft-repeated Homeric episode of single combat and the struggle over the corpse of a fallen foe.[47] In the ultimate viewing of Masistios' corpse, the historian emulates elements of the Achaean honoring of Patroklos and the examination and return of Hektor's corpse. Next, in the debate he replaces the traditional Athenian heroes Theseus and Menestheus with the Athenian troops, again placing them in the position of heroes. Finally, in the catalog, the historian completes the praise of Athens by emphasizing the number of Athenian hoplites present at the battle. He shows that they brought not only the best (heroic) troops, but the most as well.[48]

Cithaeron

As previously discussed, Herodotos uses Masistios, his trappings, and his corpse to create allusions to the *Iliad* in the first section of this *logos*. In this context the historian presents the Athenians first as an epic *promachos*, fighting

[47] Cf. Fenik. 1968, *passim*. Fenik identifies the recurring elements in Homeric battle scenes that center upon corpses.
[48] Konstan. 1987, pp. 66-67. Herodotos makes a related point at the Battle of Thermopylae between people (ἄνθρωποι) and men (ἄνδρες).

alone for their fellow Greeks at Cithaeron, then as a hero similar to Menelaos, struggling to retain control of Masistios' corpse. Finally, while he does not single them out at the viewing of the Persian's body, Herodotos' transformation of Masistios into Hektor implicitly places the Athenians into the role of Achilles.

As shown in the previous section (pp. 140-142), Herodotos arranges the opening phases of the battle at Cithaeron in a ring structure, framed by the Persian cavalry commander, who transforms the nature of the battle from conventional to heroic.[49] Herodotos uses this change to contrast the Megarians and Athenians and to characterize the latter as a collective epic hero. Initially, the Megarians bore the brunt of the conventional Persian cavalry charges "since by change they held the most vulnerable position" (κατὰ συντυχίην δὲ Μεγαρέες ἔτυχον ταχθέντες τῇ τε ἐπιμαχώτατον ἦν τοῦ χώρου παντός - ix.21.1). "Alone the Megarians were unable to withstand the Persians" (οὐ δυνατοί εἰμεν τὴν Περσέων ἵππον δέκεσθαι μοῦνοι) and threatened to abandon their position (ix.21.2). Herodotos changes the battle from conventional to an epic *mounomachia*, when he states that of all the Greeks only the Athenians volunteered to take the Megarians' place:

> … Παυσανίης δὲ ἀπεπειρᾶτο τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἴ τινες ἐθέλοιεν ἄλλοι ἐθελονταὶ ἰέναι τε ἐς τὸν χῶρον τοῦτον καὶ τάσσεσθαι

[49] Ring structure of initial Cithaeron engagement:
(a): Masistios leads the cavalry attack (ix.20).
  (b): The Megarians stationed in the most vulnerable position resist the Persian cavalry assault but fare poorly (ix.21.1).
    (c): The Megarian speech threatening to abandon the position (ix.21.2).
    (c'): The Athenian volunteers step forward to replace the Megarians (ix.21.3).
  (b'): The Athenians are stationed before the other Greeks and face the Persian cavalry assault (ix.22.1).
(a'): Masistios is unhorsed and killed by the Athenians (ix.22.1-2).

> διάδοχοι Μεγαρεῦσι. οὐ βουλομένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ᾽Αθηναῖοι ὑπεδέξαντο καὶ ᾽Αθηναίων οἱ τριηκόσιοι λογάδες…
>
> Pausanias asked if any other Greeks would be willing to volunteer and to go to that position and to relieve the Megarians. While the others were not willing the Athenians accepted and three hundred picked men … (ix.21.3)

They took up their position before the Greek army like an epic *promachos* (οἱ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν παρεόντων ῾Ελλήνων ἐς ᾽Ερυθρὰς ταχθέντες / They were stationed at Erythrai in front of the other Greeks - ix.22.1).[50] Moreover, like many epic *promachoi*, an archer, or here rather a set of archers (τοὺς τοξότας), accompanied the heroic spearmen into battle (ix.22.1).[51] Herodotos confirms the Athenian heroic stance through their opponent Masistios, who appeared at the forefront of the Persian attack (προσβαλλούσης τῆς ἵππου κατὰ τέλεα, ὁ Μασιστίου προέχων τῶν ἄλλων ἵππος / While the cavalry attacked in squadrons, the horse of Masistios was keeping in front of the others – ix.22.1). The confrontation of two champions, standing before their respective hosts, recalls the *mounomachic* combats of the *Iliad*.

Presenting the Athenians as acting collectively, like an individual warrior, Herodotos enhances this heroic characterization. The historian describes the Megarians, whom the Athenians replaced, in a collective fashion as *mounoi* (ix.21.2). In the *logos*, Herodotos never applies the term *mounos* to a single person, but rather to groups cast into the role of an individual. Thus, as the Athenians relieved the Megarians, they implicitly manned the position of a collective acting

[50] Flower and Marincola 2002, p. 142.
[51] The most notable pair in the *Iliad* is Telemonian Aias and Teucros, who repeatedly fight together as spearman and archer (viii.266f; xii.378ff; xv.442ff; et al.).

as one. Although the historian identifies the Athenian commander as Olympiodorus (ix.21.3), he otherwise does not single out any individual. He credits an unnamed Athenian with striking Masistios in the eye and killing him, even though he normally records the man's name for such exploits.[52] This anonymity contributes to the collective nature of the Athenians; for, as fitting for a democracy, the man could have been any one of them. The historian further blurs the distinction between individual and collective in his description of the Athenian phalanx's actions. He predominantly uses verbs in the third person plural and plural participles to describe the Athenians even when the action cannot rightly be attributed to all of them. *They* seized Masistios' horse and killed him (τόν τε δὴ ἵππον αὐτοῦ λαμβάνουσι καὶ αὐτὸν ἀμυνόμενον κτείνουσι - ix.22.2). At first beating upon Masistios' thorax, *they* accomplished nothing (τύπτοντες δὲ ἐς τὸν θώρηκα ἐποίευν οὐδέν - ix.22.2). When the Athenians saw the mass charge of the Persian cavalry, *they* summoned aid from the rest of the Greek army (ἰδόντες … τὴν ἄλλην στρατιὴν ἐπεβώσαντο - ix.23.1). The last is in sharp contrast to the Megarians, who dispatched a single messenger (κήρυκα - ix.21.1). While awaiting the help of the Greek army, *the three hundred* alone were defeated and abandoned the corpse (μοῦνοι ἦσαν οἱ τριηκόσιοι, ἐσσοῦντό τε πολλὸν καὶ τὸν νεκρὸν ἀπέλειπον - ix.23.2). As the battle with

[52] Herodotos displays considerable knowledge about the exploits of individual Athenians at Marathon. He describes the death of Cynegirus, whose hands were cut off as he grabbed hold of the stern of a Persian ship, and Epizelus, who lost his sight during the battle (vi.114 and vi.117 respectively).

Masistios develops the reader no longer perceives the Athenians as a divisible entity. The three hundred are presented as a single warrior.

In the battle between the Persian and Greek *promachoi*, Herodotos follows an epic pattern. Finding a part of Masistios' body unprotected by his golden armor, the anonymous Athenian, a representative for them all, struck his eye and killed the Persian hero (ix.22.2). The historian describes Masistios' splendid golden *thorax* at the moment of his death, but afterwards makes no mention of it when he refers to the Persian's corpse. The appearance and then absence of the *thorax* implies that the armor had been stripped from Masistios' fallen body, an act typical of *mounomachia*.

Herodotos continues the epic pattern of the battle through the subsequent struggle for Masistios' corpse. Scholars have typically noted this battle's resemblance to the battle for Patroklos' corpse,[53] but such a specific correlation cannot be sustained. Instead, Herodotos models the battle upon the general four-step pattern of epic combat over the heroic dead: hostile seizure, valiant defense, withdrawal, and counter-attack. For the battle over the corpse of Patroklos, the poet repeats the pattern of Trojan attack, Achaean defense, withdrawal and counter attack, four times.[54] Herodotos replicates the pattern, omitting only the use of a rebuke to stir the heroes to action.[55] Moreover, the Athenians held the corpse of an enemy, not a comrade, and their actions can be viewed less as an

[53] Masaracchia 1978, p. 162. Flower and Marincola 2002, pp. 143-144. and Boedeker 2003, pp. 20-21.
[54] Fenik. 1968, pp. 159-160.
[55] In Fenik's typology, the rebuke is an integral part of the pattern, but in three cases it is delivered by a god. Since Herodotos does not include the gods as characters within his narrative the omission of the rebuke is explicable.

attempt to rescue the body than as an attempt to capture the spoils of battle. In typical epic fashion, the Athenians initially possessed the corpse (ix.22.2). Next, the Persians attacked to retrieve the body (διακελευσάμενοι ἤλαυνον τοὺς ἵππους πάντες, ὡς ἂν τόν γε νεκρὸν ἀνελοίατο /Signaling to one another they all advanced on their horses so that they might recover the body - ix.22.3), which they did after a sharp struggle (ix.23.2). Despite the victory, however, the Persians were unable to carry off the corpse of their fallen leader. Although the act of retrieving a single body would have been simple for a large group of men such as the Persians, Herodotos maintains the passage's epic milieu and denies possession to either side until the Greeks completely routed the enemy.

The Athenians, meanwhile, move to the third stage of this type of epic combat. Facing the Persian onslaught alone the Athenians withdrew (ἕως μέν νυν μοῦνοι ἦσαν οἱ τριηκόσιοι, ἐσσοῦντό τε πολλὸν καὶ τὸν νεκρὸν ἀπέλειπον /While the three hundred were alone they got the worst of it by far and lost the body - ix.23.2). Like many epic figures, when the action became too heated for the lone *promachos* between the battle lines, they moved back towards the safety of their own ranks.[56] When Telemonian Aias and Teucer drive Sarpedon back from a breach in the Achaean wall, he calls to his fellow Lycians for help (*Iliad* xii.406f). Similarly, after repelling some Trojan assaults to seize Patroklos' body, Menelaos is forced to abandon his comrade's corpse and armor, believing that alone (μοῦνος) he cannot fight Hektor and the Trojans (*Iliad* 17.91-

[56] cf. *Iliad* iii.32f (Paris withdraws before Menelaos); iv.535f (after killing Peiros, Thoas of Aetolia withdraws before the advancing Thracians); xiii.164f (after failing to kill Deiphobus, Meriones shrinks back into the throng of his comrades); et al.

94). The hero's withdrawal recalls the Athenian inability to resist the full Persian onslaught while fighting alone (μοῦνοι - ix.23.2). Menelaos and the Athenians resolve the battle in the same manner as well. The hero calls to his fellow Achaeans for help (*Iliad* 17.656 and 665-6) and the Athenians summoned the rest of the Greek army:

> ὡς δέ σφι τὸ πλῆθος ἐπεβοήθησε, οὕτω δὴ οὐκέτι οἱ ἱππόται ὑπέμενον, οὐδέ σφι ἐξεγένετο τὸν νεκρὸν ἀνελέσθαι
>
> When the rest of the army came to their aid, then the enemy cavalry no longer held their ground, and they were unable to bear away the body. (ix.23.2)

Admittedly the adversarial relationship between the Athenians and the Persian cavalry commander differs from that of the relationship between Menelaos and Patroklos. But the stages of the battle correspond to the general pattern of epic combat.

After the battle, Herodotos maintains the epic tone through the Greek treatment of Masistios' corpse (ix.25f). At first, the mustering of the Greeks in ranks to review the Persian body seems to recall the Myrmidonian review of Patroklos' corpse:

> καὶ πρῶτα μὲν ἐς ἅμαξαν ἐσθέντες τὸν νεκρὸν παρὰ τὰς τάξις ἐκόμιζον·
>
> And first placing the body in a cart they carried it through the ranks; (ix.25.1)

> Μυρμιδόνες ταχύπωλοι, ἐμοὶ ἐρίηρες ἑταῖροι,
> μὴ δέ πω ὑπ' ὄχεσφι λυώμεθα μώνυχας ἵππους,
> ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς ἵπποισι και ἅρμασιν ἆσσον ἰόντες
> Πάτροκλον κλαίωμεν·

> Myrmidons of the fast horses, my faithful companions,
> we must not yet lose our single-foot horses from our chariots,
> but driving close with these same horses and chariots let us
> mourn him… (*Iliad* xxiii.6-9)

Such a reading, however, creates a sudden alteration of the corpse from a fallen foe to a fallen friend. Instead, the passage more closely recalls the aftermath of Hektor's death in *Iliad* xxiii and xxiv. Like the Trojans, the Persians mourned the loss of a hero whose body they had failed to recover (*Iliad* xxiii.1). In contrast, Herodotos presents the Greeks like the Achaeans, who possessed the corpse of their feared enemy (Hdt. ix.25.1; *Iliad* xxiii.2f respectively). When the timorous Achaeans approach the now dead Hektor they take heart in the sight and marvel at the size and beauty of his corpse:

> ἄλλοι δὲ περίδραμον υἷες᾽Αχαιῶν,
> οἳ καὶ θηήσαντο φυὴν καὶ εἶδος ἀγητὸν
> Ἕκτορος· οὐδ' ἄρα οἵ τις ἀνουτητί γε παρέστη.
> ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον·
> ὦ πόποι, ἦ μάλα δὴ μαλακώτερος ἀμφαφάασθαι
> Ἕκτωρ, ἢ ὅτε νῆας ἐνέπρησεν πυρὶ κηλέῳ.
>
> And the other sons of the Achaians came running about him,
> and they gazed upon the stature and on the imposing beauty
> of Hektor; and no one was present without inflicting a wound;
> and looking at each other they would thus:
> "See now, Hektor is much softer to handle
> than when he burned the ships with the blazing fire.
> (*Iliad* xxii.369-374)

At Cithaeron, the Greeks responded similarly. Like their forebears, they found encouragement in the death of the Persian (ἐθάρσησαν), whose race they regarded with considerable fear.[57] This fear provides another link between

[57] In particular, Herodotos ascribes considerable fear of the Persians to the Spartans and Peloponnesians during the Salamis campaign. In the period leading up to the decision at Salamis

Masistios and Hektor. While the Greeks feared the Persians (not just one Persian), the death of Masistios greatly alleviated this fear. Similarly, Hektor consistently instills fear in the Achaeans and his death removes the great burden of this fear. The Greeks moved forward to view the corpse (ἐφοίτων θεησόμενοι Μασίστιον), whose size and beauty they admire (θέης ἄξιος μεγάθεος εἵνεκα καὶ κάλλεος· - ix.25.1). Advancing, they admired the same characteristics the Achaeans first note when they view Hektor's body. Finally, Herodotos places the body on a cart (ἅμαξαν - ix.25.1), thereby strengthening the connection between the Persian corpse and the body of Hektor in *Iliad* twenty-four; for Priam uses the same type of vehicle to bear his son's body from the tent of Achilles back to Troy (*Iliad* xxiv.150, 179, 189, 263, 266, 711).

But if Herodotos casts the Persian cavalry commander as Hektor, who represents Patroklos? Whom did the Athenians avenge? The presentation of Masistios at ix.25.1, particularly the way in which the Greeks left their ranks to view the corpse, recalls the Persian viewing and treatment of Leonidas. Scholars have noted the similarities between the contests for Leonidas and the Achaian battle for Patroklos.[58] Hence, the Athenians achieved revenge (τίσις) for the

---

ἀρρωδέω-words appear almost entirely in the context of the Spartans or expeditions under their command (ἀρρωδέω (viii.63, 70.2, 74.1), καταρρωδέω (vii.207), ὑπεραρρωδέω (viii.72)) or the Athenians (καταρρωδέω (vii.139.2, 139.6, 140.3; viii.75.2)), although in the case of the latter the statements usually indicate a lack of fear on the part of the Athenians (see below). In the same period prior to Salamis, Herodotos uses φοβέω, φοβός in the context of Greeks and Persians (vi.112.3; vii.149, 235.3; viii.12, 27.4, 38), δέος to describe the Peloponnesians (w/ ἀρρωδέω viii.70.2), and δεῖμα, δειμαίνω, προδειμαίνω, ὑπερδειμαίνω primarily with the Persians or other Greeks (vii.50.1; viii.15, 36.1, 68γ, 86. 99.2), but also to indicate Spartan fear (viii.74.1) or the Athenian lack of fear (vii.139.6, 140.3 or).

[58] cf. n. 53.

Spartan defeat at Thermopylae. The historian associates a battle-scrum (ὠθισμὸς) with the famous corpses of both battles. In the case of Leonidas the struggle erupted over his fallen body (ὑπὲρ τοῦ νεκροῦ τοῦ Λεωνίδεω Περσέων τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ὠθισμὸς ἐγίνετο πολλός / there was a great struggle between the Persians and the Lacedaemonians over the body of Leonidas - vii.225.1). Herodotos describes a similar struggle over the corpse of Masistios and uses the term at the end of the movement of the camp (ix.26.1). The historian creates a further connection through the Persian and Greek movement to view the bodies of the fallen leaders. Xerxes gave his men leave to break ranks and view the Greek dead (including Leonidas) at Thermopylae:

> Ἄνδρες σύμμαχοι, βασιλεὺς Ξέρξης τῷ βουλομένῳ ὑμέων παραδίδωσι ἐκλιπόντα τὴν τάξιν καὶ ἐλθόντα θεήσασθαι ὅκως μάχεται πρὸς τοὺς ἀνοήτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων...
>
> Allies, king Xerxes grants leave to whoever of you wishes to break ranks and to go and see how he fights against madmen… (viii.24.2)

The Greek army at Cithaeron also broke ranks to see the body of Masistios (ἐκλείποντες τὰς τάξις ἐφοίτων θεησόμενοι Μασίστιον - ix.25.1). The correspondence of terms and their order is striking. The use of ἐκλείπω with τάξις to precede the viewing of corpses is unique to these two passages. Elsewhere in the *Histories* it indicates men breaking ranks in battle.[59] Herodotos, then, correlates the aftermath of Thermopylae and Cithaeron, making the Athenian-led victory an answer to the Spartan defeat. The killing of the Hektor figure (Masistios) answers the death of the Patroklos figure (Leonidas) and

[59] v.75.3; vii.219.2; vii.220.1; ix.21.2; ix.48.1; ix.57.1; ix.71.3.

places the slayer of the Persian cavalry commander, the Athenians, in the role of Patroklos' avenger: Achilles.

Herodotos' treatment of Masistios as Hektor also signals another parallel to the *Iliad* – the end to the desecration of enemy corpses. In the *Iliad*, the death of Hektor and the mistreatment of his corpse signal the high point of violence in the poem.[60] The mutilation of corpses, which appears only in scattered instances in the first two-thirds of the *Iliad,* steadily rises from book sixteen onward. The threat of the decapitation of an enemy's body becomes a constant refrain in the Homeric battles that only diminishes with the return of Hektor's corpse.[61] Herodotos achieves a similar result with the treatment of Masistios' body. Actual (rather than threatened) decapitation figures prominently in Herodotos' depiction of the actions of the Persians, particularly Xerxes.[62]

But after the Greeks captured Masistios' corpse, they, unlike the Achaeans (*Iliad* xxii.369-375), did not mistreat it.[63] By this point in the narrative, Herodotos has provided an honorable burial for Leonidas (vii.228). In the *Iliad*, the burial of Patroklos, while reminding the audience of how far Hektor rests from similar honors, suggests a balancing of the Achaean funeral with the promise of a Trojan funeral.[64] The Greek treatment of Masistios, while not explicitly a burial,

---

[60] Segal. 1971, pp. 38-39.
[61] Segal 1971, pp. 18, 20-22. Segal notes that the tenor of combat in the *Iliad* changes from the promise to return an enemy's corpse, as seen in the duel between Hektor and Aias (*Iliad* vii), to something more savage. He also notes the increased reference to wild animals feasting upon the flesh of the dead and the desire of antagonists to eat their enemy raw. Neither theme, however, figures prominently in the treatment of the dead in the *Histories*.
[62] Xerxes decapitated the builders of the first Hellspontine bridge after it was destroyed (vii.35.3), Leonidas (vii.238.1), some Phoenicians after Salamis (viii.90.3), and the ship captain who brought the king back to Asia (viii.118.4).
[63] Flower and Marincola. 2002, p. 145.
[64] Segal. 1971, p. 48.

substitutes Greek honor for Persian dishonor for the dead, an image Herodotos reinforces when he moves the camp from the viewing of Masistios to the heroon of Androkrates (ix.25.2). The historian explicitly demonstrates this change in behavior after the Battle of Plataea. When an Aeginetan urged Pausanias to behead the corpse of Mardonius as revenge for Xerxes' beheading of Leonidas, the Spartan general refused (ix.78.1-79.1). Pausanias regarded such an insult to a corpse an act better suited to the barbarians (ix.79.2). The Spartan forbade the Aeginetan to suggest such a proposal again and cautioned him to be thankful that he was not punished (ix.79.3).

In several ways, then, Herodotos uses Masistios, his trappings, and his corpse to evoke images and scenes from the *Iliad*. Through the person and armor of Masistios, the historian transforms the hoplite battle into epic combat. Then, he uses the Persian's corpse to emulate the struggle for a fallen hero typical of the Homeric war-poem. Finally, after the battle he echoes the Achaean examination of the fallen Hektor. Recreating elements of Homer's famous battle scenes and culminating in an allusion to the martial climax of the epic, Herodotos does not simply allude to a scene, but also imports its significance, concisely adding it to his own narrative. Hence, by evoking the death of Hektor, the historian also fills his text with the meaning of the Trojan's death – the removal of an object of fear and an obstacle to the Achaean war aims. Although Masistios' death was not

nearly so profound for the Greek war effort,[65] the Greeks did overcome their fear of the Persians and for the first time took up a position in open territory.

Moreover, the epic setting colors the representation of the Athenians, presenting them in the role of an epic hero. Emphasizing the actions of the unit rather than any particular individual, Herodotos depicts the Athenians as a collective individual. Setting them before the Greeks, he transforms the Athenians into an epic *promachos,* who faced the heroic Masistios, slew him, and then fought for his corpse. Although the historian begins with a battle-scrum reminiscent of the many struggles for heroic corpses in the *Iliad*, he creates a more specific equation between Masistios and Hektor, implicitly placing the Athenians into the role of Achilles, who has avenged the death of his comrade Patroklos (Leonidas).

The Debate

Herodotos continues the presentation of the Athenians as a collective hero in the subsequent debate (ix.26.1 – 27.6) again through their association with heroic death and corpses. Seeking to win the honor of manning a wing of the Greek army, the Tegeans and Athenians produced résumés of notable deeds both ancient and recent (πάλαι καὶ τὸ νέον) as evidence of their worth. Whereas the Tegeans focused their argument upon a lone heroic figure, Echemos, the Athenians cast themselves in the role of a hero both in antiquity and at Marathon.

[65] The Persian cavalry, particularly the Greek elements (i.e., Theban) that fought beside the Persians, were the only units to achieve any appreciable success at the Battle of Plataea (ix.68-69).

Herodotos begins the debate with the Tegeans. While he cites their claim that their long-standing resistance to Sparta was proof of their worth, the figure of the lone hero Echemos occupies most of the argument. Recalling the events of the first Heraklid invasion that followed the death of Eurystheus, the historian describes the Peloponnesian attempt to check the invasion at the Isthmus of Corinth. Confronted with this stout defense, the Heraklid leader, Hyllos, offered to fight a duel against a Peloponnesian champion to settle the issue:

> τότε ὧν λόγος Ὕλλον ἀγορεύσασθαι ὡς χρεὸν εἴη τὸν μὲν στρατὸν τῷ στρατῷ μὴ ἀνακινδυνεύειν συμβάλλοντα, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ Πελοποννησίου στρατομέδου τὸν ἄν σφέων αὐτῶν κρίνωσι εἶναι ἄριστον, τοῦτόν οἱ μουνομαχῆσαι ἐπὶ διακειμένοισι.
>
> Then Hyllus made a speech that there was no need for one army to risk attacking the other, but that they should select whoever was the best in the Peloponnesian camp, and that this man would fight him in single combat upon agreed conditions. (ix.26.3)

According to the Tegeans, their king Echemos volunteered, fought Hyllos in single combat, and killed him (ἐμουνομάχησέ τε καὶ ἀπέκτεινε Ὕλλον - ix.26.5). As a result of this single act, the invasion was delayed for one hundred years. Two relevant points can be drawn from this account: first, an individual hero acted for the whole; second, a duel (μουνομαχέω) settled the issue.

In the Athenian counter-argument, Herodotos singles out no hero for mention, but instead stresses the collective Athenian action in heroic situations. The historian lists four events from the heroic age: the Heraklid invasion, the burial of Polynikes, the Amazon invasion, and the Trojan War. Rather than place the Athenians implicitly in the role of a hero as he does in the events at Cithaeron, Herodotos replaces the heroes traditionally linked to these deeds with

collective Athenian action. As with the volunteers in ix.23.2, the Athenians acted *alone* in a collective fashion in support of the Heraklids:

> …μοῦνοι ὑποδεξάμενοι τὴν Εὐρυσθέος ὕβριν κατείλομεν, σὺν ἐκείνοισι μάχῃ νικήσαντες τοὺς τότε ἔχοντας Πελοπόννησον.
>
> Welcoming them [the Heraklids] we alone destroyed the hubris of Eurystheus, fighting with them against those that held the Peloponnese at that time. (ix.27.2)

This distinction persists in the telling of the other myths. As with the Athenian engagement against Masistios, Herodotos employs plural verbs and participles to describe Athenian action. *"We"* campaigned against the Thebans to recover and bury the corpses of Polynikes and his companions:

> …στρατευσάμενοι ἐπὶ τοὺς Καδμείους ἀνελέσθαι τε τοὺς νεκρούς φαμεν καὶ θάψαι τῆς ἡμετέρης ἐν'Ελευσῖνι.
>
> …campaigning against the Cadmeans we recovered their bodies [of the Argive heroes] and buried them in our own land in Eleusis. (ix.27.3)[66]

Similarly the Athenians gloried in *"our"* victory over the invading Amazons (ἔστι δὲ ἡμῖν ἔργον εὖ ἔχον καὶ ἐς'Αμαζονίδας… / We performed another fine deed against the Amazons…) and claimed that *"we"* did not fall short in the toils of the Trojan War (…καὶ ἐν τοῖσι Τρωικοῖσι πόνοισι οὐδαμῶν ἐλειπόμεθα. / … even in the toils of Troy we did not fall short - ix.27.4). The failure to mention heroes traditionally associated with these deeds makes this

[66] The ancient Athenians are presented as acting in a manner similar to their descendants, the volunteers at Cithaeron, who also sought to take up the corpse of a fallen hero (…τὸν νεκρὸν ἀνελέσθαι ix.23.2).

stress upon collective action more pronounced.[67] Although traditionally Theseus appears as a central figure in the defeat of the Amazons[68] and the recovery of Polynikes' corpse,[69] Herodotos omits the hero from these accounts. When contrasted with the Tegean focus upon a single hero, these omissions become marked and significant. The Athenian speaker adopted a stance identical to his Tegean counterpart, but reversed the underlying message. The Athenians did not bask in the reflected glory of the heroic deeds of individuals, but in the glory of their earlier incarnations, previous phalanxes. Hence, inverting the Tegean paradigm of the hero acting for the collective, the historian supplants the individual with the Athenian phalanx.

Herodotos maintains this presentation of the collective playing the role of the hero as the Athenian argument turns to a more recent event: the Battle of Marathon. He models the battle on the duel between Hyllos and Echemos. At Marathon, as at the Isthmus, the Athenians sought to repel a foreign invasion at its inception. Employing the same verb (μουνομαχέω) to describe each engagement the historian strengthens this similarity.[70] As Echemos fought a duel with Hyllos (…ἐμουνομάχησέ τε καὶ ἀπέκτεινε Ὕλλον / he dueled and killed Hyllos - ix.26.5) so the Athenians fought a duel with the Persians (οἵτινες μοῦνοι

[67] Although a minor figure in the *Iliad,* Menestheos, the major Athenian hero mentioned in the Trojan cycle (ii.552-556), is omitted here.
[68] Harrison. 1972, pp. 356-357. Flower and Marincola 2002, p. 155. The deed was recorded on metopes of the Parthenon as well as paintings and sculpture in the Hephaestium and the Painted Stoa, where the battle was depicted alongside the Battle of Marathon.
[69] Euripides *Suppliants, passim.* In the play Theseus, urged by the Argive king Adrastus, leads an Athenian army against Thebes to secure the recovery of Polynikes' corpse. Even in the traditions in which persuasion rather than force is used, Theseus remains a prominent figure in the legend (Aeschylus *Eleusinii*; Plutarch *Theseus* 29.4).
[70] Macan 1973 (1908), p. 643 doubts the reading of μουνομαχήσαντες in the text, but no other reading is proposed by the manuscripts and this reading fits the epic tone of the passage.

Ἑλλήνων δὴ μουνομαχήσαντες τῷ Πέρσῃ… / Who alone of the Greeks dueled with the Persians - ix.27.5). The use of the adjective *mounos* strengthens the impression of the Athenian phalanx acting as a lone hero.[71] The speaker omits the leadership of Miltiades and no single Athenian assumes the role of the Tegean Echemos' counterpart. Rather the Athenian phalanx again plays the role of the hero *mounos*.

While detailed descriptions of heroic corpses no longer occupy center stage of the narrative, Herodotos continues to focus on heroic combat and death, making explicit connections between the actions of the ancient and modern Greeks. Through this presentation he maintains the image of the Athenians as a collective hero. Siding with the Heraklids, they implicitly defeated Echemos. Next, they supplanted Theseus and Menestheus in their respective deeds. Finally, they defeated the Persians at Marathon in an epic-style duel.

The Catalogue

In the final section of the *Logos*, Herodotos abandons heroic corpses and combat in favor of an epic-style catalog of forces, specifically hoplites. Although the transition may seem strange, he moves logically from the heroic presentation of the Athenian phalanx at Marathon to an accounting of the various hoplites that composed the Greek phalanxes at Plataea. Herodotos does not simply count the men supplied by each *polis*, but rather notes the type of soldiers as well.

[71] The omission of Plataean participation at Marathon supports the presentation of the Athenians as a unity. An accurate recollection of history would undermine the collective presentation of the Athenian phalanx acting in the role of a hero.

Through this selective presentation of the number and types of troops of each *polis*, the historian undercuts the significance of the Spartan contribution to the battle while emphasizing Athenian participation. He limits his consideration of significant troops to hoplites, which collectively constitute the heroic figure of the Athenian phalanx.

Herodotos undercuts the traditional view, which held that the Spartans supplied the most men to Plataea, with a repeatedly skeptical accounting of the Spartiates, helots, and *perioikoi*. He immediately corrects the initial statement that the Lacedaemonians supplied ten thousand hoplites, noting, "of these only five thousand were Spartiates" (τούτων δὲ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἐόντας Σπαρτιήτας - ix.28.2). Additionally, while he catalogs all the light-armed troops of all the Greek states as a whole in ix.30, he singles out the light-armed troops of no other *polis* save for the Thespians, whose lack of ὅπλα relegated them to this status, and the Spartan helots. Repeatedly mentioning the thirty five thousand helots "guarding" the Spartiates, the historian undercuts the appearance of Spartan strength and numbers. The historian distinguishes the 5,000 Spartiates from 5,000 other Lacedaemonians (*perioikoi*), noting that *seven* helots "watched over" each of the former:

> … Σπαρτιήτας ἐφύλασσον ψιλοὶ τῶν εἰλώτων πεντακισχίλιοι καὶ τρισμύριοι, περὶ ἄνδρα ἕκαστον ἑπτὰ τεταγμένοι.
>
> … thirty-five thousand lightly armed helots guarded the Spartiates, seven were stationed with each man. (ix.28.2)

The use of φυλάσσω suggests an inversion of the typical Spartiate/helot relationship in which the former watched over or guarded against the latter. Herodotos places the Spartiates in a position of dependency, which he emphasizes through subsequent repetition of the ratio.[72]

In contrast, Herodotos praises Athens as the contributor of the greatest number of hoplites:

> τελευταῖοι δὲ καὶ πρῶτοι Ἀθηναῖοι ἐτάσσοντο, κέρας ἔχοντες τὸ εὐώνυμον, ὀκτακισχίλιοι·
>
> Last and first were stationed the eight thousand Athenians, who held the left wing. (ix.28.6)

Although Macan asserts that "τελευταῖοι δὲ καὶ πρῶτοι" indicates that the Athenians occupied the last position in the catalog, but the first in the order of march,[73] it more likely refers to the Athenian position in the catalog and contribution of hoplites to the battle. Situated at the end of the hoplite catalogue, after the first qualification of Spartan participation in ix.28.2, and immediately preceding the repetition of helot involvement in ix.29.1, the greatest contrast between the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks is in their contribution of the all-important hoplite. Such an accounting may seem at odds with the previous heroic characterization of the Athenians, but the number of men the Achaean heroes led to Troy was one characteristic of their greatness. In particular, Agamemnon is called the greatest king precisely because of the size of his host (*Iliad* i.280f, Thuc. i.9, et al.). The poet even notes this quality for heroes more

[72] ix.29.1 *bis*.
[73] Contra Macan 1978 (1908). p. 655.

renowned for their prowess in battle such as Achilles (*Iliad* xvi.168f). Hence, through the catalog of hoplites, whose phalanx comprises the Athenian collective hero, Herodotos adds to the heroic depiction of the Athenians. The Athenian hero was not merely a skilled warrior, but also was composed of the greatest (number of) men.

Conclusion

Through the creation of repeated epic allusions centered upon heroic combat and corpses, then, Herodotos links the three sections of the Masistios *logos* and glorifies the Athenian contribution to the opening stages of the Plataean campaign. Contrary to the tradition fostered by the elegy of Simonides,[74] Herodotos supplants the Spartans by presenting the Athenians in the role of an epic hero. The historian begins the extended heroic allusion with the figure of Masistios, his armor, and his corpse. Cast opposite the Persian *promachos*, the Athenians engaged in an epic-style battle as the Greek *promachos*, slaying Masistios and then fighting for possession of his corpse. Herodotos relies upon both epic language and epic setting, focused upon Masistios' heroic corpse, to echo similar battle scenes in the *Iliad*. Next, he creates a more specific allusion to the Achaean viewing and transportation of Hektor's corpse, implicitly placing the Athenians into the role of Achilles. He stages the Athenian act as reciprocity

[74] A recently discovered fragment of Simonides places greater emphasis on Spartan leadership and the Spartan contribution during the early stages of the land campaign in 479 BC. Subsequent authors (particularly tragedians) drew upon this poem to shape their own works on the Persian conflict. See Rutherford. 2001, pp. 33-54. and Boedeker. 2001, pp. 120-134, esp. 121-122.

for the Persian slaying and desecration of Leonidas, who resembles the figure of Patroklos.

In the *logos*' second section, Herodotos maintains his heroic depiction of the Athenians as he moves from deeds to words. Expanding the scope of their activities, he effaces the deeds of specific Athenian heroic figures and replaces them with the collective action of the Athenians. Again, he creates this message primarily by focusing the action or the speeches on heroic combat and corpses. In his final example, the Athenian victory at Marathon, he depicts the battle as a heroic duel, equating the modern Athenians to a collective heroic figure.

He departs from the use of heroic corpses in the final section of the *logos*, but the catalog accords well with the epic settings of the previous sections. In his careful accounting he explores another aspect of the Athenian hero – the number of men he led to war. Bolstering his praise of the Athenian contribution, Herodotos minimizes the Spartan presence at Plataea by distinguishing the smaller number of Spartiates and their dependence upon vast numbers of helots for their security. In contrast, he emphasizes the presence of the Athenians, who provided the single largest group of hoplites to the campaign. Hence, he presents the Athenians as heroic in both prowess and number of men.

While it is possible to read each of these sections independently, Herodotos' intense use of heroic corpses, in particular the corpse of Masistios, to shape the narrative and link the respective section indicates that the three units must be read as a whole. Setting the *logos* apart from the preceding and following chapters through its epic tone, Herodotos creates a series of ring structures

centered on heroic objects or persons (or both, in the case of corpses). He uses the theme of heroic death to link literally the first section to the second through the movement of the Greek camp from Masistios' corpse to Androkrates' tomb. Heroic combat and death provides and organizing principle of both the Tegean and Athenian arguments. The final mention of Masistios at ix.31.1 serves as a summation for the entire *logos*, marking the end of epic characterizations and a return to the description of a conventional conflict. Structurally, the objects indicate the *logos'* unity. Thus, while the historian makes distinct statements about the Athenians at the Battle at Cithaeron (ix.20-25.3), the Tegean/Athenian Debate (ix.26.1-27.7), and the Greek Catalog (ix.28.1-31.1), he uses the structural relationship to link these messages together. As a result the Athenians appear as a collective heroic figure, equal in many ways to their Achaean forebears, and superior in both quality and number to their Spartan allies.

Chapter 5:
A New Connotation: The Fallacy of Fortifications

As shown in the previous chapters, Herodotos manipulates objects in a variety of ways, but he mostly restricts their carefully crafted meanings to a finite portion of the narrative. For example, his treatment of the bows of the Ethiopian and Persian kings does not alter the meaning of all bows in the *Histories*. But Herodotos treats some objects consistently throughout his narrative, giving them an unchanging added meaning. One class of objects that the historian presents consistently is fortifications, which he presents in the unexpected light of failure. He employs this presentation for two purposes. First, he compares the Athenian strategy of aggression favorably to the Spartan strategy of defense through their respective *teichea*. The mobile wall of the fleet symbolizes Athenian initiative that rejects reliance upon traditional fortifications, such as the fixed defenses of the Isthmus that embody Spartan passivity and insularity. The fleet's victory at Salamis and the Isthmian Wall's abandonment support Herodotos' judgment in favor of Athens at vii.139. Second, the historian uses fortifications as an indicator of an empire's rising or declining fortunes. As their campaign against Greece waned, the Persians experienced difficulty with sieges and began to rely upon fortifications for their defense. At the same time, the Athenians became increasingly proficient at siege warfare, foreshadowing their rise to imperial power.

Herodotos premises both points upon the view that fortifications are vulnerable, thus subverting their normal connotation of security. Such a total

revision of an object's connotation is not unknown in antiquity. For example, while artists and writers of the Roman Empire used the image of a fish to symbolize the sea, early Christians appropriated the symbol to represent their religion.[1] Objects could also have a more general connotation; medieval artists and writers used the skull to symbolize death or mortality.[2] Hence, the simple appearance of the object (fish or skull) evokes profound significance. Herodotos uses *teichea* in a similar manner. Unlike singular objects, such as the lion statue that Croesus dedicated at Delphi (i.50), whose rich descriptive detail conveys hidden significance, Herodotos presents most *teichea* in a simple manner. He relies upon the *teichos'* negative connotation to imply vulnerability and impending failure.

Herodotos establishes the negative connotation of *teichea* during his account of Cyrus' rise to power, depicting them as feeble constructs unable to check Persian aggression. He provides elaborate descriptions of the impressive fortifications of Sardis, Ecbatana, Phocaea, and Babylon and then recounts how the Persians overcame the four nations that relied upon these *teichea* for their protection. In three of the campaigns, Herodotos carefully describes the manner in which the Persians defeated the fortifications, using daring, skill, and patience. By the end of the last siege, he has made it clear that a *teichos* provides inadequate protection against assaults, particularly one launched by the Persians.

Herodotos expands the negative depiction of fortifications beyond Persian sieges in the following books. Although he does not focus on a series of sieges,

[1] Elsner. 1995, pp. 8-9.
[2] Berger. 1972, p. 91.

like the Persian ones, he presents *teichea* in a consistently negative fashion. Overall, fortifications fail to protect their defenders 86.0% of the time. He also continues to portray the Persians as masters of siege-craft, who overcame *teichea* nearly 100% of the time.[3] The historian depicts fortifications as vulnerable constructs susceptible to destruction, capture, or circumvention. Herodotos' depiction challenges the accepted view of his Greek audience, who relied upon *teichea* for their own protection. Together he uses the initial emphatic presentations of the fortifications in book I and the simple, yet consistent, presentations of subsequent fortifications to transform the connotation of *teichos* from security to vulnerability.

Fortifications in Herodotos become a sign of imminent defeat. Whenever a king or a people turn to a *teichos* as their primary means of defense, the historian is indicating that they will soon suffer defeat. Naturally a rising imperial power will overcome defenses as it expands its territory, and thus Herodotos' triumphant depiction of Persian siege-craft may be nothing more than an emphasized presentation of real events. Hence the strategic discussions and choices of the defenders before a campaign begins or that occur at critical moments are more revealing. When a defender makes a conscious choice between an offensive strategy and a strategy reliant upon fortifications, the choice presages the outcome of the campaign. Hence, *teichea* become an indicator of fortune for the Persian Wars. As one side or another turns to fortifications

[3] For a full accounting of sieges in Herodotos see pp. 203-206 below.

rather than adopting an offensive policy, Herodotos indicates their prospects for success.

This chapter examines the historian's treatment and employment of fortifications in three parts. First, an examination of the rise of Persia in book I reveals how the historian establishes a negative connotation for *teichea.* Early in his work, the historian establishes Persian mastery of siege-craft and so raises doubts about the efficacy of *teichea*. He builds upon these doubts by consistently associating *teichea* with military failure, altering the connotation of *teichos* from security to vulnerability. Second, this chapter examines how the historian uses this portrayal of fortifications to frame his presentation of Greek strategy during Xerxes' invasion of Greece. Herodotos associates the two main Greek strategies in these terms, linking the Spartans to fixed, traditional *teichea* and the Athenians to the new mobile *teichos* of the Athenian and Greek fleets. He validates his judgment in favor of the Athenians at vii.139 in part through this presentation, placing the two types of *teichea* side by side after the Greek naval victory that Themistokles orchestrated at Salamis. Finally, this chapter examines how Herodotos alters the Persian and Athenian relationships with *teichea* in 479 BC to signify the shift of imperial fortunes from the one to the other.

A New Connotation

The Rise of Persia

The most famous *teichos* in Greek Literature was the Trojan Wall. Yet while the Achaean heroes eventually overcame this barrier, Homer presents this

and the fortification around the Achaean ships as secure structures. The former successfully protected the Trojans for ten years. The Achaeans only breached this defense after intense effort. The latter protected the majority of the Achaean ships and endured longer than the conflict with Troy until it was at last destroyed by the gods themselves in a tremendous flood (*Iliad* xii.1-33).

Herodotos challenges this association between *teichos* and security, basing his arguments on the consistent depiction of traditional *teichea* as inadequate protection. He makes no explicit reference about the efficacy of fortifications until vii.139 when he equates *teichea* to the flimsy layers of a *chiton*, but his statement there should elicit no surprise. From early in his work, the historian proclaims his slight regard for this staple of fifth-century Greek warfare, presenting *teichea* consistently and methodically in a negative light and subverting their association with security.

Herodotos initiates the new connotation during the Persian rise to power in book I. Although the Persians and other eastern empires possessed the wealth, manpower, and rudimentary siege technology[4] to conduct prolonged sieges and were regarded as experts in this field of warfare,[5] Herodotos does not assume that his Greek audience recognized this military reputation. At the time when the historian composed his works, the Greeks had successfully held the Persians at bay for fifty years. While they kept memories of the Persian sack of the Athenian Acropolis and other temples alive, their eventual reconstruction and the passage of time lessened the image of the once mighty Persian. Hence, the historian traces

[4] Garlan. 1974, pp. 139, 142-143.
[5] Aymard. 1959, p. 9.

the rise of Cyrus, the first Persian king, to re-establish the Persian military reputation as masters of siege warfare. As he describes Cyrus' conquests of Media, Lydia, Ionia, and Babylon, Herodotos directs the audience's gaze to the elaborate fortifications of the defenders, which he highlights through emphatic presentations. He focuses more upon three sieges, describing Persian daring, skill, and patient siege-craft, than on the pitched land battles that preceded them. Hence, by the end of the first book, he lays the foundation for the negative connotation of *teichea* and restores the Persian reputation for siege-craft.

Herodotos begins this process at Sardis, where the Persians displayed great daring in their capture of the Lydian citadel. After the inconclusive battle at Pteira, Cyrus pursued Croesus to Sardis, defeated the Lydian army before its gates, and besieged the citadel (i.80). Herodotos emphasizes the importance of the Lydian defenses and Croesus' reliance upon them through the repetition and elaborate description of the *teichos*. During the course of the siege (i.79-85), he refers to the *teichos* seven times,[6] but mentions the defenders only once, describing a Lydian solider who inadvertently revealed an avenue of attack to the Persians (i.84.4). He even links the Lydian king to the walls of his citadel:

> Κροῖσος δὲ δοκέων οἱ χρόνον ἐπὶ μακρὸν ἔσεσθαι τὴν πολιορκίην ἔπεμπε ἐκ τοῦ τείχεος ἄλλους ἀγγέλους ἐς τὰς συμμαχίας.
>
> Croesus believing that the siege would take a great deal of time sent other messengers from his *teichos* to his allies. (i.81)

[6] i.80.6, 81, 83, 84.1, 84.3 *bis*, 85.3.

Through the addition of ἐκ τοῦ τείχεος, the historian implicitly links Croesus' confidence to the defenses of his acropolis.

Although the Persians quickly captured this *teichos*, Herodotos magnifies their achievement further through an elaborate description of the citadel. Describing it as precipitous (ἀπότομος) and invincible (ἄμαχος), Herodotos recounts the tale of Meles, a Lydian monarch, who carried a lion cub around the acropolis to make it secure:

> ἀπότομός τε γάρ ἐστι ταύτῃ ἡ ἀκρόπολις καὶ ἄμαχος· τῇ οὐδὲ Μήλης ὁ πρότερον βασιλεὺς Σαρδίων μούνῃ οὐ περιήνεικε τὸν λέοντα τόν οἱ ἡ παλλακὴ ἔτεκε, Τελμησσέων δικασάντων ὡς περιενειχθέντος τοῦ λέοντος τὸ τεῖχος ἔσονται Σάρδιες ἀνάλωτοι.
>
> For in this place the acropolis was precipitous and impregnable; but in this place alone a previous king of Sardis Meles did not take around the lion that his concubine bore to him, although the Telmessians proclaimed that if the lion were taken around the *teichos* then Sardis would be impregnable. (i.84.3)

However, Meles neglected a portion that he considered unassailable:

> ὁ δὲ Μήλης κατὰ τὸ ἄλλο τεῖχος περιενείκας, τῇ ἦν ἐπίμαχον τὸ χωρίον τῆς ἀκροπόλιος, κατηλόγησε τοῦτο ὡς ἐὸν ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀπότομον·
>
> Meles bore it around the rest of the *teichos*, where the acropolis was vulnerable, but he ignored this place since it was invincible and precipitious. (i.84.3)

Against these divinely protected defenses, Cyrus relied upon the daring of his men rather than the siege-craft the Persians would later develop (i.84.1). Similar to their capture of the Athenian Acropolis, the Persians scaled the steep but unprotected section of the defenses and took the citadel by surprise (i.84.5-6).

Describing how the Persians overcame this strong *teichos* with surprising ease, the historian begins to cast doubt upon the security of fortifications.

Herodotos builds upon this doubt at Ecbatana. He describes the citadel, which Deioces built upon attaining power, as a series of concentric *teichea* and bastions:

> οἰκοδομέει τείχεα μεγάλα τε καὶ καρτερά … μεμηχάνηται δὲ οὕτω τοῦτο τὸ τεῖχος ὥστε ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου κύκλος τοῖσι προμαχεῶσι μούνοισι ἐστι ὑψηλότερος.
>
> He built great and strong fortifications … This *teichos* is contrived so that the one circuit is higher than the next by its battlements alone. (i.98.4)

He then elaborates further, describing the color of each bastion and *teichos* (i.98.5-6). Through the length and the detail of his description, Herodotos creates an image of an impressive fortified edifice, upon which Deioces and his descendents relied for protection. Furthermore, although Cyrus did not besiege Ecbatana, Herodotos associates the citadel with Persian siege-craft by noting the similar length of its exterior circuit to the walls of Athens, linking the first Persian conquest to one of the final Persian sieges (τὸ δ' αὐτῶν μέγιστόν ἐστι τεῖχος κατὰ τὸν ᾽Αθηνέων κύκλον μάλιστά κῃ τὸ μέγαθος. / The extent of this *teichos* is approximately the same as the circuit around Athens - i.98.5). As at Sardis, Herodotos uses the Median *teichos* to recall Persia's later victories against the Greeks and their *teichea*.

Herodotos describes the technical aspects of Persian siege-craft when he narrates the Persian conquest of Ionia. Ignoring the lesson of Sardis, the Ionians erected defenses around their *poleis* (τείχεά τε περιεβάλοντο ἕκαστοι / Each

erected a wall around [their *polis*]) for protection (i.141.4). But the Persian general Harpagus systematically overcame these *teichea* with siege mounds:

> αἵρεε τὰς πόλιας χώμασι· ὅκως γὰρ τειχήρεας ποιήσειε, τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν χώματα χῶν πρὸς τὰ τείχεα ἐπόρθεε.
>
> He seized the *poleis* with siege mounds; for investing a *polis*, he then heaped a mound beside the walls and captured the city. (i.162.2)

The magnitude of this achievement illustrates the growing siege-craft of the Persians, but Herodotos further magnifies this reputation through his description of the *teichos* and siege of Phocaea. Rather than mud-brick walls typical of most *poleis*,[7] the Phocaeans used money given to them by Arganthonius, king of Tartessus (i.163.3), to build a circuit wall of large, fitted stones:

> καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ περίοδος τοῦ τείχεος οὐκ ὀλίγοι στάδιοί εἰσι, τοῦτο δὲ πᾶν λίθων μεγάλων καὶ εὖ συναρμοσμένων.
>
> The circuit wall is not merely a few stades long, and the whole wall is built of large and well-fit together stones. (i.163.4)

The expense and uncommon composition emphasize the strength of the *teichos*, which coupled with a fleet (i.163.2) should have allowed Phocaea to withstand investment (i.163.2). But the city fell quickly to the Persians. Instead of the typical fifth-century Greek tactics of investment and blockade,[8] the Persian general, Harpagus, constructed a siege mound beside the Phocaean *teichos* (i.168). Overcoming the defenses, he displayed an added technical element to the Persian siege-craft.

The Persians fully realized their ability against fortifications, coupling daring and technical proficiency, in their siege against Babylon. Although eastern

[7] Lawrence. 1972, p. 35.
[8] Lawrence. 1972, p. 41.

sources indicate that Cyrus took the city without a siege,[9] Herodotos singles out the conquest of Babylon from among Cyrus' eastern conquests (i.177). His description of the city, like his claim of a Persian siege, though, does not correspond to other sources.[10] Whether derived from unreliable sources or invention, Herodotos' Babylon is largely his own construction. As in the cases of Sardis, Ecbataba, and Phocaea, he uses the repetition of the term *teichos* and a memorable description[11] of the Babylonian defenses to magnify the Persian achievement. He refers to the *teichos* and related defenses eighteen times,[12] erecting the wall before the eyes of his audience and describing each component of its impressive construction. Beginning with the dimensions, he outlines a four hundred eighty stade-long circuit around the city (i.178.2). Next, he describes a moat and a large *teichos*:

> τάφρος μὲν πρῶτά μιν βαθέα τε καὶ εὐρέα καὶ πλέη ὕδατος περιθέει, μετὰ δὲ τεῖχος πεντήκοντα μὲν πήχεων βασιληίων ἐὸν τὸ εὖρος, ὕψος δὲ διηκοσίων πήχεων·
>
> First a deep and broad trench full of water runs around it [the *teichos*], next there is *teichos* fifty royal cubits wide and two hundred royal cubits high; (i.178.3)

The historian lays out a fortress more impressive in size than any previously captured by the Persians.

---

[9] Both the Nabonidus Chronicle (BM 35382) and Cyrus Cylinder (BM 90920) state that Cyrus entered Babylon without a battle.
[10] Rollinger. 1993, pp. 74-75.
[11] Fornara. 1971, pp. 28-29. He notes that Aristophanes' description of the city in the *Birds* (1124-1138) is a parody of or an allusion to Herodotos' description of Babylon.
[12] Main *teichos*: 178.3; 179.1; 179.2; 179.3 *bis*; 179.4; 180.2; 181.1 *bis*. Moat: 178.3; 180.1; 180.2. Secondary *teichos*: 181.1. River walls (αἰμασιη): 180.2; 180.4. The fortification of Babylon in general: 180.1 (ἐτετείχιστο); 181.2 (ἐτετείχιστο); 184 (τείχεα). This does not include his references to gates (179.3; 180.4) and his description of interior citadels (181.2-3).

Like a Babylonian mason, Herodotos then fills these massive dimensions brick by brick. Excavating the moat he bakes the dirt into bricks (ὀρύσσοντες ἅμα τὴν τάφρον ἐπλίνθευον τὴν γῆν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὀρύγματος ἐκφερομένην – i.179.1), which he uses to line each side of the ditch and build the wall (ἔδειμαν πρῶτα μὲν τῆς τάφρου τὰ χείλεα, δευτέρα δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ τεῖχος … - i.179.2). As in the case of Phocaea, the type of brick is stronger than the unbaked mud brick typically found in fifth-century Greek walls. Emphasizing each detail, he next fits thirty courses of bricks together with mortar and rush mats (i.179.2). Atop this massive battlement he places a row of continuous buildings separated by the width of a four-horse chariot (i.179.3), like some sort of cyclopean crenellation. Finally he girds the one hundred city gateways with gates, thresholds, and lintels made entirely of bronze (πύλαι δὲ ἐνεστᾶσι πέριξ τοῦ τείχεος ἑκατόν, χάλκεαι πᾶσαι, καὶ σταθμοί τε καὶ ὑπέρθυρα ὡσαύτως. – i.179.3). Herodotos shapes a *teichos* of unparalleled dimension and strength. Each element – the bricks, the mortar, the top of the wall, and the gates – contributes to an image of an immensely strong *teichos*.

He does not stop with the *thorax* or breastplate (as he calls the *teichos*) of the city, but he adds layers of interior defenses*:*

> τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τὸ τεῖχος θώρηξ ἐστί, ἕτερον δὲ ἔσωθεν τεῖχος περιθέει, οὐ πολλῷ τεῳ ἀσθενέστερον τοῦ ἑτέρου τείχεος, στεινότερον δέ.
>
> This *teichos* is the city's thorax, but another *teichos* runs around within, it is not much weaker, but it is narrower. (i.181.1)

Next, he minimizes the weakness that the Euphrates River, which ran through the city, posed to the defenses. He constructs low walls of baked bricks (αἰμασιὴ πλίνθων ὀπτέων) along the banks of the Euphrates as the river passes through the city (i.180.2). He guards each road and alleyway, which intersect the river, with bronze postern gates (πυλίδες … χάλκεαι), leaving no gap in the defense (i.180.4). Within the heart of both quarters of the city he locates two citadels (i.181.2). The first is a royal palace surrounded by a large, strong ring wall (ἐν τῷ μὲν τὰ βασιλήια περιβόλῳ μεγάλῳ τε καὶ ἰσχυρῷ, /in one [quarter] is the king's palace with a large and strong circuit wall - i.181.2). The second is the bronze-gated temple of Bel (ἐν δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ Διὸς Βήλου ἱρὸν χαλκόπυλον /in the other [quarter] is the bronze-gated temple of Zeus Belos – i.181.2), which the historian places atop eight solid towers built to guard the sacred space:

> ἐν μέσῳ δὲ τοῦ ἱροῦ πύργος στερεὸς οἰκοδόμηται, σταδίου καὶ τὸ μῆκος καὶ τὸ εὖρος, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ πύργῳ ἄλλος πύργος ἐπιβέβηκε, καὶ ἕτερος μάλα ἐπὶ τούτῳ, μέχρι οὗ ὀκτὼ πύργων.
>
> In the middle of the temple a solid tower was built, a stade in length and breadth, and on this tower stood another tower, and another tower on this one, and so up to eight towers. (i.181.3)

Like the concentric walls of Ecbatana, Herodotos' Babylon has layer upon layer of fortifications protecting the city from assault.

Herodotos focuses his Babylonian portrait almost completely on the city's defenses. Even his accounts of the River Is and Queen Nitocris contribute to his description of the Babylonian fortifications.[13] The River Is provided the mortar

[13] Bloomer, W. Martin. 1993, pp. 37-38.

used in the city's *teichos* (i.179.4) and Nitocris strengthened the city's defenses before Cyrus' attack.[14] Fearful of the growing power of the Medes "she increased her security as far as she was able" (προεφυλάξατο ὅσα ἐδύνατο μάλιστα – i.185.1). First, she lined the banks of the Euphrates with stone, diverting the river's course in order to reduce the speed of the current (i.185.2-6). Second, within the city she lined the embankments of the river and the approaches to the river gates "with baked brick similar to the type used in the city walls" (πλίνθοισι ὀπτῇσι κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τῷ τείχει – i.186.2). Herodotos regards this queen's legacy to be the additional defenses she provided for the city[15] and further associates her with the Babylonian fortifications by placing her tomb atop one of the city's bronze gates (i.187). He relates every aspect of his Babylon to its defenses, creating an image of a nearly unassailable set of fortifications.

None of it makes a difference. Although the defenses initially frustrated the Persians, Cyrus captured the city in spite of the massive wall, the bronze gates, the interior walls, its citadels, and even a large supply of grain that the Babylonians had gathered to withstand a siege (i.190.2). He defeated the city's defenses at the point of Queen Nitocris' reinforcement. Utilizing the basin into which she formerly drained the Euphrates, Cyrus diverted the river again (i.191.3), allowing the Persians to launch a daring attack along the riverbed, passing through the exterior *teichos* and breaching the interior walls and gates

[14] Although Nitocris built her defenses before Cyrus came to power, Herodotos minimizes the appearance of the passage of time in the narrative by placing her actions immediately before his description of the Persian attack.
[15] Munson. 2001, p. 9.

that fronted the river within the city (i.191.4). As the historian makes clear, luck clearly favored the Persians; the attack would have failed but for the element of surprise (i.191.5).[16] Once again Persian daring proved decisive, but only because they also possessed the necessary engineering skill, or siege-craft, to discern and take advantage of a weakness in the Babylonian defenses. The capture of Babylon signals the full realization of Persian siege-craft.

Together with the *teichos* of Ecbatana and the sieges of Sardis and Phocaea, Herodotos uses the siege of Babylon to challenge the connotation of fortifications with security. Using the repetition of the term *teichos* and elaborate descriptions of the fortifications, he creates portraits of four impressive structures, protected either by advantageous location or careful design, to convey to the audience an image of great strength and security. He protects Sardis with sheer heights and divine prophecy, Ecbatana with eight circuits of *teichea* and bastions, Phocaea with a long stone wall, and Babylon with massive (even cyclopean) layers of *teichea*, gates, and citadels. Alone, each represents a considerable challenge to an attacker; together they are a series of escalating challenges. Yet as each *teichos* became more challenging, the Persians rose to meet it. They used daring to capture Sardis, but then acquired simple engineering skills (e.g. siege mounds) to capture Phocaea and the other Ionian *poleis*. At last against Babylon, the Persians coupled daring with siege-craft to match the Babylonian defenses. Herodotos uses these sieges, however, not only to provide a résumé of Persian siege-craft, but also to call into question the security of *teichea* in general. He devotes more

[16] Avery. 1972, pp. 545-546.

descriptive detail to these four fortifications than he does on all of the other remaining *teichea* in the *Histories* combined. He highlights the imposing strength of these four *teichea* so that, as he describes their falls, he is able to drive a wedge between *teichea* and their association with security.

The Failure of Fortifications

Herodotos widens this wedge into a full breach through his continual depiction of *teichea* as objects that fail to protect their owners. Using the term "teichos" almost exclusively in a military context (particularly sieges), he portrays fortifications as extremely vulnerable to assault. Attackers in the *Histories* succeed in capturing fortifications at a high rate (86.0%). The Persians, in particular, enjoy even greater success, capturing fortified positions nearly every time (96.7%). They storm or defeat *teichea* efficiently and only rarely rely upon deception or betrayal, important tools prior to the development of advanced siege tactics in the fourth century.[17] Herodotos depicts fortifications in an intentionally negative light, magnifying their flaws and overlooking their strengths and the inherent difficulties of a siege.

This negative depiction, however, belies the Greek reliance upon *teichea* for protection and the difficulties they had in conducting sieges. Greeks may have regarded walls as an integral part of a *polis'* defense as early as the Archaic Period.[18] Most early Greek settlements were either situated on a defensible

[17] Ducrey. 1986, p. 141.
[18] Morgan and Coulton. 1997, pp. 105-106 and Hansen. 1997, p. 52. Morgan and Coulton argue that the archaeological record does not support a relationship between *teichea* and the formation

eminence or included some form of an acropolis.[19] The Greeks in Asia Minor relied upon *teichea* and sought to enhance these defenses in the face of Persian expansion in the sixth century.[20] The European Greeks increasingly used *teichea* to protect their communities in the fifth century and by the beginning of the fourth century "… almost every *polis* had a town wall (*teichos*), or at least a walled akropolis."[21]

The Greeks gained real security from fortifications. In the late sixth and fifth centuries they employed these increasingly common defenses as effective barriers against assaults.[22] They advanced little in the art of siege-craft prior to the height of the Peloponnesian War and even simple defenses provided adequate protection.[23] Pierre Ducrey's survey of sieges during the Classical and Hellenistic Periods shows that the presence of fortifications mitigated the suffering of the victim population 60% of the time. Furthermore, he regards fortifications as under-appreciated since his survey cannot reflect instances when the attacker, noting the presence of fortifications, refused to confront the dangers and difficulties inherent in a siege.[24]

During the fifth century, the Greeks only reluctantly assaulted fortifications even under favorable circumstances.[25] They preferred traditional hoplite warfare that did require assaulting *teichea*. Hoplite battles required level

---

of *poleis*. Hansen, however, maintains that the defense circuit "…is one of the most common characteristics of a *polis*…" in Archaic literature (e.g. Homer and Ps. Hesiod *Aspis* 270).
[19] Hansen. 2000, p. 162.
[20] Kern. 1999, p. 92.
[21] Hansen. 2000, p. 164. see also Ducrey. 1995, pp. 253-255.
[22] Lawrence. 1972, pp. 208-220 and Ober. 1991, p. 180.
[23] Garlan. 1974, pp. 152-153.
[24] Ducrey. 1986, pp. 141-142. see also Ducrey. 1985, p. 167.
[25] Garlan. 1974, p. 147.

ground and the willing participation of the defenders, who could deny battle by remaining within their stronghold.[26] Confronted with the prospect of negotiating or accepting combat,[27] the defender could use a fortified position as a secure location from which to decide. In the case of a siege, the very nature of hoplite warfare[28] and the limited siege-craft of the late Archaic and early Classical Periods[29] exacerbated the attacker's difficulties. Although siege-craft advanced marginally during the Peloponnesian War,[30] most attackers needed to surround a *polis* and starve out the defenders to achieve success,[31] but few could afford the expenditure of time and treasure.[32] Thus, during the period of the composition of the *Histories* (440s-420s), fortifications provided Herodotos' Greek audience with

[26] Ober. 1991, pp. 187-188. A desire to protect the *chora* of the *polis* and to limit the damage an invading army could do to crops also drove the defenders to march out and oppose the invaders in the field. See Garlan. 1974, pp. 30-33 and Hanson. 1998, pp. 32-34. see also Ober. 1985b, pp. 43-44.
[27] Garlan. 1974, pp. 26-27.
[28] Garlan. 1974, p. 135. Ober. 1991, pp. 185-186. In most cases before the Peloponnesian War, both attackers and defenders wore the hoplite panoply, which ill-suited siege operations. While it protected a man in a phalanx where the threat came mainly from the front, it would have hampered an attacker in a siege where death could come from any direction. The hoplite would have been unable to shift his chief defense, the bulky *hoplon,* to meet threats from different directions and would have had difficulty climbing siege ladders while carrying it. His helmet, while offering valuable protection, would have limited his visibility in the chaotic conflict.
[29] Lawrence. 1972, pp. 201-205. Garlan. 1974, p. 139. Ober. 1991, pp. 181-184, 185. An attacker wishing to take a fortified position by assault had three options: over, through, or under. For the first, they relied upon ladders, but these flimsy constructs provided no protection for the attacker, who needed both hands to climb in speedy fashion, and a defender could easily break, ignite, or dislodge them. Going through a wall required siege engines, which Garlan argues first appeared between the 8th and 5th centuries in the east. But Ober notes that while eastern powers may have used some simple engines, the Greeks concentrated their attacks upon the well-protected gate because the rudimentary nature of their rams precluded their use against walls. Finally, going under a wall (e.g. the use of saps) required tremendous work to cut through the bedrock, upon which most Greek walls were set, and while the Persians displayed this ability at the beginning of the fifth century (against Soli – Hdt. v.115), there is no evidence of its use by the Greeks in the early Classical Period.
[30] Garlan. 1974, pp. 152-153.
[31] Ober. 1985b, pp. 43-44.
[32] Kern. 1999, pp. 20-21, 89-90. Thucydides (i.11) also notes that the early Greeks lacked the resources necessary to conduct sieges.

considerable protection against aggression and could be overcome only with great effort and difficulty.

In the *Histories*, however, *teichea* frequently fail to offer adequate protection in a military context. Herodotos uses the term "teichos" one hundred thirty-eight times, applying it mostly to defensive works such as city walls, towers, forts, and walls across passes:[33]

total # of *teichea*	defensive (fortifications, forts, city walls)	non-defensive (palaces, et al.)
138	134 (97.1%)	4 (2.9%)

(Table 4.1 – *Teichea* in the *Histories*)

Like most early Greek writers, Herodotos reserves "teichos" for walls with a defensive function and distinguishes them from simple structural walls (*toichea*). He refers to one hundred seven *teichea* (77.6%) in the context of a siege or other military action (a war, invasion, et al.):

	# of *teichea* in the context of a siege	# of *teichea* in other military actions	total
failure of *teichos* out of 134 defensive *teichea*	92 (68.7%)	7 (5.2%)	99 (73.9%)
success of *teichos* out of 134 defensive *teichea*	8 (6.0%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (6.0%)
failure of *teichos* out of 107 *teichea* in a martial context	92 (86.0%)	7 (6.5%)	99 (92.5%)
success of *teichos* out of 107 *teichea* in a martial context	8 (7.5%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (7.5%)

(Table 4.2 – The Success and Failure of *Teichea*)

Overall *teichea* fail to protect defenders nearly 74.0% of the time, a rate that climbs to over 90.0% when only *teichea* from martial actions are considered. In some cases, Herodotos uses the word "teichos" multiple times for a single siege,

[33] A detailed accounting of all the instances of *teichos* in the *Histories* may be found in Appendix A.

such as Darius' siege of Babylon, in which he mentions the *teichos* nine times (iii.151.1, 153.2, 155.4, 5, 6, 158.1 *ter*, & 159.1). As discussed in the previous section, however, Herodotos uses this sort of repetition to emphasize the importance of the fortifications and heighten the attacker's achievement. The repetition, then, does not mitigate the association of fortifications with failure (pp. 188-197).

As grim a picture as Herodotos paints of *teichea*, he depicts siege warfare in an even darker light. *Teichea* comprise only one type, albeit the most numerous, of fortifications in the *Histories*.[34] At times, Herodotos simply describes a siege (or multiple sieges) without mentioning any specific defenses. For example, during the lengthy Persian siege of the Pedasi on Mt. Lida, the historian makes no mention of a *teichos* or other kind of fortification (i.176). While Herodotos varies the terminology, he does not vary the results. Defenders that depend upon some sort of defensive works to repel an attacker suffer defeat a majority of the time. The historian mentions ninety-three sieges within his work, of which a significant majority succeed:[35]

	# of sieges	success	failure
non – Persians	33	22 (66.7%)	11 (33.3%)
Persians (prior to the defeat at Salamis)	58	57 (98.3%)	1 (1.7%)
Persians (total)	60	58 (96.7%)	2 (3.3%)

[34] Herodotos does use a few other terms such as ἕρκος, ἔρυμα, and κρησφύγετον to describe fortifications, but only rarely (ἕρκος: the temporary fortification of the shipwrecked Persians (vii.191.1), the Persian fortifications at Mycale (ix.96.3, 97 bis, 99.3); ἔρυμα: the old Phocian wall at Thermopylae (vii.223.2 and 225.3) and the Persian fortifications at Plataea (ix.15.2) and Mycale (ix.96.3); κρησφύγετον: the proposed Ionian refuge (v.124.2), the Athenian Acropolis (viii.51.2); the Persian fortifications at Plataea (ix.15.2) and Mycale (ix.96.3)). These examples will be dealt with in detail below.

[35] A detailed list of all sieges in the *Histories* may be found in Appendix B.

Total	93	80 (86.0%)	13 (14.0%)

(Table 4.3 – The Success Rate of Sieges)

Overall attackers succeed 86.0% of the time, but the Persians surpass even this impressive achievement (96.7%). Herodotos may base this presentation upon the reputation that the Persians had for expertise in siege warfare,[36] but in doing so he presents an incomplete picture of Persian *teichomachia*. Whether intentionally or not, he overlooks the difficulties that the Persians had subduing fortified places in the east.[37] In the more familiar Aegean, he offers an explanation for the lone failure prior to their defeat at Salamis, the turning point of Persian imperial expansion. When the Naxians and their *teichos* withstood a Persian siege, Herodotos attributes it to the treachery of the Persian commander, Megabates, rather than any inability of Persian siege-craft. Megabates warned the Naxians of the impending assault, giving the islanders time to stock supplies and prepare themselves for a prolonged siege that the Persians had not anticipated (v.33.4 – 34.1). Naxos aside, the Persians capture every *teichos* that they attack before the reversal of their fortunes at the Battle of Salamis. Even including the failure at Naxos and later at Potidaea, the Persian rate of success of 96.7% is impressive. Against such an overwhelming achievement, fortifications appear as ineffective protection.

Since Herodotos describes a period of intense warfare, it is possible his subject matter may distort his view of fortifications. He describes the rise and fall

[36] Aymard. 1959, p. 9. Garlan. 1974, pp. 139, 142-143.
[37] He omits mention of Cyrus' failure to capture Larisa early in his reign (Xen. *Anabasis* iii.4.6) and the Persian inability to subdue completely the Carduccians because of the fortified nature of their homes (Xen. *Anabasis* iii.5.15). The Persians even had difficulties near Ecbatana, paying tribute, for safe passage, to the mountain-dwelling Uxians (Arrian iii.17).

of empires, a subject that requires the capture of many *poleis* and their attendant fortifications. Yet, a comparison to his contemporary Thucydides, whose account covers a similar subject in a period of more advanced siege-craft,[38] shows that Herodotos presents *teichea* more negatively:

Thucydidean Sieges	Successful siege	Failed siege
Athenian (53 sieges)	37 (69.8%)	16 (30.2%)
non-Athenian (61 sieges)	36 (59.0%)	25 (41%)
Total (114 sieges)	73 (64.0%)	41 (36.0%)

(Table 4.4 – Sieges in Thucydides)

Whereas attackers in the *Histories* succeed 86.0% of the time, they succeed 64.0% of the time in the pages of Thucydides, a reduction of nearly 25.0%. Not even the Athenians, whom Thucydides describes as skillful at sieges (Thuc. i.102), came close to matching the overall rate of success in the *Histories* or the success of the Persians (96.7%) in particular.

Herodotos attributes the capture of most of these fortifications to military force. While attackers relied upon no single method, using direct military assaults,[39] prolonged sieges, or betrayals – the three traditional methods of capture – Herodotos grants a preponderance of success to the military assault:

	Military assault	prolonged siege / blockade	betrayal
non-Persians	22 (68.6%)	9 (28.1%)	1 (3.3%)
Persians (prior to the defeat at Salamis)	53 (91.4%)	4 (6.9%)	1 (1.7%)
Persians (total)	55 (91.7%)	4 (6.7%)	1 (1.6%)
Total	77 (83.7%)	13 (14.1%)	2 (2.2%)

[38] Garlan. 1974, p. 147 and Ober. 1985b, pp. 43-44.
[39] For this study the threat of military force, which occurs only 7.4% of the time has been incorporated into the category of military force.

(Table 4.5 – Methods of Capture)

Military action against a fortified position entailed many risks and exposed attackers to countless dangers when conducting operations against a well-protected enemy.[40] Accordingly most attackers often regarded the use of betrayal or some form of deception necessary.[41] Yet in the *Histories,* Herodotos attributes the fall of most fortified positions (97.8%) to the force of arms, either to unspecified military force or a prolonged siege.

Herodotos, then, firmly links the defensive *teichos* with failure, particularly in the face of military force, altering its connotation from security to vulnerability. After his description of the rise of Persia through its conquest of a series of strong fortified positions in book I, he continues to present *teichea* in a consistently negative light, underplaying the tangible protection that a *teichos* provided and the difficulties inherent in a siege.

The Fleet vs. the Wall

Herodotos uses this connotation of *teichos* to critique the strategic responses of the two most important Greek powers during Xerxes' invasion of 480 BC. He symbolizes the two strategies in terms of *teichea*, one traditional and the other innovative. Whereas the Spartans advocated a defensive stance reliant upon the type of *teichos* that failed to check previous Persian aggression, the Athenians, led by Themistokles, proposed a more aggressive strategy based

[40] Kern. 1999, p. 20.
[41] Ducrey 1986, p. 141.

chiefly upon a new type of *teichos* - a fleet. The association of *teichea* with vulnerability previously in the *Histories* informs the audience of the vulnerability of the Spartan position and validates the historian's judgment that without the Athenian fleet Greece would have been lost.

vii.139 and the Oracle of the Wooden Wall

Beginning at vii.139, Herodotos establishes the link between the Spartans and traditional *teichea* and the Athenians and a naval *teichos*. After a lengthy description of the Persian preparation for the war and the opening stages of Xerxes' invasion, the historian shifts the focus of his narrative to the defensive efforts of the Greeks. Examining their respective strategic outlooks, he celebrates the Athenians as the saviors of Greece, who played a pivotal role in the war:

> νῦν δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἄν τις λέγων σωτῆρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι τἀληθεός.
>
> Now someone saying that the Athenians were the saviors of Greece would not miss the truth. (vii.139.5)

Scholars have responded to the self-proclaimed controversial nature (γνώμην … ἐπίφθονον) of the historian's assessment by examining the style of his argument,[42] or determining if he was an Athenian partisan,[43] or identifying

[42] Kleinknecht. 1940, p. 241. Demand. 1987, pp. 746-758, esp. pp. 747-8 and 755. Thomas. 2000, pp. 189-190. Kleinknecht and Thomas both favor an association between Herodotos' reasoning and the counterfactual argumentation of the Ionian scientific and medical writers, but Demand notes the historian's less rigorous application of this argumentation and instead views it as a rhetorical flourish.

[43] Jacoby *RE Suppl* II.359.43-7. Fornara. 1971, pp. 45-46. Lewis. 1977, pp. 178-180. Munson. 2001, pp. 174-175. Fornara and Munson argue against Jacoby's claim that Herodotos was a partisan of Periclean Athens. Instead, they maintain, the historian's views remain ambiguous in this passage that is essentially a truthful assessment of events. Lewis argues that Herodotos really favored the

loyalty, rather than strategy, as the key element of the passage,[44] or even claiming the historian projected later views concerning sea-power back in time.[45] While useful studies, few consider the role of *teichea*, whose negative connotation assures failure.[46] The closer Herodotos weds the Spartans to these frail structures, the more critical becomes his assessment of their strategy. Similarly, the farther he divorces the Athenians from traditional *teichea*, the more favorable becomes his assessment of their strategy.

Herodotos uses the Spartan reliance upon *teichea* to cast the Lacedaemonians into a passive, almost effeminate, role. He limits Spartan action to their attempt to drive a fortification wall across the Isthmus, which he presents in a ring structure[47] to emphasize the foolishness of this endeavor:

a) εἰ καὶ πολλοὶ τειχέων κιθῶνες ἦσαν ἐληλαμένοι διὰ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ Πελοποννησίοισι / Even if many layers of *teichea* had been driven across the Isthmus by the Peloponnesians… (vii.139.3)
b) προδοθέντες ἂν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων … ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων οὐκ ἑκόντων … ἐμουνώθησαν, μουνωθέντες δὲ ἂν καὶ ἀποδεξάμενοι ἔργα μεγάλα ἀπέθανον γενναίως. ἢ ταῦτα ἂν ἔπαθον, ἢ πρὸ τοῦ ὁρῶντες ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας

Spartans and detects a touch of regret that the Lacedaemonian heroism was not a decisive factor in the victory over Persia.

[44] Immerwahr. 1966. pp. 204-206. Fornara. 1971, p. 50. Hart. 1982, pp. 169-170. Raaflaub. 1987, pp. 239-240. Lateiner. 1989, p. 201. Immerwahr and Raaflaub regard Herodotos' judgment as a reflection upon the insular nature of Sparta. Fornara, Hart, and Lateiner argue that Herodotos disregards the strategic questions and concentrates upon Athenian and Spartan loyalty to Greece. They note that while the historian states that the Athenians could have wavered, such an option never occurred to the Spartans. Lateiner stresses the Athenian freedom of political choice and praises them for exercising that freedom on behalf of Greece.

[45] Evans. 1979, p. 116. Grant. 1983, pp. 288-289. Ostwald. 1991, p. 141. Marincola. 1996, p. 591, n. 38. Evans and Ostwald argue that Herodotos developed his argument from an appreciation and recognition of sea power that only arose in the years after the Persian War. Grant and Marincola suggest that the historian is simply including or responding to prevailing attitudes of his day, namely that Athens or Sparta played the role of savior of Greece.

[46] Solmsen. 1944, p. 247. Solmsen notes some of the emphasis Herodotos places upon the Isthmian wall between vii.139 and Chileus' speech at ix.9, but does not consider the historian's general approach to *teichea*.

[47] Beck. 1971, pp. 25, 68-69.

μηδίζοντας ὁμολογίῃ ἂν ἐχρήσαντο πρὸς Ξέρξην. / Betrayed by their allies the Lacedaemonians … would have not willingly been abandoned by their allies, but abandoned and performing great deeds would have died honorably. Either they would have suffered these things, or before this point seeing that the other Greeks had medized would have come to terms with Xerxes. (vii.139.3-4)

a') τὴν γὰρ ὠφελίην τὴν τῶν τειχέων τῶν διὰ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ ἐληλαμένων οὐ δύναμαι πυθέσθαι / For I am not able to perceive the benefit of driving *teichea* across the Isthmus. (vii.139.4)

Herodotos compares the fortification to the layers of a κιθών, a term he typically uses elsewhere to refer to female or eastern undergarments,[48] as a slight to Peloponnesian masculinity.[49] Within this extended conditional statement, the historian links the range of Spartan actions to the construction of the wall. No matter how many layers of walls they *might* have laid across the Isthmus, the Spartans *would* have been betrayed by their allies (προδοθέντες), abandoned (ἐμουνώθησαν), compelled to suffer (ἔπαθον), watching (ὁρῶντες) the other Greeks medize (vii.139.3-4). Unlike the performances of Leonidas and Pausanias later in the work, here Herodotos presents the Spartans as passive, incapable of seizing the initiative, and subject to the actions of others. He only attributes one action to them: the construction of the wall, which would have led to defeat or death. But even the prospect of a noble death appears tainted when the historian asserts that instead of a noble death the Spartans might have medized

[48] Powell. 1960. p. 195. Female undergarments: i.8.3 (Lydian); v.87.3 (Athenian). Male undergarments: vii.61.1, viii.99.2, ix.22.2 (Persian); vii.75.1, vii.90, vii.91.1 (Thracians, Cyprians, Cilicians); i.195.1 *bis* (Babylonians); ii.81.1 (Egyptians); i.50.1, i.155.4 (Lydian). The only two Greeks who wear this garment are Histiaeus (v.106.6) and Alcmaeon (vi.125.3). Histiaeus had been a resident in Susa for some time and thus his *chiton* may be a reference to eastern dress. Alcmeon donned a particularly baggy *chiton* to cart gold out of Croesus' treasury in Sardis. Powell regards Alcmeon's use of the *chiton* as particularly effeminate and non-Greek.

[49] The comparison of a fortification to a lady's attire is not unique to Herodotos. Homer uses the term κρήδεμνον, which refers to a woman's head covering, to describe the towers of Troy (*Iliad* xvi.100).

(vii.139.4).[50] The historian, then, not only renders a judgment against the Spartan strategy at vii.139, but also tarnishes them through an association with *teichea*, depicting them as weak and passive.

In contrast, he represents the Athenians as an active and capable naval power. They had two options:

> εἰ ᾽Αθηναῖοι καταρρωδήσαντες τὸν ἐπιόντα κίνδυνον ἐξέλιπον τὴν σφετέρην, ἢ καὶ μὴ ἐκλιπόντες ἀλλὰ μείναντες ἔδοσαν σφέας αὐτοὺς Ξέρξῃ, κατὰ τὴν θάλασσαν οὐδαμοὶ ἂν ἐπειρῶνταο ἀντιούμενοι βασιλέι.
>
> If the Athenians afraid of the coming danger abandoned their land, or if they stayed and gave themselves to Xerxes, no one would have tried to oppose the king on the sea. (vii.139.2)

Although they possess choices similar to the Spartans, the historian's use of active verbs and participles implies that the Athenians had greater control over their fate. He also places the Greeks into a position of dependence upon Athenian resistance and initiative, claiming that no place would have tried to resist Xerxes without Athenian participation (οὐδαμοὶ ἂν ἐπειρῶντο ἀντιούμενοι βασιλέι – vii.139.2). He continues, stating that:

> οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπὶ ὁκότερα τῶν πρηγμάτων ἐτράποντο, ταῦτα ῥέψειν ἔμελλε· ἑλόμενοι δὲ τὴν ῾Ελλάδα περιεῖναι ἐλευθέρην, τοῦτο τὸ ῾Ελληνικὸν πᾶν τὸ λοιπόν, ὅσον μὴ ἐμήδισε, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἦσαν οἱ ἐπεγείραντες καὶ βασιλέα μετά γε θεοὺς ἀνωσάμενοι. οὐδὲ σφέας χρηστήρια φοβερὰ ἐλθόντα ἐκ Δελφῶν καὶ ἐς δεῖμα βαλόντα ἔπεισε ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν ῾Ελλάδα, ἀλλὰ καταμείναντες ἀνέσχοντο τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐπὶ τὴν χώρην δέξασθαι.
>
> For to whichever side these men turned, that one would have prevailed; but choosing to preserve the freedom of Greece, these men were the ones who roused all of Greece, as much as did not go

[50] Lateiner. 1989, p. 277, n.43.

> over to the Persians, and after the gods repelled the king. Not even terrifying oracles coming from Delphi and throwing them into fear persuaded them to abandon Greece, but remaining they endured to receive the invader of their land. (vii.139.5)[51]

The Athenians had it in their power to grant victory to whichever side *they* turned (ἐτράποντο). Choosing freedom (ἑλόμενοι), *they* were the ones that roused Greece to action (αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἦσαν οἱ ἐπεγείραντες). Unmoved by fearful oracles, *they* remained and received the invader (καταμείναντες ἀνέσχοντο). In Herodotos' judgment, then, the Athenians were energetic masters of fate; they acted, they were not acted upon.

The historian links this active resistance to naval power symbolized by the "wooden wall" of the Athenian fleet. Although he uses a series of counterfactuals to equate Athenian resistance against the Persian navy to a check on Xerxes' power both on the sea and on the land (vii.139.2),[52] the historian makes no explicit reference to the Athenian (or Greek) fleet during the encomium. Avoiding terms such as *naus* and *trireme*, he does not classify the nature of the Athenian resistance until the oracle of the wooden wall. Fearful of the Persian threat, the Athenians consulted the Pythia for advice. Initially the oracle advised them to flee, but when asked again offered one form of salvation - a wooden wall:

> τῶν ἄλλων γὰρ ἁλισκομένων ὅσα Κέκροπος οὖρος
> ἐντὸς ἔχει κευθμών τε Κιθαιρῶνος ζαθέοιο,
> τεῖχος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεύς

[51] The Athenians acted like epic heroes. Homer frequently uses the non-compound form of the verb (ἐγείρω) in the *Iliad* to signify characters roused to action by the gods or other mortals: Iliad xv.232, 242, 567, 594, 603; v.208, 510; xiii.58, 357; xvii.552.
[52] Demand. 1987, pp. 748, 755.

μοῦνον ἀπόρθητον τελέθειν, τὸ σὲ τέκνα τ'
ὀνήσει.

When all other things are taken as much as the boundary of Cecrops holds and the vale of divine Cithaeron, far-seeing Zeus gives to Tritogeneia the wooden wall alone to be untaken, which will benefit you and your children. (vii.141.3)

Herodotos reduces the many opinions of the oracle's meaning (γνῶμαι καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί) to two opposing lines of thought (αἵδε συνεστηκυῖαι μάλιστα), which viewed the *teichos* as a defensive position or the Athenian fleet:

τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔλεγον μετεξέτεροι δοκέειν σφίσι τὸν θεὸν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν χρῆσαι περιέσεσθαι. ἦ γὰρ ἀκρόπολις τὸ πάλαι τῶν ᾽Αθηναίων ῥηχῷ ἐπέφρακτο. οἳ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τὸν φραγμὸν συνεβάλλοντο τοῦτο τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος εἶναι, οἳ δ' αὖ ἔλεγον τὰς νέας σημαίνειν τὸν θεόν …

Some of the older men supposed that the god prophesied the Acropolis would survive, for in antiquity the Athenian Acropolis was fenced in by a thorn-hedge. They supposed this wooden wall to be the fence, but others said that the god meant the ships… (vii.142.1-2)

Themistokles settled the debate and defined the active Athenian resistance to Persia as a mobile fleet of ships, the antithesis of an immobile *teichos* (vii.143). Herodotos, then, distinguishes the Athenians from the Spartans as active to passive, naval to land.

Unlike the passivity of the Spartan fortification, the historian presents the Athenian fleet at its inception as an offensive tool. Although ultimately used for the defense of Greece, Themistokles originally intended the fleet for an offensive

war against Aegina (vii.144.1).[53] A series of raids sparked by the Aeginetan theft of the statues of Damia and Auxesia from Epidaurus escalated to full-scale war (v.85f). Consulting the oracle at Delphi, the Athenians learned that they would eventually conquer (τέλος μέντοι καταστρέψεσθαι) the island (v.89.2). Herodotos uses the verb καταστρέφομαι numerous times in the *Histories* to describe the expansion of imperialistic power[54] and may have retrojected the events of the 440s, when Athens at the height of its power reduced Aegina to tributary status, back to the earlier conflict.[55] After events reached a point of offensive (perhaps even imperialistic) action, the Athenians created a tool suited to these aims: a fleet of two hundred ships (vii.144.1). Thus, years later when the Athenians acted in the defense of Greece, they employed an offensive device that accords well with the dynamism and initiative described in vii.139.

Herodotos, then, contrasts the Spartan and Athenian strategies in terms of *teichea*, condemning the former and praising the latter. The negative connotation of traditional *teichea* reinforces his condemnation of the Spartan strategy to fortify the Isthmus of Corinth and assists his depiction of them as passive victims of fate. He casts the Athenians, however, in an opposite mould, presenting them as dynamic masters of fate and linking them to a new type of *teichos* – the fleet. Unlike the immobile *teichos* suited only for defense, the mobile *teichos* is an

[53] After a silver strike at the Laurion mines in Attica, Themistokles defeated a plan to distribute the money and instead convinced his fellow citizens to use their new-found wealth to build a fleet of two hundred triremes.
[54] The campaigns of Croesus against the Asiatic Greeks (i.6.2, 28, 71.4, 73.2, 75.1, 78.3) and Xerxes' own campaign against Greece (vii.7, 8g1, 9.2, 9a1, 10a2, 11.4, 157.3, 209.4; ix.2.3).
[55] Jeffery. 1962, p. 50.

offensive weapon and the historian uses these walls to reify the opposing temperaments of the Spartans and the Athenians.[56]

Thermopylae and Salamis

Herodotos' account of the events of 480 up to the victory at Salamis begins with the Spartan defensive strategy until Themistokles proposed the offensive use of the Greek fleet at Salamis. The historian consistently depicts the Spartans as reliant upon a traditional *teichos* for their security, thus allowing the Persians to take the initiative. In contrast, the Athenians under Themistokles eschewed the old *teichos* and its associations with passivity and defense, in favor of the new type of naval *teichos*, conceived of and constructed by Themistokles for one purpose: attack.

Prior to Themistokles' bold naval stroke at Salamis, the Greeks followed the Spartan defensive strategy on land that relied significantly upon fortifications. They used the Isthmus as a staging area for defensive operations elsewhere or as a fallback position when these efforts failed. The Isthmus of Corinth first appears in the *Histories* when the historian describes the extensive fortification built there by the Spartans (vii.139.3-4). He emphasizes the association of the Isthmus and the fortifications by linking thirty-five of thirty-seven references to the Isthmus of Corinth with fortifications and defensive efforts there or elsewhere.[57] At the urging of the Thessalians, a Greek force set out

[56] Cf. Thuc. i.68-72, et al.
[57] References associated with fortification: vii.139.3; vii.139.4; vii.172.1 bis; vii.173.4; vii.175.1; vii.177; vii.207; vii.235.4; viii.40.2; viii.49.2 bis; viii.56; viii.57.1; viii.60a bis; viii.60b; viii.60g; viii.63;

from the Isthmus to the Vale of Tempe early in 480 BC (vii.172.1). While they did not fortify the position, the Greeks adopted a defensive stance, intending to guard the pass (πεζὸν στρατὸν φυλάξοντα τὴν ἐσβολήν - vii.173.1). When warned of the position's vulnerability to circumvention, the Greeks withdrew and returned to the Isthmus (ἐπορεύοντο ἐς τὸν Ἰσθμόν - vii.173.4). From this place they soon set out once again to defend Thermopylae and Artemisium:

> ὡς δὲ ἐπύθοντο τὸν Πέρσην ἐόντα ἐν Πιερίῃ, διαλυθέντες ἐκ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ ἐστρατεύοντο αὐτῶν οἱ μὲν ἐς Θερμοπύλας πεζῇ, ἄλλοι δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπ' Ἀρτεμίσιον.
>
> When they learned that the Persians were in Pieria, breaking up from the Isthmus some set went to campaign on land at Thermopylae, others went to campaign on sea at Artemisium. (vii.177)

But they considered withdrawing to guard the Isthmus when the Persians first appeared (τὸν Ἰσθμὸν ἔχειν ἐν φυλακῇ - vii.207).[58] After the Greek defeat at Thermopylae, the exiled Spartan king Demaratos warned Xerxes that his countrymen would next defend the Isthmus (vii.235.4). Retreating from Artemisium, the Peloponnesians did indeed set a course for the Isthmus to fortify it (τὸν Ἰσθμὸν αὐτοὺς τειχέοντας - viii.40.2). The Spartan-led Greek defenders moved like a pendulum between the Isthmus and other defensive positions, revealing their passive, insular approach to the war.

---

viii.71.1; viii.71.2 bis; viii.72; viii.74.1; viii.79.2; viii.121.1; viii.123.1; ix.7.1; ix.7b1; ix.8.1; ix.8.2; ix.9.2; ix.10.2; ix.10.3. Oblique references to the defense of the Isthmus: vii.235.4. References not associated with fortification: vii.195; viii.123.

[58] Immerwahr. 1966, pp. 205-206. Immerwahr notes the general refrain of the Greeks to return to the Isthmus, but limits himself to the study of the location as the symbol of Spartan insularity, overlooking the Spartan predilection for fortifications.

One such position was Thermopylae, where the Greeks made a stand against Xerxes' army. Overlooking Simonides' tradition of the Spartan night attack upon the Persian camp,[59] Herodotos focuses his account upon the Spartan defense of a *teichos.* The Greeks chose Thermopylae in part because of the presence of an old Phocian wall (τὸ μέν νυν τεῖχος τὸ ἀρχαῖον), which they intended to rebuild to bar Xerxes' entry into Greece:

> τοῖσι δὲ αὖτις ὀρθώσασι ἔδοξε ταύτῃ ἀπαμύνειν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸν βάρβαρον.
>
> It seemed best to those re-erecting the wall to keep the barbarian away from Greece in that place. (vii.176.5)

Although the Greek contingent included Tegeans, Mantineans, Arcadians, Corinthians, Phlians, Myceneans, and Boeotians, Herodotos limits references to the wall to the context of the Spartans and Spartan action. When a Persian spy approached the Greek position, he did not see the bulk of the Greek force, which the newly rebuilt Phocian wall concealed, but observed only the Spartans stationed on the outside of the wall:

> ὡς δὲ προσήλασε ὁ ἱππεὺς πρὸς τὸ στρατόπεδον, ἐθηεῖτό τε καὶ κατώρα πᾶν μὲν οὐ τὸ στρατόπεδον· τοὺς γὰρ ἔσω τεταγμένους τοῦ τείχεος, τὸ ἀνορθώσαντες εἶχον ἐν φυλακῇ, οὐκ οἷά τε ἦν κατιδέσθαι· ὁ δὲ τοὺς ἔξω ἐμάνθανε, τοῖσι πρὸ

[59] Flower. 1988, pp. 373-375. Herodotos omits any mention of the night attack on Xerxes' tent, which the poet Simonides recounts (Diodorus xi.10). According to Flower (p. 373), Herodotos probably knew of Simonides' poem, but chose to omit the attack on Xerxes' tent for some literary reason or because he regarded it as unhistorical. Flower (pp. 374-375) suggests that the historian and poet, drawing upon different portions of the *Iliad* for inspiration, shaped their accounts accordingly. Herodotos, wishing to emulate the struggle for Patroklos, uses book 17 as his inspiration whereas Simonides bases his account upon Odysseus and Diomedes' night excursion in book 10. While the Homeric allusion is attractive, a simpler explanation can be found within the context of Herodotos' argument on *teichea.* Had he included the attack upon Xerxes' tent he would have undermined his depiction of the Spartans as passive defenders of *teichea.*

τοῦ τείχεος τὰ ὅπλα ἔκειτο· ἔτυχον δὲ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔξω τεταγμένοι.

> When the horseman approached the camp, he looked and did not indeed see the whole camp; for he was not able to see those men stationed within the fortification, which having repaired they were guarding; but he observed those outside, whose arms were grounded before the wall; at this time the Lacedaemonians happened to be stationed outside. (vii.208.2-3)

After noting everything precisely, the spy reported back to Xerxes, who, although incredulous, accepted that the Spartans (and the wall) represented the entire defense of Thermopylae (vii.209.1). During the first two days of the battle, however, Herodotos omits any reference to the wall as the Greeks defend the pass in turns (vii.212.1-2). He reintroduces the *teichos* on the third day, after the bulk of the Greek force withdrew and only the Spartans and a few Greeks remained. The historian notes that these men now moved out into the wider part of the pass whereas during the previous days' fighting they had held the wall and made sorties out from it:

… καὶ οἱ ἀμφὶ Λεωνίδην Ἕλληνες, ὡς τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ ἔξοδον ποιεύμενοι, ἤδη πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐπεξήισαν ἐς τὸ εὐρύτερον τοῦ αὐχένος. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔρυμα τοῦ τείχεος ἐφυλάσσετο, οἱ δὲ ἀνὰ τὰς προτέρας ἡμέρας ὑπεξιόντες ἐς τὰ στεινόπορα ἐμάχοντο.

> … and the Greeks around Leonidas, as they were going forth to death, now advanced farther than before to the wider part of the pass. When the defensive work of the *teichos* was being guarded, on the previous days they fought withdrawing to the narrower part of the pass. (vii.223.2)

Although all the Greeks clearly relied upon the *teichos* during the previous two days, Herodotos more closely identifies its defense with the Spartans.

The Persians defeated the Spartans only by overcoming their *teichos*. After two days of bloody stalemate, Xerxes accepted the Malian Ephialtes' offer to guide Persian troops on a mountain path that circumvented the pass at Thermopylae (vii.215.1). The Malians first discovered the track and once used it to guide the Thessalians around the precursor to the Spartan wall (vii.215.2). Although the Spartans initially responded to the Persian maneuver by moving away from the wall (vii.223.2), after Leonidas was struck down they retreated back towards the *teichos*:

> ἔς τε γὰρ τὸ στεινὸν τῆς ὁδοῦ ἀνεχώρεον ὀπίσω, καὶ παραμειψάμενοι τὸ τεῖχος ἐλθόντες ἵζοντο ἐπὶ τὸν κολωνὸν …
>
> Then they withdrew back to the narrow part of the pass, and passing by the *teichos* they went and took up a position on the hill … (vii.225.2)

There the Persians pursued and killed the Spartans to a man:

> ἐν τούτῳ σφέας τῷ χώρῳ ἀλεξομένους μαχαίρῃσι, τοῖσι αὐτῶν ἐτύγχανον ἔτι περιεοῦσαι, καὶ χερσὶ καὶ στόμασι κατέχωσαν οἱ βάρβαροι βάλλοντες, οἳ μὲν ἐξ ἐναντίης ἐπισπόμενοι καὶ τὸ ἔρυμα τοῦ τείχεος συγχώσαντες, οἳ δὲ περιελθόντες πάντοθεν περισταδόν.
>
> In that spot the barbarians shooting arrows buried those still resisting with daggers, for those to whom daggers still remained, and hands and teeth, some following directly and demolishing the defensive work of the *teichos*, others going around stood on all sides. (vii.225.3)

While Herodotos portrays the Spartan resistance in terms of their courage and the number of Persians they killed, he presents the Spartan defeat as the defeat of the old Phocian *teichos*. At Thermopylae, the Persians first encountered the

Spartans at the *teichos*, used a path designed to circumvent it, and finally killed the Spartans amid its ruins.[60]

Herodotos moves from a Spartan strategic perspective to an Athenian one at Salamis where Themistokles challenged the Greek withdrawal to the Isthmus. Previously, the Athenian had quietly accepted Spartan leadership at Tempe and Artemisium, where he commanded the Athenian land and naval contingents (vii.173.2 and viii.4.2 respectively). Once in Attic waters, however, Themistokles balked at another iteration of the Spartan strategy, and instead urged the Greeks to adopt a more offensive posture. He and his fellow Greek admirals focused their debate on *teichea.* The Spartans and Peloponnesians favored withdrawing the fleet to support the fortifications at the Isthmus. They gave the fleet (the new *teichos*) secondary importance and retained the traditional (and vulnerable) *teichos*-wall as the focus of their defense. Challenging this strategy, Themistokles proposed using the naval *teichos* offensively, to attack the Persians where he chose rather than to await the Persian blow from behind a frail wall.

The historian broadens the Spartan reliance upon the Isthmian wall to include all Peloponnesians. The Peloponnesian admirals intended to sail to the Isthmus and fortify the position (τὸν Ἰσθμὸν αὐτοὺς τειχέοντας - viii.40.2). The

[60] The events on the last day at Thermopylae resembled Herodotos' prediction of the outcome of a Spartan defense of the Isthmus. The Spartans relied upon a *teichos* in both cases only to see the Persians bypass the position. Herodotos predicts that if the Spartans had defended the Isthmus, their allies would have abandoned them when the Persians circumvented the fortification wall (εἰ καὶ πολλοὶ τειχέων κιθῶνες ἦσαν ἐληλαμένοι διὰ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ Πελοποννησίοισι, προδοθέντες ἂν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων οὐκ ἑκόντων ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀναγκαίης, κατὰ πόλις ἁλισκομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ στρατοῦ τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἐμουνώθησαν - vii.139.3). The Greeks at Thermopylae adopted a similar course, returning to their own cities after the Persians bypassed the old Phocian wall (μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο διακριθέντες οἱ μὲν ἀπαλλάσσοντο καὶ διασκεδασθέντες κατὰ πόλις ἕκαστοι ἐτράποντο - vii.219.2). As Herodotos predicts (vii.139.4), their departure left the Spartans only with the option of dying nobly.

historian delays any mention of the work done by the Peloponnesians at home until viii.71.2-73 and instead gives the impression that the sailors' alone would build the wall.[61] He implies that the Peloponnesian sailors would abandon (if only temporarily) their ships in favor of the creation of a *teichos* on land. Their admirals also favored fighting at the Isthmus and advocated moving the fleet to fight in its defense (πρὸ τοῦ ’Ισθμου ναυμαχέειν - viii.56). The Peloponnesian admirals in effect proposed fighting a naval action in support of a traditional *teichos.* Only Themistokles' threat to withdraw the Athenian naval contingent to Italy compelled the Spartan admiral Eurybiades to alter these plans temporarily and remain at Salamis (viii.63). When the Persians approached, however, the Peloponnesians anticipated defeat (νικηθέντες) and feared lest their homeland be undefended (ἀφύλακτον - viii.70.2).

Herodotos follows the Peloponnesian gaze and moves his narrative to events at the Isthmus. There, the Spartan Cleombrotus, brother of Leonidas, led a Peloponnesian effort to erect a *teichos* (viii.71.2). Herodotos' catalog of the peoples involved in the project (viii.72) recalls the earlier catalog of the Greek fleet at Salamis (viii.42.2-48), while emphasizing the Peloponnesian reliance upon *teichea.* When the Peloponnesians at Salamis learned of this construction, they once again advocated moving the fleet to the Isthmus where it would serve a supporting role (… οἱ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἀνάγειν τὰς νέας πρὸς τὸν ’Ισθμόν. - viii.79.2). Until Themistokles committed the Greeks to a battle with Xerxes' fleet,

[61] Later, at viii.71, Herodotos reveals that when news of the defeat at Thermopylae reached the Peloponnese, the inhabitants rushed to the Isthmus and began fortifying the narrows.

the Peloponnesians focused on the defense and fortification of the Isthmus: they planned it, they feared for it, and they built a *teichos* for it.

Not even the news of the Acropolis' fall, which reached the Greeks in the midst of the Salamis debate, dissuaded the Peloponnesian admirals from their preference for the Isthmian *teichos*. Herodotos uses the sack to illustrate once again the inferiority of fortifications. As previously discussed (pp. 209-210), he reduces the Athenian interpretations of the 'Wooden Wall' oracle to the *teichos*-wall of the Acropolis and the new *teichos*-fleet, a strategic divide akin to the one separating Sparta and Athens. In both debates, Herodotos describes the viewpoints or participants as at loggerheads (συνεστηκυῖαι / συνεστηκότων – vii.142.1 and viii.79.1).[62] Presented with the same two strategic options as the Greeks, the Athenians chose both. While the majority took ship and abandoned Attica (viii.41.1), a few sought refuge behind the wooden wall of the Acropolis (τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος - viii.51.2). Initially these holdouts successfully repelled Xerxes' attacks, but the Persians soon turned the wall into a liability (ὅκως στυππεῖον περὶ τοὺς ὀιστοὺς περιθέντες ἅψειαν, ἐτόξευον ἐς τὸ φράγμα / placing tow around their arrows they ignited them and shot the arrows into the barrier - viii.52.1). Next, the besiegers circumvented the barrier, climbing a precipitous, but unguarded, section behind gates, and captured the Acropolis

[62] After dismissing the majority of Athenian viewpoints, Herodotos places the views of the Acropolis and fleet in direct opposition (γνῶμαι καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ γίνονται διζημένων τὸ μαντήιον καὶ αἵδε συνεστηκυῖαι μάλιστα / there were many other opinions of those trying to discern the meaning of the oracle and these two came to grips - vii.142.1). At the height of the Salamis debate, the historian describes the Greek admirals as implacably opposed as ever (συνεστηκότων δὲ τῶν στρατηγῶν / the generals were at loggerheads – viii.79.1).

(viii.53.1). In despair, some Athenians transformed the wall from a means of protection to one of destruction by leaping from the *teichos* to their deaths:

> ὡς δὲ εἶδον αὐτοὺς ἀναβεβηκότας οἱ ᾽Αθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, οἳ μὲν ἐρρίπτεον ἑωυτοὺς κατὰ τοῦ τείχεος κάτω καὶ διεφθείροντο …
>
> When the Athenians saw them climbing up the Acropolis, some hurled themselves down from the *teichos* and perished … (viii.53.2)

With the fall of the Acropolis, the Athenians would find no traditional *teichos* to protect them and henceforth had to rely upon the new *teichos*. Yet, the Peloponnesians at Salamis failed to perceive the significance of this event. Terrified at the news of the Acropolis' fall some immediately manned their ships while the remainder reconvened and resolved to fight in the defense of Isthmus, choosing the traditional *teichos* over their ships (πρὸ τοῦ ᾽Ισθμοῦ ναυμαχέειν - viii.56).

The Athenian admirals, however, favored using the fleet, which Herodotos presents as "Athenian."[63] The Athenians supplied the most and fastest ships (viii.42.2) and without them, as Themistokles stated, “the remainder were not battle worthy” (οὐκέτι ἐγίνοντο ἀξιόμαχοι οἱ λοιποί - viii.63). Focusing upon the use of the fleet, Themistokles regarded the strategies of fighting at Salamis and retreating to the Isthmus as mutually exclusive (ἀντίθες γὰρ

[63] Herodotos (viii.42-48) states that the Greek fleet at Salamis was comprised of 378 triremes (excluding penteconters), and exceeded the size of the fleet used at Artemisium. The Athenians made up about half the fleet (one hundred eighty triremes), “supplying the best and fastest ships” (νέας δὲ πολλῷ πλείστας τε καὶ ἄριστα πλεούσας παρείχοντο ᾽Αθηναῖοι. - viii.42.2). The rest of the fleet was comprised of Spartans (sixteen), Corinthians (forty), Sicyonians (fifteen), Epidaurians (ten), Troezenians (five), Hermionians (three), Megarians (twenty), Ambracians (seven), Leucadians (three), Aeginetans (thirty), Chalcidians (twenty), Eretrians (seven), Ceans (two), and Naxians (four).

ἑκάτερον / offsetting them against each other - viii.60α). Whereas he characterized the former as a simple naval engagement (ναυμαχίην), the work of the fleet, he portrayed the latter as subordinating or literally "yoking the fleet to the Isthmian wall" (ἀναζεύξῃς πρὸς τὸν Ἰσθμὸν τὰς νέας), which he claimed would put all of Greece at risk (viii.60α). He based his arguments upon the best conditions for the navy: the narrows of Salamis rather than the open sea near the Isthmus (viii.60β).

As Herodotos contrasts the fleet with the Isthmian *teichos*, so too he characterizes Themistokles in terms opposite to the Peloponnesians. The Peloponnesian *strategoi* feared the consequences of defeat at Salamis:

> … ἐπιλέγοντες τὸν λόγον τόνδε, ὡς εἰ νικηθέωσι τῇ ναυμαχίῃ, ἐν Σαλαμῖνι μὲν ἐόντες πολιορκήσονται ἐν νήσῳ,
>
> … arguing that if they were defeated in a naval battle, they being on Salamis would be besieged on an island (viii.49.2)

Themistokles, however, expressed his expectation of victory at sea, a belief he reiterated immediately before the battle:[64]

> ἢν δέ γε καὶ τὰ ἐγὼ ἐλπίζω γένηται καὶ νικήσωμεν τῇσι νηυσί…
>
> If events turn out as I expect and we are victorious with our ships… (viii.60γ)

He also countered the oft-stated desire "to fight at the Isthmus in the defense of the Peloponnese" (πρὸς τὸν Ἰσθμὸν καὶ πρὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ναυμαχέειν

[64] Graham. 1996, p. 325. Graham translates "the troublesome passage": " …at which Themistocles alone of them all, on the one hand foretold victory. On the other hand his words were all nobler things set against the base, so far as these things arise in the nature and condition of man…"

– viii.57.1) with the argument that fighting a naval battle at Salamis would accomplish the same goal (αὐτοῦ τε μένων προναυμαχήσεις Πελοποννήσου καὶ πρὸς τῷ ᾽Ισθμῷ /…remaining here you will be fighting for the Peloponnese and the Isthmus - viii.60β). Opposing the Peloponnesian admirals in both strategy and location, Themistokles advocated the aggressive use of the *teichos*-fleet and resisted its subordination to the defenses at the Isthmus.

According to Herodotos, Themistokles never wavered in his advocacy of naval action, but took control of the situation and orchestrated a battle at Salamis. Failing to persuade Eurybiades to keep the fleet at Salamis, he threatened that a withdrawal would cost the support of the Athenian fleet (viii.62-63) and twice at night reversed the daytime decision to retreat.[65] When the Persian army moved towards the Isthmus, though, Themistokles' fellow Greeks cursed Eurybiades' "bad counsel" (ἀβουλίη) and resolved to withdraw (viii.74.1-2).[66] Instead of the Peloponnesian absence of a plan, Themistokles adopted a proactive and offensive stratagem. Sending a message to Xerxes, he sought to provoke a battle with the Persians, who quickly blockaded the Greeks and cut off their avenue of retreat (vii.75-78). When Aristides reported that they were trapped (viii.79), Themistokles claimed responsibility and compelled his unwilling allies to act:

[65] Immerwahr. 1966, p. 272.

[66] Powell. 1960, p. 1. Powell translates ἀβουλίη here as "(suicidal) folly", a translation he gives for its use at vii.9g and vii.210.1. He uses the translation "bad counsel" for ἀβουλίη at viii.57.2 for Mnesiphilos' judgment of the Peloponnesian plan to withdraw to the Isthmus. As ἀβουλίη appears twice in close proximity to one another and in the context of the movement of the fleet to the Isthmus, it seems likely that Herodotos is using the term in an identical fashion ("bad counsel") to contrast the two strategic viewpoints.

> ἴσθι γὰρ ἐξ ἐμέο τὰ ποιεύμενα ὑπὸ Μήδων. ἔδεε γάρ, ὅτε οὐκ ἑκόντες ἤθελον ἐς μάχην κατίστασθαι οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἀέκοντας παραστήσασθαι.
>
> Know that I am responsible for the things done by the Medes. For it was necessary, since the Greeks were not willing to engage in battle, that they unwillingly be convinced. (viii.80.1)

In the historian's account, the architect of the fleet becomes the architect of the battle. Although the Persians ostensibly launched the attack, Herodotos shows that Athenian (Themistoklean) initiative was the real cause.

After the battle, the Greeks dedicated three captured Phoenician triremes as offerings to the gods at Sounion, Salamis, and the Isthmus of Corinth:

> πρῶτα μέν νυν τοῖσι θεοῖσι ἐξεῖλον ἀκροθίνια ἄλλα τε καὶ τριήρεας τρεῖς Φοινίσσας, τὴν μὲν ἐς Ἰσθμὸν ἀναθεῖναι, ἥ περ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ἦν, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ Σούνιον, τὴν δὲ τῷ Αἴαντι αὐτοῦ ἐς Σαλαμῖνα.
>
> First they selected other things and three Phoenician triremes as victory offerings to the gods, they placed one at the Isthmus, where it remained even in my time, the second at Sounion, and the third there at Salamis to Ajax. (viii.121.1)

As Reginald Macan notes, the placement of the dedication here does not signify that the Greeks erected the monuments immediately after Salamis. Indeed the Persians remained a threat to both Attica and the Isthmus for some time to come.[67] Rather, Herodotos describes the monuments here primarily to emphasize the naval victory and the superiority of the Athenian strategy. He draws his audience's attention to the Isthmian trireme by noting its survival until his own day,[68] while curiously displaying no such similar knowledge about the fate of the

[67] Macan. 1973 (1908), p. 548.
[68] Naiden. 1999, pp. 139-140.

two triremes placed on Attic soil.[69] The location is the key. By placing the trireme, a symbol of the Athenian offensive strategy, at the Isthmus (ἐς Ἰσθμὸν), the site of the Spartan-built defensive strategy, Herodotos proclaims not only the Greek victory, but also the triumph of the *teichos*-fleet over the *teichos*-wall.

Consistently associating the Spartans and Athenians with two different types of *teichea*, then, the historian frames the Greek campaign of 480 to support his judgment in favor of Athens and against fortifications. He links the Spartans and the Peloponnesians to the Isthmus, which they used as a launching point for their defense of Greece at Tempe, Thermopylae, and the Isthmus itself. After Thermopylae, though, Themistokles challenged this flawed strategy in favor of the offensive deployment of the fleet at Salamis. Mastering the situation, he provoked a battle that vindicated his *teichos* and his strategy, which Herodotos then reifies in the Greek victory monument at the Isthmus.

The Road to Plataea

Even after the Athenian-led naval victory at Salamis, Herodotos continues to portray the Spartans as wedded to the Isthmian *teichos* and the Athenians, although no longer linked to a fleet, as opposed to such a defensive posture. According to the historian, *teichea* came to dominate Spartan thinking to such an degree that only arguments expressed in terms of a *teichos* finally convinced the Lacedaemonians to yield to Athenian initiative and march out against the Persian army in Boeotia.

[69] Macan. 1973 (1908), p. 548.

As Xerxes and a portion of the Persian army withdrew from Greece, the Spartans did not turn their thoughts towards counterattack, but instead continued to dwell upon defense. Under Spartan leadership the Peloponnesians carried on their efforts to fortify the Isthmus, a project that Herodotos portrays as almost endless. During the Salamis debate in the fall of 480, the historian leaves the audience with the image of the endeavor at its hasty and hurried beginning (viii.71.1). He resumes his description of the fortifications in the spring of 479 BC, stating that the workers had almost completed the *teichos* (ix.7.1), giving the impression that the Peloponnesians had continued the construction through the winter. But in fact they had stopped in mid-October of 480 BC (ix.10.3). Furthermore, in 479 BC while the Athenians requested that the Spartans march out against the Persians, the Lacedaemonians were continuing to fortify the Isthmus and adding a parapet to the wall (ἅμα δὲ τὸ τεῖχός σφι, τὸ ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ἐτείχεον, καὶ ἤδη ἐπάλξις ἐλάμβανε / At this time their wall, which was constructed in the Isthmus, now also received a parapet- ix.7.1). The Spartan ephors resisted the Athenian requests while the Peloponnesians rushed to complete their work (ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν ἐτείχεον σπουδὴν ἔχοντες πολλὴν πάντες Πελοποννήσιοι / At this same time all the Peloponnesians were hastily completing the Isthmian fortification - ix.8.1).[70]

Herodotos criticizes these efforts by equating the Isthmian wall to the nadir of the siege of Troy: the wall constructed around the Achaean ships. He

[70] Although he does not draw upon Herodotos' language, Thucydides seems to model his description of Themistokles' delay and deception of the Spartans in 479, while the Athenians hurriedly rebuilt their city walls, on this earlier passage (Thuc. i.93).

lays the groundwork for this allusion in the initial Athenian demand for help from Sparta. When Mardonius began his march southward in 479 BC, the Athenians threatened to seek some other refuge (ἀλεωρὴν) unless the Spartans came to their aid (ix.6.2). This term is the same one that Homer uses to describe the Achaean redoubt around their ships (*Iliad* xii.57). While the Spartans delayed their response, the Peloponnesians augmented the Isthmian wall with a parapet (ἐπάλξις - ix.7.1), to which Homer frequently refers when describing a Trojan assault on a particular part of the Achaean defenses.[71] The Spartans set out to oppose the Persians after they had built (δείμασαν) the wall (ix.10.2), a verb Homer uses five times to describe the construction of the Achaean Wall.[72] Through this similar language, Herodotos colors the Spartan *teichos* in Homeric terms to evoke an image of the Achaean heroes at bay behind their hastily reconstructed defenses, the victims of Hektor's initiative.

The Spartans abandoned the Isthmian defenses only when the ephor Chileos used the language of *teichea* to illustrate the short-sighted nature of their strategy. He equated the Athenian fleet to large gates cut through the *teichos*:

> ᾽Αθηναίων ἡμῖν ἐόντων μὴ ἀρθμίων, τῷ δὲ βαρβάρῳ συμμάχων, καίπερ τείχεος διὰ τοῦ ᾽Ισθμοῦ ἐληλαμένου καρτεροῦ, μεγάλαι κλισιάδες ἀναπεπτέαται ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον τῷ Πέρσῃ.
>
> If the Athenians are no longer our friends, but allies of the Persians, although a strong *teichos* has been driving across the Isthmus, great gates to the Peloponnese will be flung open to the Persians. (ix.9.2)

[71] *Iliad* xii.258, 263, 308, 375, 381, 397, 406, 424, 430.
[72] *Iliad* vii.337, 436, ix.349, xii.683, xiv.32.

Invoking the essentials of Herodotos' argument in vii.139, Chileos at last convinced the Spartans to adopt a more offensive posture in the only language they seem to understand: the language of fortifications. Lest any doubt lingers, Herodotos records the Persians second sack of Athens on the eve of Pausanias' departure from the Isthmus (ix.13.2). The historian places the sack, like the destruction of the Acropolis, amid discussions of Greek strategy, to emphasize the folly of relying upon fortifications against the Persians.

In contrast, Herodotos continually portrays the Athenians as favoring an aggressive strategy. When the Greeks pursued the retreating Persian fleet as far as Andros, Themistokles used the Greek fleet to extort money from Carystos and Paros (viii.112). In the absence of the Persian fleet in 479, however, the Athenians began to agitate for aggressive action on land. They resisted relying upon fortifications, abandoning Athens a second time (ix.13.2), and repeatedly pressed the Spartans to forsake their defenses and lead the army out against the Persians (viii.144; ix.6 – ix.11). At Plataea, Herodotos again reminds his audience of the divergence of strategic thought between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians during the Tegean/Athenian debate. He includes the invasion of the Heraklids in both speeches, describing the Tegean defense of the Isthmus (ἐς τὸν Ἰσθμὸν – ix.26.3) and the Athenian aid to the aggressors (ix.27.2). Since both sides claimed victory, Herodotos offers no insight into the superiority of each strategy, but merely reinforces his association of the Peloponnesians (and Spartans) with defense and the Athenians with attack.

Herodotos, then, uses the negative connotation of traditional *teichea* to define the strategic debate between Sparta and Athens during the Persian War. Beginning at vii.139, Herodotos identifies each side with a different type of *teichos* that symbolizes their natures. The Spartans continually worked on defensive positions, bolstered by traditional *teichea,* from which to oppose Xerxes' advance. Contrary to the ethos of hoplite combat, the Spartans withdrew behind these walls to withstand the invasion of Greece. The Athenians, on the other hand, stood before the walls and went out to meet the enemy in the field. Beginning at Salamis, they fought against Spartan reticence and urged the Greeks to seize the initiative. For this action they employ a new type of *teichos*, a fleet, which its architect Themistokles built and intended for offensive action. The historian clearly favors this new Athenian *teichos*, first proclaiming its importance at vii.139, then displaying the folly of traditional *teichea* against the Persians, and ultimately noting the placement of a captured Phoenician trireme before the ramparts of the untested Isthmian wall. After his account of Salamis, Herodotos equates this *teichos* with the wall around the Achaean ships at Troy, comparing the Spartan strategy to the Achaean low-point of the *Iliad*. Throughout his account of the war in 480 and 479 BC, the historian's negative impression of *teichea* shapes his criticism of the Spartan policy of defense and his praise of Athenian aggression (particularly at sea).

Teichea and the Rise and Fall of Empire

Herodotos not only uses *teichea* to reify strategies, but also to illustrate an empire's rise or fall. As his presentation of Greek strategy of 480/79 BC makes

clear, the historian associates fortifications with a flawed policy of passive defense, which is hardly a characteristic of a successful imperial power. Indeed he establishes the negative connotation of *teichea* in part through the Persian siege-craft displayed during the rise of Cyrus (pp 188-199). Thus, as the fortunes of Persia wane and those of Athens rise during the account of Xerxes' invasion of Greece, Herodotos represents the transfer of power in the language of *teichea.* The old empire of Persia that overcame fortifications prior to and during the invasion in 480 BC, faltered after the triumphant sack of Athens. Reeling from the defeat at Salamis, the Persians had difficulty conducting subsequent sieges. Moreover, as they lost the initiative, they began to rely on fortifications for their own protection; a transformation similar to the fateful reversal experienced by Darius during the Scythian campaign. Meanwhile the nascent imperial power of Athens, which eschewed reliance upon *teichea* to combat Xerxes' invasion, became increasingly proficient against fortifications. The Athenians displayed the siege-craft and patience at siege operations for which the Persians were once well known, signaling the rise of their imperial star. Herodotos emphasizes this transfer of power by making the Athenians the key agents for the overthrow of the Persian fortifications at Plataea, Mycale, and Sestos, indicating another turn in the cycle of history.

The Persians operated outside of *teichea* for the majority of the *Histories*. They enjoyed remarkable success against fortifications during their conquests

(and re-conquests) of Babylon, Egypt, Libya, Cyprus, and Western Asia Minor,[73] while never relying on fortifications for their own protection. Herodotos reverses the Persian relationship with *teichea* only twice: during Darius' invasion against Scythia and Xerxes' invasion against Greece. In both campaigns the Persians turned to *teichea* for protection, lost the initiative, and went down in defeat. Scholars have noted the strong parallels in both campaigns, paying particular attention to the similarities between Scythian and Athenian strategies.[74] These studies overlook, however, the additional parallels of fortifications and sieges that also exist. In Scythia, for the first time the Persians lost the initiative in a campaign.[75] Driving into Europe, Darius and his army met no appreciable resistance since the Scythians withdrew before the Persian advance. The nomadic existence of the Scythians and their lack of *poleis* prevented the Persians from utilizing one of their best military weapons: the siege. Only when Darius reached the abandoned wooden fortified town of Gelonus did he find a normal campaign element,[76] a fortification, which he promptly burned:

> ἐπείτε δὲ ἐς τὴν τῶν Βουδίνων χώρην ἐσέβαλλον, ἐνθαῦτα δὴ ἐντυχόντες τῷ ξυλίνῳ τείχεϊ, ἐκλελοιπότων τῶν Βουδίνων καὶ κεκενωμένου τοῦ τείχεος πάντων, ἐνέπρησαν αὐτό.
>
> When they [the Persians] advanced to the land of the Budini, then encountering a wooden wall, the Budini having fled and the wall being unoccupied, they burned it. (iv.123.1)

The destruction of the wooden wall marked the highpoint of Darius' campaign.

---

[73] Cyrus conquered Babylon (i.178-186); Darius re-conquered Babylon (iii.151-159); Egypt (iii.13); Libya [Barca] (iv.200f); Cyprus (v.115); Harpagus conquered Western Asia Minor (i.163-176); Western Asia Minor after the Ionian Revolt (vi.18-35).
[74] Immerwahr. 1954, pp. 25-26. Hartog. 1988, pp. 36-7, 41.
[75] Hartog. 1988, p. 41.
[76] Hartog. 1988, p. 48.

After this first sign of success, though, the Persians shifted to a defensive policy based upon *teichea*. They constructed field fortifications for the first time, perhaps seeking to secure their hold on the territory.[77] They apparently adopted the strategy of *epiteichismos*, the creation of a stronghold in enemy territory permanently manned by a garrison,[78] when Darius ordered the construction of eight large forts (ὀκτὼ τείχεα ἐτείχεε μεγάλα) near the banks of the Oarus river (iv.124.1).[79] Herodotos, however, immediately dispels any sense of gain or security. Presenting the forts diachronically, he reduces them to ruins before the audience's eyes (τῶν ἔτι ἐς ἐμὲ τὰ ἐρείπια σόα ἦν / the ruins of these survived to my own time - iv.124.1). He shows that no Persian soldiers would man these ramparts, thus implying an impending Persian withdrawal and shift in the campaign.

According to Herodotos, the Scythians seized the initiative at this point. They enacted their plan to draw Darius into the territory of neighboring peoples who had refused to aid them (iv.125). The Persian advance continued but under the direction of the Scythians,[80] who lured the Persians ever onward and prolonged the campaign until the would-be conquers began to run short of supplies. Unable to live off the land Darius at last withdrew, sacrificed a portion of his army, and retired across the Danube into safety (iv.134-142).[81] In his account of the campaign, then, the historian uses the *teichea* to indicate the shift

[77] Hart. 1982, p. 76.
[78] Garlan. 1974, p. 24.
[79] Hartog. 1988, p. 48.
[80] Hartog. 1988, p. 41.
[81] Cf. Cambyses' unsuccessful invasion of Ethiopia (iii.25). See chp. 1, pp. 17-24.

in initiative from the Persians to the Scythians. The Persians enjoyed moderate success in Scythia that culminated in the destruction of a wooden *teichos* and then quickly dissipated as they built forts along the Oarus to secure their position.

Although Herodotos alludes to a similar future inversion of Persian and Athenian fortunes at the beginning of Xerxes' invasion of Europe,[82] he does not immediately alter the invaders' and defenders' previously established relationships with *teichea*. Whereas the Persians enjoyed continued success against fortifications, the Athenians, like most non-Persians, struggled against *teichea*. Prior to the European invasion, the Athenians only conducted (or participated in) four sieges: Sardis, the Athenian Acropolis, Myrina, and Paros. They achieved only partial success at Sardis during the Ionian Revolt, failing to take the central acropolis (v.100-102). They successfully captured their own acropolis (held by the Spartan king Cleomenes) and Myrina (v.64-65; vi.140), but failed completely against Paros (vi.133-136).

Herodotos provides the greatest detail for the last siege, showing that *teichea* still presented a stumbling block to Athenian ambitions. Anticipating their imperial future,[83] the Athenians, under the command of the victor of Marathon, Miltiades, threatened to blockade the island unless the Parians give them one hundred talents (vi.133.2). The Parians, however, effectively countered Miltiades'

[82] vii.106-107: After Xerxes reviewed his troops at Doriskos, the historian looks ahead to the years immediately following the invasion when the Greeks besieged both Doriskos and Eion. Whereas he notes that the Greek (Ἑλλήνων) attempts to seize the fortress failed (vii.106), he highlights the successful Athenian capture of Eion (vii.107.1-2). After a prolonged siege they overcame the determined resistance of the governor, Boges, who committed suicide when his position became untenable (vii.107.2). Looking ahead, the historian shows that the Athenians would expand their imperial fortunes in the same manner as the Persians: through the defeat of *teichea*.
[83] Raaflaub. 1987, p. 239.

assaults and doubled the height of their *teichos* anywhere it appeared vulnerable (vi.133.3). While the Persians successfully overcame similar enhancements to Ionian *teichea* (i.141.4, 164f), Miltiades and the Athenians could not, their failure illustrating that they had not yet reached the status of an imperial power. Herodotos further symbolizes the barrier *teichea* still presented to Athenian imperial ambitions by noting that Miltiades' injury, which ended the siege, came as the general attempted to leap over a small wall (αἱμασιὴν) that was part of a larger temple wall in front of the city (τὸν πρὸ τῆς πόλιος ἐόντα ἕρκος - vi.134.2).

The Persians continued to dominate *teichea*. Aside from their failure at Naxos (v.34), they never failed to capture a fortified position. Herodotos continues this victorious association during Xerxes' invasion of Europe, which he begins at the Persian fortress (τεῖχος) of Doriskos (vii.59.1). After reviewing his troops, Xerxes led his army through Thrace, which had fallen under Persian control a few years prior (iv.93f). The Persians passed near the Samothracian forts (τείχεα) at Mesembria and Styme (vii.108.2) and afterwards marched close to the walls of the Pierian forts (τείχεα) at Phagres and Pergamus (vii.112). It is unclear whether these fortifications had been abandoned in the face of the Persian advance or defeated in prior years. Regardless, the image of the Persians marching past these *teichea* illustrates the point that no *teichos* presented an obstacle to the Persians. Herodotos ends the Perisan march through Thrace at the

Persian fortress at Eion (vii.113),[84] marking each stage of Xerxes' march through Europe with *teichea.*

When the Persians moved south into Greece, they continued to march through fortified (or defended) positions. Entering Thessaly, Xerxes chose a route that skirted the position that the Greeks had intended to guard at Tempe (vii.173.4). At Thermopylae, they overcame a Spartan-led position that largely relied upon a *teichos* (pp. 214-217). Finally, they invaded Attica and besieged the wooden wall (ξύλινον τεῖχος) of the Acropolis, which the Persians first ignited (viii.52.1) and later captured (viii.53.1). The historian highlights this conquest through the calculation of the distance that the Persians marched to Athens (viii.51.1) and through his extended description of the Persian sack (viii.53-54). Hence, he culminates the Persian campaign in the same manner that he used to note its progress, through the capture of *teichea*.

As with the burning of the ξύλινον τεῖχος at Gelonus, Xerxes' destruction of the Acropolis, marked a turning point for the Persians, who soon would lose the Battle of Salamis. Herodotos indicates this change in fortune in part through allusions to the fall of Croesus in his narration of the Athenian defeat (Acropolis) and victory (Salamis). Both the Lydian king and the Athenian holdouts believed their *teichea* would remain impregnable (ἀνάλωτον) against a Persian assault, an adjective that the historian uses in the context of these two sieges alone.[85]

[84] Herodotos describes the fortifications (τείχεϊ … τείχεος) of Eion earlier at vii.107.
[85] i.84.3: Τελμησσέων δικασάντων ὡς περιενειχθέντος τοῦ λέοντος τὸ τεῖχος ἔσονται Σάρδιες ἀνάλωτοι / The Telmessians proclaimed that if the lion were taken around the *teichos* then Sardis would be impregnable. viii.51.2: πρὸς δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ δοκέοντες ἐξευρηκέναι τὸ μαντήιον τὸ ἡ

Moreover, the Persians captured both citadels in a similar fashion: they scaled a precipitous (and hence unguarded) section of the fortifications and took the defenders by surprise (i.84 and viii.53). The victory at Salamis, though, saved the Athenians from total subjugation. The historian highlights this difference through the differing victory dedications (ἀκροθίνια) made after the falls of Sardis and Athens. He only uses this term four times in his narrative: twice after the fall of Croesus, and twice after the battle of Salamis. In the first case, Cyrus placed Croesus on a pyre as a victory dedication (ἀκροθίνια - i.86.2). But after Apollo rescued the former-Lydian king, Croesus sent the chains of his new servitude to Delphi as an ironic victory dedication (ἀκροθίνια … πέδας - i.90.4). After the sack of Athens, however, Xerxes made no victory dedication. Instead, the historian reserves the term for the Greek victory dedications after Salamis, including the dedication of three captured Phoenician triremes (ἀκροθίνια ἄλλα τε καὶ τριήρεας τρεῖς Φοινίσσας - viii.121.1). Herodotos uses these allusions to the fall of Croesus to show that the capture of the Acropolis did not defeat the Athenians.

In the wake of the Greek naval victory, the historian begins to alter the relationships of Athens and Persia with *teichea*. Convincing the Greeks not to pursue the retreating Xerxes in 480 BC, Themistokles invested Andros and demanded payment (viii.111.1). The Andrians successfully resisted the attempt at extortion, but the Carystians and Parians, fearing similar treatment, supplied

---

Πυθίη σφι ἔχρησε, τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος ἀνάλωτον ἔσεσθαι / Next, they thought that they had discovered the meaning of the oracle which the Pythia gave, that the wooden wall would remain impregnable.

the Athenians with money (viii.112.2). Themistokles failed to capture Andros, but his ability to extort money from the Parians where Miltiades had previously failed indicates a change in Athenian siege-craft and fortunes.

As Athens rose, Persia fell. After escorting Xerxes to Abdera, the Persian general Artabazus returned to Greece to rejoin Mardonius. During the march he learned that the Olynthians, Potidaeans, and the rest of the inhabitants of the Pallene peninsula had thrown off the Persian yoke (viii.126). Leading an army of 60,000 picked troops, Artabazus quickly reduced Olynthos (viii.127), but failed to take Potidaea. He first tried to capture the *polis* by treachery, but the Potidaeans uncovered the plot (viii.128.2-3). Next, he settled down for a prolonged siege, investing the city for three months during the winter of 480/79 BC without result. Finally he attempted to exploit a weakness in the Potidaean defenses, much as the Persians had done at Sardis and the Athenian Acropolis. At low tide he sent his troops through the shallow water to cross to Pallene, but the resurgent tide surprised the Persians, drowning some, while the Potidaeans slaughtered the remainder (viii.129.2). Recognizing his defeat, Artabazus withdrew and resumed his march to rejoin Mardonius. Such a failure is unparalleled in the *Histories.* Herodotos does not blame the Persian commander, as at Naxos (v.33-34), but uses the defeat to display the breakdown in Persian *teichomachia*.

After this defeat, the Persians succeeded in capturing only one final *teichos*: Athens for a second time. When Mardonius moved south in the spring of 479 BC, he captured the completely abandoned city (ix.3.2). The Persian general

demolished any standing wall (τειχέων), house, or temple (ix.13.2), but his victory was a "weak copy" of Xerxes, who had avenged the Athenian sack of Sardis in the previous year.[86] While the historian depicts the Persians as still capable of defeating *teichea*, he indicates a significant reduction in their once nearly infallible siege-craft.

Herodotos couples this reduction with an increasing Persian reliance upon *teichea* for protection. Aside from two cases of unused fortifications,[87] the Persians never relied on fortifications during a campaign until their defeat at Salamis. When Xerxes realized the extent of the disaster, he resolved to withdraw to protect the bridge at the Hellespont, but desired to give the illusion of continued offensive action. Thus, he constructed a mole towards Salamis:

> θέλων δὲ μὴ ἐπίδηλος εἶναι μήτε τοῖσι Ἕλλησι μήτε τοῖσι ἑωυτοῦ ἐς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα χῶμα ἐπειρᾶτο διαχοῦν, γαύλους τε Φοινικηίους συνέδεε, ἵνα ἀντί τε σχεδίης ἔωσι καὶ τείχεος, ἀρτέετό τε ἐς πόλεμον ὡς ναυμαχίην ἄλλην ποιησόμενος.
>
> Wishing not to be detected either by the Greeks or his own men he he tried to build a mole to Salamis, and he tied together Phoenicians merchant ships so that they might serve both as a bridge and a *teichos*, and he made preparations for war as though he was going to fight another naval battle. (viii.97.1)

Although Xerxes convinced the Greeks that he intended to continue the offensive, the *teichos* reveals the king's defensive mindset to the audience. The barrier of bound ships does not represent a mobile *teichos* like the Greek fleet, but rather a purely defensive measure. According to Powell, the historian uses this

[86] Immerwahr. 1966, p. 287.
[87] iv.124 and vii.191. The Persians began construction on forts along the Oarus River in Scythia during Darius' campaign, but abandoned them to pursue the Scythians. During Xerxes' invasion of Greece, some shipwrecked Persian sailors hastily constructed a wall from their wreckage to protect themselves from possible Thessalian attacks, which never materialized.

teichos to mean "a wall across a pass" akin to the use of *teichos* to describe the Isthmian wall and the old Phokian wall at Thermopylae.[88] Herodotos uses this *teichos* to indicate an immediate sea change in Persian strategy after their defeat.

Defensive thinking and reliance upon *teichea* spread from Xerxes to his troops. During the spring of 479 BC, Mardonius and his fellow generals, anticipating defeat, gave unprecedented attention to paths of retreat and relied increasingly upon *teichea* and other defenses to bolster their position both on and off the battlefield. After sacking Athens, Mardonius withdrew the Persian army to Boeotia for two reasons (ix.13). First, he regarded Attica as poor ground for his cavalry, one of his chief assets, and second he feared that a small force of Greeks could easily block his path of retreat if the battle should go against the Persians (ix.13.3). The trend continued at Plataea. When the Persian generals discussed strategy for the upcoming battle, Artabazus suggested that Mardonius withdraw the army to the fortified city of Thebes:

> βουλευομένων δὲ αἵδε ἦσαν αἱ γνῶμαι, ἡ μὲν Ἀρταβάζου ὡς χρεὸν εἴη ἀναζεύξαντας τὴν ταχίστην πάντα τὸν στρατὸν ἰέναι ἐς τὸ τεῖχος τὸ Θηβαίων, ἔνθα σῖτόν τέ σφι ἐσενηνεῖχθαι πολλὸν καὶ χόρτον τοῖσι ὑποζυγίοισι …
>
> These were the opinions of the ones taking counsel, the view of Artabazus was that it would be best if striking camp as quickly as possible the whole army went to the *teichos* of Thebes, where great stores of grain had been brought in for them and fodder for their draught animals … (ix.41.2)

The general favored using bribes rather than battle to deprive the Greeks of their freedom (ix.41.3). His choice of refuge, a walled city (τεῖχος), and reference to

[88] For other uses of *teichos* to describe a fortification across a pass or narrows see: vii.139.3, 4; viii.71.2; ix.7.1, b1, 9.2, 10.2 and vi.176.3, 4, 5, 208.2, 215, 223.2, 225.2, 3 respectively.

supplies, however, recalls the preparations for a siege, as Mardonius later indicated:

> ᾿Αρταβάζου δὲ θῶμα καὶ μᾶλλον ἐποιεύμην τὸ καταρρωδῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίους καταρρωδήσαντά τε ἀποδέξασθαι γνώμην δειλοτάτην, ὡς χρεὸν εἴη ἀναζεύξαντας τὸ στρατόπεδον ἰέναι ἐς τὸ Θηβαίων ἄστυ πολιορκησομένους·
>
> I rather marveled at Artabazus that he should fear the Lacedaemonians and fearing them that he should propose the most cowardly opinion that it would be best striking camp to go to the city of Thebes and be besieged – (ix.58.3)

Yet while Mardonius rejected Artabazus' strategy, he had adopted some of its features, establishing a defensive position along the Asopus and constructing a refuge (κρησφύγετον) for his army should the upcoming battle go badly:

> ἐνθαῦτα δὲ τῶν Θηβαίων καίπερ μηδιζόντων ἔκειρε τοὺς χώρους, οὔτι κατὰ ἔχθος αὐτῶν ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀναγκαίης μεγάλης ἐχόμενος, βουλόμενος ἔρυμά τε τῷ στρατῷ ποιήσασθαι, καὶ ἢν συμβαλόντι οἱ μὴ ἐκβαίνῃ ὁκοῖόν τι ἐθέλοι, κρησφύγετον τοῦτο ἐποιέετο.
>
> Then although the Thebans had gone over to the Medes, he cleared the land, moved not out of enmity towards them but great necessity, and wanting to build a defensive work for his army. He also built it as a refuge for the army when it went into battle if events turned out not as he would wish. (ix.15.2)

The anticipation of a Persian defeat and rout has no precedent in the *Histories*. The Persians completely abandoned their previous boldness and sought to augment their strength through *teichea.*

Herodotos uses the Plataean refuge to highlight the reversal of Persian and Greek fortunes. The historian calls the defensive work an ἔρυμα, the same term he applies to the old Phokian wall to which the Spartans retreated on the

last day of Thermopylae (vii.223.2, 225.3). When the Spartans arrived at the Asopus and took up a position opposite the Persians (ix.25, 31), they saw the same thing Xerxes' army had seen when it confronted Leonidas' force: an army using a defensive work to increase the security of its position. The Persian redoubt also recalls the Athenian defenses on the Acropolis. During the first invasion of Attica in 480 the Persians burned (πυρπολέεσθαι) the land of their enemies as part of an offensive operation (viii.50) and assaulted the wooden wall protecting the Acropolis, the refuge of a few Athenians:

> πρὸς δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ δοκέοντες ἐξευρηκέναι τὸ μαντήιον τὸ ἡ Πυθίη σφι ἔχρησε, τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος ἀνάλωτον ἔσεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ κρησφύγετον κατὰ τὸ μαντήιον καὶ οὐ τὰς νέας.
>
> Next, they thought that they had discovered the meaning of the oracle, which the Pythia gave, that the wooden wall would remain impregnable; that according to the oracle this itself would be the refuge and not the ships. (viii.51.2)

In Boeotia, Mardonius instead ravaged the territory of his ally (ἔκειρε τοὺς χώρους) to create a similar refuge (κρησφύγετον) for his own men (ix.15.2). Later, when the battle went against the Persians, they retreated to this refuge, now described as a wooden *teichos* (ξύλινον τεῖχος), which the Athenians successfully besieged (ix.70.1-5). The redoubt symbolizes the inversion of the Persian relationship with fortifications from offensive to defensive.

During the battle itself the Persians even fought defensively and depended upon barricades formed from their wicker shields (*gerra*) for protection, a tactic that they had never before employ in the *Histories*. After the

Greek commander Pausanias decided to withdraw the Greek army from its camp along the Asopus, Mardonius ordered his men to attack (ix.59.1). Although acting offensively in the pursuit, the Persians adopted an implicitly defensive posture with their wicker shields (*gerra*) when they encountered the retreating Spartans:

> φράξαντες γὰρ τὰ γέρρα οἱ Πέρσαι ἀπίεσαν τῶν τοξευμάτων πολλὰ ἀφειδέως …
>
> Making a barricade of their wicker shields the Persians unstintingly fired many arrows … (ix.61.3)

While the barrier stood the Persians acquitted themselves well, but the battle turned when the *gerra* fell:

> ἐγίνετο δὲ πρῶτον περὶ τὰ γέρρα μάχη. ὡς δὲ ταῦτα ἐπεπτώκεε, ἤδη ἐγίνετο ἡ μάχη ἰσχυρὴ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ Δημήτριον καὶ χρόνον ἐπὶ πολλόν, ἐς ὃ ἀπίκοντο ἐς ὠθισμόν·
>
> At first the battle was around the *gerra*-barricade. But when these had fallen, then the fighting was fierce around the temple of Demeter and continued for a long time, until they came into a battle-scrum; (ix.62.2)

At this point, Herodotos suddenly describes the Persians as "unarmed" (ἄνοπλοι – ix.62.3), as though they had possessed no other significant arms.[89] The Spartans soon killed Mardonius, routed the Persians (ix.63.1-2), and pursued them to the Persian refuge (ix.65.1). Thus, while the Persians began the battle of Plataea on the offensive, they fought the battle defensively, relying upon the *gerra* barricades and the *teichos* of their camp for protection.

[89] Hartog. 1988, p. 45.

Herodotos deepens the Persian commitment to a defensive strategy and measures at Mycale. The Persian fleet, believing themselves to be no match for the Greek fleet, withdrew towards the coast of Ionia (ix.96.1-2). Beaching their ships at Mycale, they took refuge (καταφυγόντες) with the Persian army under Tigranes (ix.96.2-3). Once there the Persians constructed a palisade and defensive work around their ships and a refuge for themselves:

> ὑπὸ τοῦτον μὲν δὴ τὸν στρατὸν ἐβουλεύσαντο καταφυγόντες οἱ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ στρατηγοὶ ἀνειρύσαι τὰς νέας καὶ περιβαλέσθαι ἕρκος ἔρυμα τε τῶν νεῶν καὶ σφέων αὐτῶν κρησφύγετον.
>
> The admirals decided to take refuge under the protection of the army, to draw the ships ashore, and to erect a palisade and defensive works around the ships and a redoubt for themselves. (ix.96.3)

Herodotos accentuates the fortified nature of the Persian position and the reversal of Persian fortunes by the repetition of three terms of fortification (ἕρκος, ἔρυμα, and κρησφύγετον), which he uses earlier in the narrative to describe Greek defenses.[90] The Persians conducted the battle in a defensive manner as well. Like Mardonius, Tigranes selected and protected his line of retreat before the battle (ix.99.3). During the battle, the Persians again erected a barricade of wicker shields (*gerra*):

> ἕως μέν νυν τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι ὄρθια ἦν τὰ γέρρα, ἠμύνοντό τε καὶ οὐδὲν ἔλασσον εἶχον τῇ μάχῃ· ἐπείτε δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν προσεχέων ὁ στρατός, ὅκως ἑωυτῶν γένηται τὸ ἔργον καὶ μὴ Λακεδαιμονίων, παρακελευσάμενοι ἔργου εἴχοντο προθυμότερον, ἐνθεῦτεν ἤδη ἑτεροιοῦτο τὸ πρῆγμα. διωσάμενοι γὰρ τὰ γέρρα οὗτοι φερόμενοι ἐσέπεσον ἁλέες ἐς τοὺς Πέρσας,

[90] Cf. ἕρκος: vii.191.1 (Thermopylae); ἔρυμα: vii.223.2, 225.3 (Thermopylae); κρησφύγετον: viii.51.2 (Athenian Acropolis).

οἳ δὲ δεξάμενοι καὶ χρόνον συχνὸν ἀμυνόμενοι τέλος ἔφευγον ἐς τὸ τεῖχος.

> While the Persian *gerra*-barricade stood, they defended themselves and had no disadvantage in the battle; but when the army of the Athenians and those adjacent to them urging one another on, so that the achievement would be theirs and not the Lacedaemonians', worked more keenly, thereafter the battled turned. For charging and thrusting aside the *gerra*-barricade they fell *en masse* on the Persians, who receiving the attack and defending themselves for some time finally fled to the *teichos*. (ix.102.2-3)

Herodotos links Persian fortunes on the battlefield to their *gerra*-barricade. Once it collapsed, they were lost. As at Plataea, Herodotos uses *teichea* to illustrate the defensive (and hence doomed) strategy of the Persians. For the second time the Persians anticipated defeat and prepared for it, ensured secure routes for retreat, and built defensive works for protection.

In both battles Herodotos gives the Athenians a critical role, attributing to them an increasing mastery of siege-craft. At Plataea, when the Persians retreated to the wooden wall of Mardonius' redoubt, the pursuing Spartans attempted to break through these defenses, but failed:

οἱ δὲ Περσαι καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὅμιλος, ὡς κατέφυγον ἐς τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος, ἔφθησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς πύργους ἀναβάντες πρὶν ἢ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπικέσθαι, ἀναβάντες δὲ ἐφράξαντο ὡς ἠδυνέατο ἄριστα τὸ τεῖχος· προσελθόντων δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων κατεστήκεέ σφι τειχομαχίη ἐρρωμενεστέρη.

> The Persians and the rest of the host, when they fled to the wooden *teichos*, reaching it first climbed up into the towers before the Lacedaemonians arrived, and having climbed up they strengthened the *teichos* and so defended themselves well; when the Lacedaemonians came a rather fierce battle for the wall developed between them. (ix.70.1)

The Persians mounted a credible defense until the arrival of the Athenians, who tore down sections of the *teichos*:

> ἕως μὲν γὰρ ἀπῆσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, οἳ δ' ἠμύνοντο καὶ πολλῷ πλέον εἶχον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὥστε οὐκ ἐπισταμένων τειχομαχέειν· ὡς δέ σφι Ἀθηναῖοι προσῆλθον, οὕτω δὴ ἰσχυρὴ ἐγίνετο τειχομαχίη καὶ χρόνον ἐπὶ πολλόν. τέλος δὲ ἀρετῇ τε καὶ λιπαρίῃ ἐπέβησαν Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦ τείχεος καὶ ἤριπον·
>
> Until the Athenians arrived, they [the Persians] defended themselves and had the better of the Lacedaemonians since they did not understand siege-warfare; but when the Athenians attacked, there was a fierce battle for the wall for a long time. But finally by valor and perseverance the Athenians mounted and breached the wall; (ix.70.2)

According to Herodotos, the Athenians succeeded because they possessed the knowledge needed to besiege a wall, which the Spartans lacked (ix.70.2); they displayed this talent again at the battle of Mycale. When the Persians fell back to their redoubt (ἔφευγον ἐς τὸ τεῖχος), the Athenians led the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and the men of Troezen through the *teichos* (ix.102.3). Herodotos does not mention the use of any particular siege-craft, but the capture of the Persian camp was largely an Athenian military success.[91] The historian, then, attributes the formerly Persian talent for siege-craft and storming fortifications to the Athenians, who put it to use against the Persians themselves in 479 BC.

Herodotos also ascribes the ability to conduct a protracted siege to the Athenians, a skill they lacked in the time of Miltiades. After the Greeks found the bridge across the Hellespont destroyed, the majority returned home, but the

[91] Immerwahr. 1966, p. 302. He notes the similarities in the Athenian participation in defeating the Persian defenses in both battles, but his claim that Athens displays the same skill in both cases is inaccurate.

Athenians under Xanthippos laid siege to Persian-held Sestos (ix.114.1). Protected by the very strong walls of the city (ὡς ἐόντος ἰσχυροτάτου τείχεος - ix.115), the Persians held out for several months, beyond the normal campaigning season (ix.117). Nevertheless the Athenians endured the hardship (ix.117) and continued the siege through the winter months of 479/78 BC until they at last took the town (ix.118.2). They displayed the patience of the Persians of old to carry out a lengthy siege. Unlike the account of Thucydides (Thuc. i.89.2), Herodotos omits the Asiatic Greeks from his account. While this may merely be a case where Herodotos has chosen to focus upon the Athenians,[92] it alters the audience's perception of the siege. The omission emphasizes the Athenian role and their ability to conduct a prolonged siege.

By the end of the *Histories,* then, with respect to *teichea*, Herodotos presents the Athenians as the new Persians.[93] He ascribes to them the siege-craft necessary for the establishment of an empire. As the Persians began to rely increasingly upon *teichea* for their own protection, the Athenians discovered a newfound and previously *Persian* talent with *teichomachia*. The historian gauges the state of an imperial power through this relationship with *teichea*, whether reliant upon them or attacking them. He depicts a *teichos* as a flawed construct that most attackers easily overcome. A thriving empire acts offensively and expands its influence by conducting successful sieges. When an empire adopts a

[92] Flower and Marincola. 2002, p. 300.
[93] Raaflaub. 1987, p. 229. Raaflaub notes that the Persians (both at the crown council at the beginning of the *Persica* and Artabanus' discussion with Xerxes) deal with issues of imperial power that would have been familiar to the Athenians of the fifth century. The fifth-century Athenian audience, then, would be able to see themselves in the Persians and come to identify the Athenians as the new Persians.

more defensive stance and begins to rely upon *teichea* for its own protection, it has entered a state of decline (albeit not necessarily collapse). Herodotos traces such a transition of imperial fortune from Persia to Athens. He depicts the decline of the Persian Empire after Salamis through their new reliance upon *teichea.* At the same time, the historian foreshadows the growing imperial power of Athens through a growing Athenian ability to conduct successful sieges. Herodotos links these changes in imperial fortune by reversing the roles of besieger and besieged. Whereas the Persians began the campaign on the offensive, besieging and sacking the Athenian Acropolis, after Salamis the Athenians were responsible for assaulting and overcoming the Persian fortifications at Plataea, Mycale, and Sestos. The Persian skill and patience with *teichomachia* and with it their imperial status passed steadily and inexorably to the Athenians.

Conclusion

The Athenian victory at Sestos was merely the last defeat in a long series of failed fortifications. Throughout the *Histories, teichea* have a consistently negative connotation. They fail. Defenders cannot ensure their security through *teichea*, no matter how formidable or reinforced. Herodotos builds this connotation through his description of the rise of Persia under Cyrus and his consistent association of *teichea* with failure. He uses the emphatic presentation of four *teichea* in book I (Sardis, Ecbatana, Phocaea, and Babylon) to highlight a growing Persian mastery of *teichomachia*. He perpetuates this initially negative depiction throughout the *Histories*. In general attackers use treachery, patience,

and military force, to capture fortified positions 86.0% of the time and the Persians succeed nearly every time (96.7%). This rate of failure does not accurately reflect the real protection defenders derived from *teichea* in fifth-century warfare. But the Herodotean bias against *teichea*, which is designed to invert their expected connotation with security, makes all attempts at a fortified defense seem suspect and even foolish.

Unlike other charged objects within the *Histories*, then, Herodotos does not limit the additional meaning of *teichea* to one portion of his work. Rather, he uses them as thematic objects, expanding the scope of the object's manipulation to embrace every instance of its use.[94] These objects come to symbolize military failure in whatever context they appear. As the historian expands the scope of his manipulation, so also he expands the ability of an object to convey additional meaning. The audience readily recognizes the object's meaning and allows Herodotos to build an argument immediately upon its foundations.

The historian uses this thematic object as a concrete indicator of strategy and imperial fortune. First, he defines the opposing Greek strategies during the Persian War in terms of *teichea*, praising an offensive strategy independent of fortifications versus a defensive strategy reliant upon them. He links traditional *teichea,* particularly the fortifications at the Isthmus of Corinth, with the Spartan efforts to defend Greece. Since the historian regards *teichea* as ultimately flawed, he judges that the Spartan reliance upon fortifications was foolish and

[94] As a result of this Herodotean bias, a reassessment of fifth-century Greek siege warfare is needed. Based in part upon Herodotos' account, previous studies have perhaps over-estimated the efficacy of Greek siege-craft.

foredoomed to failure. Opposed to the Spartan *teichos*, Herodotos places the Athenians and a new type of *teichos*: the Greek fleet. He uses the fleet's intrinsic mobility, opposite to the static nature of a traditional *teichos*, to symbolize the offensive strategy of the Athenians. Agency matters as much as the object. According to Herodotos, the Peloponnesians would have used the fleet merely to bolster the strength of the Isthmian fortifications, subordinating the fleet to a traditional *teichos*. In the hands of the Athenian admiral Themistokles, however, the fleet seized the initiative and achieved victory. After the battle of Salamis, the Athenians remained advocates for an offensive strategy, which Herodotos now defines not through the fleet, but by Athenian opposition to the continuing Spartan effort to fortify the Isthmus. The Greek victory, in the view of Herodotos, stemmed from the Athenian advocacy of an aggressive strategy divorced from *teichea*.

Second, the historian uses *teichea* as an indicator of imperial fortune. He establishes a relationship between fortifications and imperial power: thriving or ascendant empires conduct successful sieges and do not rely upon *teichea* for their own protection. He casts the Persians in the role of the aggressors for most of the *Histories*, tracing their rise and conquests in part through successful sieges. After the Greek victory at Salamis, however, the Persians lost the initiative in Greece and Herodotos represents this change through *teichea*. Once infallible in siege warfare, the Persians experienced unprecedented difficulties. As their own siege-craft faded, they turned to *teichea* for protection, constructing fortifications at Plataea and Mycale. In the *Histories*, defeat accompanies the *teichos* and with it

the ruin of Persian imperial ambitions in Europe. Herodotos synchronizes the ascent of Athenian imperial fortunes with Xerxes' reversals and signifies this rise through a newfound Athenian siege-craft. Formerly unskilled at siege warfare, the Athenians developed both the patience to conduct a prolonged siege and the technical skill to capture a *teichos* by storm. They practiced these formerly Persian skills against the Persians themselves, overcoming fortifications at Plataea, Mycale, and Sestos. Imitating the old Persian relationship to *teichea*, the Athenians emerged as the new imperial power in the Aegean.

Thus, although a thematic object possesses only one meaning, it has many potential applications. Creating such objects through initial emphatic presentations and subsequent consistent association of the object with a core meaning, Herodotos creates a powerful tool to advance an argument throughout his narrative. Although the current study has limited itself to the examination of *teichea*, other possible thematic objects may be money (*chremata*) and Greek ships.

Conclusion

In the present study, then, I have examined the manner in which Herodotos enhances the meaning of his text through objects. They are, I suggest, alterable yet fixed loci of a Herodotean sub-text. Evoking particular connotations through their contexts, the historian replaces and reshapes the objects, creating wellsprings of implicit meaning for the audience to examine and understand.

Herodotos uses these objects for a variety of purposes. In addition to adding layers of meaning to his narrative, the historian enlists these charged objects to display and compare character traits. He uses royal monuments to foreshadow the fates of monarchs and their kingdoms. Through a heroic corpse, he casts the Athenians in the role of an epic hero. Finally, presenting *teichea* in the context of failure, he contrasts strategies and traces the rise and fall of empires. In addition to these individual readings, however, this study suggests that Herodotos based his use of objects on broader cultural connotations. The additional meanings he derives for common objects, such as clothes and bows, are based largely upon existing connotations. Whether he invented or borrowed them, however, the historian reveals a clear understanding of the manipulation and arrangement of objects and their connotations.

Defining the methods that Herodotos uses to create these meanings, however, is somewhat problematic. The complexity of his work discourages rigid categorization. Even so, I suggest that there are patterns in the historian's

approach to objects and his manner of manipulating and imbuing them with additional meaning. Similar to most authors, Herodotos uses the context of a passage to evoke a particular connotation from an object. But a study of an object's meaning within its context must look beyond the immediate passage. The historian uses objects as a means to coordinate the meanings of various *logoi* in the paratactic structure of his text. Cambyses' shooting of Prexaspes' son with his bow indicates his madness, but when read within a broader context it is revealed to be a tool by which he evaluates and compares the Persian king to his royal contemporaries Amasis and the Ethiopian king. In addition, the individual failures of the myriad of *teichea* in the *Histories* take on a new meaning when viewed within the scope of the entire work. The historian's patterning argues in favor of the unity and cohesion of his work.

Although scholars have studied objects with additional meaning in other ancient authors, none have analyzed the manner in which an author manipulates or shapes these objects and their meanings. In the case of the *Histories*, Herodotos creates a cinematic effect. Presenting the audience with an image of an object, he alters or replaces it with a related image and provides the audience with a new perspective on the same (or similar event). Together these images create a text of meaning or connotations centered on the object(s). While scholars have studied the historian's use of repetition, they have never focused their examination upon objects. Yet objects, even more than the historian's language, provide a superb focal point for repetition and substitution. When the historian replaces one term with another, he often indicates a subtle change in meaning. But when he

replaces one object with another, he not only alters the object's meaning, but also changes its role in the narrative. When he replaces the Lydian Queen's *chiton* with a *himation,* he alters both the object and its significance within the *logos*; for the removal of a veil signifies something different than the removal of a negligee. Moreover, this coordinated reading of repeated and replaced objects suggests that other types of repetition, such as Herodotos' use of variant versions, should be examined in a similar way.

Finally, the historian displays an intriguing conception of time. Although other authors, such as Homer, present objects diachronically, revealing their pasts or futures in a brief analepsis or prolepsis, little study has been given to this manipulation. Through his diachronic presentation of objects, Herodotos, for one, concedes the ultimate fragility of objects in the face of time. Although the majority of his objects suffer no ill effect, the historian acknowledges the danger in his proem and correlates the passage of time and its effects upon objects to the legacy of individuals. His treatment of these objects reinforces one of the avowed purposes of his narrative – the preservation of *erga*. Moreover, similar to his use of repetition and substitution of an object, the historian uses time to give the audience additional perspectives. Through his diachronic presentation of objects, he suggests that some things cannot be understood unless viewed both at their beginnings and their ends (or at least current states).

Appendix A: *Teichea* in the *Histories*

	Type of Fortification	*Location of* Teichos *and Context*	*Result*
i.26.2	city-wall	Walls of Ephesus – Lydian 'siege'	defensive – siege (successful)
i.80.6	city wall	Walls of Sardis – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
i.81	city wall	Walls of Sardis – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
i.83	walled city	Walls of Sardis – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
i.84.1, 3 bis (3)	city wall	Walls of Sardis – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
i.85.3	walled city	Walls of Sardis – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
i.98.3-5 (3)	palace	The city and walls of Ecbatana	defensive
i.99.1	palace	The city and walls of Ecbatana	defensive
i.141.4	city wall	Walls of Ionian Cities – Persian sieges	defensive– siege (successful)
i.149.1	walled city	List of Aeolic towns includes "New Wall" city	non-defensive
i.150.1	city wall	Walls of Smyrna.	defensive– siege (successful)[1]
i.162.2	city wall	Walls of Ionian Cities – Persian sieges	defensive– siege (successful)
i.163.3, 4; i.164.1 bis, 2, 3 (6)	city wall	Walls of Phocaea – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
i.168	walled city	Walls of Teos – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
i.178.3	city wall	Walls of Babylon – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
i.179.1-4 (5)	city wall	Walls of Babylon – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
i.180.2; i.181.1 ter (4)	city wall	Walls of Babylon – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
i.184	city wall	Walls of Babylon – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
ii.118.3, 4	city wall, walled city	The Greek siege of Troy	defensive– siege (successful)
ii.121g1	city wall	Rhampsinitus hangs the headless body outside the wall (of the city)	defensive
ii.148.2	wall across passage	The wall around the labyrinth. It surrounds the entire complex.	non-defensive.
iii.13.2 bis (2)	city wall	Memphis – during the Persian siege.	defensive– siege (successful)
iii.14.1	city wall	Memphis – review of Egyptian prisoners after fall of the *teichos*.	defensive– siege (successful)
iii.39.4	city wall	Walls of Samos - Polykrates forces Lesbian prisoners dig a moat around the walls.	defensive
iii.54.1	city wall	Walls of Samos – Spartan siege.	defensive– siege (failed)
iii.55.1	city wall	Walls of Samos – Spartan siege.	defensive– siege (failed)
iii.74.3	palace wall	Prexaspes story – Magi propose he meet them at the palace wall.	non -defensive
iii.91.3	fort	The White Castle at Memphis.	defensive
iii.151.1	city wall	Walls of Babylon – Persian siege.	defensive– siege (successful)

[1] Although the men of Colophon did not march as an armed body and took Smyrna through a traditional siege, they seized the town through one recognized method of a siege (treachery) and used force of arms to hold their prize.

iii.153.2	walled city	Walls of Babylon – Persian siege.	defensive– siege (successful)
iii.155.4-6 (3)	city wall	Walls of Babylon – Persian siege.	defensive– siege (successful)
iii.158.1 ter (3)	city wall	Walls of Babylon – Persian siege.	defensive– siege (successful)
iii.159.1	city wall	Darius pulls down the walls of Babylon	defensive– siege (successful)
iv.12.1	fort	The ruins of a Cimmerian fortress described immediately after the Scythian conquest of the Cimmerians.	defensive (implicit failure)[2]
iv.46.3	walled city	The Scythians are a people without fortified town.	non-defensive
iv.78.4	city wall	The Scythian king Scylas would visit the settlement of the Borysthenites (enter the walls) and live a Greek life.	defensive
iv.108.1	city wall	The walls of Gelonus.	defensive– siege (successful)
iv.123.1 (2)	city wall, walled city	The walls of Gelonus – Darius burns the town and its wooden fortifications.	defensive– siege (successful)[3]
iv.124.1, 2 (2)	fort	Persian forts in Scythia.	defensive (failed)[4]
iv.200.2 bis (2)	city wall	The walls of Barca – initial Persian difficulties.	defensive– siege (successful)
iv.201.3 bis (2)	city wall	The walls of Barca – Persian capture of the town.	defensive– siege (successful)
iv.202 bis (2)	city wall	The walls of Barca – The Persians punish the Barcans	defensive– siege (successful)
v.34.1 bis (2)	city wall	The walls of Naxos – The Naxians prepare for the siege.	defensive– siege (failed)
v.34.3	fort	The fort of Naxos – The Persians build forts for the Naxian exiles	defensive
v.64.2	city wall	Athenian Acropolis – Cleomenes besieges and removes Hippias from Athens.	defensive– siege (successful)
v.77.3	city wall	Athenian Acropolis – Reference to the Persian siege of 480 BC.	defensive– siege (successful)
v.115.2	city wall	The wall of Soli – Persian siege.	defensive– siege (successful)
v.125	fort	Hecataeus suggests to Aristagoras that he build a fort on the island of Leros, but Aristagoras does not follow this advice.	defensive
vi.7	city wall	The walls of Miletos – Persian siege (impending)	defensive– siege (successful)
vi.18	city wall	The walls of Miletos – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
vi.33.1	walled city	Greek towns in the Hellespont – Persian sieges.	defensive– siege (successful)

[2] The Scythians did not besiege the Cimmerian fortress, but since Herodotos places the *teichos* in the context of the Scythian conquest of Cimmeria he implies the failure of the fort to resist the Scythian aggression.
[3] The Persian capture of the abandoned fortifications at Gelonus did not constitute a traditional siege, but since it fits the general pattern of Persian success against fortifications it is counted as such for this study.
[4] The Scythians never besieged the Persian forts, but since the Scythians succeeded in driving the Persians from their land the *teichea* failed to achieve their purpose: the securing of Scythia for Persia.

vi.46.1, 2 (2)	city wall	The walls of Thasos – Histiaeus' siege.	defensive– siege (failed)
vi.48.1	city wall	The walls of Thasos – The Thasians tear down their walls in response to the demands of Darius.	defensive (failed)
vi.101.2 bis (2)	city wall	The walls of Eretria – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
vi.133.2, 3 (2)	city wall	The walls of Paros – Miltiades' siege.	defensive– siege (failed)
vi.137.2	city wall	Athenian Acropolis – construction	defensive
vii.59.1	fort	Fortress at Doriscus – construction	defensive
vii.107.2 bis (2)	city wall	The walls of Eion – Athenian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
vii.108.2	walled city	The Samothracian walls (forts)	defensive (failed)[5]
vii.112 bis (2)	walled city	Pierean walls (forts)	defensive (failed)[6]
vii.139.3, 4 (2)	wall across passage	The Isthmian wall built by the Spartans.	defensive
vii.141.3	city wall	The wooden wall (Athenian fleet)	defensive
vii.142.2 bis, 3 (3)	city wall	The wooden wall (Athenian fleet)	defensive
vii.143.2	city wall	The wooden wall (Athenian fleet)	defensive
vii.176.3, 4, 5 (3)	wall across passage	Old Phocian wall at Thermopylae	defensive– siege (successful)[7]
vii.208.2 bis (2)	wall across passage	Old Phocian wall at Thermopylae	defensive– siege (successful)
vii.215	wall across passage	Old Phocian wall at Thermopylae	defensive– siege (successful)
vii.223.2	wall across passage	Old Phocian wall at Thermopylae	defensive– siege (successful)
vii.225.2, 3 (2)	wall across passage	Old Phocian wall at Thermopylae	defensive– siege (successful)
viii.51.2	city wall	Athenian Acropolis – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
viii.53.2	city wall	Athenian Acropolis – Persian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
viii.71.2	wall across passage	The Isthmian wall – construction	defensive
viii.97.1	wall across passage	Persian breakwater at Salamis.	defensive
ix.7.1	wall across passage	The Isthmian wall – additional construction.	defensive
ix.7b1	wall across passage	The Isthmian wall – additional construction.	defensive
ix.9.2	wall across passage	The Isthmian wall – additional construction.	defensive
ix.10.2	wall across passage	The Isthmian wall – additional construction.	defensive
ix.13.2	city wall	The walls of Athens – Persian sack (2nd)	defensive– siege (successful)

[5] Although the Persians had previously conquered Thrace, the appearance of the forts in the path of the Persian march emphasizes the failure of the Thracians to ward off the expansion of Persian power.

[6] see n. 5.

[7] The Spartans did not strictly use the Old Phocian wall to resist a Persian siege, but the *teichos* played an integral role in their defense of the pass and was the position they held.

ix.15.3	fort	The Persian fort in Boeotia – construction	defensive
ix.41.2	walled city	The walls of Thebes – Artabazus urges Mardonius to retreat to Thebes.	defensive
ix.65.1	fort	The Persian fort in Boeotia – Greek siege	defensive– siege (successful)
ix.66.3	fort	The Persian fort in Boeotia – Greek siege	defensive– siege (successful)
ix.66.3	walled city	The Persian fort in Boeotia – Greek siege	defensive– siege (successful)
ix.70.1 bis, 4 (3)	fort	The Persian fort in Boeotia – Greek siege	defensive– siege (successful)
ix.86.2	city wall	The walls of Thebes – Greek siege	defensive– siege (successful)
ix.98.2	wall across passage	The Persian fort at Mycale – Greek siege	defensive– siege (successful)
ix.102.3 ter, 4 (4)	fort	The Persian fort at Mycale – Greek siege	defensive– siege (successful)
ix.106.1 bis (2)	fort	The Persian fort at Mycale – Greek siege	defensive– siege (successful)
ix.115	walled city	The walls of Sestos – Athenian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
ix.117	walled city	The walls of Sestos – Athenian siege	defensive– siege (successful)
ix.118.1 (2)	walled city, city wall	The walls of Sestos – Athenian siege	defensive– siege (successful)

Appendix B: Sieges in the *Histories*

	Place and Defender	*Attacker*	*Method*	*Success/ Failure*
i.15	Colophon	Lydians – Gyges	military force	success
i.16	Smyrna	Lydians – Alyattes	military force	success
i.17-i.25.1	Miletus	Lydians – Alyattes	prolonged siege	failure
i.26-27	Ephesus – Ephesians	Lydians – Croesus	military force	success
i.80.6-84	Sardis – Croesus	Persians – Cyrus	military force	success
i.103	Nineveh	Medes – Phraortes	military force	failure
i.106	Nineveh	Medes – Phraortes	military force	success
i.150	Smyrna – Aeolians	Colophon – Colophonians	betrayal	success
i.154	Sardis – Persian governor Tabalus	Lydian rebels – Pactyes	military force	failure
i.160.1	Cyme (no siege)	Persians(no siege)	threat of siege	no siege; people of Cyme feared a siege.
i.163.3 – 164.3	Phocaea – Phocaeans	Persians - Harpagus	military force (tech)	success
i.168	Teos – Teans	Persians – Harpagus	military force (tech)	success
i.169 (x9)	Asiatic Greek *Poleis* – Greeks[1]	Persians – Harpagus	military force (tech)	success (against nine *poleis*)
i.174	Cnidus – Cnidians	Persians – Harpagus	threat of military force	success
i.175	Mt Lida – Men of Pedasus	Persians – Harpagus	prolonged siege	success
i.176	Xanthus – Lycians	Persians – Harpagus	military force	success
i.178-186	Babylon – Babylonians	Persians – Cyrus	prolonged siege	success
ii.118	Troy – Trojans	Achaeans	prolonged siege	success
ii.157	Azotus – Syrians	Egyptians – Psammetichus	prolonged siege (fifty-four years!)	success
iii.13	Memphis – Egyptians	Persians – Cambyses	military force	success
iii.54-56	Samos – Polycrates	Spartans	military force	failure
iii.147.2	Samos (citadel) – Charliaus	Persians – Otanes	military force	success
iii.151-159	Babylon – Babylonians	Persians - Darius	prolonged siege	success

[1] According to Herodotos, Harpagus captured the *poleis* of all of the other Ionians (οἱ δ' ἄλλοι Ἴωνες), except the Milesians, in a manner similar to his capture of Phocaea (i.169.1).

iv.123	Gelanus – abandoned	Persians – Darius	military force	success
iv.200-201	Barca – Barcaean	Persians	prolonged siege	success
v.34	Naxos – Naxians	Persians – Aristagoras	military force	failure
v.62.2	Leipsydrium – Athenian exiles	Peisistratids (?)	military force?	success
v.64 – v.65	Athens (Acropolis) – Peisistratids	Spartans – Cleomenes	military force, prolonged siege (a few days only)	success
v.72.2	Athens (Acropolis) – Cleomenes and Isagoras	Athenians	military force, prolonged, siege	success
v.100-102	Sardis – Persians	Athenians and Asiatic Greeks	military force	failure
v.104-114	Amathus – Amathians	Cypriots – Onesilaus	military force	failure
v.115 (x4)	Towns of Cyprus – Cypriots[2]	Persians	military force	success
v.115	Soli – Cypriots	Perisans	military force (tech)	success
vi.18	Miletus – Milesians	Persians	military force (tech)	success
vi.22, 25	Samos – Samians	Persians	threat of military force	success
vi.25	Zancale	Samians	military force	success
vi.26, 27	Chios – Chians	Histiaeus	military force	success
vi.28	Thasos – Thasians	Histiaeus	military force	failure
vi.31 (x12)	Chios, Lesbos, Tenedos, and Ionians of the mainland.[3]	Persians	military force	success
vi.33.1 (x2)	Towns in the Hellespont on the Asiatic coast.[4]	Persians (Phoenicians)	military force	success
vi.33.1-2 (x6)	Towns in the Hellespont on	Persians (Phoenicians)	military force	success

[2] Although Herodotos does not list them by name, he claims at v.104.1 that all of Cyprus (except Amathus) rebelled from the Persians. Later, after the defeat of the Ionians and Cypriots the Perisans besieged all of the towns of Cyprus except Salamis (καὶ τὰς πόλις τῶν Κυπρίων πολιορκευμένας τὰς ἄλλας πλὴν Σαλαμῖνος) and captured them all (v.1115). If the Persians did not besiege Salamis and Amathus remained loyal, then the Persians conducted at least four other sieges: Marium, Citium, Idalium, and Paphos.

[3] Since Herodotos deals with the siege of Miletus elsewhere, the remaining Ionians would have been – Myrus, Priene, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebebus, Teos, Clazomenae, Phocaea, and Erythrae.

[4] Although Herodotos does not name the *poleis* on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, his use of the plural (τὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ δεξιὰ) suggests that the Persians took by assault (ὑποχείρια ἦν γεγονότα κατ' ἤπειρον) at least Sestos and one other *polis.*

	the European coast.[5]			
vi.33.2 (x2)	Proconnesus and Artace.[6]	Persians (Phoenicians)	military force	success
vi.35, 37, 40	Chersonese – Miltiades	Persians	threat of military force	success
vi.46-48	Thasos – Thasians	Persians – Darius	threat of military force	success
vi.99	Carystus – Carystians	Persians	military force, burned crops	success
vi.101	Eretria – Eretrians	Persians	betrayal	success
vi.133-136	Paros – Parians	Athenians – Miltiades	military force	failure
vi.140	Myrina	Athenians	military force	success
vii.105-106	Doriscus – Mascamus the Persian	Greeks (post 479 BC)	military force	failure
vii.107	Eion – the Persian Boges	Athenians	prolonged siege	success
vii.154.2 (x4)	Callipolis, Naxos, Zancale, Leontini, Syracuse	Gela – Gelon and Hippocrates	military force	success in all save Syracuse.
vii.170.1	Camicus (a town in Sicily)	All the Cretans except the people of Polichna and Praesus	prolonged siege	failure
vii.200, 208-225	Thermopylae - Spartans[7]	Persians – Xerxes	military force	success
viii.28	Phocians	Thessalians	military force	not a siege?
viiii.49.2	Peloponnesians	Persians	military force	fear of being besieged on Salamis
viii.52-53	Athenian Acropolis	Persians – Xerxes	military force	success
viii.111.3	Andros – Andrians	Greeks – Themistokles	prolonged siege (blockade)	failure
viii.112.1	Carystus and Paros	Greeks – Themistokles	threatened siege	not a siege
viii.126-127	Olynthos – Olynthians	Persians – Artabazus	military force	success

[5] Herodotos mentions the Chersonnese, which contains many communities (ἐν τῇ πόλιες συχναὶ ἔνεισι), Perinthus, the strongholds on the Thracian coast (τὰ τείχεα), Selymbria, and Byzantium. Again, since Herodotos uses the plural in two cases, the Persians (Phoenicians) took and burned (κατακαύσαντες) at least six communities. Although it is not clear that all these communities were walled, it is likely the majority were.

[6] It is not clear that the Phoenicians besieged these cities, but they did capture (ἐξαιρήσοντες) further unnamed communities in the Chersonnese.

[7] Strictly speaking the action at Thermopylae was not a siege. Since the Spartans rekued so greatly upon the old Phocian wall (*teichos*) for the defense of the pass, however, the Persian attack is treated as an assault upon a fortified position.

viii.129	Potidaea – Potidaeans	Persians – Artabazus	military force, betrayal, prolonged siege	failure
ix.13	Athens – abandoned	Persians – Mardonius	military force	success
ix.58.3	Thebes – Persians	Greeks	military force	proposed siege – not a siege
ix.70	Persian fortification at Plataea	Greeks	military force	success
ix.86-88	Thebes – Thebans	Greeks	Threat of military force	success
ix.96-97, 102	Persian fortifications at Mycale	Greeks	military force	success
ix.114-118	Sestos – Persians	Athenians – Xanthippus	prolonged siege	success

Bibliography

Adam, Jean-Pierre. 1982. *L'Architecture Militarie Grecque.* Picard.

Alonso-Núñez, J. M. 1988. "Herodotus' Ideas about World Empire," *Ancient Society.* 19, 125-134.

Alonso-Núñez, José Miguel. 2003. "Herodotus' Conception of Historical Space and the Beginnings of Universal History," in *Herodotus and his World: Essays from a Conference in Memory of George Forrest.* edd. Peter Derow and Robert Parker, Oxford University Press, 145-152.

Aly, Wolf. 1969 (1921). *Volksmärchen, Sage und Novelle bei Herodot und seinen Zeitgenosen: Eine Untersuchung über die volkstümlichen Elemente der altergriechischen Prosaerzählung.* 2nd edition, Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht in Göttingen.

Appadurai, Arjun. 1981. "The Past as a Scarce Resource," *Man*. 16, 201-219.

Arieti, James. 1995. *Discourses on the First Book of Herodotus*. Littlefield Adams Books.

Armayor, O. Kimball. 1974. "Herodotus' Catalogues of the Persian Empire in the Light of the Monuments and the Greek Literary Tradition," *Transactions of the American Philological Association.* 108, 1-9.

Armayor, O. Kimball. 1978. "Did Herodotus Ever Go to the Black Sea?" *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*. 82, 45-62.

Armayor, O. Kimball. 1978. "The Homeric Influence on Herodotus' Story of the Labyrinth," *Classical Bulletin*. 54, 68-72.

Armayor, O. Kimball. 1980. "Sesostris and Herodotus' Austopsy of Thrace, Colchis, Inland Asia Minor, and the Levant," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*. 84, 51-74.

Asheri, David.1978. *Erodoto: La Persia.* trans. Augusto Fraschetti, Fondazione Lorenzo Valla.

Asheri, David.1988. *Erodoto: La Lidia e la Persia.* trans. Virginio Antelami, Fondazione Lorenzo Valla.

Athanassakis, Apostolos N. 1983. *Hesiod: Theogony, Works and Days, Shield.* Johns Hopkins University Press.

Austin, Norman. 1975. *Archery at the Dark of the Moon*. University of California Press.

Avery, H. C. 1979. "A Poetic Word in Herodotus," *Hermes*. 105, 1-9.

Avery, Harry C. 1972. "Herodotus' Picture of Cyrus," *American Journal of Philology*. 93, 529-546.

Aymard, André. 1959. "Remarques sur la poliorcétique grecque," *Études d'archéologie classique*. 21-25.

Bakker, Egbert J. 2002. "The Making of History: Herodotus' Histories Apodexis," in *Brill's Companion to Herodotus*. edd. E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. De Jong, and H. van Wees, Brill, 3-32.

Balcer, Jack Martin. 1984. *Sparda by the Bitter Sea: Imperial Interaction in Western Anatolia.* Scholars Press.

Barthes, Roland. 1977. "Structural Analysis of Narratives," in *Image, Music, Text.* trans. Stephen Heath, Hill and Wang, 79-124.

Bassi, Karen. 1995. "Male Nudity and Disguise in the Discourse of Greek Histronics," *Helios*. 22, 3-22.

Beck, Ingrid. 1971. *Die Ringkomposition bei Herodots und ihre Bedeutung für die Beweistechnik. Spudasmata: Studien zur Klasischen Philologie und ihren Grenzgebieten Herausgegeben von Hildebrecht Hommel und Ernst Zinn.* Georg Olms.

Becker, Andrew Sprague. 1990. "The Shield of Achilles and the Poetics of Homeric Description," *American Journal of Philology*. 111, 139-153.

Benardete, Seth. 1969. *Herodotean Inquiries.* Martinus Nijhoff.

Bérard, Claude and Jean-Louis Durand. 1989. "Entering the Imagery." in *A City of Images: Iconography and Society in Ancient Greece.* ed. Jean-Pierre Vernant, Princeton University Press, 23-38.

Berger, John. 1972. *Ways of Seeing*. Viking Press.

Bergren, Ann L. T. 1983. "Language and the Female in Early Greek Thought," *Arethusa*. 16, 69-96.

Blackman, Deane R. and John Sawyer. 2000. “Croesus’ Craters at Delphi," *Oxford Journal of Archaeology*. 19, 319-321.

Blakesley, Joseph Williams. 1854. *Herodotus with a Commentary*. Whittaker and Co.

Block, Elizabeth. 1985. “Clothing Makes the Man: A Pattern in the Odyssey," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*. 115, 1-11.

Blok, Josine. 2002. “Women in Herodotus’ Histories," in *Brill’s Companion to Herodotus*. edd. E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. De Jong, and H. van Wees. Brill, 225-242.

Bloomer, W. Martin. 1993. “The Superlative Nomoi of Herodotus’s Histories," *Classical Antiquity*. 12, 30-50.

Blösel, Wolfgang. 2001. “The Herodotean Picture of Themistocles: A Mirror of Fifth-century Athens," in *The Historian’s Craft in the Age of Herodotus*. ed. Nino Luraghi, Oxford University Press, 179-197.

Boardman, John. 1990. “Symposion Furniture." in *Sympotica: A Symposium on the Symposion*. ed. Oswyn Murray, Clarendon Press, 122-131.

Boedeker, Deborah. 1987. “The Two Faces of Demaratus,” *Arethusa*. 20, 185-207.

Boedeker, Deborah. 1988. “Protesilaos and the End of Herodotus’ Histories," *Classical Antiquity*. 7, 30-48.

Boedeker, Deborah. 1993. “Hero Cult and Politics in Herodotus: The Bones of Orestes," in *Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics*. edd. C. Dougherty and L. Kurke. Cambridge University Press. 164-177.

Boedeker, Deborah. 2001. “Heroic Historiography: Simonides and Herodotus on Plataea," in *The New Simonides: Contexts of Praise and Desire*. edd. D. Boedeker and D. Sider. Oxford University Press. 120-134.

Boedeker, Deborah. 2002. “Epic Heritage and Mythical Patterns in Herodotus," in *Brill’s Companion to Herodotus*. edd. E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. De Jong, and H. van Wees, Brill, 97-116.

Boedeker, Deborah. 2003. “Pedestrian Fatalities: The Prosaics of Death in Herodotus,” in *Herodotus and His World: Essays from a Conference in Memory of George Forrest*. edd. Peter Derow and Robert Parker, Oxford Univserity Press17-36.

Bonheim, Helmut. 1982. *The Narrative Modes: Techniques of the Short Story*. D. S. Brewer.

Bowie, A. M. 2003. "Fate May Harm Me, I Have Dined Today: Near-Eastern Royal Banquets and Greek Symposia in Herodotus," *Pallas*. 61, 99-109.

Brock, Roger. 2003. "Authorial Voice and Narrative Management in Herodotus," in *Herodotus and His World: Essays from a Conference in Memory of George Forrest*. edd. Peter Derow and Robert Parker, Oxford Univserity Press, 1-16.

Brown, Truesdell B. 1962. "The Greek Sense of Time in History as suggested by their Accounts of Egypt." *Historia*. 11, 257-271.

Brown, Truesdell S. 1982. "Herodotus' Portrait of Cambyses," *Historia*. 31, 387-403.

Burn, A. R. 1984. *Persian and the Greeks*. 2nd edition, Duckworth.

Cairns, D. L. 1996. "'Off with Her AIDWS': Herodotus i.8.3-4," *Classical Quarterly*. 46, 78-83.

Calame, Claude. 2003. *Myth and history in ancient Greece: the symbolic creation of a colony*. trans. Daniel W. Berman, Princeton University Press.

Camp, John McK. 2000. "Walls and the Polis," in *Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History*. edd Pernille Flensted-Jensen, Thomas Heine Nielsen, and Lene Rubinstein.Museum Tusculanum Press, 41-57.

Campbell, David A. (ed.).1991. "Introduction," *Greek Lyric III: Stesichorus, Ibycus, Simonides, and Others*. Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press.

Casevitz, M. 1995. "Sur la malice d'Hérodote," *Ktéma*. 20, 5-16.

Cawkwell, G. L. 1989. "Orthodoxy and Hoplites," *Classical Quarterly*. 39, 375-389.

Chiasson, C. C. 1982. "Tragic Diction in Herodotus: Some Possibilities," *Phoenix*. 36, 156-161.

Chiasson, C. C. 1983. "An Ominous Word in Herodotus," *Hermes*. 111, 115-8.

Chiasson, Charles C. 2003. "Herodotus' Use of Attic Tragedy in the Lydian Logos," *Classical Antiquity*. 22, 5-36.

Chiasson, Charles. 1980. *The Question of Tragic Influence on Herodotus*. Yale University Diss.

Christ, Matthew R. 1994. “Herodotean Kings and Historical Inquiry," *Classical Antiquity*. 13, 167-202.

Cobet, Justus. 1971. *Herodots Exkurse und die Frage der Einheit seines Werkes*. Franz Steiner.

Cobet, Justus. 1986. “Herodotus and Thucydides on war," in *Past Perspectives: Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writing*. Papers presented at Leeds, 6-8 April, 1983.edd. I. S. Maxon, J. D. Smart, & A. J. Woodman, Cambridge University Press, 1-18.

Cobet, Justus. 2002. “The Organization of Time in the Histories," in *Brill’s Companion to Herodotus.* edd. E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. De Jong, and H. van Wees, Brill, 387-412.

Compton-Engle, Gwendolyn. 2005. “Stolen Cloaks in Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*. 135, 163-176.

Corcella, Aldo. 1993. *Erodoto. Le Storie.* Volume IV. Traduzione di Augusto Fraschetti, Fondazione Lorenzo Valla.

Davidson, M. 1997/98. “Object Position in Herodotus,” *Glotta*. 74.3/4, 146-158.

De Jong, I. 2001. “The Anachronical Structure of Herodotus’ Histories," in *Texts, Ideas, and the Classics: Scholarship, Theory, and Classical Literature*. ed. S. J. Harrison, Oxford University Press, 93-116.

De Jong, I. 2002. “Narrative Unity and Units," in *Brill’s Companion to Herodotus*. edd. E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. De Jong, and H. van Wees, Brill, 245-266.

de Romilly, J. 1977. *The Rise and Fall of States According to Greek Authors*. University of Michigan Press.

Demand, N. 1988. “Herodotus and Metoikesis in the Persian Wars," *American Journal of Philology*. 109, 416-423.

Denniston, J. D. 1934. *The Greek Particles*. Clarendon Press.

Dewald, C. 1985. “Practical Knowledge and the Historian’s Role in Herodotos and Thucydides," in *The Greek Historians: Literature and History. Papers Presented to A. E. Raubitschek.* Department of Classics, Stanford University, 47-63.

Dewald, C. 1987. “Narrative Surface and Authorial Voice in Herodotos’ Histories,” *Arethusa*. 20, 147-170.

Dewald, C. and J. Marincola. 1987. “A Selective Introduction to Herodotean Studies,” *Arethusa* 20, 9-40.

Dewald, Carolyn. 1981. “Women and Culture in Herodotus’ Histories," in *Reflections of Women in Antiquity*. ed. H. P. Foley, Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 91-125.

Dewald, Carolyn. 1993. “Reading the World: The Interpretation of Objects in Herodotus’ Histories," in *Nomodeiktes: Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald.* edd. Ralph M. Rosen and Joseph Farrell. University of Michigan Press, 55-70.

Dewald, Carolyn. 1997. “Wanton Kings, Pickled Heroes, and Gnomic Founding Fathers: Strategies of Meaning at the End of Herodotus’s Histories," in *Classical Closure: Reading the End in Greek and Latin Literature*. edd. Deborah H. Roberts, Francis M. Dunn, and Don Fowler. Princeton University Press. 62-82.

Dewald, Carolyn. 2003. “Form and Content: The Question of Tyranny in Herodotus," in *Popular Tyranny*. ed. K. Morgan, University of Texas Press, 25-58.

Dillery, John. 1992. “Darius and the Tomb of Nitocris (Hdt. 1.187)," *Classical Philology*. 87, 30-38.

Dillery, John. 1996. “Reconfiguring the Past: Thyrea, Thermopylae and Narrative Patterns in Herodotus," *American Journal of Philology*. 117, 217-254.

Dobson, Marcia. 1979. “Herodotus 1.47.1 and the Hymn to Hermes: A Solution to the Test Oracle," *American Journal of Philology*.100, 349-359.

Drews, R. 1997. “Review of Herodots babylonischer Logos: Eine kritische Untersuchung der Glaubwürdigkeitsdiskussion. by Robert Rollinger," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*. 56, 125-126.

Ducat, Jean. 1976. “Fonctions de la statue dans la Grèce archaique: kouros et kolossos," *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*. 100, 259-251.

Ducrey, P. 1995. “La muraille est-elle element constitutif d’une cité?" in *CPCActs*. 2, 245-256.

Ducrey, Pierre. 1985. *Warfare in Ancient Greece*. trans. Janet Lloyd.

Ducrey, Pierre. 1986. "Les Fortifications Gréques: Rôle, Fonction, Efficacité," in *La Fortification Dans L'Histoire Du Monde Grec*. edd. Pierre Leriche and Henri Tréziny, Éditions du Centre National de la Recerche Scientifique, 133-142.

Dwora Gilula. 2003. "Who Was Actually Buried in the First of the Three Spartan Graves (Hdt. 9.85.1)? Textual and Historical Problems," in *Herodotus and His World: Essays from a Conference in Memory of George Forrest*. edd. Peter Derow and Robert Parker, Oxford Univserity Press, 73-87.

Dyer, Louis. 1905. "Olympian Treasuries," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 25, 294-319.

Eco, Umberto. 1976. *A Theory of Semiotics*. Indiana University Press.

Elsner, Ja´s. 1995. *Art and the Roman Viewer*. Cambridge University Press.

Evans, J. A. S. 1979. "Herodotus and Athens: The Evidence of the encomium," *L'Antiquité Classique*. 48, 112-118.

Evans, J. A. S. 1982. "The Oracle of the 'Wooden Wall,'" *Classical Journal*. 78, 24-29.

Evans, J. A. S. 1991. *Herodotus, Explorer of the Past*. Princeton University Press.

Faraone, Christopher A. 1993. "Erotic Magic in Pindar Pythian 4.213-19." *Classical Journal*. 89, 1-19.

Fehling, Detlev. 1989. *Herodotus and His 'Sources.' Citation, Invention, and Narrative Art.* trans. J. G. Howie, Francis Cairns.

Felton, D. 1998. "Advice to Tyrants: The Motif of 'Enigmatic Counsel' in Greek and Roman Texts," *Phoenix*. 52, 42-54.

Fenik, Bernard. 1968. *Typical Battle Scenes in the Iliad. Studies in the Narrative Techniques of Homeric Battle Descriptions. Hermes. Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie.* 21, Franz Steiner.

Ferrill, Arther. 1966. "Herodotus and the Strategy and Tactics of the Invasion of Xerxes." *The American Historical Review*. 72, 102-115.

Figueira, T. J. 1985. "Herodotus on the Early Hostilities between Aegina and Athens." *American Journal of Philology*. 106, 49-74.

Flory, Stewart. 1978. "Laughter, Tears, and Wisdom in Herodotus," *American Journal of Philology*. 99, 145-153.

Flory, Stewart. 1978. "Arion's Leap: Brave Gestures in Herodotus," *American Journal of Philology*. 99, 411-421.

Flory, Stewart. 1987. *Archaic Smile of Herodotus*. Wayne State University Press.

Flower, H. I. 1991. "Herodotus and Delphic Traditions about Croesus," in *Georgica: Studies in honour of George Cawkwell*. edd. Michael A. Flower and Mark Toher, University of London Institute of Classical Studies, Bulletin Supplement 58, 57-77.

Flower, M. A. 1988. "Simonides, Ephorus, and Herodotus on the battle of Thermopylae," *Classical Quarterly*. 48, 365-379.

Flower, Michael A. and John Marincola. 2002. *Herodotus: Histories. Book IX*. Cambridge University Press.

Fornara, C. 1981. "Herodotus' Knowledge of the Archidamian War," *Hermes*. 109, 149-156.

Fornara, C. W. 1983. *The Nature of History in Ancient Greek and Rome*.

Fornara, Charles W. 1971. *Herodotus: An Interpretive Essay*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Forrest, W. G. 1984. "Herodotus and Athens," *Phoenix*. 38, 1-11.

Forsdyke, Sara. 1999. "From Aristocratic to Democratic Ideology and Back Again: The Thrasybulus Anecdote in Herodotus' Histories and Aristotle's Politics," *Classical Philology*. 94, 361-372.

Forsdyke, Sara. 2001. "Athenian Democratic Ideology and Herodotus' Histories," *American Journal of Philology*. 122, 329-358.

Fowler, Robert L. 2001. "Early Historié and Literacy," in *The Historian's Craft in the Age of Herodotus*. ed. Nino Luraghi, Oxford University Press, 95-115.

Fowler, Robert. 2003. "Herodotos and Athens," in *Herodotus and his World: Essasy from a Conference in Memory of George Forrest*. edd. Peter Derow and Robert Parker, Oxford University Press, 305-318.

French, A. 1972. "Topical Influences on Herodotos' Narrative," *Mnemosyne*. 25, 9-27.

Freyer, Hans. 1968. "Das historische Sehen," in *Herodot: Eine Auswahl aus der Neueren Forschung*. ed. Walter Marg.C. H. Beck, 157-168.

Galt, C. M. 1931. “Veiled Ladies," *American Journal of Archaeology*. 373-93.

Gammie, John G. 1986. “Herodotus on Kings and Tyrants: Objective Historiography or Conventional Portraiture?" *Journal of Near Eastern Studies.* 45, 171-195.

Garlan, Yvon. 1974. *Recherces De Poliorcétique Grecque*.

George, David B. 1994. “Euripides’ Heracles 140-235: Staging and the Stage Iconography of Heracles’ Bow," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies.* 35, 145-157.

Georges, Pericles B. 1986. “Saving Herodotus’ Phenomena: The Oracles and the Events of 480 BC,” *Classical Antiquity* 5, 14-59.

Georges, Pericles. 1994. *Barbarian Asia and the Greek Experience: From the Archaic Period to the Age of Xenophon*. The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Giraudeau, M. 1984. “L’héritage épique chez Hérodote,” *Bulletin de l’Association G. Budé*. 4-13.

Glover, T. R. 1924. *Herodotus*.

Graham, A. J. 1996. “Themistocles’ Speech before Salamis: The Interpretation of Herodotus 8.83.1,” *Classical Quarterly*. 46, 321-326.

Grant, John R. 1969. “ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΡΑΤΥΧΟΝΤΟΣ ΠΥΝΘΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ," *Phoenix*. 23, 264-268.

Grant, John R. 1983. “Some Thoughts on Herodotus," *Phoenix*. 37, 283-298.

Gray, Vivienne. 1995. “Herodotus and the Rhetoric of Otherness,” *American Journal of Philology*. 116, 185-211.

Gray, Vivienne. 1996. “Herodotus and Images of Tyranny: The Tyrants of Corinth,” *American Journal of Philology*. 117, 361-389.

Gray, Vivienne. 1997. “Reading the Rise of Pisistratus: Herodotus 1.56-68," *Histos*.

Gray, Vivienne. 2001. “Herodotus’ Literary and Historical Method: Arion’s Story (1.23-24),” *American Journal of Philology*. 122, 11-28.

Gray, Vivienne. 2002. “Short Stories in Herodotus’ Histories,” in *Brill’s Companion to Herodotus.* edd. E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. De Jong, and H. van Wees, Brill, 291-320.

Griffin, J. 1980. *Homer on Life and Death*. Clarendon Press.

Griffith, R. D. 1988. "Disrobing in the Oresteia," *Classical Quarterly*. 38, 552-554.

Groten, F. J. 1963. "Herodotus' Use of Variant Versions," *Phoenix*. 17, 79-87.

Hansen, M. H. 2000. "The Hellenic Polis," in *A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures.* ed. Mogens Herman Hansen, 141-182.

Hansen, Mogens Herman and Thomas Heine Nielsen (edd.). 2004. *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*. Oxford.

Hansen, Mogens Herman. 1997. "The Polis as an Urban Centre: The Literary and Epigraphical Evidence," in *The Polis as an Urban Centre and as a Political Community. Symposium August, 29-31 1996.* ed. Mogens Herman Hansen. Acts of the Copenagen Polis Center vol. 4, pp. 9-86.

Hanson, Victor Davis. 1989. *The Western Way of War*. University of California Press

Hanson, Victor Davis. 1998. *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece.* University of California Press.

Harrison, Evelyn B. 1972. "The South Frieze of the Nike Temple and the Marathon Painting in the Painted Stoa," *American Journal of Archaeology*. 76, 353-378.

Harrison, Evelyn B. 1981. "Motifs of the City-Siege on the Shield of Athena Parthenos," *American Journal of Archaeology*. 85, 281-317.

Harrison, Thomas. 2003. "'Prophecy in reverse'? Herodotus and the Origins of History," in *Herodotus and his World: Essasy from a Conference in Memory of George Forrest.* edd. Peter Derow and Robert Parker, Oxford University Press, 237-255.

Hart, John. 1982. *Herodotus and Greek History*. St. Martin's Press.

Hartog, François. 1988. *The Mirror of Herodotus. The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History*. trans. Janet Llyod, University of California Press.

Hartog, François. 1999. "'Myth into Logos': The Case of Croesus, or the Historian at Work," in *From Myth to Reason? Studies in the Development of Greek Thought.* ed. Richard Buxton, Oxford University Press, 183-196.

Harvey, F. D. 1966. "The Political Sympathies of Herodotus," *Historia*. 15, 254-255.

Heffernan, James A. W. 1993. *Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery*. The University of Chicago Press.

Hendrick, Charles W. Jr. 1993. "The Meaning of Material Culture: Herodotus, Thucydides, and Their Sources," in *Nomodeiktes: Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald.* edd. Ralph M. Rosen and Joseph Farrell. University of Michigan Press. 17-37.

Herington, John. 1991. "The Poem of Herodotus," *Arion*. 3, 5-16.

Herington, John. 1997. "The Closure of Herodotus' Histories," *Illinois Classical Studies.* 22, 149-160.

Higbie, Carolyn. 1997. "The Bones of a Hero, the Ashes of a Politician: Athens, Salamis, and the Useable Past," *Classical Antiquity*. 16, 278-307.

Higbie, Carolyn. 2003. *The Lindian Chronicle and the Greek Creation of their Past.* Oxford University Press.

Hoffer, Stanley. 1995. "Telemachus' 'Laugh' (Odyssey 21.105)," *American Journal of Philology*. 116, 515-531.

Hollmann, Alexander James. 1998. *The Master of Signs: Signs and Signification in the Histories of Herodotos.* Harvard University Dissertation.

Hollmann, Alexander. 2000. "Epos as Authoritative Speech in Herodotus' Histories," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*. 100, 207-225.

Hollmann, Alexander. 2005. "The Manipulation of Signs in Herodotos' Histories," *Transactions of the American Philological Society*. 135, 279-327.

Hooker, J. T. 1989. "Arion and the Dolphin," *Greece & Rome*. 36, 141-146.

Hornblower, Simon. 2001. "Epic and Ephiphanes: Herodotus and the 'New Simonides'," in *The New Simonides: Contexts of Praise and Desire*. edd. D. Boedeker and D. Sider. Oxford University Press. 135-147.

How, W. W and J. Wells. 1912. *A Commentary on Herodotus*. Oxford University Press.

Huber, Ludwig. 1965. "Herodots Homerverständnis," in *Synusia: Festgabe für Wolfgang Schadewaldt zum 15. März 1965*. Neske. 29-52.

Hunt, Peter. 1997. "Helots at the Battle of Plataea." *Historia*. 46, 129-144.

Hunter, V. 1982. *Past and Process in Herodotos and Thucydides*. Princeton University Press.

Huxley, George. 1989. *Herodotos and the Epic*. Athens.

Immerwahr, H. R. 1957. "The Samian Stories of Herodotus," *Classical Journal*. 53, 312-321.

Immerwahr, Henry R. 1954. "Historical Action in Herodotus," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*. 85, 16-45.

Immerwahr, Henry R. 1956. "Supplementary Paper: Aspects of Historical Causation in Herodotus," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*. 87, 241-280.

Immerwahr, Henry R. 1960. "Ergon: History as a Monument in Herodotus and Thucydides," *American Journal of Philology*. 81, 261-290.

Immerwahr, Henry R. 1966. *Form and Thought in Herodotos*. Press of Western Reserve University.

Iser, Wolfgang. 1974. *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Jackson, A. H. 1991. "Hoplites and the Gods: The Dedication of Captured Arms and Armour," *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience*. ed V. D. Hanson, Routledge, 228-249.

Jacoby, F. 1913. "Herodotos," in *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Alterumswissenschaft*. ed. W. Kroll.Stuttgart.

Jeffery, L. H. 1962. "The Campaigns between Athens and Aegina in the Years Before Salamis (Hdt. vi.87-93)," *American Journal of Philology*. 83, 44-54.

Jenkins, I. D. 1985. "The Ambiguity of Greek Textiles," *Arethusa*. 18, 109-138.

Johnson, William A. 1994. "Oral Performance and the Composition of Herodotus' Histories," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*. 35, 229-254.

Kern, Paul Bentley. 1999. *Ancient Siege Warfare*. Indiana University Press.

Konstan, David. 1987. "Persians, Greeks, and Empire," *Arethusa: Herodotus and the Invention of History*. 20, 59-73.

Krentz, P. 1985. "The Nature of Hoplite Battle," *Classical Anquity*. 4, 50-61.

Kroll, J. 2001. “Review of Kurke, Leslie, Coins, Bodies, Games, and Gold: The Politics of Meaning in Archaic Greece,” *Classical Review*.

Kuhrt, Amélie. 2002. “Babylon," in *Brill’s Companion to Herodotus*. edd. E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. De Jong, and H. van Wees. Brill, 475-496.

Kurke, L. 1999. *Coins, Bodies, Games, and Gold: The Politics of Meaning in Archaic Greece*. Princeton University Press.

Kurtz, Donna C. and John Boardman. 1971. *Greek Burial Customs*. Thames and Hudson.

Lang, Mabel L. 1987. “Commentary on Nagy and Boedeker," *Arethusa: Herodotus and the Invention of History*. 20, 203-208.

Lang, Mabel. 1984. *Herodotean Narrative and Discourse*. Harvard University Press.

Larson, Stephanie. 2006. “Kandaules’ Wife, Masistes’ Wife: Herodotus’ Narrative Strategy in Suppressing Names of Women (Hdt. 1.8-12 and 9.1089-13)," *Classical Journal*. 101, 225-244.

Lateiner, D. 1977. “No Laughing Matter: A Literary Tactic in Herodotus," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*. 107, 173-182.

Lateiner, D. 1983. “The Failure of the Ionian Revolt,” *Historia*. 31, 129-160.

Lateiner, D. 1985. “Limit, Propriety, and Transgresion in the Histories of Herodotus," in *The Greek Historians: Literature and History. Papers Presented to A. E. Raubitschek.* Department of Classics, Stanford University, 87-100.

Lateiner, D. 1986. “The Empirical Element in the Methods of Early Greek Medical Writers and Herodotus: A Shared Epistemological Response," *Antichthon*. 20, 1-20.

Lateiner, D. 1987. “Nonverbal Communication in the Histories of Herodotus," *Arethusa: Herodotus and the Invention of History*. 20, 41-57.

Lateiner, D. 1989. *The Historical Method of Herodotos*. University of Toronto Press.

Lateiner, D. 1990. “Deceptions and Delusions in Herodotus," *Classical Antiquity*. 9, 230-246.

Lateiner, Donald. 1993. “The Perception of Deception and Gullibility in Specialists of the Supernatural (Primarily) in Athenian Literature," in

Nomodeiktes: Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald. edd. Ralph M. Rosen and Joseph Farrell. University of Michigan Press. 179-196.

Lateiner, D. 2002. "Assessing the Nature of Herodotus' Mind and Text: Review of Divinity and History: the Religion of Herodotus. by Thomas Harrison," *Classical Philology*. 97, 371-382.

Lattimore, Richmond. 1939. "The Wise Adviser in Herodotus," *Classical Philology*. 34, 24-35.

Lattimore, Richmond. 1958. "The Composition of the History of Herodotus," *Classical Philology*. 53, 9-21.

Lavelle, B. M. 1991. "The Compleat Angler: Observations on the Rise of Peisistratos in Herodotus (1.59-64)," *Classical Quarterly*. 41, 317-324.

Lawrence, A. W. 1972. *Greek Aims in Fortification*.

Lee, Mirelle M. 2004. "'Evil Wealth of Raiment': Deadly Pevploi in Greek Tragedy," *Classical Journal*. 99, 253-280.

Legrand, Ph. E. 1954. *Hérodote*. Raspail.

Lesky, Albin. 1977. "Tragödien bei Herodot?" in *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory: Studies Presented to Fritz Schachermeyr on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday*. ed K. H. Kinzl, de Gruyter, 224-230.

Levine, Daniel B. 1985. "Symposium and the Polis," in *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and Polis.* edd. T. J. Figueira, G. Nagy, Johns Hopkins University Press, 176-196.

Lidov, Joel B. 2002. "Sappho, Herodotus, and the Hetaira." *Classical Philology*. 97, 203-237.

Lissarrague, François. 1990. "Around the Krater: An Aspect of Banquet Imagery." in *Sympotica: A Symposium on the Symposion*. ed. Oswyn Murray, Clarendon Press, 196-209.

Lloyd, A. B. 1969. "Perseus and Chemmis (Herodotus II 91)," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 89, 79-86.

Lloyd, A. B. 1988. "Herodotus' Account of Pharaonic History," *Historia*. 37, 22-53.

Lloyd, Alan B. 1978. *Erodoto: L'Egitto. II*, trans. Augusto Fraschetti, Fondazione Lorenzo Valla.

Lloyd, Alan B. 1993. *Herodotus Book II*. 3 vols, E.J. Brill.

Long, T. 1986. *Repetition and Variation in the Short Stories of Herodotos*. Athenaeum.

Lowenstam, Steven. 1981. *The Death of Patroklos. A Study in Typology*. Anton Hain.

Luke, Joanna. 1994. "The Krater, Kratos, and the Polis," *Greece & Rome*. 41, 23-32.

Macan, Reginald Walter (ed.). 1973 (1908). *Herodotus. The Seventh, Eighth & Ninth Books*. vol 1, Arno Press.

MacCary, W. Thomas. 1982. *Childlike Achilles: Ontogeny and Phylogeny in the Iliad.* Columbia University Press.

MacGinnis, John. 1986. "Herodotus' Description of Babylon," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies.* 33, 67-86.

MacKendrick, P. 1963. "Herodotus, 1954-1963," *Classical World*. 56, 269-274.

Malandro, Loretta A., Larry L. Barker, and Deborah Ann Barker. 1989. *Nonverbal Communication*. 2nd edition, Random House.

Martidou, Despina. 1996. *The Role of Stories in Herodotus*. Dissertation from the Graduate Department of Classical Studies, University of Toronto.

Masaracchia, Agostino. 1978. *Erodoto: La Sconfitta Dei Persiani: Libro IX delle Storie.* Fondazione Lorenzo Valla.

Mastronarde, Donald J. 1975. "Iconography and Imagery in Euripides' Ion," *California Studies in Classical Antiquity*. 8, 163-176.

McNeal, R. A. 1981. "Herodotus 1.56: A Trio of Textual Notes." *American Journal of Philology*. 102, 359-361.

McNeal, R. A. (ed.). 1986. *Herodotus Book I.* University Press of America.

McNellen, Brad. 1997. "Herodotean Symbolism: Pericles as Lion Cub," *Illinois Classical Studies*. 22, 11-23.

McQueen, E. I. (ed.). 2000. *Herodotus Book VI.* Bristol Classical Press.

Meier, Christian. 1987. "Historical Answers to Historical Questions: The Origins of History in Ancient Greece," *Arethusa: Herodotus and the Invention of History.* 20, 41-57.

Meyer, Eduard. 1968. “Gescichtsauffassung," in *Herodot: Eine Auswahl aus der Neueren Forschung*. ed. Walter Marg.C. H. Beck, 7-11.

Mitchell, B. M. 1975. “Herodotus and Samos,” *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 95, 75-91.

Mitchell, W. J. T. 1986. *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology*. University of Chicago Press

Moles, J. L. 1993. “Truth and Untruth in Herodotus and Thucydides," in *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*. ed. C. Gill and T. P. Wiseman, University of Texas Press, 88-121.

Moles, John. 1996. “Herodotus warns the Athenians." in *Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar.* 9, edd. Francis Cairns and Malcolm Heath, Francis Cairns (Publications) Ltd., 259-284.

Moles, John. 2002. “Herodotus and Athens," in *Brill’s Companion to Herodotus.* edd. E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. De Jong, and H. van Wees, Brill, 33-52.

Momigliano, Arnaldo. 1978. “The Historians of the Classical World and Their Audiences: Some Suggestions," Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. 8, 59-75.

Moon, Warren. 1983. “The Priam Painter: Some Iconographic and Stylistic Considerations." in *Ancient Greek Art and Iconography*. ed. Warren Moon, University of Wisconsin Press, 97-118.

Morgan, Catherine and James J. Coulton. 1997. “The Polis as a Physical Entity," in *The Polis as an Urban Centre and as a Political Community. Symposium August, 29-31 1996.* ed. Mogens Herman Hansen. Acts of the Copenagen Polis Center vol. 4, pp. 87-144.

Mossman, J. M. 1996. “Chains in Imagery in Prometheus Bound." *Classical Quarterly*. 46, 58-67.

Mueller, Melissa Yin. 2002. *Speaking through Objects: Reciprocity and Gender in Euripides.* Dissertation University of California at Berkeley.

Munson, R.V. 1986. “The Celebratory Purpose of Herodotus: the Story of Arion in Histories 1,23-24," *Ramus*. 15, 93-104.

Munson, Rosaria Vignolo. 1991. “The Madness of Cambyses (Herodotus 3.16-38)," *Arethusa*. 24, 43-66.

Munson, Rosario Vignolo. 1993. "Herodotus' Use of Prospective Sentences and the Story of Rhampsinitus and the Thief in the Histories," *American Journal of Philology*. 114, 27-44.

Munson, Rosaria Vignolo. 2001. *Telling Wonders: Ethnographic and Political Discourse in the Work of Herodotus.* University of Michigan Press.

Murray, Oswyn. 1983. "The Greek Symposion in History," in *Tria Corda: Scritti in onore di Arnaldo Momigliano.* ed. E. Gabba, New Press, 257-272.

Murray, Oswyn. 1987. "Herodotus and Oral History," in *Achaemenid History: The Greek Sources.* II, edd Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburge and Amelie Kuhrt, Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 93-115.

Myres, Sir John L. 1971. *Herodotus: Father of History*. Gateway.

Nagler, M. 1974. *Spontaneity and Tradition: A Study of the Oral Art in Homer.* UC Berkeley Press.

Nagy, Gregory. 1987. "Herodotus the Logios," *Arethusa: Herodotus and the Invention of History*. 20, 175-184.

Nagy, Gregory. 1987. "Reply to Mabel L. Lang's Commentary," *Arethusa: Herodotus and the Invention of History*. 20, 209.

Nagy, Gregory. 1990. *Greek Mythology and Politics*. Cornell University Press.

Naiden, F. S. 1999. "The Prospective Imperfect in Herodotus." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*. 99, 135-145.

Neer, Richard T. 2001. "Framing the Gift: The Politics of the Siphnian Treasury at Delphi," *Classical Antiquity*. 20, 273-336.

Neville, James W. 1977. "Herodotus and the Trojan War," *Greece and Rome*. 24, 3-12.

Newman, John. K. 2001. "The Golden Fleece. Imperial Dream," in *A Companion to Apollonius Rhodius*. edd T.D. Papanghelis and A. Rengakos, Brill, 309-340.

Newton, Rick. 1998. "Cloak and Shield in Odyssey 14." *Classical Journal*. 93, 143-156.

Nyland, R. 1992: "Herodotos' Sources for the Plataiai Campaign," *L'Antiquíte Classique*. 61, 80-97.

Nylander, Carl. 1980. “Earless in Nineveh: Who Mutilated ‘Sargon’s’ Head?" *American Journal of Archaeology*. 84, 329-333.

Ober, Josiah. 1985b: *Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier 404-322 BC.* E. J. Brill.

Ober, Josiah. 1985a: “Thucydides, Pericles, and the Strategy of Defense," in *The Craft of the Ancient Historian: Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr*. edd John W. Eadie and Josiah Ober, pp. 171-183.

Ober, Josiah. 1991. “Hoplites and Obstacles," in *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience.* ed V. D. Hanson, pp. 173-196.

Olson, S. Douglas. 1994. “Telemachos’ Laugh," *Classical Journal*. 89, 369-372.

Ostwald, Martin. 1991: “Herodotus and Athens," *Illinois Classical Studies*. 16, 137-148.

Parke, H. W. 1984. “Croesus and Delphi." *Greek, Roman & Byzantine Studies*. 25, 209-232.

Pearce, T. E. V. 1981. “Epic Regression’ in Herodotus," *Eranos*. 79, 87-90.

Pearson, Lionel. 1931. “The Ingots of Croesus (Hdt. I.50)," *Classical Review*. 45, 118-119.

Podlecki, Anthony J. 1977. “Herodotus in Athens?" in *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory: Studies Presented to Fritz Schachermeyr on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday*. ed K. H. Kinzl, de Gruyter, 246-265.

Poudrier, Almira F. 2002. *Memory and Identity in Herodotus: The Historiographical and Cultural Meaning of Sanctuaries and Dedications in the Histories.* Dissertation, SUNY at Buffalo.

Powell, J. E. 1960. *A Lexicon to Herodotus*. Georg Olms Hildesheim, 2nd Edition.

Powell, J. Enoch. 1935. “Notes on Herodotus,” *Classical Quarterly*. 29, 72-82.

Powell, J. Enoch. 1937. “Puns in Herodotus," *Classical Review*. 51, 103-105.

Pritchett, W. K. 1985. *The Greek State at War*. Part IV. University of California Press.

Pritchett, W. Kendrick. 1993. *The Liar School of Herodotos*. J. C. Gieben.

Raaflaub, Kurt A. 1987. “Herodotus, Political Thought, and the Meaning of History," *Arethusa: Herodotus and the Invention of History*. 20, 221-248.

Ravn, O. E. 1942. *Herodotus' Description of Babylon. Herodots Beskrivelse af Babylon.* trans. by Margaret ovborg-Jensen, Nyt Nordisk Forlag. Arnold Busck.

Rawlinson, H. C. 1847. *The Persian Cuneiform Inscription at Behistun*. John W. Parker.

Redfield, J. 1985. “Herodotos the Tourist,” *Classical Philology*. 80, 97-118.

Redfield, James. 1987. “Commentary on Humphreys and Raaflaub,” *Arethusa: Herodotus and the Invention of History*. 20, 249-253.

Regenbogen, Otto. 1968. “Herodot und Sein Werk," in *Herodot: Eine Auswahl aus der Neueren Forschung.* ed. Walter Marg.C. H. Beck, 57-108.

Renehan, R. 1985. “Herodotean Cruces," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*. 89, 25-35.

Rösler, Wolfgang. 2002. “The Histories and Writing," in *Brill's Companion to Herodotus.* edd. E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. De Jong, and H. van Wees, Brill, 79-94.

Rubin, David C. 1995. *Memory in Oral Traditions: The Cognitive Psychology of Epic, Ballads, and Counting-out Rhymes*. Oxford University Press.

Rups, M. 1986. *Thesauros: A Study of Treasury Buildings as Found in Greek Sanctuaries.* Johns Hopkins University Dissertation.

Rutherford, Ian. 2001. *The New Simonides. in The New Simonides: Contexts of Praise and Desire.* edd. D. Boedeker and D. Sider. Oxford University Press, 33-54.

Saïd, Suzanne. 2002. “Herodotus and Tragedy," in *Brill's Companion to Herodotus.* edd. E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. De Jong, and H. van Wees, Brill, 117-147.

Sansone, David. 1985. “The Date of Herodotus' Publication," *Illinois Classical Studies.* 10, 1-9.

Schwartz, J. 1969. “Hérodote et Périclès,” *Historia*. 18, 367-369.

Segal, Charles. 1971. *The Theme of the Mutilation of the Corpse in the Iliad. Mnemosyne Suppliment.* E. J. Brill.

Segal, Charles. 1971. “Croesus on the Pyre: Herodotus and Bacchylides," *Wiener Studien*. 18, 39-51.

Segal, Charles. 1980. “Visual Symbols and Visual Effects in Sophocles." *Classical World.* 74, 125-142.

Segal, Charles. 1983. “Greek Myth as a Semiotic and Structural System and the Problem of Tragedy," *Arethusa*. 16, 173-198.

Segal, Charles. 1990. “Golden Armor and Servile Robes: Heroism and Metamorphosis in Hecuba of Euripides," *American Journal of Philology*. 111, 304-317.

Shapiro, H. A. 1991. “The Iconography of Mourning in Athenian Art." *American Journal of Archaeology*. 95, 629-656.

Shapiro, Susan O. 1994. “Learning Through Suffering: Human Wisdom in Herodotus," *Classical Journal*. 89, 349-356.

Shrimpton, Gordon S. 1997. *History and Memory in Ancient Greece*. McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Shuckburgh, E. S. (ed.). 1906. *Herodotos IV. Melpomene*. ed. E. S. Shuckburgh, Cambridge University Press.

Sinos, Rebecca. 1993. “Divine Selection: Epiphany and Politics in Archaic Greece," in *Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics*. edd. C. Dougherty and L. Kurke. Cambridge University Press, 73-91.

Slater, W. J. 1990. “Sympotic Ethics in the Odyssey," in *Sympotica: A Symposium on the Symposion*. ed. O. Murray, Clarendon Press, 213-220.

Slings, S. R. 1992. “Written and Spoken Language: An Exercise in the Pragmatics of the Greek Sentence," *Classical Philology*. 87, 95-109.

Slings, Simon. 2002. “Oral Strategies in the Language of Herodotus," in *Brill’s Companion to Herodotus.* edd. E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. De Jong, and H. van Wees, Brill, 53-77.

Smith, David Neel. 1987. *Herodotos and the Archaeology of Asia Minor: A Historiographic Study*. University of California at Berkeley, Dissertation.

Snodgrass, A. M. 1986. “The Historical Significance of Fortification in Archaic Greece," in *La Fortification Dans L’Histoire Du Monde Grec*. edd. Pierre Leriche and Henri Tréziny, Éditions du Centre National de la Recerche Scientifique, 125-131.

Snodgrass, A. M. 1990. “Survey Archaeology and the Rural Landscape of the Greek City," in *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander*. Clarendon Press, 113-136.

Solmsen, Lieselotte. 1944. “Speeches in Herodotus’ Account of the Battle of Plataea," *Classical Philology*. 39, 241-253.

Stadter, P. A. 1992. “Herodotus and the Athenian Arche," *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia*. 22, 781-809.

Stahl, Hans-Peter. 1968. “Herodots Gyges-Tragödie," *Hermes*. 96, 385-399.

Stahl, Hans-Peter. 1975. “Learning through suffering? Croesus’ conversations in the history of Herodotus," *Yale Classical Studies*. 24, 1-36.

Steiner, Deborah Tarn. 2001. *Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought.* Princeton University Press.

Steinkopf, G. 1957. *Untersuchungen zur Geschicte des Rubines bei den Griechen*. Würzburg.

Stern, Jacob. 1989: “Demythologization in Herodotus: 5.92.η." *Eranos*. 87, 13-20.

Strasburger, H. 1955. “Herodot und das perikleische Athen," *Historia*. 4, 1-25.

Taplin, Oliver. 1978. *Greek Tragedy in Action*. Routledge.

Tejada, José Vela. 2004. “Warfare, History and Literature in the Archaic and Classical Periods," *Historia*. 53, 129-146.

Thomas, Rosalind. 1992. *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece*. Cambridge University Press.

Thomas, Rosalind. 1993. “Performance and Written Publication in Herodotus and the Sophistic Generation," in *Vermittlung und Tradierung von Wissen in der griechischen Kultur.* edd W. Kullmann and J. Althoff, Tübingen, 225-244.

Thomas, Rosalind. 2000. *Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, Science and the Art of Persuasion*. Cambridge University Press.

Thomas, Rosalind. 2001. “Herodotus’ Histories and the Floating Gap," in The *Historian’s Craft in the Age of Herodotus*. ed. Nino Luraghi, Oxford University Press, 198-210.

Tolman, Herbert Cushing. 1908. *The Behistan inscription of King Darius*. Vanderbilt University.

Toy, Sidney. 1955. *A History of Fortification from 3000 B.C. to A. D. 1700.* William Heinemann Ltd.

Tracy, Stephen. 2002. "Herodotus and Xanthippus, Father of Pericles," in *Noctes Atticae: 34 Articles on Graeco-Roman Antiquity and its Nachleben.* edd. Bettina Amden, Pernille Flensted-Jensen, Thomas Heine Nielsen, Adam Schwartz, and Chr. Gorm Tortzen. Museum Tusculanum Press, 315-319.

Travis, Roger. 2000. "The Spectation of Gyges in P. Oxy. 2382 and Herodotus Book I," *Classical Antiquity*. 19, 330-359.

van der Veen, J. E. 1993. "The Lord of the Ring, Narrative Technique in Herodotus' Story on Polycrates' Ring," *Mnemosyne*. 46, 433-457.

van der Veen, J. E. 1995. "A Minute's Mirth ... Syloson and His Cloak in Herodotus," *Mnemosyne*. 48, 129-145.

van der Veen, J. E. 1996. *The Significant and the Insignificant.* J. C. Gieben.

van Wees, Hans. 2002. "Herodotus and the Past," in *Brill's Companion to Herodotus.* edd. E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. De Jong, and H. van Wees, Brill, 321-349.

Vandiver, Elizabeth. 1991. *Heroes in Herodotus. The Interaction of Myth and History.* Studien zur klassichen Philologie. Band 56, Peter Lang.

Vansina, Jan. 1985. *Oral Tradition as History*. University of Wisconsin Press.

Vernant, Jean-Pierre. 1990. *Figures, idoles, masques*. Julliard.

Vernant, Jean-Pierre. 1991. "The Birth of Images," in *Mortals and Immortals. Collected Essays.* ed. F. I. Zeitlin, Princeton University Press, 164-185.

Vickers, Michael. 1990. "Attic Symposia after the Persian Wars." in *Sympotica: A Symposium on the Symposion.* ed. Oswyn Murray, Clarendon Press, 105-121.

von Fritz, Kurt. 1936. "Herodotus and the Growth of Greek Historiography," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*. 67, 315-340.

Waters, K. H. 1966: "The Purpose of Dramatisation in Herodotus," *Historia*. 15, 157-171.

Waters, K. H. 1972. "Herodotos and Politics." *Greece and Rome*. 19, 136-150.

Waters, K. H. 1974. "The Structure of Herodotos' Narrative," *Antichthon*. 8, 1-11.

West, Martin L. (ed.) 2003. "Introduction," *Greek Epic Fragments. From the Seventh to the Fifth Centuries BC.* Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press.

West, Stephanie.1985. "Herodotus' Epigraphical Interests," *Classical Quarterly*. 35, 278-305.

West, Stephanie. 1988. "The Scythian Ultimatum (Herodotus iv.131, 132)," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 108, 207-211.

West, Stephanie. 1992. "Sesostris' Stelae (Herodotus 2.102-106)," *Historia*. 41, 117-120.

West, Stephanie. 1999. "Sophocles' Antigone and Herodotus Book Three," in *Sophocles Revisited: Essays Presented to Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones*. Oxford University Press, 109-136.

West, William C. III. 1970. "Saviors of Greece," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*. 11, 271-282.

White, M. E. 1969. "Herodotus' Starting-Point," *Phoenix*. 23, 39-48

White, M. E. 1969. "Review of Henry R. Immerwahr: Form and Thought in Herodotus," *Phoenix*. 23, 314-316.

Willetts, R. F. 1980. "Herodotos IX 85, 1-2," *Mnemosyne*. 33, 272-277.

Williams, Mary Frances. 1991. *Landscape in the ARGONAUTICA of Apollonius Rhodius. Studien zur klassischen Philologie.* Band 63. Peter Lang.

Wood, Henry. 1972. *The Histories of Herodotus: An Analysis of the Formal Structure.* Mouton.

Woodhouse, W. J. 1930. *The Composition of Homer's Odyssey*. Clarendon Press.

VITA

Kenneth Michael Tuite was born in New Brunswick, New Jersey on August 31, 1969, the son of James Reginald Tuite and Winifred Mae Tuite. After graduating from San Marin High School in 1987, Mr. Tuite entered the University of California at Berkeley. In December 1992, he received a Bachelor of Arts in History. Mr. Tuite then entered the University of California at Santa Barbara where he received a Master of Arts in Ancient History in June 1996. In September 1996, he received a Fulbright Grant and attended the American School of Classical Studies in Athens. He entered the University of Texas at Austin in the fall of 1998 where he began doctorate studies in Classics.

While both at the University of California at Santa Barbara and the University of Texas at Austin, Mr. Tuite gained teaching experience as a teaching assistant and an assistant instructor for various classes. Mr. Tuite is currently an Instructor at the University of Maryland.

Mr. Tuite is the co-author of an article and sole author of several presentations. These include:

- Harris, E. and K. Tuite. 2000. "Notes on a *Horos* from the Athenian Agora," *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 131, pp. 101-105.
- Tuite, K. "The Fragile Future: Monuments and Foreshadowing in Herodotos' *Histories*." – APA (San Diego), Jan. 2007
- Tuite, K. "The *Teichos* Debate: The Response to the Long Walls and the Strategy of Perikles." – Great Lakes History Conference, Oct. 2006
- Tuite, K. "The Ethiopian Bow and The Madness of Cambyses (Hdt iii.19-37)." – CAMWS (Gainesville), Apr. 2006

- Tuite, K. "False Refuge: Fortifications and the Transfer of Power from Persia to Athens in Herodotos' *Histories*." – APA (Boston), Jan. 2005.
- Tuite, K. "Objects in Herodotos' *Histories*: The Body of Masistios" – CAMWS (St. Louis), Apr. 2004.
- Tuite, K. "The Mark of Success: Monarchs and Monuments in the Narrative of Herodotos." – Art in Literature / Literature in Art: Eighth Annual University of Virginia Classics Graduate Student Colloquium, Mar. 2004.
- Tuite, K. "A Re-dating of the Coins of Citium." – AIA (New Orleans), Jan. 2003.
- Tuite, K. "The Lucretian Garden in the Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine." – CAMWS (Austin), Apr. 2002.
- Tuite, K. "Augustus: *Imperator* or Economic Reformer?" – CAMWS (Provo), Mar. 2001.
- Tuite, K. "The Merchant *Proxenoi* of the Athenian *Arche."* – APA (San Diego), Jan. 2001.
- Tuite, K. "Women and Lending in Athenian Oratory." – APA (Dallas), Dec. 1999.

Permanent Address: 1672 Barnstead Dr., Reston, VA. 20194

This dissertation was typed by the author.